Punjab-Haryana High Court
Charanjeet Singh @ Channu @ Channi vs State Of Punjab on 21 May, 2026
1
CRM-M-27849-2026
228
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-27849-2026
Charanjeet Singh @ Channu @ Channi
....Petitioner
versus
State of Punjab
....Respondent
Date of Decision: 21.05.2026
Date of Uploading: 21.05.2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present:- Mr. Abhaysher Singh, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Hemant Aggarwal, DAG, Punjab.
*****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)
Present 2nd petition has been filed under Section 483 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’) for grant of
regular bail to the petitioner, in case bearing FIR No.57 dated 29.03.2024,
registered for the offences punishable under Sections 21(c)/61/85 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ‘NDPS Act‘)
(Sections 23/ 29/ 27-B of NDPS Act added later on), at Police Station Sadar
Fazilka, District Fazilka.
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is an
accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving alleged
recovery of 9.720 kgs of Heroin effected on 29.03.2024 by the officials of BSF
after searching the area near boundary pillar No.253/4 and 253/5 as suspicion
arose upon finding footprints on the international border near said pillars. On
the basis of suspicion, co-accused, namely, Harjinder Singh @ Jindu son of
JATIN
2026.05.21 17:32
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
2
CRM-M-27849-2026
Harbans Singh, Charanjit Singh @ Channu and Surinder Singh @ Kali
(petitioner herein) were apprehended by the BSF and nominated as accused,
vide DDR No.3 dated 09.04.2024. Thereafter, another co-accused, namely,
Jagsir Singh @ Jaggi was nominated, vide Rapat No.46 dated 12.04.2024, on
the basis of disclosure of aforesaid co-accused, and even drug money of
Rs.2.25 lacs, 2 lacs, 1.75 lacs and Rs.3,46,700/-, respectively, was also
effected. Further, from co-accused, Jagsir Singh @ Jaggi, gold weighing 71.84
grams and silver weighing 109 grams being alleged proceeds of illegal trade in
drugs was effected. On the basis of disclosure of aforesaid co-accused,
Harjinder Singh alias Ajay was nominated in this case.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner is
in custody since 09.04.2024. Learned counsel has further submitted that
mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not scrupulously been complied
with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects. Learned
counsel has iterated that the trial is delayed and the liability thereof cannot be
fastened upon the petitioner. Learned counsel has argued that similarly placed
co-accused, namely, Harjinder Singh alias Jindi has been accorded concession
of regular bail by co-ordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 10.03.2025
passed in CRM-M-50965-2025 and the said order (whereby bail was afforded
to Harjinder Singh alias Jindi) has not been assailed before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court till date. Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioner
has suffered incarceration for more than 02 years. Thus, regular bail is prayed
for.
4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by arguing
that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in nature and, thus,
the petitioner does not deserve the concession of the regular bail. Learned State
JATIN
2026.05.21 17:32
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
3
CRM-M-27849-2026
counsel has further submitted that the instant bail plea is barred by the rigors of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same ought to be dismissed. Learned
State counsel seeks to place on record custody certificate dated 21.05.2026, in
the Court today, which is taken on record.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through
the available records of the case.
6. The petitioner is in custody since 09.04.2024, whereinafter
investigation was carried out and challan qua the petitioner was presented on
05.10.2024. Total 27 prosecution witnesses have been cited, out of which, none
has been examined till date. Indubitably, conclusion of the trial will take its
own time. Concededly co-accused of the petitioner has been afforded
concession of regular bail vide order dated 10.03.2025 passed by the co-
ordinate Bench of this Court, and till date, there is no challenge to the same
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise
to debatable issues, which shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial.
This Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival
contentions, at this stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has
been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding
from the process of justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence.
6.1. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be
saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 21.05.2026 filed
by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration
for a period of 02 years 1 month and 04 days, & is not shown to be involved in
any other FIR(s).
6.2 Indubitably, the present petition is the 2nd attempt by the
petitioner to secure regular bail. The last bail plea preferred by the petitioner
JATIN
2026.05.21 17:32
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
4
CRM-M-27849-2026
was dismissed as withdrawn on 26.09.2024. Keeping in view the entirety of
the factual milieu of the case in hand, especially extended incarceration of
the petitioner and no substantial progress in trial, this Court is inclined to
favourably consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in this
regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA-S-2332-
2023 titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another; relevant
whereof reads as under:
“10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the
following principles emerge:
I. Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is
maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be
rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.
II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is
maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as
withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-
prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.
III. For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to
succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be
essentially/pertinently required to show substantial change
in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or
ostensible change would not suffice. The metaphoric
expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s) ought
not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s)
without substantial, effective and consequential change in
circumstances.
IV. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as
to what would constitute substantial change in
circumstances as every case has its own unique
facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing but
an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the
judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with
such second/successive regular bail petition(s).
V. In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive
regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are
pertinently required to be recorded for granting such pleaJATIN
2026.05.21 17:32
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
5
CRM-M-27849-2026despite such a plea being second/successive petition(s). In
other words, the cause for a Court having successfully
countenanced/entertained such second/successive
petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly decipherable
from the said order passed.”
6.3. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of
Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying
upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul
Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh
vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd
Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311;
Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias
Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal“; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The
State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated
22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of
Gujarat“; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal
Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:
“7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a
vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate
anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail
any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is
an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right
has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of
the above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series
of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of
speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint
imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent
incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible
prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since
the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings
consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early
hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence.
JATIN
2026.05.21 17:32
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
6
CRM-M-27849-2026
The overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the
resultant pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the
entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain.
However, this cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles
hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve
any credit to the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of
affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression
and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an
obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The
guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused
against oppressive pre-trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the
accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal
charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost or
memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the
accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of
pre-trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven
otherwise, are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of
jail-life, usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden
of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent
members of his family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition
in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the
rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates
that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public
prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the
offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985
must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused’s
fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty
cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial
process, particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the
accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An
individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by
taking refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985.
The legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely
disposal of the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of
special Courts under Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot
turn Nelson’s eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that
frustrate this legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure
that it does not become complicit in violation of an individual’s
fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything contained in a statute.
While dealing with bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious
balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the
sacrosanct right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged
incarceration, without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial
detention into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the
principle of justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of lifeJATIN
2026.05.21 17:32
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
7
CRM-M-27849-2026and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other
words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the
ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985.”
In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of
the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution of
India.
Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is
not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail, if not required in any other case, on his
furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial
Court/Duty Magistrate. However, in addition to conditions that may be
imposed by the concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall
remain bound by the following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or
documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before
the trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the
trial Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and
shall not change his cell-phone number without prior
permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of
every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court,
to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of
any offence after being released on bail. In case the
petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his
being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of
his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move,
forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of
course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.
JATIN
2026.05.21 17:32
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
8
CRM-M-27849-2026
8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those
which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed
hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant
shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous
application, if any, shall also stands disposed off.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
21.05.2026
jatin
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
JATIN
2026.05.21 17:32
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
