Delhi High Court
Central Bureau Of Investigation vs Kuldeep Singh & Ors on 20 April, 2026
Author: Swarana Kanta Sharma
Bench: Swarana Kanta Sharma
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 13.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 20.04.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 20.04.2026
+ CRL.REV.P. 134/2026 & CRL.M.A. 6853/2026
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Tushar Mehta, SG, Mr. S.V. Raju, Mr.
D.P. Singh and Mr. Chatan Sharma, ASGs,
with Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Mr. Manu Mishra,
Ms. Garima Saxena, Mr. Venkatesh, Mr.
Vivek Gurnani, Ms. Tanvi Jain, Mr. Pranjal
Tripathi and Mr. Imaan Khera, Advocates
alongwith Mr. J. S. Randhawa - DIG, Mr.
Alok Shahi -ASP, Mr. I. B. Pendhari-SP
(CBI) and Mr. Naveen, Sub-Inspector for
CBI.
versus
KULDEEP SINGH & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Tushar Agarwal, Mr. Naveen Kumar,
Mr. Arun Kumar, Mr. Abhishek Mahal and
Ms. Rashi Chaudhary, Advocates for R-1.
Mr. Pradeep Rana and Mr. Tushar
Rohmetra, Advocates for R-2
Mr. Shadan Farasat, Sr. Advocate, Mr.
Harshit Anand, Ms. Varisha Sharma and
Ms. Suvarna Swain, Advocates for R-3
Mr. Sumer Singh Boparai, Mr. Surya Pratap
Singh, Mr. Abhilash Pathak and Mr. Sirhaan
Seth, Advocates for R-4
Mr. Nitesh Rana, Ms. Zainab Khan, Mr.
Aditya Narayan, Ms. Aditi Singh and Mr.
Suyash Pandey, Advocates for R-5
Mr. Shivendra Dwivedi and Ms. Onmichon
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CRL.REV.P. 134/2026 Page 1 of 115
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:20.04.2026
23:53:54
Ramrar, Advocates for R-6 and R-10
Mr. Dhruv Gupta and Mr. Anubhav Garg,
Advocates for R-7
Mr. Sanjay Hegde, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Vivek Jain, Mohd. Irshad, Mr. Sadiq
Noor, Mr. Ankit Tiwari and Mr. Angad
Pathak, Advocates for R-8.
Mr. Adit S. Pujari, Mr. Shashwat Sarin, Mr.
Shaurya Mittal and Ms. Dhanya
Visweswaran, Advocates for R-9.
Mr Abhishek Singh, Mr Vishvendra Singh,
Mr Talib Mustafa, Mr Ketan Kumar Roy
and Mr Shubh Mathur, Advocates for R-11.
Mr. Rajat Bhardwaj, Mr. Dushyant
Chaudhary and Mr. Tushar Garg, Advocates
for R-12
Ms. Baani Khanna, Mr. Robin Singh, Mr.
Kapil Balwani and Ms. Komal Thakkar,
Advocates for R-16
Mr. Dama Seshadri Naidu, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Ramesh Allanki, Ms. Aruna Gupta
and Mr. Sahil Sood, Advocates for R-17.
R-18 in person (through VC).
Mr. Chanchal K. Singla, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Rohit Kaliyar and Mr. Akshay
Malhotra, Advocates for R-19
Mr. Prabhav Ralli, Mrs. Stuti Gupta, Mr.
Dev Vrat Arya, Mr. Samraat Saxena and
Ms. Deeya Mittal, Advocates for R-20
Ms. Tusharika Mattoo, Advocate for R-21
Mr. Harsh Bora and Mr. Sahil Ghai,
Advocates for R-22
Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Senior Advocate with Mr.
Mayank Jain, Mr. Madhur Jain, Mr. Arpit
Goel and Mr. Deepak Jain, Advocates for R-
23 (through VC).
CORAM:
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CRL.REV.P. 134/2026 Page 2 of 115
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:20.04.2026
23:53:54
JUDGMENT
Index to the Judgment
WHEN I WAS ASKED TO RECUSE… ………………………………………………… 5
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT ……………………………………………… 8
Submissions By Respondent No. 18 Arvind Kejriwal ……………………………………. 8
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 8 Manish Sisodia ………………………. 16
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 3 Vijay Nair……………………………… 18
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 19 Durgesh Pathak …………………… 21
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 12 Rajesh Joshi …………………………. 22
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 5 Arun Ramchandran Pillai ………. 23
Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioner-CBI ………………………………………………. 23
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS …………………………………………………………………..27
A. ALLEGED APPREHENSION OF BIAS IN VIEW OF THE
ORDER DATED 09.03.2026 ………………………………………………………………… 27
(i) Advance Service of Respondents ……………………………………………………… 29
(ii) Stay on remarks against the Investigating Officer……………………………… 31
(iii) Prima facie observations recorded in the order dated 09.03.2026 ……….. 34
(iv) Examples of Prima facie observations & Interim Relief Granted in
Favour of Respondent No. 18 Sh. Arvind Kejriwal & Members of his Political
Party by the Court ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 40
(v) Argument that CBI was heard only for ‘Five Minutes’ on the first date
of hearing …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 44
(vi) Conduct of applicants who had filed SLP and Writ Petition before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court ………………………………………………………………………………. 45
B. ALLEGED UNDUE HASTE IN THE PRESENT CASE &
LONGER DATES GIVEN IN OTHER CASES BY THIS
COURT…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 46
C. ALLEGED APPREHENSION OF BIAS ARISING FROM
EARLIER DETAILED JUDGMENTS OF THIS COURT …………….. 53
(i) Earlier Findings of this Court in respect of Challenge to Arrest under
Section 19 of PMLA ……………………………………………………………………………………. 53
(ii) Earlier Findings of this Court in respect of Bail under Section 45 of
PMLA 55
(iii) Relief denied by Other Benches too …………………………………………………. 59
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
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23:53:54
(iv) Argument that findings of Trial Court are contrary to this Court ……… 60
(v) Relief Was Granted Too – But Conveniently Ignored………………………. 63
D. ARGUMENT OF RECUSAL APPLICANTS THAT PREVIOUS
JUDGMENTS OF THIS COURT WERE SET ASIDE BY THE
HON’BLE SUPREME COURT …………………………………………………………. 65
E. APPREHENSION OF BIAS EMERGING FROM A STATEMENT
ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE UNION HOME MINISTER ………. 68
F. ALLEGED APPREHENSION OF BIAS ARISING FROM
PARTICIPATION OF THIS COURT IN EVENTS ORGANISED
BY ONE AKHIL BHARATIYA ADHIVAKTA PARISHAD …………… 70
G. ALLEGED APPREHENSION OF BIAS ARISING OUT OF
PROFESSIONAL ENGAGEMENTS OF RELATIVES & THE
ALLEGED ‘CONFLICT OF INTEREST’. ……………………………………….. 79
H. CONSIDERATION OF TODAY’S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
AND CONTRADICTORY STAND OF THE APPLICANT SH.
ARVIND KEJRIWAL ……………………………………………………………………………. 93
I. JUSTICE SHOULD NOT ONLY BE DONE, BUT SEEN TO BE
DONE …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 96
(i) Mere Unease or Anxiety of a Litigant Cannot Be a Ground for
Recusal ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 96
CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………………….. 100
(i) Test of Bias Cannot Be Manufactured by a Litigant ……………………….. 100
(ii) The Catch-22 of Recusal: A Litigant’s Win Regardless of the Outcome
102
(iii) Whether this Court must give an ‘Agni Pariksha’? ……………………………. 104
(iv) Judicial Integrity Cannot Be Put to Trial by a Litigant …………………….. 105
(v) If I were to withdraw readily………………………………………………………….. 106
THE END… …………………………………………………………………………………… 108
CRL. M.A. 11377/2026 (by R-18), CRL. M.A. 11303/2026 (by R-
19), CRL. M.A. 11300/2026 (by R-12), CRL. M.A. 11302/2026
(by R-3) and CRL. M.A. 11301/2026 (by R-8)
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J.
Signature Not Verified
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:20.04.2026
23:53:54
WHEN I WAS ASKED TO RECUSE…
1. While I began to pen this judgment in the quiet aftermath of
end of arguments, the Courtroom had fallen silent, the voices of
arguments had faded, the echoes of accusations no longer filled the
courtroom or my ears, what remained was the quiet weight of
responsibility of being a Judge, who has taken oath on the
Constitution of India i.e. Bharat, to uphold the purity and dignity of
the judicial system, with one persistent question – „Should I recuse?‟
2. It was also that moment, when I realized that my silence as a
judge itself is being put to test – and now the question is no longer
about the case, but about the judge and fairness of the process and
institution itself.
3. While in my entire life, as in the lives of many of my brother
and sister judges across this country, the cases put up before us for
adjudication test our knowledge, intellect and experience, at times
before few of us, a litigant through a case, tests the institution‟s
resilience itself. This case belongs to the latter category.
4. The challenge before me was not that I had to adjudicate
difficult questions of law or fact, but I was drawn to adjudicate a
recusal application against myself. However, it is not for the first
time that such an application has been filed before the same judge
seeking recusal by a litigant. Therefore, in that sense, it is not an
extraordinary situation for a judge. In the past, before this High Court
itself, there have been multiple occasions when applications for
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:20.04.2026
23:53:54
recusal have been filed before the same judge, which have been
heard and decided by them.
5. The issue before me was clear – as to whether I should recuse
from hearing the present case. I was thus faced with a situation where
my impartiality and dignity had been challenged, and the natural
instinct would have been to recuse without hearing the application
seeking recusal, which would have been the easier path of
withdrawing and stepping aside. However, for the sake of the
institution, I decided to adjudicate the recusal application, for it
throws questions not only at me, but also at the institution itself. It
also weighed in my mind that all my brother and sister Judges and
the judges of District Courts of Delhi, who are part of this institution,
may be affected by the outcome of this application since it may be
cited as a precedent and many other litigants may take a similar path.
6. Equally was it clear to me that I had to decide it totally
undisturbed and unaffected by the accusations and insinuations, in a
fair manner, as objectively as it is required of a judge, and to test the
recusal applications purely on the basis of jurisprudence of recusal
laid down till date in our country, for that is what I have been trained
to do as a Judge and what I have lived in the last 34 years of my
judicial career.
7. During arguments, the applicants repeatedly submitted before
the Court that they do not doubt my integrity on any account and
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:20.04.2026
23:53:54
they are seeking recusal not because they doubt my integrity, but
because of apprehension in their own minds that I may be biased.
8. What is also important is the fact that today I am dealing with
the apprehension in the mind of the litigant and not actual bias in
myself, which needed a thorough examination.
9. What made the task more challenging was that, during
arguments, contrary stands were taken. All the applicants, at the
beginning of arguments on recusal and some in the pleadings as well,
submitted before this Court that they have complete respect for this
Court as an individual judge and they do not doubt integrity of any
kind or fairness of this Court. However, the applicants still want the
case to be transferred, not because I am biased, but because they
have apprehension in their mind that I may be biased.
10. I am fully conscious of the fact that today, I am not to judge
the litigant, but the litigant has put me and this institution on trial,
and it will be dealt with as it should be, not only on my behalf but on
behalf of the institution of judiciary itself. To reiterate, though
choosing the path of recusal – without even hearing the application
for recusal – would have been quiet, comfortable, uncontroversial
and easy, but a reputation once surrendered to accusation of bias, if
not dealt with, will not be easy to re-claim.
11. Therefore, I choose the path to resolve the controversy thrown
at me where my integrity has been put to test. The strength of judicial
institution lies in strong resolve to respond appropriately to such
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:20.04.2026
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accusations, fearlessly and unhesitatingly. It is with this resolve that I
begin writing my judgment and deal with every accusation hurled at
me in an objective manner, without being affected by any of it.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT
1. In the present case, six of the respondents, i.e. discharged
accused persons, have sought the recusal of this Court from hearing
the present matter. These applicants are as under:
(i) Respondent No. 3 Vijay Nair
(ii) Respondent No. 5 Arun Ramachandran Pillai
(iii) Respondent No. 8 Manish Sisodia
(iv) Respondent No. 12 Rajesh Joshi
(v) Respondent No. 18 Arvind Kejriwal
(vi) Respondent No. 19 Durgesh Pathak
Submissions By Respondent No. 18 Arvind Kejriwal
2. The applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, who appears in person,
states that he, in his mind, has an apprehension of bias, which
becomes the focal point in a case where a party seeks recusal of a
Judge. To buttress his submission, he relies upon the decision of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India: (1987)
4 SCC 611.
3. He draws the attention of this Court to the order dated
09.03.2026 passed in the present case and states that on the very first
date the matter was listed, after hearing the Central Bureau of
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:20.04.2026
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Investigation [hereafter „CBI‟] only for „five minutes‟, this Court
observed that prima facie there appeared to be certain erroneous
observations in the discharge order passed by the learned Trial Court,
which had heard the accused persons for nearly three months and had
examined more than 40,000 pages of evidence. He states that since
the order dated 09.03.2026 was passed in the absence of any of the
accused persons or their counsels, it has given rise to an
apprehension in his mind that he will not get justice from this Court.
4. In this regard, he also draws the attention of this Court to the
judgment in Satyendra Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement:
CRL.M.C. 4916/2022, and submits that the facts of that case and the
present case are similar; rather, according to him, his apprehension is
on a stronger footing than the apprehension expressed by the
Directorate of Enforcement [hereafter „DoE‟] in that case.
5. The Applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal also relies upon the
decision in Kanaklata v. State (NCT of Delhi): (2015) 6 SCC 617, to
argue that if the same Court has earlier recorded „strong
observations‟ in a case, it may create a reasonable apprehension in
the mind of a litigant. He submits that this Court had given strong
and rather conclusive findings while dealing with his earlier petition,
wherein his arrest was challenged. In this regard, he draws the
attention of this Court to the decision Arvind Kejriwal v.
Enforcement Directorate: 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2685. He states
that since this Court had recorded conclusive findings and strong
observations, such as those relating to non-recovery of the alleged
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
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money, value of statements of approvers, etc., almost „declaring him
guilty‟ at a stage when only his arrest was under challenge, he has a
reasonable apprehension in his mind that he will not get justice from
this Court.
6. Further, the Applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal submits that the
strong findings recorded by this Court in the past are totally contrary
to the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court in the impugned
order, which were arrived at after hearing the case for three months
and examining 40,000 pages of record. According to him, since the
findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are completely contrary
to the earlier findings recorded by this Court, it gives rise to an
apprehension in his mind that he will not get justice from this Court,
as this Court has already pre-determined the issue and may not be
able to appreciate the findings and reasoning recorded in the
impugned order.
7. He also draws the attention of this Court to the order passed by
this Court on the bail application filed by Respondent No. 8, i.e., the
decision in Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate: 2024 SCC
OnLine Del 3731, and submits that strong observations were made in
the said bail order and that this Court had almost held him guilty for
the offence in question. He further draws attention to the fact that the
said order was overturned by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. He
submits that since this Court has already made up its mind in respect
of the case in question, he apprehends that he will not get justice
from this Court.
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:20.04.2026
23:53:54
8. He also draws the attention of this Court, particularly to
paragraph no. 8 of the order dated 09.03.2026 passed in the present
case, and submits that this Court had observed as follows: “The
observations made by the learned Trial Court regarding the
statements of the witnesses and the approvers, at the stage of charge
itself, prima facie appear erroneous and require consideration when
viewed in the background of well-settled law on charge and
conspiracy, as to whether such observations could have been made at
the stage of charge itself.” According to him, by recording these
observations, this Court has, at the very threshold, and without
hearing the accused persons and without going through the record,
given a finding that the order of the learned Trial Court is erroneous.
He further submits that the case of the prosecution is primarily based
on the statements of the approvers, and that this Court has already
recorded an observation in paragraph 8 of the order dated 09.03.2026
in this regard; therefore, he apprehends that he will not get justice
from this Court. He also submits that even the Trial Court Record
had not been summoned by this Court at that stage, and without
having the same before it, the Court had prima facie recorded
conclusions regarding the evidentiary value of the approvers‟
statements.
9. He next draws the attention of this Court to certain data which
he has filed along with the recusal application, and submits that in
some other revision petitions filed in the year 2026, this Court had
granted three to six months‟ time for filing replies, whereas in the
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:20.04.2026
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present case, little time was granted for filing replies, which,
according to him, stands in stark contrast to the manner in which
other cases are being dealt with. He submits that undue haste was
shown on that day while passing the said order, which, according to
him, also gives rise to a reasonable apprehension in his mind that he
will not get justice from this Court.
10. He also states that this Court was very generous to the DoE
since, without any prayer being made by it when it had filed the
present petition, this Court had passed an order in the present case
filed by the CBI. He further states that on the day when the case was
first listed before this Court, without hearing the respondents and
without following the principles of natural justice, this Court, only on
the asking of the CBI, had passed the order dated 09.03.2026
directing that the trial in the connected DoE case be adjourned
awaiting the outcome of the present petition.
11. He also states that the proceedings with respect to the
Investigating Officer of the CBI were also stayed by this Court till
the next date of hearing, including the direction recommending
departmental action against him, when the Investigating Officer was
not even a party to the proceedings and the order was passed only at
the mere asking of the CBI. According to Mr. Kejriwal, grave
suspicion has arisen in his mind since this Court had stayed the
observations and the disciplinary proceedings directed to be initiated
against the Investigating Officer only at the mere asking of the CBI,
when the Investigating Officer was not even a party to the case.
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12. He further states that the respondents herein were not even
served; however, this Court had mentioned in the order dated
09.03.2026 that there was advance service to the respondents.
According to him, this also raises grave suspicion in his mind that he
may not get justice from this Court. He further states that this Court
had also mentioned in the order that the respondents had “chosen not
to appear”. He states that he was hurt by these observations since he
has been regularly appearing for the last four years before this Court
as well as before the learned Trial Court, either personally or through
his chosen counsel.
13. The applicant also states that this Court had passed the order
dated 06.04.2026, wherein it is mentioned in paragraph no. 12 that –
“Though this Court had granted opportunity to the respondents on
two occasions to file their replies to the main petition, some of the
respondents have still failed to do so, and seek further time of one
week to file the same. In the interest of justice, a last and final
opportunity is granted to those respondents who have not yet filed
their replies to do so positively by 10.04.2026. In case any
respondent fails to file the reply by the said date, the opportunity to
file the same shall stand closed.” He submits that he apprehends bias
against him even on this ground.
14. The applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal also states that he has
noticed a trend in the orders passed by this Court that while deciding
matters against him, this Court has almost “endorsed” the arguments
advanced on behalf of the CBI or the ED and has granted all the
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prayers sought by them. He submits that his pleas, or those of the
other accused persons in this case, were always rejected, except in
the case of one of the respondents, i.e., Arun Ramachandran Pillai.
15. He also states that the impugned order was passed by the
learned Trial Court on 27.02.2026 and within four hours of the
passing of that order, the CBI chose to file a revision petition,
without specifically countering the observations made by the learned
Trial Court qua each and every charge against each accused, and that
a general petition was filed. However, this Court was pleased to pass
a sweeping order on the basis of such a general petition filed before
it, which, according to him, gives rise to a reasonable apprehension
in his mind that he will not get justice from this Court.
16. He further states that on the last date of hearing, this Court was
inclined to close the right of several accused persons to file their
replies, while they were „shouting in the Court‟ that they should be
granted time. According to him, it was only upon the request made
by the learned Solicitor General that time was granted to the accused
persons to file their replies, and not out of the Court‟s own
generosity.
17. He further submits that since this Court had attended certain
programmes organised by Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad,
which, according to him, follows a particular ideology that is
opposite to the ideology of his political party, and which openly
opposes that ideology, it has given rise to an apprehension in his
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mind that this Court may be more inclined or sympathetic towards
them, and therefore he doubts that he will not get justice from this
Court. When asked by this Court whether it had ever made any
political statement or any statement regarding the ideology followed
by the said Adhivakta Parishad, he stated that the mere fact that this
Court had attended a programme organised by the said Adhivakta
Parishad gives rise to a strong apprehension in his mind that he will
not get justice from this Court.
18. He also states at the Bar, though it is not mentioned in the
pleadings, that the Union Minister of Home Affairs of this country
had made a statement in a television programme that when the
judgment of this Court comes, Sh. Kejriwal will have to approach the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court. According to him, this statement has given
rise to a suspicion in his mind that this Court will not give justice to
him.
19. He further states at the Bar that he is also strongly affected and
apprehends bias on the part of this Court in view of certain social
media posts which, according to him, show that there is a conflict of
interest of this Court in the present case, and that there is an old
tradition of not presiding over cases where the Judge and one of the
parties are related to each other in any manner. He submits that all
these reasons, individually as well as collectively, have given rise to
a very strong suspicion in his mind that he will not get justice from
this Court, and therefore this Court may recuse itself from the present
proceedings.
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:20.04.2026
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Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 8 Manish Sisodia
20. The learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No. 8
Manish Sisodia, submits at the outset that he holds the highest regard
for the institution of the judiciary and for this Court. He, however,
contends that the applicant harbours a reasonable apprehension that
the matter may not be heard with complete impartiality by this Court,
and that such apprehension is based on objective circumstances.
21. The learned senior counsel submits that bias is a concept with
many shades and colours, and in the present case, he is using the
expression in a limited sense – i.e., subject-matter bias. According to
him, the apprehension is not of any personal prejudice, but of a pre-
conceived judicial view arising from this Court having already dealt
extensively with the same subject matter and having formed strong
prima facie opinions on several aspects of the case.
22. It is argued that this Court already possesses deep domain
knowledge of the present matter, having dealt with multiple petitions
arising out of the same case. According to the learned senior counsel,
when a judicial mind has expressed itself in considerable detail on
the issues involved, and has recorded strong prima facie findings,
there arises a genuine concern in the mind of the litigant that the
Court may find it difficult to take a completely contrary view while
examining the impugned discharge order. It is further submitted that
this apprehension becomes stronger because the learned Trial Court,
in its detailed discharge order, has taken a view contrary to several
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material observations earlier recorded by this Court. Therefore,
according to him, the applicant reasonably apprehends that this Court
may not be inclined to affirm an order which substantially
contradicts its earlier prima facie findings.
23. The learned senior counsel has also drawn the attention of this
Court to several paragraphs of the order passed by this Court in the
bail application of the applicant Sh. Manish Sisodia. It is submitted
that the observations made therein are extensive in nature and give an
impression that findings on merits have already been recorded.
According to learned senior counsel, these observations convey as if
the applicant has already been found guilty. It is, however, clarified
by him that the submission is not that this Court is actually biased,
but that the apprehension in the mind of a reasonable litigant, who is
facing serious consequences affecting his liberty, is that the matter
may not be considered with a completely open mind.
24. The learned senior counsel also submits that, vide order dated
09.03.2026, this Court had adjourned the proceedings in the
connected ED matter to a date later than that fixed before the learned
Trial Court. It is further urged that the conduct of the Investigating
Officer, as recorded by the learned Trial Court, was stayed by this
Court without reference to the material placed before the Trial Court
by the CBI or to the chargesheet itself.
25. It is also urged by the learned senior counsel that in matters of
this nature, public perception assumes significance, as the
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consequences extend beyond the individual and may have wider
ramifications. In conclusion, learned senior counsel has drawn an
analogy with the episode of „Agni Pariksha‟ in the Ramayana,
wherein Mata Sita was required to establish her purity not because
Lord Rama doubted her, but to satisfy the expectations of the people.
It is sought to be conveyed that the present case places this Court in a
similar position – not because there is any actual bias, but because
the apprehension in the mind of the litigant is such that the Court
may be required to demonstrate that justice will not only be done, but
will also be seen to be done. The learned senior counsel also states
that the public perception in such kind of cases should also be taken
into consideration, which has larger ramification.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 3 Vijay Nair
26. The learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No. 3
submits that the present case is one where the entire case of the
prosecution has been discarded at the stage of charge, and it is not a
case where only a few accused have been discharged. He submits
that both advocates and judges are legally trained minds, accustomed
to analysing facts and law through a judicial lens. However,
according to him, while considering an application for recusal, the
Court must step outside the box of normal judicial thinking and also
examine the issue from the perspective of an ordinary litigant. What
may appear to the Court as only another matter on the board may, for
the litigant, be his entire life, liberty, and reputation.
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27. He submits that when this Court has already taken a particular
prima facie view in earlier proceedings arising out of the same case,
and the learned Trial Court has now taken an entirely opposite view
while discharging the accused persons, a genuine apprehension arises
in the mind of the litigant as to whether this Court would, in any
circumstance, be able to agree with the view taken by the learned
Trial Court.
28. The learned senior counsel also draws the attention of this
Court to the fact that this Court has already dealt with five
applications/petitions arising out of the same matter, in which,
according to him, strong observations have been recorded. It is
contended that these observations indicate that this Court has already
formed a particular view on the issues involved. In support of the
aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed upon Kanaklata v.
State (NCT of Delhi) (supra). On that basis, it is submitted that the
applicant apprehends that the present matter would also be decided
on the same lines as the earlier orders.
29. The learned senior counsel further submits that on 09.03.2026,
when the interim order was passed by this Court, only the impugned
discharge order and the revision petition filed by the petitioner were
before this Court. Neither the learned Trial Court record was
available, nor were the respondents present before the Court. It is
argued that in such circumstances, the passing of interim directions
and recording of prima facie observations gives rise to a serious
apprehension in the mind of the respondents.
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30. As regards advance service, it is submitted that the petitioner
seeks to justify service by stating that copies were sent to the counsel
who had appeared for the accused persons before the learned Trial
Court. It is argued that advance notice is required to be served upon
the parties concerned, and not merely presumed through earlier
counsel. Once the discharge order had been passed, the proceedings
before the learned Trial Court had come to an end, and with that, the
lawyer-client relationship for that stage also stood concluded.
Therefore, according to the learned senior counsel, such service upon
Trial Court counsel cannot be treated as proper advance notice for
the purposes of the present revision petition.
31. It is also submitted that recusal in criminal matters stands on a
stronger footing than in civil proceedings, since criminal cases
concern life, liberty, and personal reputation. Therefore, according to
him, even a reasonable apprehension in the mind of an accused
deserves greater sensitivity and caution while considering whether
the Judge should continue to hear the matter. Reliance has also been
placed on the judgment in Satyendra Kumar Jain v. Directorate of
Enforcement (supra).
32. The learned senior counsel further submits that once there is a
reasonable apprehension in the mind of the applicant that the matter
may not be considered with a completely open mind, and that the
conclusions drawn in the earlier proceedings may influence the
outcome of the present case, it would be appropriate that, in order to
dispel such apprehension, the matter be placed before another Bench.
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Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 19 Durgesh Pathak
33. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
applicant submits that the present applicant has no role in the alleged
conspiracy, and that his name has surfaced only in the fourth
supplementary charge-sheet. He submits that justice should not only
be done, but must also be seen to be done.
34. It is further submitted that, while considering recusal, the
Court must keep in mind the reasonable apprehension in the mind of
a well-informed litigant, as well as that of the general public. The
learned senior counsel submits that in criminal cases, such
apprehensions assume greater significance, as the outcome directly
affects the personal liberty of the accused.
35. The learned senior counsel draws the attention of this Court to
the order dated 09.03.2026 and submits that the said order has
contributed to the apprehension in the mind of the applicant. It is
contended that the order was passed without hearing the accused, and
that notice was served only upon the counsel who had earlier
represented the applicant, despite the fact that the applicant had
already been discharged and the authority of such counsel had come
to an end.
36. The learned senior counsel also submits that the conduct of the
CBI in filing a reply in the present matter reflects an over-
enthusiastic approach, which, according to him, contributes to the
apprehension in the mind of the applicant that he may not receive
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justice from this Court. It is further submitted at the Bar that certain
social media reports and articles have also impacted the applicant,
including his health, and have strengthened his apprehension that
justice may not be done in the present case.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 12 Rajesh Joshi
37. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 12 Rajesh
Joshi, submits that he is adopting all the common arguments of other
recusal applicants. He further states that the order dated 09.03.2026
was passed in circumstances where neither the Investigating Officer
nor the DoE were even parties before this Court. Despite this,
according to learned counsel, relief came to be granted on the asking
of the CBI. It is contended that no specific prayer had been made in
the pleadings for such relief, and yet directions affecting non-parties
were issued.
38. The learned counsel submits that this gives rise to a concern
that relief was granted without a proper foundation in the pleadings
and without hearing the affected parties. It is further submitted that
such a course, where relief is extended beyond the parties before the
Court and in the absence of a specific prayer, contributes to the
apprehension in the mind of the applicant that the proceedings may
not be conducted with complete fairness.
39. On this basis, it is urged that the order dated 09.03.2026, and
the manner in which relief was granted therein, is one of the
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circumstances which gives rise to a reasonable apprehension in the
mind of the applicant Rajesh Joshi.
Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 5 Arun Ramchandran
Pillai
40. The learned counsel further states that an amended application
will be filed within two days. During the course of arguments, this
Court‟s attention was drawn to the report of Registry informing this
Court that Respondent No. 5 had not re-filed the recusal application.
At that stage, the learned counsel for Respondent No. 5 appeared and
stated at the Bar that an amended application will be filed within two
days, but same grounds and submissions as advanced on behalf of
Respondent No. 8 Sh. Manish Sisodia by Sh. Hegde are being
adopted.
41. Without commenting on the failure to remove objections and
re-file the application, which had been returned vide Diary No.
150763/2026, this Court takes note of the aforesaid submission, and
accordingly, the oral request for recusal on behalf of Respondent No.
5 is being considered.
Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioner-CBI
42. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing for the
CBI, at the outset submits that the CBI, per se, has no issue with any
Bench of this Court hearing the present matter. However, he states
that the conduct of some of the respondents borders on maligning the
judicial institution and scandalising the same, and such attempts to
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browbeat the Court must be nipped in the bud. According to him, this
Court must deter such attempts made by unscrupulous litigants.
43. He submits that this Court was assigned the roster of MP/MLA
category cases by the Hon‟ble Chief Justice of this Court on
31.12.2025, whereas even the arguments on charge in the present
case were concluded before the learned Trial Court only on
12.02.2026 and the judgment was pronounced on 27.02.2026. Thus,
there was no possibility of foreseeing in December 2025 that this
Bench would hear the present matter in March 2026, since at the time
when the Roster was assigned, the arguments on charge had not even
concluded before the learned Trial Court.
44. As regards the argument concerning advance service of the
petition upon the respondents, the learned Solicitor General submits
that service was effected upon all the counsels representing the
accused persons before the learned Trial Court on the e-mail IDs
furnished by them. None of them has disputed receipt of such
service. He further points out that all those counsels are also
appearing for the respondents before this Court in the present
proceedings. He submits that service of the petition in advance upon
counsels is valid service in law, both as per judicial precedents and
the Rules of the Delhi High Court.
45. As regards the observations recorded in the order dated
09.03.2026, he submits that Respondent No. 18 as well as some other
respondents have already challenged the said order before the
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Hon‟ble Supreme Court, but the Special Leave Petitions filed by
them, including Applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, have been kept
pending under office objections. He further submits that it is
common judicial practice that whenever a Court grants any interim
relief, even on the first date of hearing, it records certain prima facie
observations indicating the reasons for granting such relief. Such
observations are only prima facie in nature and not conclusive. He
also submits that in the present case, only prima facie observations
on legal issues were recorded and not on factual issues requiring
appreciation of evidence.
46. As regards the stay of remarks and the consequential action
against the Investigating Officer, the learned Solicitor General
submits that this Court had only stayed the scathing remarks made
against the I.O., whereby the impugned order had concluded that the
I.O. had falsely implicated accused No. 1, Kuldeep Singh, and had
directed initiation of departmental proceedings against him. He
submits that there is nothing unusual or contrary to law in staying
such consequential directions when the impugned order itself is
under challenge before a superior court. According to him, the
applicants are virtually seeking a rule that once a Bench grants an ex-
parte stay, it must not proceed to hear the matter further and should
necessarily recuse, which is wholly untenable.
47. He further submits that the present case falls under the
MP/MLA category, and the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that such cases must be taken up on priority and decided
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expeditiously. Therefore, the allegation of undue haste is wholly
misplaced.
48. As regards the alleged ideological association with Akhil
Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad, the learned Solicitor General submits
that making such sweeping allegations merely because a Judge
attended legal seminars, which were not related to any political issue,
amounts to an attempt to scandalise the Court and interfere with the
administration of justice. According to him, such conduct borders on
contempt of court. He submits that attending a legal seminar can
never be a ground for recusal, especially when the subject was purely
legal and had no political context. Mere attendance does not
demonstrate ideological association. If such a contention is accepted,
a large number of sitting Judges of various High Courts and even the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court would have to recuse themselves from cases
involving politically exposed persons, which would lead to an absurd
situation.
49. He further argues that bias cannot be attached to views
expressed by Judges during judicial proceedings or in judgments
rendered by them. If that becomes the test for recusal, it would
amount to permitting forum shopping, where parties seek exclusion
of Judges whose earlier views appear unfavourable to them. Such a
proposition would extend not only to this Court, but to every Judge
who may have passed an adverse order on a similar issue, which
would be contrary to the rule of law and judicial discipline.
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50. He also submits that if deciding an issue were itself to create
bias, even the very basis of review jurisdiction would be undermined,
since review petitions are ordinarily placed before the same Judge or
Bench which delivered the original judgment.
51. Lastly, he submits that several Judges of this Court have
rendered adverse findings based on material collected by
investigating agencies in the Delhi Excise Policy cases, and such
judicial findings can never become a source of bias. If the applicants‟
contention is accepted, every such Judge would be required to recuse
from hearing the present matter, making the administration of justice
impossible.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
52. The question which is posed is whether what is being urged, is
a genuine, reasonable and legally sustainable apprehension of bias in
the mind of a litigant, or merely an unfounded perception. It is in this
background that the submissions raised by the recusal applicants are
being considered.
A. ALLEGED APPREHENSION OF BIAS IN VIEW OF THE
ORDER DATED 09.03.2026
53. One of the major grounds on which recusal has been sought is
the order dated 09.03.2026 passed by this Court. In fact, applicant
Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, while addressing the Court in person,
repeatedly referred to the said order and stated that upon seeing the
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order dated 09.03.2026, it gave rise to an apprehension in his mind
that he would not get justice from this Court.
54. At the outset, this Court is of the view that an order passed in a
petition, on the very first date of hearing, cannot by itself become a
ground for seeking recusal of the Court on the premise that such
order, merely because it records certain prima facie observations,
creates an apprehension of bias in the mind of the opposite party. In
Neelam Manmohan Attavar v. Manmohan Attavar: (2021) 3 SCC
727, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that merely because an
earlier order of the Court may not have been in favour of the
applicant cannot be a ground for seeking recusal, and that a litigant
cannot be permitted to browbeat the Court by seeking a Bench of his
choice.
55. The remedy for a litigant, who is aggrieved by an order, lies in
challenging the same before the higher court. It is also noteworthy
that applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal herein has already challenged
the order dated 09.03.2026 by way of a Special Leave Petition,
bearing Diary No. 15911/2026, before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court,
which was filed on 14.03.2026. Some other respondents as well have
also challenged the said order. However, these petitions have
remained pending in defects for more than a month.
56. Be that as it may, the objections raised against the order dated
09.03.2026 are now being considered one by one by this Court.
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(i) Advance Service of Respondents
57. Firstly, it has been contended that though this Court recorded
in the order that the respondents had been served in advance, there
was in fact no service on the respondents as such, but only service on
the counsels who had represented them before the learned Trial
Court. It is thus argued that this Court erred in observing that the
respondents had chosen not to appear on the first date of hearing.
This is a common ground raised by all the respondents who have
preferred the applications seeking recusal of this Court.
58. As far as the question of non-appearance and alleged non-
service of the respondents on the first date of hearing is concerned, in
the present case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner-CBI had served
advance copies of the petition upon the learned counsels representing
the accused persons before the learned Trial Court, on the e-mail IDs
which had been furnished by them before the Trial Court. None of
the learned counsels has disputed that such service was affected upon
them. It has also not been disputed that the said e-mail IDs had been
provided by them only before the learned Trial Court for the purpose
of communication. The only objection raised is that service ought to
have been effected directly upon the respondents and not upon the
counsels who had represented them before the learned Trial Court,
since a respondent may choose to engage a different counsel before
this Court.
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59. This Court also takes note of the fact that the learned counsels,
who were served advance notice of the present petition by the CBI
are, in fact, appearing for the respondents before this Court as well,
and thus, it is not the case that the respondents have engaged some
different counsels before this Court, than those were engaged before
the Trial Court.
60. In this regard, the attention of this Court was also drawn by the
petitioner-CBI to the Rules of the Delhi High Court on the Civil
Side, which permit service either on the party or on the counsel
representing the party, though there is no specific rule on the
criminal side to that effect.
61. The Court as well as the Registry is required to rely upon the
proof of advance service annexed by a petitioner along with the
petition. It is presumed that since advance service is mandatory
before permitting e-filing of a petition, the Registry would have
ensured that proof of such service is placed on record. If, on the very
first day of hearing, the Court were to start presuming that the proof
of service filed along with the petition may not be correct, the
functioning of the Court itself would become extremely difficult. In
such a situation, the Registry would be compelled to spend
considerable time verifying the correctness of proof of service rather
than facilitating e-filing and listing of matters.
62. Even otherwise, this Court is of the opinion that no prejudice
has been caused to the recusal applicants or the other respondents on
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account of the order dated 09.03.2026. This is for the reason that the
impugned discharge order, which directly concerned the accused
persons, was never stayed by this Court. In fact, the CBI itself had
not made any prayer seeking stay of the discharge order.
63. On the said date, this Court had merely issued notice in the
matter. It may be noted that the Court is required to hear the
petitioner even for the purpose of deciding whether the petition
deserves issuance of notice. Needless to say, not every petition
necessarily results in issuance of notice. Several petitions are
dismissed in limine at the very threshold as well.
(ii) Stay on remarks against the Investigating Officer
64. Another grievance raised by the recusal applicants relates to
the stay granted by this Court on the observations made by the
learned Trial Court against the Investigating Officer of the CBI as
well as the direction recommending departmental action against him.
65. In this regard, it may be noted that what was stayed on the first
date of hearing by this Court were only the remarks and the
departmental action which had been directed against the
Investigating Officer by the learned Trial Court. Broadly speaking,
the accused persons had nothing to do with the same. The accused
persons had argued the matter at the stage of charge before the
learned Trial Court, which had resulted in the passing of impugned
discharge order dated 27.02.2026. While passing that order, the
learned Trial Court had made certain remarks and had directed
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departmental action against the Investigating Officer, on its own
assessment, and not at the asking of the accused persons. The
concerned party aggrieved by such directions would therefore be the
investigating officer or the investigating agency, i.e., the CBI, and
not the accused persons.
66. It is also not uncommon for courts, while examining such
directions, to grant interim protection in order to maintain status quo
i.e. preserve the situation until the matter is finally adjudicated.
When the impugned order of discharge was itself under challenge
before this Court, if the departmental action was allowed to proceed
and the officer concerned were to be suspended or subjected to
disciplinary consequences, but subsequently the Court were to reach
a conclusion that no such action was warranted in the case, the
situation would become difficult to undo. It is to prevent such
situations that interim protection is often granted by Courts. On the
other hand, if upon final consideration of the matter, the Court
arrives at the conclusion that the observations made by the learned
Trial Court were justified and that departmental action is warranted,
the process of law would naturally follow in accordance with the
final decision of the Court.
67. What the litigant forgets is that he is not the only party before
this Court; a Judge always has two parties before her. On one hand,
he questions how the CBI can even file a response to his application
seeking recusal, contending that it is only a matter between him and
the Judge. On the other hand, he alleges bias on the ground that this
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Court merely stayed certain observations made against the
Investigating Officer, though that issue too was between this Court
and the affected party, namely, the Investigating Officer of the case.
68. This Court has, however, acted fairly by giving the litigant an
opportunity to file a reply even with respect to the stay granted by
this Court qua the observations made against the CBI. This is despite
the fact that this Court had not even stayed the extensive
observations made against the CBI and ED in another case in which
the present litigant had been discharged, regarding their functioning
in general and the broader pattern noticed during his tenure as a
learned Trial Court Judge. Fair justice has to be done to both parties
by a Judge, and not only to one. That is precisely why, even in that
case, an opportunity was granted to the agencies to file their reply.
69. The litigant cannot have one set of rules for himself, which
this Court must follow, and another set of rules for the opposite
party. The CBI is also a party before this Court. This Court cannot
permit the justice delivery system to be made vulnerable to
unfounded allegations against the Judge.
70. To reiterate, what would have mattered for the accused
persons was stay of the impugned discharge order. The impugned
discharge order however was never stayed by this Court. In fact, the
accused persons continue to remain discharged and the discharge
order remains fully intact.
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(iii) Prima facie observations recorded in the order dated
09.03.2026
71. Another grievance raised by the recusal applicants, and
particularly by applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, relates to the prima
facie observations recorded by this Court in the order dated
09.03.2026. applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, while addressing the
Court in person, questioned the necessity of such observations and
stated in open Court, in his own words, “ye zarurat kya thi likhne ki
order mei”.
72. In this regard, it may be noted at the outset, that the present
matter is yet to be heard finally. It is neither uncommon nor unusual
for a Court, while issuing notice or granting limited interim reliefs, to
record a prima facie view on the submissions made before it. Such
observations are part of the judicial process while considering
whether the matter requires further examination.
73. The expression – prima facie – even in its literal sense means
what appears to be true at the first impression. A prima facie opinion
or view is only a view which a court forms on the basis of the
material placed before it at the first instance, when the matter is
looked at, at a first blush. Such a view is always tentative and may
eventually be proved to be incorrect once the matter is fully heard.
74. When petitions come up before courts, parties often seek
interim or even ex-parte interim reliefs. If a court, while exercising
its jurisdiction, for instance in civil jurisdiction, grants an ex-parte
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ad-interim or interim relief, it naturally means that the other side may
not yet be present before the court and the relief is granted on the
very first date after making certain prima facie observations.
However, such relief is only interim, meaning thereby that it operates
only during the pendency of the proceedings. It is also ex-parte,
meaning that it has been granted without hearing the other side. The
opinion expressed by the court in such circumstances is necessarily
prima facie, i.e., based only on the material presently available
before the court. It can never mean that the final outcome of the case
has already been decided. More often than not, such interim orders
are subsequently modified or vacated upon an application being
moved by the other side, or even at the time of final adjudication
when the entire matter is heard in detail. In such cases, the prima
facie observations remain only prima facie and do not culminate into
the final outcome.
75. However, it has been projected before this Court as if the
prima facie observations made by this Court at the time of first
hearing of the case are to be treated as conclusive findings. In the
opinion of this Court, such an interpretation can only be termed as an
imagination of the part of applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal and the
other recusal applicants.
76. If the argument of the applicants is that no prima facie
observation could have been recorded on the first date of hearing
without hearing the other side, then it would mean rewriting the
entire settled law and jurisprudence. It appears that applicant Sh.
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Arvind Kejriwal, who argued the matter in person, may not be fully
aware of the manner in which interim reliefs are granted or how
prima facie observations are recorded by courts while passing such
orders. These observations are recorded so that the order remains a
reasoned one and the parties are made aware as to what weighed with
the Court at the first instance.
77. In fact, such observations are often more important for the
other side, as they indicate to them what appeared to the Court at the
first blush so that they are better prepared, on facts as well as law, to
address those aspects during the course of final hearing, and in all
probabilities, convince the Court to take a view different than the one
expressed at the first date of hearing, which is only prima facie in
nature, and in no manner, a conclusive opinion of the Court.
78. If the argument advanced by the applicants is accepted, no
court would ever be able to grant any interim relief or pass any order
of stay. In civil matters, no court would be able to exercise powers
under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Similarly, in criminal matters, courts would not be able to grant
interim bail, or grant interim protection from arrest, or pass any
interim directions while awaiting a status report or service upon the
complainant or victim. Every such order could then be challenged on
the ground that it was passed in the absence of the other side.
79. Courts cannot function under such constraints. They must be
allowed to perform their judicial functions independently and in
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accordance with law and the requirements of each case. Accepting
the argument put forth by the respondents seeking recusal would
effectively permit an accused to question and castigate the Judge
merely because the accused fears that the prima facie view expressed
may ultimately result in an adverse final order, without appreciating
the basic principle that a prima facie view is not a final view.
80. Be that as it may, if any party is aggrieved by the grant of any
interim relief or by any interim order passed by a court, the law
provides appropriate remedies to challenge such orders before the
higher court. The remedy is not to seek recusal of the Judge. If such
requests for recusal were to be entertained, every litigant against
whom an interim order is passed by a Judge of a High Court would
start seeking recusal of that Judge from hearing the matter. Courts
would then be flooded with such frivolous applications.
81. Let us explain this to the recusal applicants by way of a
judicial precedent which was decided by one of the judges of this
Court in similar facts and circumstances. Some years ago, a case
came before this High Court where one of the parties asked a brother
Judge, who later adorned the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, to step aside
from hearing the matter. The reason was familiar: an earlier interim
order had been passed by a Bench of which he was also a member,
and the party felt that by making certain prima facie observations and
disturbing the existing status quo, the Judge had already “prejudged”
and “predetermined” the issues involved. Their concern was simple.
They believed that once such observations had been recorded, it
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would be difficult to expect justice from the same Judge hearing the
matter again. According to them, the mind of the Court had already
been made up. The opposite side, however, while opposing this
request, said that if such an argument was accepted, every
unsuccessful litigant would begin seeking recusal merely because an
interim order had been passed against him. The learned Judge, while
answering that question, held that merely because prima facie
observations were made while passing an interim order, it could not
be said that the matter had been prejudged. It was observed that
requests for recusal must rest on reasonable apprehensions and not
on speculative or fanciful suppositions. The principle thus was
clear: if every interim order were treated as proof of bias, any litigant
dissatisfied with such an order could seek a Bench of choice by
asking the Judge to step aside, which the law does not permit. The
conclusion of the story is one: recusal denied. For reference, the
observations in this regard, in case of AIIMS v. Prof. Kaushal K.
Verma: 2015 SCC OnLine Del 9226 (S. Ravindra Bhat, J.) are set
out below:
“1. This order will dispose off the contentions urged in W.P.(C)
4228/2014 and W.P.(C) 4245/2014. The issue is whether this Bench
should not hear the said Writ Petitions. The writ petitioners, in
identically worded affidavits dated 11.03.2015, urge that the present
Bench should not hear this petition and connected cases since the
earlier Bench comprising of one of us (i.e. S. Ravindra Bhat, J) and
Vipin Sanghi, J (who is not part of the Bench) had, “already prejudged
and predetermined the issues involved while passing the order dated
03.12.2014.” This request – to recuse the Bench comprising of one of
the members of the said Bench (S. Ravindra Bhat, J – hereafter “the
Presiding Judge”) was first voiced on 04.02.2015. The Court had then
granted time to the petitioners to file affidavits, which they
subsequently did.
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***
4. ……Consequently, the matters were marked to the present Bench
which otherwise, (according to roster allocation) has to decide all
manner of tax appeals and petitions against orders of BIFR, AIFR,
DRAT and the writ petitions concerning validity of statutes and laws
with respect to these subjects. Accordingly, when the petitions were
called for hearing on 04.02.2015, learned senior counsel appearing for
the Petitioners in W.P.(C) 4228/2014 and W.P.(C) 4245/2014 urged
that this Bench should desist from hearing the matters. The Court
recorded this contention as follows:
“It is stated by Sh. Dinesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the
petitioners in W.P.(C) 4228/2014 and W.P.(C) 4245/2014 that this
Bench should not hear the matter since one of us (HMJ S. Ravindra
Bhat) has prejudged the case on account of the interim orders made.
Learned senior counsel states that an affidavit to this effect would be
filed in Court. He requests for some time. List on 16.03.2015.”
***
6. Sh. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel urges firstly that the order of
03.12.2014 – to the extent it disturbed the existing status quo,
amounted to a determination on the merits of the case…….
***
9. Sh. C. Harishankar, learned senior counsel on behalf of the
respondents, urged that this Court should reject the recusal request. He
submitted that accepting the recusal request would mean that in every
case, the party unsuccessful in securing interim relief can potentially
claim to have an apprehension that the Presiding Judge or the Judge
concerned is biased. Every such apprehension cannot be granted
unless the conduct of the proceeding or the tenor of the concerned
order from which the request stems betrays a predilection by the judge
to decide in a particular manner.
***
24. ……As observed earlier, every litigant who seeks interlocutory
relief of any kind, is reasonably aware of the possibilities of both
outcomes; where the court in question is not a final court, but one of
first instance or an intervening appellate court-it has to record its
reasons-howsoever tentative and prima facie……Given such
circumstances, this singular feature cannot in the opinion of the court,
be said to constitute a reasonable likelihood for the apprehension that
the Presiding Judge had pre-judged the merits on 03-12-2014 or had
expressed such strong views as to make it difficult to secure justice.
25. Before ending this unusually prolix order, which can run into the
danger of self-vindication, the Court observes that requests for recusal
are to be based on reasonable apprehensions; they cannot be
speculative or fanciful suppositions…”
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82. Therefore, to put it in simpler words, an interim order cannot
become a tool for seeking recusal, nor can a litigant be permitted to
choose a Bench merely because a prima facie view expressed by the
Court does not suit him. If the respondents herein are aggrieved by
the order dated 09.03.2026, they have every right in law to challenge
the said order before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. In fact, as noted
above, they have already chosen to file Special Leave Petitions in
that regard. However, a Judge cannot be asked to recuse merely
because an interim order has been passed against a party. If such a
course were permitted, it would mean that any litigant could force a
Judge to withdraw from a case simply by questioning an interim
order, which is neither the spirit nor the mandate of law. It may
further be reiterated that no interim relief, in fact, was granted against
the respondents per se, since the impugned discharge order itself was
never stayed by this Court.
(iv) Examples of Prima facie observations & Interim Relief
Granted in Favour of Respondent No. 18 Sh. Arvind Kejriwal &
Members of his Political Party by the Court
83. The argument of the recusal applicants that merely because
this Court had granted limited interim relief on the first date of
hearing and had recorded certain prima facie observations, an
apprehension of bias must necessarily arise, is based more on
misbelives than on settled principles of law. Such an attempt appears
to be only to portray a routine judicial exercise as something
extraordinary so as to build a ground for seeking recusal.
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84. It will be appropriate to set out some instances, where either
the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal herein or other leaders belonging
to his political party were granted interim reliefs/stay by this Court –
on the first date itself, without hearing the other side or calling for
their reply, and such interim orders continue to operate till now.
85. In the case of Arvind Kejriwal & Anr. v. State & Anr.:
CRL.M.C. 6508/2019, the petitioners therein – who are applicants/
respondents Sh. Arvind Kejriwal and Sh. Manish Sisodia before this
Court in the present proceedings – had challenged a summoning
order passed against them in a complaint case for defamation filed by
a leader of another political party. In that matter, a Coordinate
Bench had stayed the operation of the impugned summoning
order on the very first date of hearing itself, when neither the
complainant nor his counsel was present before the Court, and
thus without hearing the other side. The said interim order
continues to operate till date, for about six years. However, the
petitioners therein have no grievance with that interim stay order,
even though relief was granted to them on the very first date without
hearing the complainant – perhaps because the order was passed in
their favour. The said matter was last listed before this Court, this
Judge on 30.01.2026, when it was adjourned to 14.07.2026 at request
and it was this Court, this Judge only which had extended the interim
order of stay.
86. Similarly, Raghav Chadha v. Chhail Bihari Goswami &
Ors.: CRL.M.C. 8484/2023 and Satyendra Kumar Jain v. State &
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Anr.: CRL.M.C. 8514/2023, were two petitions filed by
members/leaders of the same political party of which applicant Sh.
Arvind Kejriwal is the National Convenor. In those matters,
summons had been issued to the petitioners in complaint cases of
defamation filed by the members of another political party. In the
said petitions, this Court, this Judge, in the interest of justice,
had directed the learned Trial Court to adjourn the matter to a
date beyond the date fixed before this Court, and the interim
relief granted in favour of the petitioners was allowed to
continue. This was done even though no arguments were heard
on the merits of the case due to paucity of time, which was
specifically recorded in the order itself. No allegation of any bias
or any ideological inclination was then raised against this Court by
any of the parties. The petitioners in those cases, who belonged to the
political party of applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, also never argued
that no interim order should be passed in their favour without first
hearing the other side. Notably, the interim order has been
operating in favour of the petitioners therein for more than two
years.
87. There are several other such matters pending adjudication on
the board of this Court, within MP/ MLA category, including cases
filed by leaders belonging to the political party of applicant Sh.
Arvind Kejriwal, where interim orders were granted in their
favour on the very first date of hearing after recording their
submissions in detail and expressing a prima facie view, even in
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the absence of the opposite parties. Many such interim orders
continue to operate till date. However, this Court does not deem it
necessary to burden the present judgment by extracting details of all
such cases.
88. Be that as it may, these two examples have been discussed
above, only to show that passing interim orders or recording prima
facie observations at the initial stage, even in the absence of the
opposite side, is neither unusual nor indicative of bias. It is a settled
law that when urgency exists and the Court finds that the matter
requires consideration, interim relief may be granted after recording
the submissions made and forming a prima facie view, subject
always to further hearing in the case and its final adjudication. A
judicial practice which is accepted without objection when it
operates in one‟s favour, cannot suddenly become a ground of
bias when the same course is adopted in another case by a court
of law.
89. Therefore, the grievance now raised by the recusal applicants,
that an interim order was passed or prima facie observations were
recorded by this Court on the first date of hearing in the present case,
without hearing the respondents, cannot be accepted as a ground for
recusal.
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(v) Argument that CBI was heard only for ‘Five Minutes’ on
the first date of hearing
90. Applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal also argued that this Court had
heard the petitioner-CBI only for “five minutes” on the first date of
hearing i.e. 09.03.2026 and was generous enough to grant interim
relief, despite the impugned discharge order running into more than
600 pages and being based on a voluminous record of nearly 40,000
pages.
91. This argument is equally without merit. This Court is of the
opinion that a litigant cannot be permitted to question the ability of a
judge to read a file, or the time given to a party for arguments or the
necessity for passing a particular order. The manner in which a Court
reads the record, appreciates the material, and forms a prima facie
view lies entirely within the judicial domain of the Court and can
only be questioned by a higher court.
92. Further, when applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal himself has
repeatedly argued that he was not properly served and was not
present before the Court on the first date of hearing, it is difficult to
understand how he could precisely tell whether the petitioner-CBI
was heard for five minutes or fifty minutes on the first day of
hearing. In the considered opinion of this Court, such assertions
appear to be based more on assumptions than on fact, and cannot be
a ground for alleging bias, especially when he has filed SLP
challenging the order dated 09.03.2026 before the Hon‟ble Supreme
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Court, however has not removed the objections and is pending in
defects for about one month.
(vi) Conduct of applicants who had filed SLP and Writ Petition
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court
93. One important aspect which also deserves to be noticed is that
on 16.03.2026, when the respondents appeared before this Court for
the first time after issuance of notice, learned counsels had appeared
for applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal and informed this Court that two
petitions had been filed before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court by
applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, one challenging the order of the
Hon‟ble Chief Justice of this Court declining their request to transfer
the present case to another Bench, and the other challenging the
order dated 09.03.2026.
94. However, despite the said petitions having been filed on
14.03.2026, they were kept under objections, in the defect list of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court. Undisputedly, the removal of such
objections is the responsibility of the litigant and his counsel.
Interestingly, though the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal later
appeared in person to address arguments on the present recusal
application, on an earlier date i.e. 16.03.2026, learned counsels had
appeared on his behalf. Even the petitions before the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court had been filed through a counsel, yet the objections
were not removed.
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95. Thereafter, on 06.04.2026, when applicant Sh. Arvind
Kejriwal appeared in person before this Court and submitted that he
had filed a recusal application before this Court, he did not inform
this Court that the writ petition seeking transfer of this case from
this Bench had already been withdrawn from the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court. It was only when this Court made a query in this
regard, and the same was also pointed out by the CBI, that the
applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, and learned senior counsel who was
appearing for Respondent No. 3, informed this Court that the
applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal had withdrawn the said writ
petition seeking transfer of the case from this Bench to another
Bench.
96. Needless to say, equity demands that when parties appear
before a court, nothing material should be withheld from the Court.
Those who insist that the Judge must demonstrate fairness and
transparency must themselves come before the Court with complete
transparency. Legal strategy cannot be stretched to the extent of
attempting to mislead the Court. To ignore such conduct and not
record it in the present judgment would itself be a disservice to the
institution.
B. ALLEGED UNDUE HASTE IN THE PRESENT CASE &
LONGER DATES GIVEN IN OTHER CASES BY THIS COURT
97. It has also been insinuated that this Court has acted with bias
on the ground that in several other revision petitions listed before this
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Court in the year 2026, longer dates were granted for filing replies,
whereas in the present case shorter dates were granted. According to
the applicants, this shows that there was undue haste on the part of
this Court while dealing with the present matter.
98. Interestingly, in the present case, the litigant apprehends bias –
merely because the Court is ensuring an expeditious hearing. It is a
rather strange situation where, outside the Court, there is constant
criticism that cases are not decided quickly, but when it comes to
one‟s own case, the same litigant resists expeditious proceedings and
questions the Court for granting short adjournments.
99. Nevertheless, as far as the above argument is concerned, this
Court finds that the same proceeds on a clear misunderstanding of
the legal framework governing such cases, as well as on an
incomplete and selective presentation of facts by the recusal
applicants.
100. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v.
Union of India and Anr.: W.P.(C) No.699/2016, vide order dated
09.11.2023 had passed certain directions for expeditious disposal of
cases pertaining to MPs and MLAs. It had also observed as under:
” 14. These cases have a direct bearing on our political
democracy. Hence, there is a compelling need to make every
effort to ensure that these cases are taken up on priority and
decided expeditiously. Confidence and trust of the
constituency in their political representative, be it an MP or an
MLA, is necessary for an interactive, efficient and effective
functioning of a parliamentary democracy. However, such
confidence is difficult to expect when figures, as indicated in
the above referred table, loom large in our polity.
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15. In fact, there are no two views about the compelling
need to take up and dispose of the subject cases
expeditiously. We have no doubt in our mind that even the
political representative, be it MP or an MLA, involved in
the prosecution would also seek a quick disposal of these
cases. However, the problem lies elsewhere. It seems systemic,
perhaps institutional, and takes within its sweep many factors
including the method of adversarial litigation that we have
adopted. Yet, at every stage of the practice and procedure that
we adopt, there is scope for reform. It is in this context that we
have earnestly conducted and monitored this case for the last
seven years.”
(emphasis added)
101. In compliance with the decision of the Supreme Court in
Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay (supra), the Division Bench-I of this
Court had passed an order dated 21.12.2023, in Court on its Own
Motion v. Union of India & Ors.: W.P.(CRL) 1542/2020, and inter
alia directed as under:
” 2. Having considered the order of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court, in its letter and spirit, the following directions are issued
for expeditious and effective disposal of criminal cases
pending in the designated Courts against the members of
Parliament and Legislative Assemblies:-
***
(iv) In case any revision petitions regarding such matters
are pending before the designated Sessions Court(s), every
endeavour shall be made to dispose of the same within six
months. Where such revision petition(s) or other
petition(s) are pending before Ld. Single Judge(s) of
this Court, they are requested to dispose of the same as
expeditiously as possible.
***
(ix) The cases in which orders of stay of trial have been
passed and are continuing for a period of more than six
months, are directed to be disposed of expeditiously by
the concerned Benches of this Court. The Registrar
General shall file a status report of the said cases before the
next date of hearing.”
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(emphasis added)
102. Thereafter, vide order dated 02.04.2024, the Division Bench-I
had directed as under:
” 3. In line with the directives passed by Hon‟ble the Chief
Justice of India in W.P.(C) No.699 of 2016 titled as
Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs. Union of India & Anr., we
direct the Registry of this Court to circulate this order to
brother and sister Judges assigned with such cases so that
priority is given to all criminal cases/appeals/revisions
pending before them against the members of Parliament
and Legislative Assemblies, as it is essential for
expeditious and effective disposal of such cases.”
103. Thus, it is incumbent upon this Court that cases falling under
the MP/MLA category are taken up and disposed of expeditiously,
particularly in situations where any stay order has been passed. The
purpose behind such directions is to ensure that criminal proceedings
involving former or sitting elected representatives are not allowed to
remain pending indefinitely.
104. Notably, several recusal applicants have picked up certain
revision petitions and referred to them in their applications, to
suggest what, according to them, is the uniform practice of this Court
in granting dates in such cases.
105. In this regard, it must be noted that the applicants have
conveniently ignored an important aspect. The cases listed before
this Court – as per the Roster assigned by the Hon‟ble Chief Justice –
include matters relating to MP/MLA cases, as well as matters which
do not fall within that category. As far as cases pertaining to MPs
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and MLAs are concerned, this Court is guided by the directions of
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court as well as by the orders of Division
Bench-I of this Court, as noted above.
106. Pertinently, none of the revision petitions, details whereof
have been mentioned in the recusal applications, fall within the
MP/MLA category.
107. If a litigant chooses to rely upon examples of dates given in
some cases, particularly ignoring those falling within the MP/MLA
category, then such comparison must be fair and complete. The
litigant cannot selectively refer only to those matters where longer
dates have been granted, while ignoring cases where proceedings
have been conducted on short dates or on a day-to-day basis. By way
of illustration, in an appeal against conviction preferred by a sitting
MLA (CRL.A. 328/2026) recently, the matter was listed before this
Court on 04.04.2026, 07.04.2026, 08.04.2026, and 15.04.2026, and
the respondent therein was granted only one week‟s time to file a
reply to the appeal.
108. In this background, suffice it to say, the attempt made by the
applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal who appeared in person, as well as the
other recusal applicants, to compare the dates granted in cases not
pertaining to the MP/MLA category, with the present case which
falls within that category, is wholly misplaced inasmuch as such a
comparison ignores the legal framework governing these matters and
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the directions binding upon this Court. The attempt to draw such a
comparison, therefore, deserves to be deprecated.
109. Moreover, the absurd submission of the recusal applicants
that this Court has “deviated from its usual or uniform practice” of
granting longer dates in general, by granting shorter dates in the
present matter, also completely ignores the fact that fixing dates and
regulating the proceedings of a case fall within the sole prerogative
of the Judge hearing the matter. There are also cases which are
taken up and decided on the very same day or where short
adjournments are given- something which the applicants have
conveniently chosen not to mention, as the effort appears to be
more directed towards finding fault with the Judge and the
functioning of the Court. However, this is understandable. A
layperson cannot be expected to fully appreciate how a Judge with
nearly thirty-four years of judicial experience manages the Court,
based on the competence demonstrated over the years to those to
whom it is to be demonstrated, and the experience gained in the
discharge of judicial duties over decades.
110. To give an illustration in this regard, this Court in case titled
Sachin Bajpai v. Union of India & Ors.: W.P.(Crl.) 4250/2025, had
stayed the summons issued by the CBI to an advocate on the very
first date of hearing itself, on a Saturday, without awaiting any reply
from the CBI, after observing prima facie that the advocate in
question could not have been summoned by the investigating officer
by treating him as a suspect merely for discharging his professional
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duties, and that such action appeared to be in direct contravention of
the guidelines laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. On the
very first date of hearing, an order running into 9 pages, containing
detailed prima facie observations, was passed against the CBI and
the operation of the impugned summon was stayed.
111. Thus, it is for the Judge to decide which cases require longer
dates, which matters can be adjourned for a later date, which require
shorter adjournments of a few days, and which matters can be taken
up again on the same day after a few hours. These are aspects of the
normal functioning of a Court and cannot, by any stretch, be made
grounds for alleging bias.
112. Even otherwise, an accused cannot be permitted to re-write
jurisprudence or the settled practices governing the judicial and
administrative functioning of courts. Nor can an accused dictate how
a Court is to be run by the Judge holding the Court. These matters
fall squarely within the domain of the Court and are guided by
established principles, statutory requirements, and binding directions
of the Higher courts. Such aspects are not open to scrutiny on the
basis of political considerations or personal perceptions, as the
independence of the judiciary and the principle of separation of
powers require that courts be allowed to function without such
external interference.
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C. ALLEGED APPREHENSION OF BIAS ARISING FROM
EARLIER DETAILED JUDGMENTS OF THIS COURT
113. One of the grounds on which the recusal applicants,
particularly applicants Sh. Arvind Kejriwal and Sh. Manish Sisodia,
have sought recusal of this Court is that while dealing with matters
arising out of the Delhi Excise Policy case in the past, this Court had
passed detailed judgments and recorded findings on several aspects.
114. The applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, during the course of
arguments, described those findings as „conclusive findings of this
Court‟ and „almost holding him guilty‟ and declaring him „super
corrupt‟ (“maha corrupt”). He also argued that there was no need for
this Court to give such detailed findings while deciding earlier
matters, including the case where he had challenged his arrest by the
DoE in Arvind Kejriwal v. Enforcement Directorate (supra).
(i) Earlier Findings of this Court in respect of Challenge to
Arrest under Section 19 of PMLA
115. In this regard, it is necessary to note that in the case of
applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, he had filed a writ petition
challenging the legality of his arrest by the DoE (i.e. W.P.(CRL)
985/2024). Such arrest is effected under Section 19 of the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), and the validity of such
arrest has to be tested on the parameters laid down under the said
provision. Section 19 mandates that before effecting the arrest of a
person for the offence of money laundering, the concerned officer
must have reasons to believe, based on the material in his
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possession, that the person sought to be arrested is guilty of the
offence of money laundering. It is the scheme of the PMLA and the
mandate of Section 19 which requires a Constitutional Court, while
examining a petition challenging the legality of arrest, to scrutinize
the material in the possession of the authorised officer and reasons
recorded by him, to satisfy itself whether the requirement of the
statute has been complied with. Therefore, the Court is required to
examine the material relied upon by the investigating agency to
ascertain whether the formation of such belief was based on relevant
material.
116. It is also a matter of record that it was applicant Sh. Arvind
Kejriwal himself, who through his then learned Senior Counsel Sh.
Abhishek Manu Singhvi had addressed extensive arguments before
this Court while challenging his arrest by the DoE. Detailed
submissions were advanced, including questioning the evidentiary
value of the statements of approvers and other witnesses recorded by
the CBI and the DoE. Arguments were also addressed on the aspect
that no alleged proceeds of crime had been recovered, on the timing
of the arrest of applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, and on various other
aspects relating to the investigation.
117. Since arguments at considerable length were addressed before
this Court, and the Court was called upon to examine those
contentions and determine whether the arrest of the petitioner was
valid or liable to be declared illegal, it became necessary for this
Court to deal with the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner
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in detail. Thus, the findings were given by this Court for the benefit
of the accused himself, that he knows as to why his petition was
being rejected.
118. This Court wonders that had it not dealt with those elaborate
arguments, in detail in its judgment, the applicant Sh. Arvind
Kejriwal may then have raised a grievance that the submissions
advanced on his behalf had been overlooked or ignored by the Court.
(ii) Earlier Findings of this Court in respect of Bail under
Section 45 of PMLA
119. Similarly, in other matters wherein this Court had dealt with
bail applications filed by Respondent No. 8, Respondent No. 9 and
Respondent No. 17, and one Sanjay Singh, the Court was dealing
with bail applications under the provisions of the PMLA. Section 45
of the PMLA lays down twin conditions for the grant of bail and
inter alia mandates that before granting bail, the Court must record a
finding that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the offence of money laundering. In order to
comply with this statutory mandate, it becomes necessary for the
Court to examine the material collected by the investigating agency
at that stage and to consider the arguments raised on behalf of the
accused persons. It is only after such examination that the Court can
arrive at a prima facie conclusion as to whether the conditions
prescribed under Section 45 of the PMLA stand satisfied. It is again
relevant to note that in those cases as well, the learned counsels
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appearing on behalf of the accused persons had addressed detailed
arguments before the Court. In fairness to the parties and in
discharge of its judicial duty, this Court dealt with the submissions
raised before it and recorded its prima facie findings while deciding
the bail applications.
120. Pertinently, in the case concerning the bail applications filed
by Respondent No. 8, this Court had disposed of two bail
applications, one relating to the CBI case and the other relating to the
DoE case. In those matters, arguments had been addressed both on
the issue of delay in trial as well as on the merits of the allegations,
and the Court had dealt with both aspects while passing the order.
121. However, in all these judgments, this Court had specifically
observed that the observations recorded therein were only prima
facie in nature and were not to be treated as a final opinion on the
merits of the case. It was so because, at that stage, arguments on
charge had not yet been addressed and the Court was required to
consider only the material placed on record by the prosecution for the
limited purpose of deciding whether a case for grant of bail, or a case
for declaring the arrest invalid, as the case may be, was made out.
122. The observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Indore
Development Authority (Recusal Matter-5) v. Manohar Lal: (2020)
6 SCC 304, which are also pertinent to note, are set out below:
“43. Having surveyed the precedents cited at the Bar, and having
considered the arguments, it is my considered view that a judge
rendering a judgment on a question of law would not be a bar to her
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consideration. The previous judgment cannot constitute bias, or a
pre- disposition nor can it seem to be such, so as to raise a reasonable
apprehension of bias. Nor can expressions through a judgment
(based on the outcome of arguments in an adversarial process) be a
“subject matter” bias on the merits of a norm or legal principle, or
provisions. The previous decisions and practice of this court have
clearly shown that there can be and is no bar as the respondents‟
senior counsel argue. Accepting the plea of recusal would sound a
death knell to the independent system of justice delivery where
litigants would dictate participation of judges of their liking in
particular cases or causes.
44. Recusal is not to be forced by any litigant to choose a Bench. It is
for the Judge to decide to recuse. The embarrassment of hearing the
lengthy arguments for recusal should not be a compelling reason to
recuse. The law laid down in various decisions has compelled me not
to recuse from the case and to perform the duty irrespective of the
consequences, as nothing should come in the way of dispensation of
justice or discharge of duty as a Judge and judicial decisionmaking.
There is no room for prejudice or bias. Justice has to be pure,
untainted, uninfluenced by any factor, and even decision for recusal
cannot be influenced by outside forces. However, if I recuse, it will
be a dereliction of duty, injustice to the system, and to other Judges
who are or to adorn the Bench/es in the future. I have taken an
informed decision after considering the nitty gritty of the points at
issue, and very importantly, my conscience. In my opinion, I would
be committing a grave blunder by recusal in the circumstances, on
the grounds prayed for, and posterity will not forgive me down the
line for setting a bad precedent. It is only for the interest of the
judiciary (which is supreme) and the system (which is nulli
secundus) that has compelled me not to recuse.”
123. This Court‟s attention was also drawn by the learned counsel
appearing for the recusal applicants to the decision in Kanaklata v.
State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), contending that there may be
situations where earlier strong observations made by a Court can
give rise to a reasonable apprehension in the mind of a litigant.
However, the facts of the said case are clearly distinguishable from
the present case. In the said case, the learned Trial Court, while
discharging the accused of offences under the SC/ST Act, had made
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strong and wide-ranging observations regarding the alleged misuse
of the provisions of the Act. When the matter reached the High
Court, although safeguards were provided by directing the Trial
Court to decide the matter afresh without being influenced by its
earlier observations, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court noted that the
earlier order was so strongly worded that it could still give rise to a
reasonable apprehension in the mind of the complainant. It was in
those peculiar facts that the transfer was permitted.
124. The situation in the present case is entirely different. Here, the
discharge order passed by the learned Trial Court is itself under
challenge before this Court, for the first time, and this Court has not
dealt with the discharge order on any earlier occasion as the same
was passed on 27.02.2026. Unlike the facts in case of Kanaklata v.
State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), the observations made by this Court in
the past, while deciding either bail applications or the challenge to
arrest under PMLA, were confined only to the material available on
record at that point of time, as per mandate of Section 19 or 45 of
PMLA. Those observations do not travel beyond the case so as to
create any independent or generalized prejudice of this Court qua the
entire case in general. Therefore, the reliance placed on the said
decision can be of no help to the recusal applicants.
125. Therefore, the submission of the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal
that this Court had delivered detailed judgments without any
necessity is clearly without merit. The contention that this Court
might have pre-judged the present case, merely because it had given
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detailed findings while deciding these earlier petitions and
application, is also devoid of merit.
(iii) Relief denied by Other Benches too
126. Another aspect which cannot be ignored is that the attempt of
recusal applicants to portray as if all adverse orders in matters arising
out of the Delhi Excise Policy case were passed only by this Court is
factually incorrect. Notably, several orders, including orders relating
to arrest and bail were also passed by different Benches of this Court,
much before this Court was even assigned the MP/MLA roster and
even after that. Some of these instances are:
● Arvind Kejriwal – Validity of Arrest in CBI Case: The
order upholding the arrest of the applicant Sh. Arvind
Kejriwal, in the CBI case, was not passed by this Court, but by
another Bench.
● Arvind Kejriwal – Stay of Bail in DoE Case: The bail
granted to the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal by the learned
Trial Court in the DoE case, was stayed not by this Court, but
by another Bench.
● Manish Sisodia – First Round of Bail Applications: The
first round of bail applications of the applicant Sh. Manish
Sisodia, in this case were also not rejected by this Court, but
by another Bench, and the same were subsequently dismissed
by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court too.
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● Other Co-Accused: The bail applications of several other co-
accused in the present case were dismissed by another Bench,
at a time when this Court had not even been assigned the
MP/MLA roster by the Hon‟ble Chief Justice.
127. Therefore, the argument propounded that this Court has
always taken views adverse to the respondents herein and denied
them bails etc., for which any other Court may hear this matter, is
clearly misplaced since the above facts clearly show that adverse
judicial orders in the present Delhi Excise Policy matter were not
confined to this Court alone, but were passed by several Benches of
this Court, in accordance with law.
(iv) Argument that findings of Trial Court are contrary to this
Court
128. Another interesting argument raised by applicant Sh. Arvind
Kejriwal, who appeared in person, as well as some other recusal
applicants, was that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court
in the impugned discharge order are completely contrary to the views
expressed by this Court in the past while deciding his petition
challenging arrest by the DoE and while deciding bail applications of
co-accused persons. On that basis, it was suggested that since this
Court had earlier taken a different view than the Trial Court, for
instance, on law of approvers, this Court may not be able to
appreciate or uphold the findings of the learned Trial Court.
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129. The recusal applicants, in a way, also sought to place the
findings of the learned Trial Court on a higher pedestal than those of
this Court, so as to persuade this Court, that because this Court does
not think in the same manner as the learned Trial Court, they
therefore have an apprehension that they will not receive a fair
hearing.
130. This argument, however, is wholly misconceived. The passing
of an order either in favour of or against a party is based solely on the
facts of the case and the applicable law. Such submission also
proceeds on the assumption that once a Court has expressed a prima
facie view at an earlier stage, it becomes incapable of examining a
subsequent order with an open mind. That is neither the position in
law nor the manner in which judicial functioning operates. While
deciding earlier petitions arising out of the Delhi Excise Policy case,
this Court was dealing with matters such as challenge to arrest and
applications for bail under the provisions of the PMLA. Those
proceedings required examination on entirely different legal
parameters and at a stage where arguments on charge had not even
been addressed. The observations made therein were necessarily
confined to that limited stage and were specifically recorded to be
only prima facie in nature, without expressing any final opinion on
the merits of the case. As noted above, detailed observations were
recorded in those judgments since detailed arguments were addressed
before this Court.
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131. The present proceedings however arise from a revision petition
challenging the discharge order passed by the learned Trial Court.
The scope, the stage, and the legal questions involved are entirely
different. This Court is now required to examine the impugned order
independently, on the basis of the material on record, the reasoning
of the learned Trial Court, and the settled principles of law governing
law on charge. That exercise cannot be presumed to be foreclosed
merely because this Court had earlier dealt with different
proceedings arising from the same case.
132. If such an argument were to be accepted, it would mean that
no Judge who has ever decided a bail application, anticipatory bail
application, or challenge to arrest in a criminal case would thereafter
be competent to hear proceedings arising from the same FIR. That is
neither the law nor the practice of courts. In fact, the position of law
is contrary and there are specific directions issued by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court wherein it has been directed that, in order to avoid
conflicting or inconsistent orders, matters arising out of the same
FIR, especially bail applications, ought to be listed before the same
Judge [Ref: Sajid v. State of Uttar Pradesh: SLP(Crl) No.
7203/2023; Rajpal v. State of Rajasthan: SLP (Crl.) No.
15585/2023; Shekhar Prasad Mahto @ Shekhar Kushwaha v. The
Registrar General, Jharkhand High Court & Anr.: WP (Crl.) No.
55/2025; M/s Netsity Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. The State Govt. of NCT of
Delhi & Anr.: 2025 INSC 1181].
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133. The judicial system functions within a well-defined hierarchy,
and every Court performs its role according to law. A Trial Court
may take one view, the High Court may take another, and the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court may examine both. That is the normal
course of the judicial process. A litigant cannot seek recusal merely
because he apprehends that a Court which had earlier expressed a
prima facie view may not agree with the findings of the learned Trial
Court.
134. The High Court does not approach such matters to defend
its earlier observations, nor to oppose the findings of the learned
Trial Court. It approaches the case as a constitutional court, with
judicial discipline, an open mind, and a duty to decide in
accordance with law. Therefore, this ground for seeking recusal is
completely without merit.
(v) Relief Was Granted Too – But Conveniently Ignored
135. The further argument advanced by the recusal applicants that
this Court has never granted any relief to any of the accused persons
in the „Delhi liquor policy cases‟, is also factually incorrect and
contrary to record.
136. This Court notes that it is the accused, who himself has been
mentioning in his pleadings and arguing and referring to in his
arguments that in „Delhi Liquor Policy cases‟ and this is not a term
coined by this Court.
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137. Even applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal himself admitted during
the course of arguments that this Court had granted interim bail on
medical grounds to one of the accused, Arun Ramachandra Pillai
(Respondent No. 5 in the present case), who has also filed a recusal
application before this Court. Therefore, the broad submission that
this Court has uniformly denied relief to all accused persons in these
matters is plainly incorrect.
138. Similarly, in the case of accused Amandeep Singh Dhall
(Respondent No. 9 in the present case), pursuant to orders passed by
this Court, he was provided hospitalization and medical treatment of
his choice in hospitals including AIIMS, ILBS, Safdarjung Hospital,
and Indian Spinal Injuries Centre. In fact, out of the total custody
period of about fifteen months, he was permitted to remain in
judicial custody while being hospitalised for surgery and
thereafter for a substantial period for post-surgery
physiotherapy and post-epidural care. For more than 06 months,
he continued to remain under medical care outside the jail
premises, primarily because the required physiotherapy machines
and facilities were not then available in the jail hospital or the
referral hospitals, and the accused had insisted that even AIIMS was
not able to provide the kind of treatment which he claimed he was
entitled to receive. Taking note of his grievance regarding the non-
availability of proper physiotherapy equipment in jail hospitals, this
Court had also issued directions to the Government of Delhi, i.e. the
political party of Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, and constituted a Committee
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for the purpose of assessing the requirement of necessary medical
equipment in jail hospitals, vide judgment dated 22.12.2023 in BAIL
APPLN. 2229/2023. The purpose was not confined to the case of one
accused alone, but to address a larger issue concerning the medical
care of undertrial prisoners and inmates facing serious health
challenges in prisons.
139. Pursuant to the said directions, it was the Government of Delhi
which had provided the required healthcare machines, physiotherapy
equipment and other medical facilities, which were earlier not
available in the jail hospitals. These facilities are now available for
the benefit of all prisoners.
140. Therefore, the attempt to project that this Court has never
granted any relief to the accused persons in the Delhi liquor policy
cases is not only incorrect, but also a selective presentation of facts.
A litigant cannot choose to remember only those orders which do
not favour him and conveniently forget those where relief was
granted.
D. ARGUMENT OF RECUSAL APPLICANTS THAT
PREVIOUS JUDGMENTS OF THIS COURT WERE SET ASIDE
BY THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT
141. Another submission made before this Court was that the
earlier detailed judgments passed by this Court, relating to challenges
to arrest or applications for bail, as noted above, were subsequently
overruled by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
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142. In this regard, it is to be noted that the bail application of an
accused Sanjay Singh, in the PMLA case was rejected by this Court
vide judgment dated 07.02.2024 [Ref: Sanjay Singh v. Directorate of
Enforcement: 2024:DHC:906]. The said accused – who is not even
an accused in the CBI case and is not a respondent before this
Court in the present proceedings – was granted bail by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court, on the basis of a concession made by the DoE that
he may be enlarged on bail, and the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had
specifically recorded in the order dated 02.04.2024 that „no
comments‟ were made on merits of the case [Ref: Sanjay Singh v.
Directorate of Enforcement: SLP(Crl.) No. 2558 of 2024].
143. Similarly, in the case of Sh. Manish Sisodia (Respondent No.
8 herein), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court granted bail to the said
accused on the ground of delay in trial vide judgment dated
09.08.2024 [Ref: Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement:
2024 INSC 595]. However, no observations were made by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court on the merits of the case or on the findings
recorded by this Court qua the merits of the case while deciding his
bail applications on 21.05.2024. It is also relevant to note that at an
earlier stage, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court itself had rejected the bail
application of Respondent No. 8 – on merits – after considering the
allegations and the material placed against him [Ref: Manish Sisodia
v. Central Bureau of Investigation: 2023 INSC 956]
144. As far as applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal is concerned, it is
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this Bench, upholding the validity of his arrest, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court had found that there were, in fact, sufficient
“reasons to believe” for the purpose of effecting his arrest under
the provisions of the PMLA, that he was guilty of the offence of
money laundering. However, only the issue regarding the need and
necessity of arrest, and whether such necessity is to be read into the
power of arrest under the statute, was referred by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court to a larger Bench for consideration, and this
Court‟s order was not set aside. Since the said issue was referred to
a larger Bench and its adjudication was likely to take some time, the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court considered it appropriate to grant „interim
bail‟ to applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, who had earlier also been
released on interim bail for the purpose of canvassing and contesting
elections.
145. When a Judge sits as a neutral adjudicator, the parties
appearing before the Court cannot question the competence of the
Judge by stating that since some of her judgments have been
modified or set aside by a higher court, she is therefore not fit to do
justice. Just as politicians are left to perform their duties in the
Parliament and the Vidhan Sabhas, judges must be left to their
own processes and institutional mechanisms which test their
competence and their ability to do justice. Needless to say, every
litigant has the right to challenge an order of the High Court before
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, and that is the course which the law
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comes to entering the domain of Parliament or the State Legislature
and questioning certain aspects, except as permitted under the
Constitution. The same principle applies in reverse. A politician, or
an accused who happens to be a politician, cannot be permitted to
cross that boundary and sit in judgment over the competence of a
Judge.
146. In any case, the fact that a judgment of a High Court is set
aside or modified by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, can never be a
ground to seek recusal of the Judge. Judicial decisions are always
subject to appellate scrutiny, and correction by a higher court is an
integral part of the judicial process. To treat such appellate
interference as a ground for alleging bias would go against the very
system of the hierarchy of courts in our country. This ground,
therefore, being devoid of any merit, deserves to be rejected.
E. APPREHENSION OF BIAS EMERGING FROM A
STATEMENT ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE UNION HOME
MINISTER
147. This Court also notes that the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal
stated at the Bar that the Union Minister of Home Affairs had made a
statement in a television programme to the effect that when the
judgment of this Court comes, Sh. Kejriwal will have to approach the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, which has created reasonable apprehension
in his mind regarding bias.
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148. However, this Court finds that neither has this ground been
mentioned in the recusal application nor were any details provided
during the course of arguments as to what exactly was said, in which
television programme, or on what occasion such a statement was
made.
149. Seeking recusal of a Court on such a ground, that a Union
Minister, or for that matter any politician appearing in a television
programme, has expressed an opinion that a Court may pass an order
adverse to a particular party, would amount to proceeding purely on
imaginations and misbeliefs of the litigant. Clearly, this Court has no
control over what any politician or the litigant, such as the applicant
Sh. Arvind Kejriwal, who himself is a politician, may choose to state
in the public domain or in his political life. It equally cannot regulate
or control statements made by politicians in public discourse.
150. Even otherwise, it is a matter of common knowledge that rival
political parties often make claims in public as to what a Court may
decide in a given case, each advancing its own narrative to suit its
political position. Courts, however, are not concerned with such
statements or claims and are guided only by the material placed
before them and the applicable law. This ground is, therefore,
rejected as being devoid of any merit whatsoever.
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F. ALLEGED APPREHENSION OF BIAS ARISING FROM
PARTICIPATION OF THIS COURT IN EVENTS ORGANISED
BY ONE AKHIL BHARATIYA ADHIVAKTA PARISHAD
151. Out of all the recusal applications filed before this Court, this
particular ground has been urged only by the applicant Sh. Arvind
Kejriwal and by no other recusal applicant.
152. It was stated by the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal that this
Court had attended programmes organised by one Akhil Bharatiya
Adhivakta Parishad on about four occasions over the last few years,
and on that basis, he has reasonable apprehension of bias. He also
stated, during the course of his arguments, that he follows an
ideology which is opposite to that followed by Akhil Bharatiya
Adhivakta Parishad, and that he strongly opposes it. However, upon
being asked a specific question as to whether his argument was that
this Court had made any ideological statement, supported the
ideology followed by the said Parishad, or delivered any political
speech at such programmes, he categorically denied the same. He
specifically stated that he was not suggesting so at all, and that he
was neither doubting this Court nor suggesting that this Court
follows their ideology. According to him, it was only his own
personal belief and apprehension that perhaps this Court may have
some “sympathy” towards them on mere account of attending such
programmes.
153. At the outset, this Court must state that the functions or
programmes organised by Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad,
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which were attended by this Court and are being referred to by the
applicant Sh. Kejriwal, were not political functions or party events.
They were programmes organised by a body of lawyers, where
occasions such as Women‟s Day celebrations, seminars for lawyers
on new criminal laws, and other professional discussions were
conducted, and speakers were invited to interact with members of the
legal fraternity. The CBI has also placed on record, along with its
reply and annexures, copies of some flyers of the programmes
organised by Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad. A bare perusal of
the same would reveal that several judges of this Court, and even
judges of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, have attended such events.
154. In my opinion, merely because in my capacity as a Judge, I
was invited to deliver a lecture or interact with younger members of
the Bar or other members of the legal fraternity, the same cannot be
used to insinuate political association or ideological bias. For the last
several decades, judges of various High Courts and even the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court have attended such events – not as members of any
political party or as persons associated with them – but purely in
their capacity as judges interacting with the members of the Bar. It is
not the case of the litigant, who appeared and argued in person, that
the said Adhivakta Parishad is not a body of advocates.
155. Such an argument has to give way to the right and duty of a
Judge to attend legal functions organised by members of the Bar, for
the benefit of the legal fraternity. It is difficult to understand what is
meant by “sympathising” with a lawyers‟ body without any specific
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allegation or material. Though it is understandable that membership
of, or active participation in the affairs of a foundation or body
having direct affiliations or specific interests may, in some situations,
may raise a reasonable apprehension of bias, it is however difficult to
appreciate how, in the complete absence of such circumstances, mere
participation as a chief guest, guest, or speaker in a legal programme
organised by a body of lawyers can, by itself, give rise to any
reasonable apprehension of bias, or lead to a conclusion that such
participation has foreclosed the Judge‟s ability to approach the case
with an open mind.
156. It also does not escape the notice of this Court that the
applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal has selectively placed on record only
those events attended by this Court which were organised by Akhil
Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad. However, this Court, as well as many
other Judges, routinely attend official functions organised by various
universities and law schools such as the University of Delhi, National
Law Universities, private colleges, and different forums of lawyers.
Even while serving as a District Judge, I had visited several schools
and colleges for delivering lectures as part of legal literacy
programmes. Needless to say, such educational institutions or forums
may at times be headed by individuals who may have their own
political ideologies. However, such participation is part of
maintaining the relationship between the Bench and the Bar, and also
of engaging with the younger members entering the profession or
even at times, the community in general.
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157. Whatever the organisation or university it may be, whosoever
its founders may be, judges are invited in their capacity as „Judges of
Courts‟ to interact with law students or members of the Bar. In such
interactions, there is no space for any personal or political ideology,
and the engagement remains confined to law, the functioning of
Courts, and the relationship between the Bar and the Bench.
158. Thus, the relationship between the Bar and the Bench is not
confined only to courtrooms, and it extends to various professional
and institutional interactions. It is also not uncommon for Bar
Associations to organise events such as seminars, lectures, farewell
functions on the retirement of judges, or gatherings on festivals or
occasions like New Year, where members of the Bar and the Bench
interact with each other. Even friendly sports matches are played
between the Bar and the Bench.
159. Whenever the members of the Bar and the Bench meet in such
settings, they do not meet with the tinted glasses of their political
affiliations. The relationship between the Bar and the Bench stands
above such considerations. How such participation, in any manner,
can become a matter of concern for an accused person appearing
before the Court is difficult to comprehend.
160. This Court is of the considered and firm opinion that no
litigant can be permitted to sever or weaken the relationship
between the Bar and the Bench, which is sacred and stands
above the politics of any level. The Bar and the Bench share a
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relationship which may perhaps be beyond the understanding of
many, but the Bar and the Bench themselves understand it in the
manner in which it has been understood historically.
161. Furthermore, some members of the Bar may, at times, be
representing a particular political party in a case, or may be known to
be associated with a political party. However, when they appear
before a Court of law, whether in a private matter or otherwise, their
cases are adjudicated on the basis of the merits of the case they
argue, and not and not by judging a person through the prism of
ideology or political affiliation.
162. Similarly, many persons are appointed to the Bench from the
Bar. Merely because they were once members of the Bar, have
professional associations, or friendships within the Bar, cannot be
viewed through the lens of bias. The relationship of a Judge with the
Bar and its members is a natural and necessary part of the justice
delivery system. However, the limits of such participation and
interaction are not to be dictated by a litigant, but by judicial ethics
and the discipline of the office itself.
163. If such a proposition is to be accepted, the same logic would
then apply to conferences on arbitration, intellectual property rights,
legal aid, or any other legal subject. Judges and lawyers participate in
such programmes regularly. Some are organised by Judges and some
by lawyers. Before sending invitations, do organisers ask what
ideology a lawyer follows, what religion he belongs to, or whether he
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appears for a particular political party? The argument, in itself, is
mischievous.
164. Such acceptance would also lead to judges avoiding and
declining intellectual engagements and social events organised by the
Bar and attended by the Bench, or organised by the Bench and
attended by the Bar. Judges, by this standard, would be forced to
withdraw from public legal discourse and from sharing their
experiences and knowledge with younger members of the Bar and
others. Further, the most dangerous outcome would be that judges
would become cautious even in performing their legitimate judicial
and academic duties, which they have historically been performing
for decades.
165. Judges, by attending programmes, symposiums, legal
discussions, and conferences in India as well as internationally,
contribute significantly to legal development and law reforms. This
is so common that even an ordinary, non-legal member of society
can observe it. At times, judges are also part of law-framing
discussions and legal education initiatives. Many District Court
Judges visit universities and schools as part of campaigns run by the
Delhi State Legal Services Authority (DSLSA), engaging with
students in schools and colleges.
166. Accepting recusal on a ground as frivolous as attending a
professional legal event, which in the perception of the litigant is
allegedly linked to an ideology that he, as a politician belonging to a
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rival political party, opposes, would therefore lead to consequences
far beyond the present individual case. This Court cannot, through
this judgment, pass an order which projects that it is normal to
intimidate judges merely because they attended professional legal
events organised by a group of lawyers. It would send a message to
society that the judiciary can be pressurised through insinuation, and
not by evidence which goes to the root of the alleged perception of
bias in the mind of the litigant. Such a perception of bias in the mind
of a litigant, who happens to be a political figure, cannot be used as a
weapon to intimidate a judge.
167. Thus, can a Judge attending a legal event and interacting with
the legal fraternity in, say, a women empowerment programme,
where only a speech is delivered on women empowerment or new
laws, be treated as evidence of bias? If such participation is used
against a judge by a litigant who, by going through social media
archives despite not having attended such events oneself, seeks
recusal without specifically pointing out any ideological or political
statement made by the judge at such an event, judges will eventually
stop contributing meaningfully to the legal community and society,
as they have historically done.
168. The judiciary cannot be placed in an ivory tower and
expected to live a life of complete seclusion, cut off from society,
organisations, and even the Bar. If that were so, how would Judges
understand the society in which people live and the realities of life
they are called upon to adjudicate?
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169. In this Court‟s view, the floodgates of courts cannot be
opened for litigants to plant seeds of distrust, suspicion, and mistrust
merely on the basis of what they feel, such as personal unease,
dislike for a place, or dislike for an organisation visited by a Judge.
The issue then lies in the mind of the litigant who, because he
follows a particular ideology and opposes another, begins to treat
every person attending such a function as aligned against him.
Therefore, merely because a litigant cannot tolerate people associated
with a particular ideology, and despite there being no ground, reason,
evidence, or material on record – as was admitted by him in Court
when he clarified that this Court had neither made any political
statement nor followed the ideology of the said body – he cannot be
permitted to cast allegations against a Judge who has merely attended
a programme organised by a body of advocates.
170. Impartiality is a presumption in favour of a Judge, just as
integrity is presumed in favour of every constitutional functionary
upon taking oath of office. Impartiality is not only a legal
requirement but also an ethical one. When a Judge takes oath of
office, there arises a presumption that she will discharge her duties
fairly, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.
171. When a person seeks recusal of a Judge, that presumption of
impartiality has to be rebutted by the litigant raising such a plea.
Mere apprehension or personal perception is not enough. Even when
an advocate, after practising for several years, is elevated to the
Bench, there is a presumption that upon taking oath as a Judge, he or
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she will act impartially towards all, irrespective of the positions
earlier held, including appearances for the Government or any other
party. In this regard, a reference can be made to the decision in
Trishala v. M.V. Sundar Raj: (2010) 15 SCC 714, where an
objection was raised before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that one of
the appellants before the High Court was a municipal corporator, and
the learned Judge who had passed the impugned order had, while
practising at the Bar, served as Standing Counsel for the Municipal
Corporation. On that basis, it was argued that the learned Judge
ought to have recused himself from hearing the appeal. It was also
pointed out that in another matter, the same learned Judge had
recused himself. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court rejected the plea and
held that merely because the learned Judge had earlier served as
Standing Counsel for the Municipal Corporation, he was not
precluded from hearing a case where a corporator was a party in his
personal capacity. It was observed that past professional association,
by itself, does not create a ground for recusal unless there is a direct
nexus with the lis in question, and the fact that the learned Judge had
recused in another matter was held to be irrelevant.
172. The real test of absence of bias is whether, despite personal
experiences, professional associations, or past positions, the Judge is
able to approach the case with an open mind and decide it fairly.
Since there is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality attached
to every Judge, it cannot be lightly displaced merely because an
argument of apprehension of bias is raised.
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173. In the present case, the litigant did not even quote a single line
from any speech delivered by this Court at such functions, nor did he
point out any specific context from which such an apprehension of
bias could reasonably arise. In fact, he himself admitted that this
Court had neither made any political speech nor expressed any
ideological opinion at any such programme. In the absence of any
material to the contrary, merely attending legal programmes or
delivering lectures cannot be held against a Judge. The allegation that
this Court may be “sympathising” with a body of lawyers merely
because it attended such programmes, without any specific act,
statement, or conduct to support such an inference, is wholly vague
and deserves to be rejected.
G. ALLEGED APPREHENSION OF BIAS ARISING OUT OF
PROFESSIONAL ENGAGEMENTS OF RELATIVES & THE
ALLEGED ‘CONFLICT OF INTEREST’.
174. Another argument was put forth by applicant Sh. Arvind
Kejriwal, that he was strongly affected by certain social media posts
which, according to him, showed that there was a conflict of interest
of this Court in the present case. To further support his argument,
applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal also filed an additional affidavit –
after the judgment had been reserved by this Court, on his mere
mentioning to file it in the Court – relying upon RTI reply, which
had been sought by a person unconnected with the present case and
was thereafter circulated on social media, with claims that a large
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number of cases had been marked by the Central Government to
certain family members of this Court in the last three-four years.
175. Notably, in response to the said affidavit, the CBI drew the
attention of this Court to the fact that even the information obtained
under the RTI Act had been deliberately misrepresented in the public
domain. It was pointed out that the information supplied under the
RTI Act merely reflected the “number of dockets” issued to panel
lawyers and not the number of independent matters allotted to them,
and that a “docket” does not mean a separate case. Once a matter is
assigned to a panel lawyer, a fresh docket is generated each time that
matter is listed before the Court. Thus, if one single matter is listed
20 times, 20 dockets may be issued for the same matter. Even on
occasions where the Court may not hold sitting but the matter
remains on board, dockets are issued as part of listing and
communication.
176. Thus, it was pointed out by the CBI that the figures mentioned
by applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal in his additional affidavit, and
which are being circulated on social media at his behest, as the
“number of cases assigned,” were factually incorrect and
mischievously projected, since they only reflected the number of
dockets and not the number of separate matters marked to a counsel.
The CBI also specifically stated that neither of the relatives of this
Court had dealt with, assisted in, or appeared in any matter connected
with the present case pertaining to the Delhi Excise Policy at any
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stage before any Court, nor had they been involved in the present
proceedings in any capacity whatsoever.
177. In the opinion of this Court, even if relatives of this Court are
empanelled on Government panels, the litigant is still required to
show the proximity, relevance, and impact of such empanelment on
the present case or on the decision-making power of this Court. No
such nexus has been shown. The independent professional
engagements of the relatives of this Court have no connection
whatsoever with the present dispute, nor do they create any financial
or personal stake of this Court in the outcome of these proceedings.
178. The learned Solicitor General also highlighted the manner in
which a social media campaign had been built around this issue. This
Court, though takes notice of the same, is of the opinion that courts,
while deciding cases, are bound by their oath to the Constitution and
have to deliver justice as per law, by remaining unaffected by any
narratives created in the public domain. This Court, having served as
a Judge for nearly thirty-four years, is adequately trained to pay little
heed to what may be said on social media, whatever be the intent or
motive behind it. Although, when such campaigns are sought to be
brought into judicial proceedings to cast aspersions on the integrity
of a Judge, the Court may take note of the seriousness of such
attempts, yet judicial decisions are rendered on the basis of law and
the record before it, not on social media perceptions.
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179. This issue however needs to be addressed. Merely because a
Judge takes an oath of office, her family does not take an oath that
they will not enter this profession or do well in it. The spouses,
siblings and children of a large number of judges may be in the same
profession. If the children of a judge, such as in the present case,
were born to her when she was a Judicial Magistrate, and chose to
walk the same path, decide to pursue the same profession, that
circumstance cannot be exploited. A litigant cannot dictate how the
children or family members of a Judge are to live their lives, whether
they must rise through their own struggles and hard work, or whether
they should be prevented from doing so. In the absence of any proof
beyond doubt that the office of the Judge has been misused for the
benefit of her children or family, even a whisper of such allegations
cannot be permitted.
180. It may also be noted that there have been judges who were
earlier Government Pleaders, Panel/Standing Counsels and who had
appeared along with the highest law officers appointed by any
Government whether at the centre or the State. This has been the case
in the past, continues in the present, and will continue in the future.
Similarly, the children of judges may assist the Government on their
own strength, because they too possess their own fundamental rights.
If others can be empanelled, why should the family members of
judges be excluded from such empanelment, unless it is proved that
they were not entitled to it?
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181. In the absence of any bias or doubt regarding their integrity or
ability, how can anyone question this? If the sons or wives of
politicians can become politicians, there have also been instances at
the Bar which have produced stellar judges who were themselves the
children of politicians, yet not a single finger has been raised
regarding their bias. This Court wonders that if the test of
„apprehension bias‟ relates to whether the children or spouses of
judges are empanelled by the Central Government, the Judge should
not hear such cases, then a large part of the judiciary, from the
District Courts to the highest Court, would have to recuse from
hearing such matters.
182. Therefore, if the wife of a politician can be a politician without
having to explain her expertise or experience in that field, and if the
children of politicians can enter politics, how would it be just to
question the children of a Judge who study like others, struggle like
others, and prove themselves in Court like others to earn their
livelihood? Accepting such an argument would mean taking away
the fundamental rights of the family members of judges, as if merely
because their parent is a Judge, their spouse is a Judge, their sibling
is a Judge, they can never enter the legal profession.
183. The Constitution of India does not bar a lawyer from holding
or being associated with any particular ideology, nor does it prohibit
a lawyer from representing the State or the Central Government at
any stage of his or her professional career. Many lawyers, at different
points in their professional lives, represent State Governments, the
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Central Government, their departments, local bodies, and public
undertakings before courts of law. Such empanelment follows a
defined process and specific criteria.
184. There is no dearth of examples which demonstrate this
principle. The legal history of this country itself provides instances
where persons who had held important governmental positions, later
adorned the Bench and discharged their judicial duties with
distinction. There have been Judges of the Supreme Court of India
who had earlier served as Ministers in a particular government or
Member of Parliament and yet went on to author some of the most
remarkable judgments in our judicial history and decided thousands
of cases. Never was their integrity questioned merely because of their
earlier association with a government.
185. The insinuation that mere empanelment on a Government
panel necessarily gives rise to a conflict of interest or affects judicial
impartiality is itself misplaced. Empanelment as a Government
counsel is a professional engagement and nothing more. Moreover, a
Judge cannot be judged on the basis of the independent professional
choices of family members who are not even connected with the lis
before the Court. To suggest otherwise would mean that merely
because a person is elevated to the Bench, the family members of
that Judge must give up their independent professional engagements
or their empanelment with the Government. Such a proposition is
neither supported by law nor by constitutional principles.
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186. Let us explain this to the recusal applicants by way of a
judicial precedent which was decided by one of the judges of this
Court in similar facts and circumstances. A case came before a
brother Judge of this Court, now retired, a few years back. It began
with a concern raised by the petitioners therein, including a former
Chief Minister of a state, who pointed out that the Judge shared a
relationship with the then Attorney General of the country, against
whom they had their own grievances. To them, this was enough to
raise a doubt – would the Judge remain completely impartial? The
Bench in question did not brush aside this concern. Instead, it paused
and examined it carefully. It acknowledged the relationship openly,
without any denial or hesitation. But then came the real question:
does knowing someone, even closely, mean that one cannot decide
fairly? The answer was clear. A judge does not carry personal
equations into the courtroom. The Bench noted that it had no stake in
the outcome of the case, no interest to protect, and nothing to gain.
The relationship, by itself, did not create any real danger of bias. The
Bench went a step further too. It reflected upon the innuendos the
petitioners were really suggesting. If their argument were to be
accepted, it would mean that the Attorney General would try to
influence the Judge, and that the Judge would allow himself to be
influenced. The Judge then turned towards the oath he had taken. His
duty was to the Constitution and the law, nothing else. He was
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made something very clear. If at any point he felt even a slight doubt
in his own mind about his ability to decide the case fairly, he would
step aside on his own. But in the case before him, there was no such
doubt. And so, with that clarity, the Judge declined the request for
recusal. The story leaves behind a simple thought: A judge may
know people, may hear allegations, may face doubts, but what
matters is whether those doubts are real, reasonable, and grounded in
fact. Not every apprehension can become a reason to step aside. The
conclusion of the story is one: recusal denied. For reference, the
observations in the case of Virbhadra Singh & Anr. v. Central
Bureau of Investigation & Ors.: 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7747 (Vipin
Sanghi, J.) are set out below:
“29. Coming to the submission of the petitioners that I should
recuse from the case on account of my relationship with the
learned Attorney General Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, in my view, the
same is not a reason good enough for me to accede to the said
request made by the petitioners. My relationship with Mr.
Mukul Rohatgi does not pose a real danger of bias against the
petitioners. That relationship does not give rise to a real or
reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of the petitioners. I
have no interest in promoting the cause of either party to this
case. I am not personally interested in the outcome of the case,
and the effect that the same would have on the rights or
position of the parties.
30.The petitioners have made allegations against Mr. Mukul
Rohatgi -the learned Attorney General, with regard to his
alleged hostility with the petitioner no. 1 and his alleged deeds
to harass the petitioner no. 1. It is not for me to judge the
correctness of the allegations made by the petitioners qua Mr.
Mukul Rohatgi. Assuming, for the sake of arguments, that the
allegations made by the petitioners against Mr. Mukul Rohatgi,
the learned Attorney General and the political Party in power at
the Centre are true, it does not follow that I, on account of my
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exhibit a sense of bias in my functioning as a Judge of this
Court. Mr. Justice Joseph in the Supreme Court Advocates on
Record Association (supra) observed in paragraph 75 as
follows:
“75. Ultimately, the question is whether a fair-minded and
reasonably informed person, on correct facts, would
reasonably entertain a doubt on the impartiality of the
Judge. The reasonableness of the apprehension must be
assessed in the light of the oath of office he has taken as a
Judge to administer justice without fear or favour, affection
or ill will and his ability to carry out the oath by reason of
his training and experience whereby he is in a position to
disabuse his mind of any irrelevant personal belief or
predisposition or unwarranted apprehensions of his image
in public or difficulty in deciding a controversial issue
particularly when the same is highly sensitive.”
31. In my view, if the aforesaid test were to be applied, it
cannot be said that the petitioners have any basis to have any
reasonable apprehension that I would deal with this case with a
bias against the petitioners.
32. The expression of apprehension of bias against the
petitioners, on account of my relationship with Mr. Mukul
Rohatgi, the learned Attorney General, carries with it the
innuendo that:
(a) Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, the learned Attorney General (who
allegedly is inimical towards the petitioner no. 1 – though
there is no established basis for it) would, in breach of his
professional ethics as an Advocate, and my constitutional
independence, speak to me about the present case.
(b) That he would speak to me, so as to influence me in
forming an opinion against the petitioners.
(c) That I would entertain such a conversation with anyone,
including Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, the learned Attorney General
in respect of a cause being dealt with by me as a judge.
(d) That I would, on such talk or persuasion by Mr. Mukul
Rohatgi, give in, and thereby betray the trust and
confidence reposed in me by the President of India in
appointing me as a Judge of this Court, as well as breach
my oath of office and fall in my own estimation by killing
my conscience.
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33. There is absolutely no basis for entertainment of the
apprehension expressed by the petitioners in my independence
to decide the present petition entirely on its merits, and merits
alone. There is no justification for, or reasonableness in
entertainment of any such belief by the petitioners.
34. As a Judge of this Court, I owe my allegiance only to the
Constitution of India and the laws of the land. I am completely
independent – financially and otherwise, and I am not
subordinate to any one, much less to the learned Attorney
General Mr. Mukul Rohatgi – either on account of his office, or
on account of my personal relationship with him. I am fully
conscious of my responsibilities as a Judge of this Court, and
the trust that has been reposed in me – including in my integrity
and my independence, by the President of India in appointing
me as a Judge of this Court. I am sworn (by my oath of office)
to do my duty faithfully, and to the best of my ability,
knowledge and judgment and to perform the duties of my
office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. Like all men,
I am my own conscience keeper. I would myself recuse from a
case if I have even the slightest inkling or doubt in my mind
that I would not be able to decide the cause freely or
independently, or that it would be improper for me to judge a
cause, even though, I find myself in no way incapable of
judging the cause independently and fairly…”
187. In the present case too, the expression of apprehension of bias
raised by the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal on this ground carries
certain aspects: (a) that since allocation of certain Government
matters is undertaken by the learned Solicitor General of India, who
is presently appearing before this Court on behalf of the CBI, the
independent professional engagements of the relatives of this Court
would create a channel of influence in the present proceedings; (b)
that such professional work undertaken by the relatives of this Court,
would mean that the Solicitor General, or the Government, could
directly or indirectly influence the judicial decision-making of this
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Court; (c) that this Court would permit or entertain any such
influence in relation to a matter being adjudicated by it; and (d) that
this Court would, on account of such perceived association,
compromise the constitutional trust reposed in it, betray the oath of
office taken as a Judge, and decide the case otherwise than on the
basis of law, record, and judicial conscience.
188. It must be mentioned here, that the relatives of this Court,
whose empanelment has been referred to by the applicant Sh. Arvind
Kejriwal, have no connection whatsoever with the dispute in
question. They have neither dealt with nor assisted in any matter
relating to the present Delhi Excise Policy case at any stage before
any Court, nor have they been involved in these proceedings in any
capacity. They have no proximity to the lis, nor can they be
perceived as having any bearing on the outcome of the present case.
They have no pecuniary interest, advisory role, or any stake in the
issue involved in the lis. They are neither directly nor indirectly
concerned with, or connected to, the subject matter of the present
proceedings.
189. Therefore, even in such a situation, if the line of reasoning
given by the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal was to be accepted, it
would mean that only because relatives of this Court are empanelled
on a Central Government panel, this Court should never hear any
matter in which the Union of India is a party, or where the Solicitor
General appears on behalf of the Union or any of its departments etc.
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190. It should also mean that a Judge whose family members are
empanelled as panel counsel for the Government would be
disqualified from hearing any matter where the Government is a
party. Thousands of cases before constitutional courts involve the
Union Government or the State Government in one form or another.
Similarly, in criminal cases, the State is invariably a party to the lis.
By that logic, even if a relative is empanelled by the State
Government on the civil side, or say as a prosecutor before the Trial
Court, the Judge would be expected never to sit on the criminal roster
in the High Court at all, since the same Government also appears
through the State in all criminal proceedings. A litigant could then
conveniently argue that the Court would have a conflict of interest
merely because the State is a party to the proceedings, or because a
Standing Counsel or Law Officer representing the Government is
appearing before it. Such a proposition is neither supported by law
nor by reason or any rationale or practice followed in the High Court,
and cannot be accepted as a valid ground for alleging bias or seeking
recusal of a court of law.
191. The argument also raises a larger question as to what
exactly is being insinuated by the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal.
Is it being suggested that the relatives of this Court survive only on
income earned from the cases marked to them as part of these
empanelments; or that this Court itself is dependent upon, or
influenced by, the earnings of its family members? Is it being
suggested that a Judge of this High Court, who draws salary, status,
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and constitutional responsibility from judicial office, would
compromise judicial independence because of the professional
engagements of family members pursuing their own careers? Such an
insinuation is not only unfounded, but the same also overlooks the
very nature of judicial office and the independence attached to it.
192. To summarise, in this Court‟s view, there is a clear distinction
between a genuine conflict of interest and an attempt by a litigant to
create an impression of one. A litigant, instead of seeking justice,
cannot be permitted to create a situation that lowers the judicial
process itself by raising unfounded allegations. A “conflict of
interest” arises only where there exists a real, direct, and substantial
connection or interest which may affect the impartiality of the Judge.
It cannot be assumed, imagined, or inferred from remote
circumstances; it must rest on tangible material and a clear nexus
with the lis before the Court, which is absent in the present case.
193. In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v.
Union of India: (2016) 5 SCC 808, a prayer for recusal was made
before the Constitution Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, which
was considering the constitutional validity of the 99th Constitutional
Amendment relating to the National Judicial Appointments
Commission (NJAC). It was argued that one of the Hon‟ble Judges
on the Bench, being a member of the existing collegium system, had
an interest in the outcome of the case since, if the amendment were
struck down, the collegium system would continue and he would
retain the constitutional role attached to it. On that basis, it was
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contended that he should recuse from hearing the matter. The
Constitution Bench had rejected the said plea. The Hon‟ble Supreme
Court, while dealing with the issue of recusal, had summarized the
governing principles in paragraph 25 of the judgment as follows:
“25. From the above decisions, in our opinion, the following
principles emerge:
25.1. If a Judge has a financial interest in the outcome of a
case, he is automatically disqualified from hearing the case.
25.2. In cases where the interest of the Judge in the case is
other than financial, then the disqualification is not automatic
but an enquiry is required whether the existence of such an
interest disqualifies the Judge tested in the light of either on the
principle of “real danger” or “reasonable apprehension” of
bias.
25.3. The Pinochet case [R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate, exp Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), (2000) 1
AC 119 : (1999) 2 WLR 272 : (1999) 1 All ER 577 (HL)]
added a new category i.e. that the Judge is automatically
disqualified from hearing a case where the Judge is interested
in a cause which is being promoted by one of the parties to the
case.”
194. One of the Hon‟ble Judges, whose recusal had been sought in
the above-cited case, had also penned a separate opinion and
observed:
“56. Despite the factual position noticed above, I wish to
record that it is not their persuasion or exhortation, which made
me take a final call on the matter. The decision to remain a
member of the reconstituted Bench was mine, and mine alone.
The choice that I made, was not of the heart, but that of the
head. The choice was made by posing two questions to myself.
Firstly, whether a Judge hearing a matter should recuse, even
though the prayer for recusal is found to be unjustified and
unwarranted? Secondly, whether I would stand true to the oath
of my office, if I recused from hearing the matters?
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57. …In my considered view, the prayer for my recusal is not
well founded. If I were to accede to the prayer for my
recusal, I would be initiating a wrong practice, and laying
down a wrong precedent. A Judge may recuse at his own,
from a case entrusted to him by the Chief Justice. That would
be a matter of his own choosing. But recusal at the asking of a
litigating party, unless justified, must never be acceded to. For
that would give the impression, that the Judge had been scared
out of the case, just by the force of the objection. A Judge
before he assumes his office, takes an oath to discharge his
duties without fear or favour. He would breach his oath of
office, if he accepts a prayer for recusal, unless justified. It
is my duty to discharge my responsibility with absolute
earnestness and sincerity. It is my duty to abide by my oath
of office to uphold the Constitution and the laws. My
decision to continue to be a part of the Bench, flows from
the oath which I took, at the time of my elevation to this
Court.”
(emphasis added)
195. As an officer of the Court, I am also conscious of the fact that
a lie or a false imputation, even if repeated a thousand times in Court
of law or on social media, does not become the truth; it remains false,
and truth does not lose its strength merely because falsehood is
repeated more often. Truth, even if softly spoken and supported by
conviction and reason, is always stronger and more lasting than an
argument made only to damage the reputation of a Court and the
credibility of an institution.
H. CONSIDERATION OF TODAY’S WRITTEN
SUBMISSIONS AND CONTRADICTORY STAND OF THE
APPLICANT SH. ARVIND KEJRIWAL
196. The written submissions, in rejoinder, placed on record by the
applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal today, makes for an interesting
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reading. He states in his written submissions that he never argued,
and does not even argue now, that where a Judge‟s relative holds a
Government panel, such Judge should automatically recuse. He,
however, submits that the alleged „conflict of interest‟ in the present
case arises from the specific fact that the learned Solicitor General
exercises control over the allocation of work to the relatives of this
Court.
197. These two statements, when read together, are clearly
contradictory. While on one hand, the applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal
submits that mere empanelment would not require recusal, on the
other hand, he seeks recusal of this Court on the very same
circumstance, namely, the allocation of work to such panel counsels
who are relatives of this Court.
198. It is also noted by this Court that, in the additional affidavit
earlier filed by the applicant himself, it has been specifically stated
that, as per the established procedure, it is the learned Solicitor
General who marks cases to all panel lawyers. In that view of the
matter, the argument now sought to be advanced appears to be self-
contradictory, since if the marking of cases to panel counsels is done
by a particular Law Officer, it is not done only for a selectively
chosen lawyer pointed out by name by the applicant, but for all panel
lawyers. It is not the case that such allocation is made only to the
relatives of this Court and to no other panel counsel.
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199. This Court notes that in the written submissions filed today, at
one stage, the applicant asserts that mere empanelment is not
sufficient to warrant recusal, and at another stage, he contends that
recusal is required in this case precisely because work is allocated to
the relatives of this Court, who are on Government panels, by the
learned Solicitor General. These two positions cannot stand together,
being inherently inconsistent. The question, therefore, arises as to
why this Court is being selectively targeted on that basis and why the
applicant is taking a stand contrary to his own earlier pleadings and
submissions in support of the recusal application.
200. The applicant has further stated that the CBI, by arguing that
such a standard would disqualify learned Judges across the country,
has falsely widened the controversy, mischievously dragged the
entire judiciary into the present lis, and that such a stand borders on
contempt. He has even reserved liberty to initiate appropriate
contempt proceedings against the CBI officer who signed such
written submissions.
201. This submission also stands in contrast with the position taken
by the applicant himself. When the applicant seeks to target one
Judge and raises allegations concerning the Judge and her family, it
is not considered by him to be an attempt affecting the dignity of the
institution; however, when the CBI responds to the very same
argument by pointing out its wider implications for the judiciary, the
same is termed as bordering on contempt.
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202. The applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal has also stated that it is
unfortunate that the CBI is seeking to malign the entire judiciary in
order to have this matter heard by a particular Judge. In this regard, it
is to be noted that when similar allegations and assertions are made
by the applicant himself against this Court, the same are not
considered by him as amounting to any such attempt to malign the
judiciary.
I. JUSTICE SHOULD NOT ONLY BE DONE, BUT SEEN TO
BE DONE
203. There is no doubt that Justice should not only be done but seen
to be done, however, this Court also unhesitatingly, adds to it, that
justice should not only be done but it should also be seen that it
cannot be manipulated, intimidated or bend pressure of any kind
especially a powerful person of the society. It is to ensure that not
only one litigant‟s trust in the Judiciary is maintained, but the trust of
the entire community and the country is not shaken by mere
insinuations and accusations amplified by arguments in the Court and
social media. Justice should not only be done but also be seen to
be done, without being clouded or intimidated by unfounded
perceptions.
(i) Mere Unease or Anxiety of a Litigant Cannot Be a Ground
for Recusal
204. The question which also arises is – who is to evaluate the
appearance of such justice being done? Is it to be judged solely by a
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litigant who feels uneasy only because he apprehends that he may not
receive a favourable order, or is it to be assessed by the standard of a
reasonable and informed person?
205. A litigant may not always be successful before a Court of law.
The concern raised by applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal is, at best, a
general concern which any litigant may have, when he apprehends
that the relief granted to him by the learned Trial Court may be
reversed by a higher Court. However, there is nothing unusual in a
High Court examining the correctness of a judgment passed by a
learned Trial Court. It is equally not uncommon for a Trial Court
judgment to be set aside by the High Court, or for a High Court
judgment to be set aside by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. That is the
very structure of judicial hierarchy and appellate scrutiny. It is only
the higher Court which can determine whether a judgment is one-
sided, contrary to law, or against the principles of natural justice. To
argue before a High Court, for instance, that the learned Trial Court‟s
opinion regarding the evidentiary value of approvers is necessarily
better than the prima facie view expressed by this Court, only shows
that the argument is not based on settled legal principles or judicial
precedents.
206. Even while dictating judgments, a Court does not build its
inclination towards any party. Our adversarial system of adjudication
requires a Court to hear both sides with an open mind and without
any predetermined opinion of its own. It is this system which ensures
that judicial decisions are governed only by law, the record, and
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judicial conscience, and not by any other factor. Thus, such fear of a
litigant cannot be sufficient to conclude that the Judge, who is yet to
hear the challenge to the impugned order, is biased, merely because
the litigant apprehends that the relief granted to him by the learned
Trial Court may not be upheld.
207. The general unease of a litigant, or the apprehension that this
Court might not grant him relief, must remain far below the elevated
threshold required for a Judge to recuse. The test of apprehension of
bias also cannot rest entirely upon the subjective perception of a
litigant, who merely fears that the Judge may not grant him relief in
view of adverse orders suffered by him in the past, and therefore
seeks recusal.
208. Just as a litigant is entitled to raise a genuine apprehension of
bias, the Judge is equally duty-bound to examine whether the
strategy adopted in seeking recusal is itself motivated and not based
on any real or reasonable perception of bias. The appearance of
justice cannot be determined solely by a litigant who himself admits
that his apprehensions arise from reasons which do not objectively
exist.
209. Reasonable apprehension of bias, therefore, cannot be based
on imagination or personal perceptions of a litigant who is guided by
his own concerns or interests. In Chandra Kumar Chopra v. Union
of India: (2012) 6 SCC 369, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court reiterated
that an apprehension of bias cannot be based on imagination or mere
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suspicion, but must be in accord with the prudence of a reasonable
person. It was observed that while the principle that justice must not
only be done but also be seen to be done is of great importance, the
same has to be tested on the basis of material placed on record. The
Court cautioned that wild, irrelevant, or imaginary allegations made
to frustrate proceedings cannot be equated with a reasonable
apprehension of bias, and that such a principle cannot be invoked in a
vacuum without any substantive foundation.
210. The anxiety of applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal as well as other
recusal applicants also could not be fully understood by this Court
because, fortunately for them, this Court is not the final Court of law
and any order passed by this Court is open to challenge before the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court. Notably, as has been repeatedly
mentioned by the recusal applicants, especially Sh. Arvind
Kejriwal, all orders passed by this Court are eventually
overturned by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. If that be their own
perception and the trend noted by them, then this Court sees
little reason for such anxiety.
211. To conclude, mere unease is wholly insufficient for a Judge to
recuse. Allegations of even perceived bias must have some
connection with reality. Suspicion without substance, and
apprehension without foundation, cannot become grounds to seek
recusal of a Judge
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CONCLUSION
212. I, today, for nearly thirty-four years, have sat on this side of
the Bench – listening more than speaking, deciding more than
reacting. Faces have changed, causes have changed, times have
changed, but the oath has remained constant. It has asked for little,
and demanded everything: patience in provocation, silence in
criticism, and faith in the process even when it is questioned.
(i) Test of Bias Cannot Be Manufactured by a Litigant
213. This Court has already undergone every test that the law and
the constitutional framework requires before assuming judicial office
– first as a Judicial officer, and eventually being elevated to the Delhi
High Court. The Judicial Career expanding over 34 years has tested
me on touchstone of not only legal issues but also on ethical
parameters expected of a judge, as any other judge on the Bench with
variable judicial and legal experience and law degree.
214. However, it now appears that Judges would have to pass an
additional test put forth by litigants seeking recusal to prove that they
are fit to hear their cases.
215. According to the line of argument of applicant Sh. Arvind
Kejriwal, the pre-qualification for any Judge to hear his matter would
be that – firstly, the Judge should not have attended any programme
organised by Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad, a body of lawyers,
since he personally disagrees with its ideology, or any other such
public engagement with lawyers whose ideology he may not agree
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with; and secondly, that no member of the Judge‟s family should
have been empanelled by the Central Government on any of its
panels. Nevertheless, he has not clarified what his position would be
with respect to those Judges who themselves had earlier appeared for
Governments, were on Government panels, or served as law officers
or senior counsel for the Government before being elevated to the
Bench.
216. Be that as it may, if such a standard is to be accepted, Judges
would not only have to satisfy this newly manufactured test, but
would also have to ensure that their families are virtually sent into
exile from the legal profession, merely because they chose law as
their profession while exercising their fundamental right to
livelihood and choice of profession. Such a test of bias cannot be
manufactured by a litigant, nor can judicial impartiality be measured
by such personal standards of a litigant.
217. A High Court judge cannot be judged on the touchstone of
mere perception, suspicion, or personal belief, or misbelief, of a
litigant. The standard is that of a reasonable person, and not of an
individual who may be guided by his own concerns or interests or
ideologies. A judge cannot abandon judicial responsibility in the face
of unfounded allegations. If such a course is adopted, it would
become impossible for the courts in this country to function
independently.
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218. It is also to be noted that personal attacks on a judge are, in
effect, attacks on the institution itself. The scars of such attacks,
especially if recusal is allowed on such grounds, are not temporary.
They are borne by the institution for a long time. If, merely because
allegations are made, the judge steps aside, it may create an
impression that such allegations have some basis. However, judicial
duty cannot be guided by such pressures. The matter must be dealt
with in accordance with law, so that there remains no room for any
genuine doubt, and the integrity of the process is preserved.
(ii) The Catch-22 of Recusal: A Litigant’s Win Regardless of
the Outcome
219. The self represented litigant by his arguments has also invited
this Court to a catch-22 situation in the present case, which appears
to create a win-win situation for the self-represented litigant. If this
Court were to recuse on account of the accusations, the litigant
would be in a position to claim before the country that his allegations
had substance and proof and therefore, the judge has recused.
220. At the same time, if this Court does not recuse and the litigant
ultimately fails to obtain relief on merits, he may say that he had
already predicted such an outcome. On the other hand, if he succeeds
in obtaining relief, he may again claim that the Court had acted under
pressure or fear. Thus, whichever way the matter proceeds, the
litigant may attempt to portray the situation in a manner that suits his
narrative.
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221. Judges are bound by the discipline of their office and
ordinarily speak only through their orders and judgments. If such
applications and applicants are entertained, and judges bow down to
such vilification and sustained, systematic attacks on them, it would
not merely be an attack on an individual Judge but on the institution
itself. Today it may be this Court; tomorrow it may be another. Such
a malaise would travel not only to the higher courts but also to the
District Courts.
222. The jurisprudence of recusal has historically guarded against
recusal merely at the asking of a litigant. The underlying reason is
that the societal repercussions of entertaining such recusal
applications, the institutional consequences, and the harm it may
cause to judicial independence have always weighed heavily in the
minds of the judges of the Supreme Court as well as this Court. The
judicial precedents cited by this Court in the preceding discussion
would also show that the path of recusal, sought by a litigant on
unfounded grounds and unreasonable apprehensions, has been
consciously avoided, even on allegations almost identical to those
alleged against this Court.
223. Another issue that arises in the mind of this Court is that if this
Court, by penning a judgment of recusal, gives an impression to the
community that it can be intimidated by a political litigant, it would
undermine the very duty of this Court to preserve confidence in the
institution and never allow it to be weakened either by its own acts or
by the acts of a litigant.
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224. A recusal would also lead the public to believe that judges are
aligned to a particular political party or ideology, though their oath
commands them to remain neutral adjudicators. This Court, by
penning a recusal, cannot allow courts to turn into battlegrounds
where the judge‟s ideology and competence are questioned by
litigants, instead of the judge neutrally adjudicating upon the
criminality of the acts of a litigant or the parties, as the case may be.
225. Further, if this Court were to pen a recusal, it would open the
doors for powerful litigants to attack judges, their families, and even
their attendance at certain functions, making it a routine tool for
forum shopping by giving it legality through such recusal. If a
litigant wishes to go hunting – first for the judge deciding his case,
and then for the Bench he prefers to appear before – it would not
only delay the delivery of justice but would also place the other side,
which may not have similar resources, at a serious disadvantage.
(iii) Whether this Court must give an ‘Agni Pariksha’?
226. The learned senior counsel Sh. Hegde, appearing for applicant
Sh. Manish Sisodia, addressed a very enlightening argument, by
referring to the example of „Agni Pariksha‟, which as per him, Mata
Sita had to give not once but twice, through which he sought to
convey that there are situations in life where, despite one‟s integrity
and purity being intact, one is still called upon to prove it again and
again.
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227. This Court is thankful for this enlightening and novel
argument. However, today, if this Court is being asked to undergo an
Agni Pariksha by an accused who stands discharged – which means
he has not been acquitted, but has only been let off at this stage by
the first Court of jurisdiction on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence – this Court must counter-question as to why a Judge
should be asked to undergo such an Agni Pariksha at the mere asking
of an accused who harbours apprehensions or misbeliefs about the
Judge being biased, merely because he fears that the Judge may
ultimately render a verdict not in his favour? No lawyer or litigant
can enter a Court with a guarantee that the case will necessarily be
decided in his or her favour. Until a matter is finally decided by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court of this country, subject of course to the legal
exceptions, no judicial determination attains finality. The same
principle applies in the present case as well.
(iv) Judicial Integrity Cannot Be Put to Trial by a Litigant
228. While it can be understood that an accused may wish to prove
that he is clean and honest, in that process he cannot be permitted to
attempt to prove that the Judge herself is tainted. Such taint may not
always be insinuated in terms of money; it may also be suggested in
terms of perceived or imaginary biases of a mind which begins to
look at everyone with suspicion, believing that no one will do justice
to him. The applicant Sh. Arvind Kejriwal began his arguments with
a sentence in the open Court, as he argued in the mix of Hindi and
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English language, that “Mai aapki bohot izzat karta hu”, that he has
highest regards and respect for this Court, and is not doubting its
integrity on any account, and as he further states in his Additional
Affidavit in paragraph 16 that he is “not alleging actual bias, nor
attributing any improper motive to this Court”.
229. The rules of natural justice must apply equally when a
Judge is judging a litigant and when a litigant seeks to judge a
Judge. Can it be said that, without any material on record, a Judge
can be placed under a veil of suspicion merely on the basis of
apprehension? For a litigant, the Judge is expected to follow the
principles of natural justice, evaluate material, and decide in
accordance with law and reason. The same fairness must apply when
allegations are sought to be made against a Judge. Even a political
leader, howsoever powerful or influential he may be, cannot be
permitted to weaken or damage an institution by making insinuations
against a Judge without any material.
(v) If I were to withdraw readily…
230. There can be no doubt that I had to walk the tight-rope of
deciding whether to recuse or to continue hearing the matter, while
following my duty to uphold principle and the oath taken to dispense
justice. I had to balance the duty to recuse, so as to avoid even the
appearance of bias, with the duty to decide the case, assigned to it as
per its roster, so as to ensure that justice is not evaded or delayed by
mere insinuations of perceived bias raised by a litigant.
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231. This Court would certainly withdraw where it is convinced
that there exists a real conflict of interest and where recusal is
genuinely warranted. It has done so in multiple cases in the recent
past as well as earlier, sometimes even without any party raising an
objection, and at times despite parties themselves stating that they
had no objection to this Court adjudicating the matter. In such
situations, to ensure that justice is not only done but is also seen to be
done, this Court has directed transfer of such matters to other
Benches, including cases falling within the MP/MLA category.
232. However, a judicial function cannot be surrendered by a
Judge, nor can a Judge surrender her reputation to the mere
perception of a litigant. This Court understands that, being a Judge, it
is not required to respond to criticism, including criticism in the
public domain that may at times be unjustified or baseless. At the
same time, it is equally aware that it is not expected to submit to
unfounded allegations on its integrity, to permit aspersions to be cast
on its fairness, or to succumb to allegations of perceived bias while
adjudicating judicial proceedings. In the opinion of this Court, that
would amount to failing to perform its duty.
233. If I were to withdraw readily without hearing arguments
on these applications, I would be abandoning my adjudicatory
responsibility in the face of perceived allegations by a litigant who
himself repeatedly stated during arguments that he does not doubt the
integrity of the Judge, but questioned what he should do with his
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own mind, which makes him believe that he will not get justice from
this Court.
234. Illusions and speculations of the kind, as discussed above, on
the part of a litigant cannot take the place of reasonable
apprehension. Unfounded allegations cannot be given credibility
merely because this Court chooses the easier path of stepping away
to avoid the mud being slung at herself and her family. The test of
perceived bias must also be whether such perception is objective and
founded on some tangible material, or whether it is merely the
suspicion of a litigant arising out of political disagreement with a
party which, in his own estimation or imagination, he believes this
Court may be following.
235. A recusal penned by this Court would also carry deeper
constitutional ramifications, and this Court must briefly capture that
concern in this judgment. Judicial independence has to be guarded by
every Judge – not only by being fair to both parties in a case, but also
by protecting the institution from being targeted, maligned,
intimidated, and from allowing the jurisprudence of recusal to be
reshaped by media pressure or litigant pressure.
THE END…
236. Before I conclude, I must record that a courtroom cannot be a
theatre of perception. It is a space where doubt must answer to
reason. I may add that the reputation of a Judge, including mine,
cannot be so fragile that it would yield, without proof or material, to
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insinuations. That reputation has been built by this Court not in a
day, but after adjudication of case after case, year after year, while
remaining under the scrutiny of the open Court and subject to
correction within the hierarchical system of the judiciary by higher
Courts.
237. In case this Court withdraws from this case in the absence of
any demonstrable cause, as is required under the law of recusal, it
would be attaching weight to allegations which carry none. The
judicial office and Judges cannot be left vulnerable, since the
reputation of a Judge and of the system is not a personal asset or
shield of one Judge who is part of the system, but an institutional
asset.
238. On a closer examination, the narrative constructed in the
applications for recusal was found to be based on conjectures, urging
this Court to withdraw from adjudication of the present case solely
on the basis of perceived inclinations attributed to me and
contradictory arguments. If I were to accept these applications, it
would set a troubling precedent, since the competence of Judges to
decide cases would then become dependent on the subjective comfort
or discomfort of a litigant.
239. When the question shifts from what is decided to who decides
it, it becomes my bounden duty to answer it as fearlessly as I have,
all my life, decided every other question and issue between two
litigants. Unfortunately, today, it is not a dispute between two
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litigants that I have been called upon to decide; it is between a
litigant who is a discharged accused and myself, the Judge.
240. The robe that this Court wears will not be allowed to be
weighed down by insinuations. The arguments and pleadings before
this Court have fallen far short of the standard required under the law
and jurisprudence of recusal. Allegations and insinuations, though
persistent and loud, can never take the place of the proof required in
law for seeking recusal.
241. I am reminded of a powerful quote by Justice Rosalie
Silberman Abella, former Judge of Supreme Court of Canada, that
„Judges are expected to bring to the Bench an open mind and not an
empty one‟.
242. For decades, that steadiness has not been a choice, but a duty.
A judge cannot recuse to satisfy a litigant‟s unfounded suspicion of
bias, not to avoid discomfort felt by it due to manufactured
allegations.
243. Accepting the present applications would mean giving
credence to an attempt to cast a shadow of doubt on the fairness of a
Judge without any material, and then insisting that such a shadow
alone is sufficient for the Judge to recuse from the case.
244. This Court has remained indifferent to the stature of the
litigant appearing before it.
245. In case this recusal is allowed, the judicial process would not
remain independent but vulnerable to insinuations which can be put
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under pressure of such unfounded allegations and thus, become
selectable and a strategic move in the hand of a litigant.
246. This Court will stand up for itself and for the institution when
such standing is required, though it may appear difficult, this Court
will decide when duty demands that a case be decided, even if
inconvenient, and will not yield or retreat where doing so would
erode the credibility of the institution itself.
247. The robe that this Court wears is not so light that, on a mere
whisper of accusation, it would seek refuge in recusal where no
reason for such recusal exists.
248. If recusal on such grounds is accepted, it would risk the
adjudicatory process being shaped by the preference or discomfort of
a litigant, and in that case, it would not be justice administered, but
justice managed. This path is not permitted by our Constitution. The
personal apprehensions of the applicants, howsoever persistently
advanced, have not been able to pass the threshold test of
reasonableness of bias, where a fair-minded and informed observer,
in the facts and circumstances of this case, would conclude that there
exists a real apprehension of bias.
249. Recusal has to stem from law and not narrative.
250. I understand that it is a defining moment in my judicial life
and that this order would decide, as to whether I will stand my
ground in performing my duty, or allow myself to be moved or
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unsettled by the ground beneath my feet being sought to be shaken
by accusations thrown at me.
251. If the grounds raised in these applications were to be accepted
as valid grounds for disqualification of a Judge from hearing a case,
the qualifications for judicial office itself would have to be redrawn,
suggesting absence of a family, absence of past associations, and
complete absence of social or official engagement with the Bar. The
Constitution, fortunately, does not prescribe such solitude as a
qualification to be a Judge.
252. As curtains are drawn on the arguments in these
applications seeking recusal, I must add that, in this case, the file
seeking recusal did not arrive with evidence. It arrived on my table
with aspersions, insinuations, and doubts cast on my fairness and
impartiality – though quietly worded and couched in legally
assembled sentences, yet carrying much beyond the phrases. The
applications were not questioning a decision, but whether the
decision-maker could make a decision.
253. The easier path of recusal would have offered a quiet exit,
avoided discomfort, and closed the matter without confronting the
allegations, suggestions, and insinuations. However, this Court
knows that the office of a Judge demands restraint and silence. Yet,
such restraint and silence must not cause injury to the institution
itself. Every unproven and unfounded accusation of bias or partiality
is not merely a question put to an individual Judge, but also casts
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aspersions upon the collective integrity of the institution of the
judiciary. It is for this reason that this Court has decided to speak
through this judgment, not to defend myself, but to defend that
collective trust.
254. This Court is conscious of the constitutional office it holds and
the discipline it demands. It has no personal interest, direct or
indirect, in the outcome of the matter. The allegations levelled, the
grounds raised, and the associations referred to, as discussed above,
were neither proximate nor relevant to the issue in question.
255. What lends a deeper disquiet to the present application, as also
submitted by the learned Solicitor General, is the attempt to attach a
media-driven narrative to the proceedings, including instances of
vilification, without any accountability. This Court, being trained to
remain uninfluenced by such external narratives, has proceeded to
decide the matter uninfluenced by any such pressure. The rule of law
is not upheld on the basis of repeated allegations or media headlines,
however persistent or widespread they may be. It rests on the
objectivity and impartiality expected of a judge, which this Court has
adhered to. At the same time, the subtle attempt to discredit the
institutional integrity of the Court, and the concerns arising
therefrom, have been rightly placed on record by the learned
Solicitor General.
256. The powerful and the powerless are equal before this Court.
There may be a political figure as one of the respondents/applicants
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before it; however, the law remains completely indifferent to the
status of a litigant. The Courts stand firm in their duty to treat all
litigants equally.
257. The office of a Judge also demands detachment from self, for
the self must yield to the credibility of the institution.
258. If this Court were to recuse, it would not be prudence, but
abdication of duty, and would amount to lending legitimacy to
aspersions, insinuations, and doubts when no ground for the same
exists.
259. It would be an act of surrender – quiet and convenient, yet not
without consequences. The signal that an institution can be bent and
shaken by unverified assertions would travel far beyond this case.
260. Far more profound would be the effect if such insinuations
were allowed to be closed merely in the file by this Court recusing,
as they would continue to linger – in Courtrooms, in public
discourse, in law schools, and in the general understanding of what
real justice means and what it does not. It would also mean that the
judiciary can be compelled to yield not to reason, but to narrative,
diminishing the trust that justice must continue to command even
when tested. This Court will not permit that faith to be eroded or
allow damage to be caused to the judicial system.
261. The applications seeking recusal are, therefore, rejected, and in
this rejection, this Court affirms its fidelity to the Constitution, on
behalf of myself and every Judge who stands by it.
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262. Justice lies not in yielding under pressure, but in doing justice
objectively while enduring that pressure. This is, has been, and will
remain the solemn trust, quiet strength, and unwavering resolve of
this Court, i.e., to remain faithful to its oath, to not choose the easier
path of recusal, but to walk the path shown by the Constitution,
unhesitatingly, fearlessly, and by adjudicating without fear or favour,
and state in clear terms – that I will not recuse.
263. In view thereof, the applications filed by the applicants are
accordingly dismissed.
264. That said, despite the fact that I have decided not to recuse,
this Court shall proceed to hear and decide the main petition on its
merits, totally uninfluenced and unaffected by these recusal
applications, and the contents thereof. The adjudication will be solely
guided by the applicable law and all the settled principles governing
impartial adjudication.
265. The observations made in this order were only for the purpose
of deciding the present applications. The Court carries no bitterness
against any applicant for moving applications for recusal since they
were exercising their right, as per law.
266. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
APRIL 20, 2026/ns
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