Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Central Bureau Of Investigation & Anr vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 6 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE UDAY KUMAR
CRR 2164 of 2022
CRAN 15 of 2026
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ANR.
-VS-
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.
For the Petitioners/CBI : Mr. Kallol Mondal, Ld. Sr. Adv.
Mr. Amajit De, Ld. Adv.
For the State : Mr. Rudradipta Nandy, Ld. Adv.
Mr. Saryati Dutta, Ld. Adv.
For the Opposite Party No.2 : Mr. Ayan Poddar, Ld. Adv.
Ms. Anjali Shaw, Ld. Adv.
Hearing concluded on : 06.02.2026
Judgment on : 06.04.2026
UDAY KUMAR, J.: -
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Invoking the “Inherent Power” of this Court under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now corresponding to Section 528 of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the Petitioners being the
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Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and its designated Investigating
Officer, seek the quashing of Bishnupur Police Station Case No. 361 of
2022, dated 27.05.2022, registered under Sections 120B, 193, 195,
195A, 196, 465, 467, 468, 471, 506(ii), and 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860, presently pending before the Learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Alipore. They move for the quashing of Bishnupur P.S. Case
No. 361 of 2022, (the impugned FIR) characterizing it as a “Statutory
Nullity” and a “Procedural Encroachment” upon the sovereign mandate of
a federal investigative agency. The Petitioners contend that the FIR is not
a bona fide report of crime but a “Tactical Obstruction” meticulously
engineered to subvert a court-monitored probe into a multi-crore national
scam.
1.2. The challenge to the “Viability of the Impugned FIR” and all
consequential proceedings is anchored in a “Trilogy of Jurisdictional
Prohibitions” that render the proceedings void ab initio:
I. The charges involving the “Administration of Public Justice”
(Sections 193 and 196 IPC) are hit by the “Impenetrable
Barrier” of Section 195(1)(b)(i), which vests the exclusive power
of complaint in the concerned Court, thereby denuding the
police of investigative locus.
II. As the alleged acts occurred during the “Statutory Discharge” of
official duties, the “Mandatory Mantle” of Section 197 was an
inviolable prerequisite; its absence constitutes a “Fatal
Jurisdictional Defect.”
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III. A statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code is a “Legal
Non-Entity” under the prohibitive mandate of Section 162; as a
matter of law, it cannot constitute “Evidence in a Judicial
Proceeding” to sustain charges of forgery or perjury.
Collectively, these grounds frame the investigation as a
“manifest abuse of process,” where the law of the land has been
to facilitate an institutional assault.
1.3. The “Quintessential Legal Conundrum” before this Court transcends a
mere factual evaluation and necessitates a “Judicial Inquiry into
Institutional Integrity.” The Court must discern whether the proceedings
represent a genuine grievance of “Custodial Excess” or a “Calculated
Anatomy of a Counter-Blast,” a weaponized strike designed to achieve the
“Substantive Paralysis” of the “Coal Scam” probe (RC0102020A0022). The
pivotal question remains that can local police machinery exercise a “De
Facto Veto” over a court-monitored federal mandate, or is this FIR a
manifest “Institutional Sabotage” that must be quashed to preserve the
Rule of Law?
2. FACTUAL MATRIX
2.1. The “Genesis of the Present Conflict” is rooted in the “Statutory
Execution” of a high-stakes federal probe into a multi-crore coal
smuggling syndicate, registered as CBI Case No. RC0102020A0022. In
the “Legitimate Discharge” of his investigative mandate, Petitioner No. 2
served a peremptory notice under Section 160 of the Code upon Opposite
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Party No. 2, a self-described political volunteer, requiring his attendance
for examination as a witness. This “Regulatory Invocation” marks the
primary point of contact between the federal agency and the individual,
occurring strictly within the “Procedural Framework” of a court-monitored
investigation into systemic economic offenses.
2.2. In “Strict Adherence” to this Regulatory Mandate, the Complainant
presented himself at the federal headquarters at Nizam Palace, Kolkata,
on May 26, 2022. It remains a matter of “Unassailable Official Record”
that his entry and presence within the high-security “Federal Precincts”
were documented with “Systemic Precision” from 11.00 AM until his
departure at 6.40 PM, a duration the Agency defines as a “Regulated
Interrogative Session” yet one that has been strategically reframed by the
Complainant as a window of “Unlawful Coercion.”
2.3. The “Anatomy of the Asserted Coercion,” as articulated in the
impugned FIR, posits that during eight-hour window of Statutory
Examination,” the complainant was subjected to a “Calculated Battery of
Psychological Intimidation” by Petitioner Number 2 and other unidentified
federal officials. This narrative rests upon a triad of “Constructed
Allegations”:
a. the production of “Bills and Photographs” which the Complainant
characterizes as “Fabricated Forensic Instruments,” intended to
“Extort a Signature” thereon;
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b. a sustained “Interrogative Pressure” to extract incriminating
statements against a high-profile Member of Parliament to establish
a “Nexus to the Proceeds of Crime”; and
c. a “Pivotal Allegation of Collateral Threat,” wherein the petitioners
purportedly weaponized the safety of the complainant’s spouse and
nine-month-old infant child, suggesting they would be “Judicially
Implicated” and incarcerated if he failed to provide the “Desired
Testimony.”
2.4. This account seeks to transform a “Statutory Examination” into a site
of “Custodial Dehumanization.” However, the subsequent conduct of the
Complainant suggests a “Calculated Spatial Manoeuvre”; upon his
release, he bypassed the “Natural Seats of Redressal” in Bhowanipore and
the Kolkata metropolis, choosing instead to undertake a journey to the
Diamond Harbour Police District. This “Jurisdictional Displacement,”
lodging the FIR at Bishnupur Police Station, 20 kilometer from the alleged
site of occurrence, is characterized by the Petitioners as a “Textbook Case
of Forum Shopping,” meticulously designed to initiate a “Parallel and
Hostile Investigation.”
2.5. Aggrieved by the registration of FIR what the petitioners term a
“Malicious Counter-Strike” intended to sabotage the “Coal Scam” probe,
the Petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of this Court. Recognizing the
“Forensic Gravity” of the challenge and the potential for a “Constitutional
Collision,” an interim stay was granted on June 29, 2022. This “Protective
Mantle” has served as a “Cessation of Hostilities” for nearly four years, an
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interval the Petitioners maintain is an “Implicit Recognition” that the
proceedings constitute a “Tactical Siege” against the Rule of Law.
2.6. Ultimately, this dispute represents a conflict between federal
statutory powers and the sovereign police powers of the State,
necessitating a “Juristic Dissection” to determine if the FIR is a report of
crime or a “Forensic Pretext” facilitating a “Collateral Attack” on a court-
monitored probe. The Court must now navigate a “Juristic Tightrope” to
decide if local police machinery can be permitted to “Monitor the Monitor,”
or if such “Institutional Sabotage” must be excised to preserve the
“Sanctity of the Federal Mandate.”
3. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
3.1. Commencing the arguments for the Petitioners, Mr. Kallol Mondal,
learned Senior Counsel, sketched a factual matrix defined by “Statutory
Decorum.” He submitted that the interaction with Opposite Party No. 2
was conducted strictly within the “Four Corners of the Law,” where the
witness’s presence at Nizam Palace was the result of a formal notice
under Section 160of the Code. Every movement, he underscored, was
documented in the “Official Visitor Register,” and the examination was
recorded with “Systemic Precision.” The Petitioners maintain that this was
a “Regulated Statutory Exercise” that concluded long before the
“Contrived Narratives” of the FIR were architected.
3.2. Building upon this foundation, Mr. Mondal characterized the
impugned FIR as a “Textbook Legal Strike” designed to achieve the
“Substantive Paralysis” of a court-monitored investigation of grave
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national importance. Relying on the ratio in Mukul Roy v. State of West
Bengal, reported in 2019 Cri LJ 245, he argued that the proceeding is a
“Weaponized Tool of Obstruction” intended to exert a “Chilling Effect” on
federal officers. To permit such “Engineered Criminality,” he warned,
would invite a “Jurisdictional Anarchy” where any high-profile subject
under the scanner could effectively “Neutralize the Probe” by subjecting
the agency to a “Barrage of Frivolous and Malicious Prosecution.”
3.3. Addressing structural infirmities, Learned Counsel pointed to an
“Unexplained Temporal Gap” and a blatant “Jurisdictional Displacement.”
Although the alleged occurrence took place at the federal headquarters
under the Bhowanipore jurisdiction, the FIR was strategically registered
20 kilometers away at Bishnupur. Characterizing this as a “Textbook Case
of Forum Shopping,” Mr. Mondal urged that the “Precise and Legalistic
Articulation” of the complaint reveals it to be an “Artificially Constructed
Afterthought,” designed to bypass metropolitan scrutiny and subject
federal officers to a “Pre-meditated and Hand-picked Forum.”
3.4. Ascending to the legal plane, Mr. Mondal raised an “Impenetrable
Legislative Proscription” regarding Sections 193 and 196 of the IPC. He
vehemently submitted that as these offences pertain to the
“Administration of Public Justice,” they are hit by the mandatory bar of
Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code. Since the interrogation was part of a
probe pending before a Special Court, that Court remains the “Sole and
Exclusive Custodian” of any grievance regarding evidence. To allow a
parallel police investigation, he argued, is a “Subversion of the Judicial
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Process” and a manifest bypass of a “Non-Negotiable Statutory
Safeguard.”
3.5. Advancing the defence of “Functional Immunity,” Learned Counsel
argued that the actions of Petitioner No. 2, the summoning and
examination of a witness, possess an “Inseparable Nexus” with his official
mandate. Performed under the “Aegis of Statutory Duty,” these acts
directly attract the “Mandatory Mantle” of Section 197. The requirement
for “Prior Statutory Sanction” is an “Inviolable Condition Precedent” that
the State Police conveniently bypassed, rendering the FIR a “Jurisdictional
Nullity” that strips federal officers of their “Legislative Armor.”
3.6. Regarding the invocation of Sections 465-471 IPC, Mr. Mondal
contended that forgery was a calculated manoeuvre to provide a “Veneer
of Gravity” to an “Anemic Complaint.” He highlighted the “Forensic
Absurdity” of a Section 467 charge, “Forgery of a Valuable Security,”
embarked upon without the recovery of a single forged document. To
sustain such “Vacuum-Based Allegations” is to allow the “Metamorphosis
of a Statutory Duty” into a “Criminal Conspiracy,” penalizing professional
teamwork as if it were an illicit pact.
3.7. Dismissing the allegation of “Criminal Intimidation,” Counsel
characterized it as a “Calculated Distortion of the Interrogative Mandate.”
He submitted that explaining the “Legal Ramifications of Accessory
Liability” to a recalcitrant witness is a “Duty of the Office,” not a “Threat
of the Person.” To allow an FIR every time a witness feels “Interrogative
Discomfort” would be to grant a “License for Silence,” ensuring the
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“Truth-Seeking Process” of a premier agency is effectively “Censored and
Terrorized” by the subjective feelings of the witness.
3.8. Concluding his submissions, Mr. Mondal urged that permitting the
State Police to investigate the “Internal Mechanics” of a CBI interrogation
grants the State Executive an “Extra-Legal Veto” over federal mandates.
Invoking the high-threshold guidelines of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
[1992 Supp (1) SCC 335] specifically Categories (1), (3), (6), and (7), he
maintained that where allegations are “Absurd and Inherently
Improbable,” the Court must intervene to prevent an “Institutional
Miscarriage of Justice” and protect the “Federal Shield” provided by the
Code.The Bishnupur Case, he concluded, is not a search for truth, but a
“Tactical Siege” against the Rule of Law.
3.9. In light of the “Statutory Immunity” and the “Absence of Bona Fides”
in the impugned proceedings, the Petitioners solemnly pray this Court be
pleased to set aside the proceedings in Bishnupur P.S. Case No. 361 of
2022, protect the “Institutional Integrity” of Petitioner No. 1 from
“Collateral Sabotage” by stay or dismissal of all consequential proceedings
arising from the said FIR; and reaffirm the “Federal Shield” provided
under Sections 195 and 197 of the Code, ensuring that officers of a
premier agency are not subjected to “Interrogative Extortion” for the
lawful discharge of their sovereign duties.
4. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY NO. 1 (THE
STATE)
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4.1. Mr. Rudradipta Nandy, learned counsel for the State, sounded on the
“Juristic Plea for Investigative Autonomy” as a “Note of Judicial Caution,”
by emphasizing the extraordinary and discretionary nature of the Court’s
power under Section 482 of the Code. He vehemently argued that this
inherent jurisdiction must be exercised with “Surgical Circumspection” so
as not to “Short-Circuit” a lawful investigation, asserting that the Court
must resist the invitation to assume the mantle of a “Super-Investigator”
or to stifle a legitimate inquiry into grave allegations of custodial
misconduct at the very threshold. Mr. Nandy further submitted that the
“Logical Inconsistencies” heavily relied upon by the Petitioners are
essentially “Trial-Stage Defenses” are the matters of evidence that must
be tested in the “Crucible of Cross-Examination” rather than being
adjudicated summarily at the threshold.
4.2. Invoking the legal concept of “Juristic Mandate of Non-Interference”
as enunciated in M/S Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra, Ld. Counsel maintained that at the threshold of an FIR, the
High Court must resist the temptation to transform itself into a “De Facto
Trial Court.” The High Court possesses no “Probative Compass” at this
nascent stage to evaluate the correctness or reliability of allegations.
Referring to the cautionary mandates in Paragraph 23 and 33.12 of the
said judgment, Ld. Counsel emphasized that an FIR is a “Starting Point,”
not an “Encyclopaedia,” and that any premature interference effectively
“Stifles the Discovery of Truth” while the case remains in “Involuntary
Stagnation” due to the interim stay.
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4.3. Transitioning to a “Substantive Disclosure of Criminality,” Mr. Nandy
contended that a holistic and meaningful reading of the FIR and written
complaint reveals the “Unmistakable Commission” of multiple cognizable
offences, pointing toward a “Systemic Abuse of Office.” These allegations,
are not do not merely suggest administrative lapses but point towards a
systematic abuse of office, involving public servants framing incorrect
documents (Sections 166/167 IPC) and the “Deliberate Fabrication of
False Evidence” (Sections 193/195/196 IPC), and Grave Criminal
Intimidation (Section 506 (ii) IPC), all woven into a web of criminal
conspiracy under Section 120B. He argued that since the FIR, on its face,
discloses the essential ingredients of these crimes, operate as a
“Jurisdictional Bar,” precluding this Court from quashing the proceedings
at the threshold, as the Golden Rule enunciated under the Bhajan Lal’s
(supra) guidelines, precluding this Court from quashing the proceedings
at the threshold. To do so, he urged, would be to ignore a “Manifest
Criminality” that demands a full-fledged investigation.
4.4. Advancing a “Juristic Validation of Universal Investigatory Mandate,”
Mr. Nandy dismissed the challenge to territorial competence as a
“Misconceived Procedural Formalism.” Relying on the settled ratio in
Satvinder Kaur v. State [(1999) 8 SCC 728], and the concept of a “Zero
FIR” codified in Section 173(1) of the BNSS, 2023, he argued that a
perceived defect in jurisdiction provides no ground for quashing of an FIR
at the threshold. Under Section 156(2) of the Code, the law affirms a
12 CRR 2164 of 2022“Non-Negotiable Duty” to investigate irrespective of the area, rendering
the Petitioners’ jurisdictional objection a “Legal Anachronism.”
4.5. Relying on the “Doctrine of Mandatory Registration” as refined by the
Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari vs State of Uttar Pradesh, [(2014)
2SCC 1], the State argued that Sections 154 and 156 of the Code impose
a “Peremptory Command” upon the police to register an FIR the moment
a cognizable disclosure is made. He vehemently submitted that the police
possess “Zero Discretion” to conduct a preliminary inquiry when a
complaint, on its face, unveils a crime. Counsel maintained that any
judicial stay on such an investigation “Trespasses upon the Exclusive
Domain” of the Executive, and erodes public confidence in the Rule of
Law. In the present case, where the complaint contained specific and
chilling allegations of “Forensic Fabrication” and “Custodial Intimidation,”
the State contended that the police were not merely empowered, but
“Statutorily Compelled” to initiate the investigative process to protect the
“Sanctity of the Citizen” against institutional overreach.
4.6. Turning to a “Judicial Deconstruction of Institutional Immunity,”
Learned Counsel for the State contended that the official capacity of CBI
officers does not grant a “Sanctuary of Exemption” from liability under
criminal laws of the land. Mr. Nandy submitted that the chilling
allegations, specifically the “Psychological Coercion” of a nine-month-old
infant and the “Forensic Forgery” of documents to extract a confession,
constitute a manifest “Betrayal of Public Trust” and a grave violation of
Article 21. Citing the restrictive ratio in Choudhury Parveen Sultana v.
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State of West Bengal [(2009) 3 SCC 398] Ld. Counsel urged that acts
such as “Scripting Witness Testimony” or “Fabricating Signatures” can
never, by any stretch of legal logic, be regarded as the bona fide
discharge of official duty. Consequently, the protection of Section 197 of
the Code was characterized as a “Misplaced Shield,” as the requirement
for sanction only matures at the stage of “Judicial Cognizance” and cannot
prevent an investigation. Relying on Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan
Kumar Upadhyaya [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3726], he argued that the law
does not permit a “Pre-emptive Strike” against an investigation under the
deceptive garb of statutory immunity.
4.7. Transitioning to an “Affirmation of Independent Cognizability,” the
State relied upon the ratio decided in recent case in State of Kerala v.
Sunil [2025 OnLine SC 2295] to dismantle the challenge under Section
195 of the Code. He argued that Section 195A of the IPC stands as an
“Independent Sentinel” specially enacted to provide an immediate and
effective “Protective Umbrella” to witness during the investigation. Mr.
Nandy contended that the police possess the “Standalone Power” to
investigate threats without awaiting the “Procedural Formalism” of a
court-led complaint under Section 340 of the Code, lest the statutory
mandate of protection be rendered “Statutorily Illusory.” To interpret the
law otherwise, the State Maintains, would be to leave a vulnerable
witness in a Jurisdictional Limbo,” effectively rendering the statutory
mandate of witness protection “Statutory Illusory” and allowing the
“Poisoning of Evidence” to continue unchecked.
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4.8. Invoking the “Axiom of Facial Veracity,” the State submitted that the
Petitioners’ reliance on “Logical Inconsistencies” or “Mala Fides” is an
invitation for a “Mini-Trial.” Drawing strength from Rajeev Kourav v.
Baisahab [(2020) 3 SCC 317] and CBI v. Aryan Singh [2023 (18) SCC
399], Mr. Nandy argued that the High Court, in its inherent jurisdiction, is
“Procedurally Precluded” from evaluating veracity of an FIR or the defence
of the accused at this nascent stage. He contended that the truth of the
facts demands the “Oxygen of Cross-Examination,” and any “Meticulous
Weighing of Evidence” now would constitute a “Premature Exoneration.”
4.9. Finally, the State raised a formidable preliminary objection regarding
maintainability of the petition filed by the CBI in its institutional capacity.
Relying on the restrictive ratio in Hukum Chand Garg & Anr. v. State of
Uttar Pradesh [2022 SCC OnLine SC 2165], Learned Counsel argued that
the CBI is a “Legal Stranger” to the case, being neither informant nor
accused. He vehemently submitted that a federal institution cannot act as
a “Proxy Litigant” or an “Aggrieved Person” to shield its members from an
investigation into “Individual Malfeasance,” characterizing the petition as
an “Unauthorized Interposition” into a state investigation.
4.10. In view of the “Forensic Gravity” of the allegations and the
“Statutory Mandate” to investigate cognizable crimes, the State prayed
that :
(i) The present petition be dismissed in limine as being
“Jurisdictional Terminated” by the lack of institutional locus
standi;
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(ii) the interim stay, which has served as a “Shield for the
Accused” and a “Barrier to the Truth” for nearly four years,
be vacated with immediate effect;
(iii) the state investigating Agency be permitted to exercise its
“Executive Prerogative” to conduct an unfettered inquiry,
thereby upholding the “Constitutional Promise” that no
officer, regardless of their stature, is beyond the reach of the
law.
5. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY NO. 2 (DE-
FACTO COMPLAINANT)
5.1. Advancing a vehement and granular defence of the complainant’s
verson, Mr. Ayan Poddar learned counsel for the Opposite Party No. 2
characterized the instant application for quashing as a “Manifest Attempt
to Stifle” a legitimate inquiry into grave custodial excesses. He
meticulously reconstructed the timeline of May 26, 2022, asserting that
the De-facto Complainant, a law-abiding citizen, presented himself at
Nizam Palace at 11:00 AM, not as a suspect, but in “Strict Obedience” to
a statutory notice under Section 160 of the Code. This nearly eight-hour
ordeal, Learned Counsel argued, transcended the bounds of a routine
examination and descended into the realm of an “Unauthorized Custodial
Interrogation,” stripped of the procedural safeguards guaranteed under
the “Sanctity of Article 21.”
5.2. Shifting to the “Anatomy of Forensic Coercion,” Mr. Poddar
highlighted the grave allegation that Petitioner No. 2, acting under the
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“Aegis of Office,” produced a series of fabricated documents, including
bills and photographs, and attempted to “Extort an Admission” of their
fabricated documents. Upon the Complainant’s steadfast refusal to “Adopt
Forged Signatures” as his own, the investigative process ceased to be a
search for truth and devolved into a “Threat-Based Interrogation,” where
he was relentlessly pressured to provide a “Scripted Testimony” against
high-profile individuals namely Mr. Abhishek Banerjee and Mr. Sumit Roy,
to establish a “Contrived Link” to the proceeds of crime, a conduct
characterized as a “Gross Perversion” of statutory power vested in a
federal agency.
5.3. This grievance was further elevated to a “Jurisprudential Critique of
Psychological Intimidation,” with Learned Counsel highlighting the most
distressing facet of the ordeal: the alleged extension of threats to
implicate the Complainant’s wife and his nine-month-old infant. It was
forcefully submitted that the Petitioners utilized the “Spectre of
Incarceration” against an innocent family to compel a “Coerced
Narrative,” (stating they would be “Shown as Beneficiaries” of the scam
and left to “Languish in Jail”) an act of “Totalitarian Encroachment” into
the private sphere of a witness constitutes a manifest abuse of
investigative power, that strikes at the very soul of the “Right to Life and
Liberty” and violates the fundamental “Sanctity of the Witness” in a
democratic polity. This was characterized not as a legitimate
interrogation, but as a “Strategic Battery” aimed at “Planting False
Evidence” through extreme psychological trauma.
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5.4. Interposing a “Juristic Barrier to Maintainability,” Mr. Poddar raised a
threshold objection anchored upon the restrictive rule of standing held in
Hukum Chand Garg (supra). He argued that the extraordinary remedies
under Sections 197, 401, and 482 of the code are reserved exclusively for
an accused or a person directly aggrieved by a judicial order. He
contended that the CBI, in its institutional capacity, is neither the
informant nor a named accused in the Bishnupur Case rendering it a
“Statutory Stranger” to the present FIR. He forcefully contended that a
federal institution cannot invoke the “Inherent Powers” of this Court to
create a “Sanctuary of Immunity” for individual officers, effectively
shielding them from a lawful investigation into personal criminal liability,
as to allow the Agency to litigate on behalf of a natural person is to permit
a “Corporate Hijacking” of the criminal process.
5.5. Invoking a “Judicial Prohibition against Pre-Trial Adjudication,” Mr.
Poddar contended that the ingredients of criminal intimidation and forgery
are manifest upon a plain reading of the FIR. He urged that this Court
must eschew the temptation to conduct a “Mini-Trial” at this nascent
stage. Citing Daxaben v. State of Gujarat [2022 (16) SCC 117], MCD v.
Ram Kishan Rohtagi [(1983) 1 SCC 1], State of Odisha v. Pratima
Mohanty [(2022) 16 SCC 703], and CBI v. Aryan Singh [2023 (18) SCC
399] he argued that instead proceed on the “Axiom of Facial Veracity,”
any inquiry into the credibility of the version is a matter for the “Crucible
of Trial” as mandated in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [(2020) 3 SCC 317],
and Muskan v. Ishaan Khan [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355]. To stifle the
18 CRR 2164 of 2022investigation now would be to prematurely “Exonerate” a potential
offender without a shred of evidence being tested in Cross-Examination.
5.6. Advancing a “Dissection of the Protective Aegis” regarding statutory
immunity, Mr. Poddar submitted that the requirement for sanction under
Section 197 is both “Premature and Inapplicable” at the investigative
threshold. Drawing a “Juristic Demarcation” between official acts and
criminal departures, and relying on Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan Kumar
Upadhyay [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3726] and Choudhury Parveen Sultana
Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal [(2009) 3 SCC 398],
he argued that acts such as “Threatening an Infant” or “Systemic
Fabrication of Records” by any stretch of legal imagination, can be
regarded as official duty. The protection of Section 197, he contended, is
conceived as a shield for the bona fide officer, not a “Charter of Impunity”
for “Extortionate Conduct” committed under the deceptive garb of a
federal investigation.
5.7. Transitioning to a “Juristic Affirmation of Witness Autonomy,” Mr.
Poddar, placed heavy reliance on the definitive ratio in State of Kerala v.
Sunil, [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2295], to justify the invocation of Section
195A of the I.P.C. He argued that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has now
clarified the “Independent Cognizability” of this provision, elevating it to a
Standalone protection for witnesses even at the pre-trial and investigative
stages to investigate threats under Sections 154 and 156 of the Code,
without the “Procedural Fetters” of a prior court complaint. Drawing from
Indresh Kumar v. State of UP [2022 SCC OnLine SC 2411] and Salim
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Khan v. Sanjai Singh [(2002) 9 SCC 670], he noted that the “Poisoning of
Evidence” is a “Continuous Injury” necessitating immediate intervention
to prevent the “Subversion of the Truth.”
5.8. Advancing a “Dismissal of Territorial Formalism” concerning the
challenge to jurisdiction, Mr. Poddar relied on Satvinder Kaur v. State
[(1999) 8 SCC 728]) to argue that a perceived defect provides no “Juristic
Ground” for quashing at the threshold. Invoking the “Mandatory
Command” of Lalita Kumari, and the cautionary principles in M/S
Neeharika Infrastructure (supra), he urged that the police are under a
“Statutory Obligation” to exhaust the investigative process once a
cognizable offence is disclosed. He expressed “Grave Judicial Concern”
over the interim stay granted on 29.06.2022, contending that a “Quest
for Truth” into allegations of custodial torture cannot be held in “Perpetual
Abeyance” merely because the alleged perpetrator enjoys the “Stature of
a Federal Officer.” To stay such an inquiry, he argued, is to permit a
“Jurisdictional Vacuum” where the rule of law is effectively suspended.
5.9. Concluding with an “Invocation of the Edifice of Justice” Mr. Poddar
placed reliance on the seminal ratio in Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v.
State of Gujarat [(2006) 3 SCC 374], to affirm that the integrity of the
system rests upon the “Sanctity of the Witness.” He argued that the
prolonged stay has created a “Justice Deficit” and a “Substantive
Paralysis” of the Rule of Law. Consequently, he prayed that the interim
order be vacated to allow the law to take its “Logical and Unfettered
Course” and ensure a “Truth-Oriented Conclusion” to the Bishnupur Case.
20 CRR 2164 of 2022
5.10. He urged this Court to recognize that the “Inherent Powers” under
Section 482 of the Code are intended to prevent the abuse of the process
of any Court, not to provide a “Safe Harbour” for officials accused of
violating the fundamental rights of a citizen. Consequently, it was prayed
that:
i. The instant Criminal Revision and the accompanying
application for quashing be dismissed as being “Devoid of
Merit” and legally “Misconceived”;
ii. The interim order of stay, which has held the investigation in
“Perpetual Abeyance” since 29.06.2022, be vacated forthwith
to prevent further “Erosion of Evidence”;
iii. The Investigating Agency be permitted to reach a “Logical and
Truth-Oriented Conclusion” in the Bishnupur Case, thereby
vindicating the “Institutional Credibility” of the State Police
and the “Fundamental Rights” of the Complainant.
6. QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION
6.1. Based on the rival contentions and the legal landscape governing the
interaction between federal investigative mandates and State police
powers, the following issues are settled for the consideration of this
Court:
i. Whether Petitioner No. 1 (CBI), in its institutional capacity,
qualifies as a “person aggrieved” within the scheme of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, or whether the present petition,
insofar as it seeks to quash an FIR against individual officers,
21 CRR 2164 of 2022is hit by the restrictive principles of standing as enunciated in
ii. Whether the acts complained of, namely the summoning and
interrogation of a witness at Nizam Palace, bear such an
“inseparable nexus” to the discharge of official duty that they
attract the mandatory requirement of prior sanction, or
whether the allegations of custodial coercion strip the public
servant of such statutory immunity as per the ratio in
Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal [2009]?
iii. Whether the registration of the impugned FIR for offences
primarily relating to the “fabrication of false evidence”
(Sections 193, 195, 196 IPC) is legally sustainable at the
instance of a private individual, or whether such a proceeding
is hit by the absolute statutory embargo contained in Section
195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C., which reserves such jurisdiction
exclusively to the concerned Court?
iv. Whether the inclusion of Section 195A IPC (threatening a
witness), in light of the recent ratio in State of Kerala v. Sunil
[2025], provides a valid legal basis for the State Police to
independently investigate a federal investigator’s conduct
during an ongoing judicial probe?
v. Whether the narrative of the De-facto Complainant,
specifically the allegation of being “forced to admit”
signatures while simultaneously asserting a “clear denial,”
22 CRR 2164 of 2022
that renders the FIR “inherently improbable” under Category
3 or “manifestly malicious” under Category 7 of the Bhajan
Lal guidelines.
vi. Whether the choice of a geographically distant Police Station
(Bishnupur), coupled with the strategic timing of the
complaint immediately following a summons in a sensitive
scam, indicates a “Counter-Blast” intended to obstruct the
administration of justice and interfere with the CBI’s
institutional autonomy?
7. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT
7.1. The Locus Standi of Petitioner No. 1 (CBI) and Institutional
Maintainability
7.1.1. Commencing with the sovereign-juristic inquiry, this Court must
determine whether the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), in its
collective and juristic capacity, possesses the locus standi to invoke the
inherent, plenary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code.
The controversy necessitates a determination of “Functional Identity,”
whether a premier federal agency is a “Legal Stranger” to a criminal
process that, while not impleading the Agency eo nomine, specifically
arraigns its Investigating Officer and “unknown officials” for acts
purportedly committed within a federal enclave. This Court must decide if
the Institution qualifies as an “Institutional Victim of Collateral
Criminalization,” an entity whose very operational mandate is placed
under siege by the impugned proceedings.
23 CRR 2164 of 2022
7.1.2. A formidable challenge has been mounted by the learned Counsel
for the State and the De-facto Complainant, primarily anchored upon the
dictum in Hukum Chand Garg & Anr. v. State of U.P. [2022 SCC OnLine
SC 2165]. They advocate for a “Restrictive Interpretive Rule,” contending
that the right to seek the quashing of a criminal proceeding is a purely
personal right, an action personalis, vested exclusively in the “Accused.”
The pivot of their critique is that since the CBI, as a statutory juristic
entity, is not formally impleaded as an accused in the FIR, it remains a
“Legal Outsider” to the controversy. It is argued that the Institution
cannot, by any stretch of legal imagination, be deemed a “Person
Aggrieved” within the scheme of the Code, and consequently, the petition
at its instance is hit by a jurisdictional deficit of locus standi.
7.1.3. Upon a Jurisprudential Dissection of the ratio in Hukum Chand Garg
(supra), I find the reliance placed by the Opposite Parties to be a
“Categorical Misapplication” of the law to the present facts. While it
remains an axiomatic principle that a total stranger cannot meddle with
the investigative machinery, the factual matrix here is “Starkly
Distinguishable.” The instant FIR does not target a private citizen in a
vacuum; it specifically identifies the “Investigating Officer and unknown
officials of the CBI” for acts allegedly committed during a high-stakes,
court-monitored investigation. This is not the intervention of a
“Meddlesome Interloper” seeking to derail a private prosecution; rather, it
is a premier federal agency seeking to protect the sanctity of its own
mandate from being “Criminalized in situ.” To equate the CBI’s
24 CRR 2164 of 2022
institutional standing with that of a “Stranger” is to ignore the reality that
the Agency is the very target of the impugned process.
7.1.4. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), as a statutory entity
constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946,
functions as the specialized investigative arm of the Union, embodying a
“Sovereign Institutional Prerogative.” Its efficacy is intrinsically linked to
the “Inherent Functional Autonomy” of its officers, who must be insulated
from the spectre of retaliatory or obstructive state action while
discharging their mandates. While not expressly cited by the Bar, I find
the principles in CBI v. Rajesh Gandhi [(1996) 11 SCC 253] and the
seminal observations in Vineet Narain v. Union of India [(1998) 1 SCC
226] to be of profound relevance. These authorities underscore that the
“Institutional Integrity” of the CBI is a vital cog in the machinery of
justice. To suggest that the Agency remains a “Legal Stranger” when its
very interrogation procedures are under criminal challenge is a
proposition that is not only conceptually flawed but is, in the estimation of
this Court, “Legally Fallacious.”
7.1.5. Formulating an “Institutional Siege Hypothesis,” this Court
observes that if the internal interrogation protocols within a federal
precinct, such as Nizam Palace, are permitted to be criminalized through
the mechanism of a “Collateral FIR” at the mere behest of a disgruntled
witness, the Institution itself is effectively placed under siege. The logic of
the Opposite Parties would reduce a premier federal agency to a “Mute
Spectator” while its statutory mandate is systematically dismantled by a
25 CRR 2164 of 2022
parallel police inquiry. In the landscape of federal-state investigative
friction, where an agency’s methodology is challenged as a “Criminal
Enterprise,” the Institution is not merely an interested party; it is a
“Necessary Party.” To deny it the standing to challenge such a proceeding
would be to sanction a “Procedural Veto” in the hands of the State,
thereby subverting the very essence of a fair and independent
investigation and permitting the “Administrative Sabotage” of a federal
probe.
7.1.6. Establishing a “Distinction of Juridical Categories,” this Court finds
that the factual matrix in Hukum Chand Garg (supra) was confined to the
rights of private individuals in a personal litigation where no sovereign or
institutional interests were at stake. By contrast, the impugned FIR in the
present case displays a “Triad of Institutional Aggrievement” that
transcends personal liability and merges into institutional injury:
i. The impleadment of “unknown officials” casts a wide and
indeterminate net over the entire investigative team,
effectively paralyzing the Agency’s collective function through
a “blanket threat” of arrest;
ii. The alleged acts originated from a formal process under
Section 160 of the Code, thereby rendering them acts
performed ex virtuteofficii (by virtue of office) rather than
private conduct;
iii. The timing and nature of the complaint demonstrate a clear
attempt to create a “Tactical Diversion” to a court-monitored
26 CRR 2164 of 2022probe, thereby directly impacting the CBI’s institutional
capacity to fulfill its federal mandate.
These factors, taken together, create a distinct legal
category of “Aggrieved Party” that was never
contemplated in the private-party context of the Hukum
Chand Garg decision.
7.1.7. Furthermore, I find significant resonance in the ratio of K. Kapila v.
CBI [(1999) 9 SCC 526], which, although rendered in a different factual
setting, recognizes a “Metaphysical Integration” between an Institution
and its officers. The law recognizes that an Institution possesses a vested
and subsisting interest in the legality of proceedings involving its
personnel, predicated on the principle that an officer does not act in a
vacuum but as the “Hand and Voice” of the Agency. Consequently, any
criminal proceedings initiated against such an officer for acts purportedly
done in the discharge of official functions necessarily implicate the
Agency’s own procedural integrity. This judicial recognition of
“Institutional Persona” provides the necessary “Legal Bridge” to hold that
Petitioner No. 1 is not a meddlesome stranger, but a party whose very
functional existence is jeopardized by the impugned FIR.
7.1.8. To label Petitioner No. 1 as a “Stranger” to the controversy is, in
the estimation of this Court, “Legally Myopic” and ignores the volatile
realities of federal-state investigative friction. When the very methodology
of an Agency’s interrogation that conducted within its own jurisdictional
enclave, is characterized as a “Criminal Enterprise,” the Institution is not
27 CRR 2164 of 2022
merely an interested party; it is a “Necessary Party.” To hold otherwise
would be to sanction a regime where the State machinery could
systematically “Decapitate” a federal investigation by targeting individual
officers seriatim, thereby leaving the Agency sans any legal recourse to
protect its institutional mandate. Such a restrictive interpretation of locus
standi would not only offend the principles of natural justice but would
effectively permit the criminal process to be “Weaponized” as a tool of
administrative obstruction.
7.1.9. Arriving at a “Sovereign Jurisdictional Affirmation,” this Court
rejects the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of this
petition at the instance of the CBI. It is held that Petitioner No. 1
possesses the requisite locus standi to invoke the inherent, plenary
powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Code. The Agency is not a
“Legal Stranger” to the controversy; rather, it qualifies as an “Aggrieved
Party” in the context of institutional interference and the preservation of
investigative sanctity. To deny the Institution a voice in this forum would
be to permit the “Systematic Decapitation” of its mandate through the
“Weaponization” of local criminal process. Question No. 1 is, accordingly,
answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Petitioners.
7.2. The Statutory Bar under Section 197 Cr.P.C. and the “Official
Duty” Nexus
7.2.1. Proceeding to the second quintessential inquiry, this Court must
determine whether the acts impugned in the FIR, specifically the
summoning and custodial interrogation of a witness, possess such an
28 CRR 2164 of 2022
“Inextricable Link” to the discharge of official duty that the State Police
was legally interdicted from initiating any criminal process. The core of
this determination lies in whether the alleged “high-handedness” can be
legally severed from the underlying statutory function, or whether the
absence of a prior sanction from the Central Government acts as an
absolute “Jurisdictional Bar” to the registration of the FIR and the
continuation of the investigation.
7.2.2. A spirited challenge has been mounted by the learned Counsel for
the State and the De-facto Complainant, primarily anchored upon the
dictum in Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal [(2009) 3
SCC 398] and the recent observations in Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan
Kumar Upadhyay [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3726]. They advocate for a
“Surgical Severance” of the acts alleged, specifically “forgery,” “criminal
intimidation,” and the “threatening of an infant of nine months” arguing
that such conduct can never, by any stretch of legal imagination, be
assimilated into a public servant’s official mandate. The pivot of their
contention is a “Thematic Decoupling”: that the moment an officer
oversteps the bounds of the law to commit a perceived crime, the
protective “shield” of Section 197 Cr.P.C. is automatically lowered,
exposing the individual to the full rigor of ordinary criminal process
without the necessity of a prior executive filter.
7.2.3. Inverting this perspective, Mr. Mondal, appearing for the
Petitioners, anchors his rebuttal upon the “Sovereign Functionality” of the
act. He submits that Petitioner No. 2 was not acting in a private capacity,
29 CRR 2164 of 2022
but was operating within the “Statutory Crucible” of a federal
investigation, conducted within the high-security precincts of Nizam
Palace. The core of his contention is that the entire encounter was a direct
manifestation of a “Core Duty,” the questioning of a witness in a complex,
multi-crore scam. He cautions this Court that if “Robust Interrogation” is
permitted to be “Tactically Re-labelled” as criminal intimidation to bypass
the requirement of sanction, it would expose every federal investigator to
the caprice of “Retaliatory Litigation,” effectively paralyzing the
institutional machinery of the Central Bureau of Investigation.
7.2.4. Undertaking a jurisdictional distillation of the authorities cited, this
Court acknowledges that the protection afforded by Section 197 of the
Code is not a “Blanket Immunity” for every act committed during a public
servant’s tenure. While Choudhury Parveen Sultana (supra) remains a
guiding light in preventing the abuse of statutory shields for purely
private crimes, the subsequent evolution of the “Nexus Test” has
introduced a significant degree of “Jurisprudential Refinement.” The
inquiry has shifted from a binary assessment of “duty versus crime” to a
more nuanced examination of whether the act complained of, even if
allegedly excessive, was an inseparable byproduct of the officer’s official
mandate.
7.2.5. Pursuing an inquisitorial discovery beyond the citations provided by
the Bar, I find the ratios in State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew
[(2004) 8 SCC 40] and D. Devaraja v. OwaisSabeer Hussain [(2020) 7
SCC 695] to be of profound, perhaps even dispositive, relevance. The law
30 CRR 2164 of 2022
has moved past a simplistic binary; the settled “Reasonable Nexus Test”
does not ask whether a specific act, such as intimidation or high-
handedness, constitutes a “duty” in the abstract. Rather, it demands an
inquiry into whether the act was committed under the “Colour of Office.”
If the alleged excess is inextricably linked to the performance of an official
function, the protective umbrella of Section 197 is immediately and
irresistibly attracted, shielding the officer from a prosecution that lacks
the requisite executive clearance.
7.2.6. Sifting the factual matrix through the sieve of the “Nexus Test,”
this Court finds that the present case is fundamentally distinguishable
from instances of “Purely Private Crimes” committed by officers. A “Triad
of Jurisdictional Facts” emerges here, which anchors the alleged acts
firmly within the perimeter of official duty:
a. The Complainant was present at Nizam Palace not by choice
or private invitation, but in strict obedience to a statutory
notice issued under Section 160 of the Code;
b. Petitioner No. 2 was present not as a private individual, but ex
virtute officii as the designated Investigating Officer of a
federal probe;
c. The interrogation itself was the very raison d’être, the sole
reason for existence, of the meeting.
These characteristics collectively confirm that the
encounter was a creature of the statute, not a chance or
personal confrontation.
31 CRR 2164 of 2022
7.2.7. Drawing a Jurisprudential Contrast with the State’s reliance on Om
Prakash Yadav (supra), this Court finds that the allegations therein
involved acts entirely de hors, outside, the scope of an officer’s mandate.
In the present matrix, however, the alleged acts, pressuring a witness to
sign a statement, are fundamentally intertwined with the modus operandi
of a federal investigation. Even if the officer’s conduct was “over-zealous”
or “robust” to the point of causing subjective discomfort, such acts were
performed under the “Aegis of Official Duty.” To hold otherwise would be
to hand a “Procedural Weapon” to the State machinery, allowing it to
systematically achieve the “Institutional Decapitation” of federal probes
by merely inserting a charge of “abuse” or “threat” into an FIR to bypass
the mandatory statutory filter of Section 197.
7.2.8. Identifying a fundamental Jurisprudential Disjunction, this Court
finds that the ratio of Choudhury Parveen Sultana is wholly inapplicable to
the present factual matrix. That precedent addresses “Purely Private
Crimes” that bear no relation to the officer’s mandate. In the present
case, however, the alleged interaction was not a stray or independent
criminal act; it was “Statutorily Anchored” in the official process of
investigation. The allegations of intimidation and forgery, which I have
already noted as “Factually Paradoxical,” occurred during the very
discharge of official functions. Consequently, the act cannot be surgically
removed from the officer’s status as the Investigating Officer for the
purpose of avoiding the “Sanction Shield.”
32 CRR 2164 of 2022
7.2.9. Arriving at a point of Indivisible Nexus, this Court finds that the link
between the alleged acts and the officer’s mandate is not merely
reasonable; it is “Inherent and Absolute.” To deny Petitioner No. 2 the
protection of Section 197 under these circumstances would be to sanction
a “Procedural Veto” in the hands of a witness, granting any subject of an
investigation the power to halt a federal probe by simply alleging “High-
Handedness.” Such a precedent would subvert the very essence of a fair
and independent inquiry, replacing “Statutory Authority” with
“Administrative Sabotage.” Consequently, no FIR could have been legally
registered, and no investigation could have proceeded, without the prior
“Jurisdictional Trigger” of a sanction from the Central Government.
7.2.10. Pronouncing a threshold decree upon the statutory immunity of
the officer, this Court holds that the acts alleged possess a “Direct and
Inseparable Nexus” with the discharge of official duty. The protection
afforded by Section 197 of the Code is not merely a trial-stage defense,
but an “Absolute Interdict” at the very threshold of the criminal process.
By registering the FIR and initiating an investigation without the prior
“Jurisdictional Trigger” of a sanction from the Central Government, the
State has committed a “Manifest Illegality” that strikes at the root of the
proceeding. Consequently, the entire investigative exercise is void ab
initio for want of competence. Question No. 2 is, accordingly, answered in
the affirmative, against the State and in favour of the Petitioners.
7.3. The Statutory Bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C. and Offences
Against Public Justice
33 CRR 2164 of 2022
7.3.1. Turning our focus to the structural integrity of the criminal process,
the Court must now determine whether the State Police possessed the
jurisdictional mandate to initiate an FIR and pursue an investigation into
offences under Sections 193, 195, and 196 of the Indian Penal Code. This
inquiry centers on whether such proceedings are rendered void ab initio
by the categorical embargo engrafted in Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973. I called upon to decide if the “Judicial Filter,
“a mechanism meticulously designed by the Legislature to safeguard the
administration of justice, can be circumvented by a private FIR in
instances where the sanctity of evidence destined for a Court is the
primary subject of dispute.
7.3.2. Centering the Petitioners’ challenge upon a factual-jurisdictional
nexus, Mr. Mondal submits that the essence of the Complainant’s
grievance, the alleged “coerced fabrication of evidence” under Section
161 of the Code, is inextricably linked to an ongoing federal prosecution.
Given that this statement was destined for the evidentiary record of the
“Coal Scam Case” currently pending before the Special CBI Court, the
Petitioners contend that the State Police has strayed into a “Prohibited
Zone” of investigation. By invoking Category (6) of the celebrated Bhajan
Lal precedent, he argued that the existence of an express legal bar
renders the FIR a “nullity in law.” The spirit of this submission is that the
Executive cannot be permitted to perform a “Parallel Adjudication” on the
veracity of evidence that falls within the sole and sovereign domain of the
Special Court.
34 CRR 2164 of 2022
7.3.3. Navigating a sharp jurisdictional divergence, the State and the De-
facto Complainant mount a spirited defense, asserting that the restrictive
bar of Section 195 of the Code remains dormant during the embryonic
stage of a police investigation. The pivot of their contention is a literalist
interpretation that the statutory embargo merely prevents a Court from
“taking cognizance” and does not, ipso facto, paralyze the inherent power
of the police to probe a cognizable offense. In their estimation, the
investigative machinery may proceed to its logical conclusion regardless
of any future judicial hurdle. However, I find this line of reasoning to be a
“Procedural Fallacy” of the highest order; it ignores the inescapable reality
that where the ultimate judicial destination is legally barricaded, any
parallel police inquiry into the veracity of evidence destined for a Special
Court is not only redundant but constitutes a manifest overreach of
executive power.
7.3.4. Engaging in a rigorous statutory exegesis, this Court finds that
Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code operates as a “Jurisdictional Sentinel,”
explicitly mandating that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence
punishable under Sections 193 to 196 of the IPC, among others, when
such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any
proceeding in any Court, except upon the complaint in writing of that
Court or its authorized officer. While not explicitly highlighted by the Bar,
I find the principles enunciated by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh
Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370] and the subsequent
clarification in Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni
35 CRR 2164 of 2022[(2020) 20 SCC 1] to be of profound relevance. The law is now crystal
clear that the moment false evidence is “fabricated” for the purpose of
being produced in a Court, the mandatory “Judicial Filter” is immediately
attracted. This statutory protection is not a matter of administrative
convenience, but a vital safeguard to ensure that the presiding Court
remains the sole arbiter of the integrity of its own proceedings.
7.3.5. Achieving a factual-jurisdictional fusion within the present matrix, it
remains an undisputed reality that the interrogation conducted at Nizam
Palace was an integral component of an ongoing federal investigation,
already under the supervisory and adjudicatory aegis of a Special CBI
Court. Any statement recorded during such an exercise, performed under
the mandate of a federal probe, is for all legal intents and purposes a
“step in a judicial proceeding” within the ambit of Section 193 of the IPC.
It follows, as an immutable legal corollary, that the alleged act of
“fabricating” or “coercing” such a statement is inextricably woven into the
administration of justice within that specific forum. Consequently, the
State Police cannot be permitted to launch a parallel criminal inquiry into
the veracity of these statements, as doing so would effectively empower
the Executive to execute a “Collateral Attack” on the exclusive prerogative
of the Special Court to determine the purity of its own evidentiary record.
7.3.6. Subjecting the State’s contention to a teleological critique, this
Court finds that the proposition of a police investigation proceeding where
a Court is barred from taking cognizance is a “Profound Procedural
Fallacy.” It ignores the fundamental tenet that a criminal investigation is
36 CRR 2164 of 2022not an end in itself, but a subordinate means to an eventual adjudication
by a Court of competent jurisdiction. If the ultimate judicial destination is
legally barricaded by the mandatory provisions of Section 195 of the
Code, then permitting a parallel police inquiry into the “honesty” of a
federal investigator’s statutory statement results in a “Manifest
Absurdity.” Such an approach would sanction a “Roving and Fishing
Inquiry” by one investigative agency into the methodology of another,
thereby precipitating an intolerable “Collision of Jurisdictions” and
reducing the “Judicial Filter” to a mere dead letter.
7.3.7. Invoking the precedential imperative established in M.S. Ahlawat v.
State of Haryana [(2000) 1 SCC 278], this Court must reiterate that the
provisions of Section 195 are mandatory and admit of no “go-by” by any
court, much less an investigative agency. By registering an FIR at the
instance of a private individual for offences under Sections 193 and 196 of
the IPC, the State Police has effectively executed an unauthorized
“Jurisdictional Overstep,” bypassing the Special CBI Court which remains
the solitary authority competent to determine if its own proceedings were
being tainted by fabricated evidence. The statutory requirement of a
“complaint in writing” by the Court is a Non-Negotiable Jurisdictional Fact;
to permit a police investigation to proceed without such a trigger is to
sanction a “Procedural Shortcut” that the law expressly forbids as a
matter of public policy.
7.3.8. Arriving at a point of jurisdictional finality, this Court finds that the
offences alleged under Sections 193, 195, and 196 of the IPC fall squarely
37 CRR 2164 of 2022within the “Prohibitive Orbit” of Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code. The
State Police cannot be permitted to masquerade as a “Supervisory Body”
over the investigative records of the CBI when those very records are
destined for the exclusive and sovereign scrutiny of a Special Court. To
hold otherwise would be to sanction an “Executive Encroachment,”
allowing a collateral attack on the integrity of a federal probe and
subverting the “Judicial Filter” which the Legislature has specifically
enacted as a bulwark against the harassment of officers and witnesses in
relation to court proceedings.
7.3.9. Invoking the precedential imperative of State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], specifically the mandates of Category (6)
thereof, this Court finds its application to the present factual matrix to be
both direct and irresistible. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has unequivocally
decreed that where an express legal bar is engrafted within the provisions
of the Code against the institution and continuance of a proceeding, this
Court cannot remain a “Silent Spectator.” To permit an investigation that
is legally destined for a “Jurisdictional Dead-End” due to a lack of
competence would be to sanction a “Manifest Abuse of Process.” The
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code are designed precisely for
such exigencies: to truncate a proceeding that, on its very face, offends a
statutory prohibition and constitutes an exercise in futility.
7.3.10. Pronouncing a definitive order upon the jurisdictional competence
of the State, this Court holds that the registration of an FIR for offences
hit by the statutory bar of Section 195 of the Code is legally
38 CRR 2164 of 2022impermissible, structurally unsustainable, and void ab initio. The
mandatory “Judicial Filter” is a non-negotiable legislative command that
cannot be bypassed through the artifice of a private FIR. Any parallel
inquiry by the State Police into the veracity of statements intended for the
exclusive consideration of a Special Court constitutes a “Jurisdictional
Overreach” that this Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, is duty-
bound to truncate. To permit such an investigation to persist would be to
sanction a “Legal Nullity” and a manifest abuse of the process of law.
Question No. 3 is, accordingly, answered in the AFFIRMATIVE, against the
State and in favour of the Petitioners.
7.4. The “Cognizability” of Section 195A IPC and the
“Jurisdictional Hook”
7.4.1. Directing our attention to the procedural architecture of the
complaint, the Court must now scrutinize whether the strategic invocation
of Section 195A of the Indian Penal Code, rendered cognizable by the
2005 Amendment, functions as a legitimate “Jurisdictional Gateway” for
the State Police to investigate the conduct of federal officers. This
determination would hinge on whether the “cognizable” status of an
offence possesses the legal gravitas to override the mandatory statutory
and institutional “Shields” previously discussed. The crux of this inquiry is
to discern if a mere procedural classification in the First Schedule can, by
some legal alchemy, extinguish the substantive protections of Section 197
of the Code, or whether such an inclusion is a “Procedural Artifice”
specifically designed to bypass the executive filter of prior sanction.
39 CRR 2164 of 2022
7.4.2. Advancing a spirited defence of the investigative process, the
learned Counsel for the State, in concert with the De-facto Complainant,
draws an aggressive jurisprudential pivot toward the recent
pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Sunil
(supra). They contended with considerable vehemence that Section 195A
stands as an autonomous, standalone, and cognizable edifice, specifically
forged as a remedial instrument to insulate witnesses from the peril of
intimidation. The essence of their submission is that because this specific
provision bypasses the “Judicial Filter” of a Court-initiated complaint
under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code, the State Police is not merely
empowered, but constitutionally obligated, to register an FIR and embark
upon an unfettered investigation into the alleged threats issued within the
high-security precincts of Nizam Palace.
7.4.3. Mounting a formidable rebuttal to this procedural expansionism,
Mr. Mondal, appearing for the Petitioners, cautions this Court against the
“Strategic Dilution” of Section 197 through the “Backdoor Entry” of
Section 195A. He argues with compelling clarity that the “Cognizability” of
an offence and the “Statutory Immunity” of a public servant acting ex
virtute officii are not mutually exclusive, but rather occupy distinct legal
hemispheres. The core of his contention is that the State’s reliance on the
2005 Amendment is a “Jurisdictional Crowbar,” a calculated attempt to
pry open an investigation that the law has otherwise double-locked
behind the requirement of prior sanction. The Petitioners maintain that
the procedural classification of a crime can never be permitted to serve as
40 CRR 2164 of 2022
a “Colourable Tool” to dismantle the substantive protections afforded to
federal officers under the Code.
7.4.4. Subjecting the ratio in Sunil (supra) to a rigorous contextual
deconstruction, this Court finds that while the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
indeed expanded the remedial horizons for a threatened witness, the
State’s reliance upon it is fundamentally misplaced through a failure of
categorical application. In the said case, the Apex Court clarified that a
witness who is intimidated need not remain a hostage to the procedural
delays of a Court-filed complaint under Section 340 of the Code. However,
a seminal distinction, often overlooked in the heat of argument, must be
drawn from the Sunil‘s case pertained to the conduct of a private
individual attempting to subvert the course of justice. It did not
contemplate, nor can it be judicially stretched to govern, the actions of a
public servant engaged in a statutory interrogation under a federal
mandate. The “Remedial Right” of a witness to report a crime cannot be
conflated with the “Investigative Power” of the State to bypass the
jurisdictional barriers of Section 197.
7.4.5. Establishing a rigorous jurisprudential segregation, this Court holds
that the “Cognizability” of an offence and the “Statutory Requirement of
Sanction” occupy two distinct and non-overlapping legal spheres. The
former is a mere procedural classification under the First Schedule of the
Code, which delineates the power of the police to arrest without a
warrant; it does not, however, possess the legal alchemy to transmute a
protected official act into an unprotected criminal one. Applying this logic
41 CRR 2164 of 2022
to the factual matrix at hand, the alleged “threat” namely, the cautionary
intimation regarding the potential legal consequences for the
complainant’s family, transpired during a formal examination under
Section 161 of the Code. In the high-stakes and often adversarial
environment of a federal investigation, an officer’s duty to explain the
gravity of being an accessory to a crime may be subjectively perceived as
“intimidation.” However, such communication, performed within the four
corners of a statutory interrogation, remains an act performed ex virtute
officii and cannot be stripped of its immunity by the simple application of
a “cognizable” label.
7.4.6. Envisaging the systemic repercussions of the State’s contention,
this Court must emphasize that to allow a subjective perception of
“intimidation” to trigger a Section 195A investigation would be to
effectively dismantle the institutional autonomy of the Central Bureau of
Investigation. Such a precedent would invite the “Weaponization of
Procedural Labels,” subjecting every federal investigator to the looming
shadow of “Retaliatory Prosecution” by the very subjects of their scrutiny.
The State cannot be permitted to wield the cognizable nature of one penal
section as a “Jurisdictional Crowbar” to forcibly pry open an inquiry into
acts that are otherwise double-locked by the statutory mandate of
sanction. While the 2005 Amendment may indeed bypass the “Judicial
Filter” of Section 195, it remains legally impotent to breach the “Executive
Filter” of Section 197, which stands as a constitutional sentry over the
official discharge of duties.
42 CRR 2164 of 2022
7.4.7. Culminating this inquiry into the procedural manoeuvrings of the
State, this Court finds that the absence of prior sanction from the Central
Government remains an insurmountable jurisdictional barrier. The
“Cognizable” label attached to Section 195A of the IPC is legally incapable
of acting as a “Jurisdictional Solvent” to dissolve the mandatory
protections afforded to acts performed during an official federal
investigation. To hold otherwise would be to allow a “Procedural Artifice”
to override a substantive statutory mandate, thereby striking at the very
root of the legal order. The inclusion of this specific section in the FIR,
while strategically clever, fails to cure the fundamental defect of
jurisdiction that plagues the entirety of the State‘s case. Question No. 4
is, accordingly, answered in the negative, against the State and in favour
of the Petitioners.
7.5 The “Forgery Paradox” and the Bhajan Lal Test of Inherent
Improbability
7.5.1. Moving to the substantive merits of the accusations, this Court is
now called upon to apply a “Logical Filter” to the four corners of the FIR to
determine whether the narrative propounded by the De-facto
Complainant survives the rigorous test of Inherent Probability. This
inquiry does not necessitate a premature appreciation of evidence, but
rather a structural examination of whether the allegations, even when
taken as an uncontroverted whole, offend the basic tenets of human
conduct to such a degree that they qualify as “Manifestly Absurd” under
Category 3 of the Bhajan Lal guidelines. The core of this determination
43 CRR 2164 of 2022lies in whether the story of a “forced forgery” that resulted in no forged
document is a credible grievance or a factual impossibility that defies the
very nature of a criminal transaction.
7.5.2. Assailing the Petitioners’ prayer for quashing, the learned Counsel
for the State, in conjunction with the De-facto Complainant, urges this
Court to exercise extreme judicial circumspection. Placing heavy reliance
upon the principles enunciated in CBI v. Aryan Singh [supra] and M/S
Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (supra), they
contend that the High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, is
strictly prohibited from venturing into a “mini-trial.” The essence of their
argument is that the veracity or the alleged “improbability” of a complaint
is a matter of evidence to be tested during the trial, and not at the
threshold of a Section 482 petition. They maintain that as long as the FIR,
on its face, alleges a cognizable offence, the statutory duty of the police
to investigate remains sacrosanct and should not be “scuttled” by judicial
intervention.
7.5.3. In sharp contrast to the State’s plea for judicial restraint, Mr.
Mondal, appearing for the Petitioners, invites this Court’s scrutiny into the
profound “Internal Contradictions” that permeate the narrative of the De-
facto Complainant. He argues with considerable cogency that the story of
a “forced forgery,” wherein the Complainant was purportedly coerced into
signing fabricated documents, yet simultaneously managed to maintain a
steadfast refusal and was ultimately released without executing any
incriminating statement, is a “Logical Mirage” that falls squarely within the
44 CRR 2164 of 2022prohibited ambit of Category 3 of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (Supra).
The Petitioners maintain that where the foundational allegations are so
“transparently hollow” and “inherently improbable” that they offend the
basic tenets of human logic, the High Court is not only empowered but is
duty-bound to exercise its inherent powers to prevent the criminal
process from being reduced to a farce.
7.5.4. In evaluating these competing contentions, this Court remains
acutely cognizant of the restrictive parameters delineated in M/S
Neeharika Infrastructure (supra), which caution against the premature
stifling of a legitimate investigative process. However, the mandate of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has never been to reduce the High Court to a
state of judicial myopia, nor has it ever suggested that the Court must
shut its eyes to “patent absurdities” or “inherent improbabilities”
presented under the guise of an FIR. While a “mini-trial” is undeniably
prohibited, a “judicial filter” is fundamentally required. The inherent
power of this Court is the ultimate safeguard against the weaponization of
the criminal process, and it must be invoked precisely when the narrative
of the prosecution, even if uncontroverted, offends the very principles of
human logic and common sense.
7.5.5. While not explicitly brought to the attention of this Court by the
learned Counsel for either party, I find the ratio in Shafiya Khan v. State
of U.P. [(2022) 4 SCC 549] and Ramesh Chandra Gupta v. State of U.P.
[2022 SCC OnLine SC 1634] to be of profound relevance and authoritative
guidance. These precedents clarify that the High Court’s inherent power is
45 CRR 2164 of 2022
not a dormant jurisdiction but a vibrant one, designed to ensure that the
criminal justice system is not utilized as a theatre for “extravagant” or
“internally inconsistent” narratives that defy basic human logic. Where a
complaint is found to be constructed upon a foundation of factual
impossibilities, the Court is not only empowered but is duty-bound to
intervene. To hold otherwise would be to allow the investigative
machinery to be set in motion upon a story that, even if uncontroverted,
is fundamentally incapable of sustaining a conviction in any court of law.
7.5.6. Upon a microscopic and clinical reading of the FIR, this Court
encounters what can only be described as a “Forgery Paradox,” a
narrative that systematically dismantles its own foundational allegations.
The De-facto Complainant’s story is constructed upon three irreconcilable
pillars of factual impossibility:
(i) first, he alleges being shown “fabricated photographs and
bills” under severe threat and coercion to implicate third
parties;
(ii) in the very next breath, he asserts a “clear denial” and a
successful “refusal to sign” any statement or document;
and
(iii) finally, he admits to being permitted to depart from the
precincts of Nizam Palace at 06:40 PM without having
executed any incriminating instrument.
This sequence of events presents a glaring logical void; it
suggests a scenario where a high-stakes, “coercive”
46 CRR 2164 of 2022
interrogation by federal officers, purportedly involving
forgery and threats, concluded with the “coerced” party
simply walking away, unyielding and empty-handed, with
no forged document ever having been created, signed,
or recovered.
7.5.7. Translating this factual void into the language of the Penal Code, it
becomes patently clear that if the purported “coercion” and “threats”
yielded no signature, and if no “fabricated document” was actually planted
upon or recovered from the De-facto Complainant, the essential
ingredients of Section 467 IPC (Forgery of valuable security) or Section
193 IPC (Fabrication of evidence) simply do not exist in either the
physical or legal realm. The criminal law of this land does not contemplate
the punishment of an “unsuccessful attempt to persuade a witness” under
the specific and severe penal sections invoked herein. A charge of forgery
without a forged instrument is a legal oxymoron; it is a story of logical
self-defeat that fails to cross the threshold of a prima facie case. To allow
a prosecution to proceed on such a basis would be to sanction the trial of
a “ghost allegation” that has no anchor in the material facts of the case.
7.5.8. In light of the aforementioned logical void, this Court finds that the
ratio in CBI v. Aryan Singh (supra), which was vehemently pressed into
service by the State, finds no fertile ground for application in the present
factual matrix. While the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Aryan Singh cautioned
against a “mini-trial” where a prima facie case exists, it did not mandate
judicial acquiescence in the face of a self-destructive narrative. In the
47 CRR 2164 of 2022
instant case, the Court is not required to weigh the evidence of the
defence against the prosecution; rather, the Complainant’s own story acts
as a “Legal Harakiri,” destroying the very possibility of the offence ever
having occurred. When the foundational facts of a complaint are so
internally corrosive that they dissolve the legal charge of “forgery” at its
very inception, the mandate of Aryan Singh to proceed to trial becomes
an exercise in futility, for there is no “triable issue” left to adjudicate.
7.5.9. In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that the allegations fall
squarely and inescapably within the prohibited ambit of Category 3 of
Bhajan Lal, “Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR… are
so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.” To permit the state machinery to persist with an
investigation into a “forgery” that the Complainant himself admits to have
successfully resisted, and which has notably failed to produce a single
shred of documentary evidence, would be to sanction a “fishing and
roving inquiry” into the internal operations of a federal agency under the
thin veil of criminal law. This Court cannot remain a passive observer to a
proceeding that lacks a prima facie pulse; to do so would be to allow the
criminal process to be utilized not as a shield for the victim, but as a
sword against the investigator.
7.5.10. In the final analysis, the allegations contained in the impugned
FIR are found to be internally contradictory, logically inconsistent, and
inherently improbable to the point of being legally non-existent. They fail
48 CRR 2164 of 2022
to meet even the most liberal threshold of a prima facie case and instead
present a narrative that is fundamentally at odds with the natural course
of human conduct. To compel the Petitioners to undergo the rigors of a
criminal trial based on a “forgery” that, by the Complainant’s own
admission, never reached fruition, would be to sanction a gross
perversion of the judicial process. This Court, therefore, finds that the
continuation of such a proceeding would be an exercise in futility and a
direct affront to the ends of justice. Question No. 5 is, accordingly,
answered in the affirmative in favour of the Petitioners.
7.6. The “Counter-Blast” Theory and Manifest Malice
7.6.1. The final and perhaps most consequential question that falls for
determination before this Court is whether the impugned FIR, when
viewed through the critical prism of its strategic timing, the jurisdictional
anomaly of its registration, and the highly sensitive backdrop of the court-
monitored “Coal Scam” investigation, constitutes a “Counter-Strike” or a
“Counter-Blast.” This Court is tasked with adjudicating whether the
criminal machinery of the State has been set in motion to vindicate a
genuine grievance, or whether it has been pre-meditatedly deployed as a
tactical strike designed to obstruct the due process of justice and derail a
national-level probe. The pivot of this inquiry is to discern if the legal
process is being weaponized to create a “Litigation Shield” for those
currently under the investigative scanner of a federal agency.
7.6.2. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners, in a spirited challenge,
contends that the impugned FIR is a “textbook example” of Category 7 of
49 CRR 2164 of 2022
the celebrated guidelines enunciated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
(supra). It is argued with considerable force that the criminal proceeding
is manifestly attended with mala fide and has been maliciously instituted
with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance upon the Investigating
Officer for his role in a sensitive federal probe. Mr. Mondal, appearing for
the Petitioners, points to the “legalistic and precisely drafted” nature of
the complaint, replete with the technical nomenclature of the Indian Penal
Code, and the inexplicable choice of a distant, remote police station as
incontrovertible evidence of a pre-planned, “engineered” conspiracy to
harass the federal IO and, by extension, to cripple the CBI’s institutional
mandate.
7.6.3. Countervailing the Petitioners’ stance, the learned Counsel for the
State, in conjunction with the De-facto Complainant, submits that the
existence of “malice” or “ulterior motive” is essentially a question of fact
that cannot be adjudicated at the threshold, but must be left to the rigors
of a full-fledged trial. Drawing sustenance from the ratio in M/S Neeharika
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (supra), they argue that
this Court, in its inherent jurisdiction, is precluded from quashing an FIR
on the mere plea of a “counter-blast.” The State maintains that the police
are under a mandatory statutory obligation to investigate every
cognizable complaint which, on its face, discloses the commission of an
offence, and any judicial interference at this nascent stage would amount
to a premature stifling of a legitimate criminal process.
50 CRR 2164 of 2022
7.6.4. While this Court is acutely cognizant of the general rule that
“malice” or “ulterior motive” alone, however pervasive, may not
constitute a sufficient ground for quashing a criminal proceeding if the
allegations ex facie disclose a cognizable offence, the law is equally
emphatic that the High Court cannot remain a mute spectator to a series
of “procedural red flags.” Where the cumulative effect of the surrounding
circumstances points to a patent abuse of the process of law, the Court is
not only empowered but is duty-bound to pierce the veil of the complaint.
The inherent power under Section 482 of the Code is designed precisely
for such exigencies, to ensure that the criminal justice system is not
reduced to a tool of administrative obstruction or private vengeance
under the garb of a statutory investigation.
7.6.5. In this regard, while not explicitly cited by the Bar, I find the ratio
in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699] and the more
recent observations in Salib @ Shalu @ Salim v. State of U.P. [2023 SCC
OnLine SC 947] to be of profound relevance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
has consistently held that the High Court, while exercising its inherent
powers, must look at the “entirety of the circumstances” to discern
whether the criminal justice system is being utilized as a weapon of
harassment or a tool of administrative obstruction. If the “whole of the
matter” reveals that a proceeding is being carried on for an ulterior
motive or to satisfy a private grudge, the ends of justice would be poorly
served by allowing the investigative machinery to continue its course. In
the present matrix, this Court is compelled to examine the “Counter-
51 CRR 2164 of 2022
Blast” theory not as a mere defence of the accused, but as a discernible
reality emerging from the chronological and geographical anomalies of the
complaint itself.
7.6.6. In the backdrop of these settled legal postulations, the task before
this Court is to determine whether the “Counter-Blast” asserted by the
Petitioners is a mere speculative defence or a discernible reality etched
into the very face of the record. To reach a just conclusion, one must look
beyond the sterile text of the FIR and examine the “Environment of the
Litigation.” It is the duty of the High Court to scrutinize whether the
criminal machinery has been set in motion as a bona fide pursuit of
justice or as a tactical manoeuvre to create an “Inter-Agency Friction”
intended to dampen the morale of a federal officer. Consequently, I shall
now proceed to examine the specific factual indicators, the “Procedural
Red Flags,” which, in the opinion of this Court, strip the impugned FIR of
its veneer of legitimacy.
7.6.7. Upon a clinical analysis of the record, this Court finds three specific
and converging factors that lead to the inescapable conclusion of manifest
malice. These “procedural red flags” are not merely incidental but are
indicative of a pre-meditated design to obstruct the federal mandate:
a. It is an undisputed fact that the “place of occurrence” for the
alleged threats and coercion was Nizam Palace, situated in
the heart of Kolkata and falling squarely within the
jurisdiction of the Bhowanipore Police Station. Yet, the De-
facto Complainant chose to travel a significant distance,
52 CRR 2164 of 2022bypassing several intermediary police stations, to register
the FIR at Bishnupur P.S. in the South 24 Parganas district.
This Court finds that no plausible or rational explanation has
been offered for this blatant exercise in “forum shopping.”
Such a deliberate selection of a distant jurisdiction is a
classic hallmark of a “controlled” prosecution, designed to
cause maximum procedural harassment to the federal
officers.
b. While a one-day delay in lodging an FIR is not always fatal, it
assumes a sinister character when viewed in the context of
an alleged “threat to life” and “forgery” involving high-
ranking federal investigators. A person truly in “perpetual
fear” for his nine-month-old infant would, in the natural
course of human conduct, seek immediate redress at the
nearest available precinct. Instead, the complainant waited
twenty-four hours to produce a “legally perfected and
precisely drafted” document. The sophisticated use of penal
nomenclature and the meticulous structuring of the narrative
suggest that the complaint was not a spontaneous outburst
of a victim, but a “calculated afterthought” engineered with
legal assistance to fit specific criminal categories.
c. Perhaps most significantly, the FIR was lodged as an
immediate reaction to the complainant being summoned and
examined in a highly sensitive, court-monitored, multi-crore
53 CRR 2164 of 2022
political scam. The initial inclusion and subsequent deletion
of the Prevention of Corruption Act reveals an over-
exuberant intent to characterize the Investigating Officer’s
routine interrogation as a “non-bailable” criminal enterprise.
This sequence of events leaves no doubt in the mind of
this Court that the FIR was intended to act as a
“Litigation Shield,” aimed at decapitating the federal
probe by criminalizing its lead investigators.
7.6.8. Furthermore, this Court finds that the facts of the present case are
starkly distinguishable from the ratio in CBI v. Aryan Singh [2023 (18)
SCC 399], which was pressed into service by the learned Counsel for the
State. In the Aryan Singh matter, the allegations were substantive,
involving a clear and present criminal act that necessitated a trial.
Conversely, in the instant case, the “Counter-Blast” is not a mere
speculative allegation raised by the Petitioners as a defense; rather, it is a
discernible and documented reality emerging from the very face of the
record. The chronological proximity between the complainant’s
examination in the “Coal Scam” and the lodging of this FIR at a distant
jurisdiction creates a nexus of malice that is too pervasive to be ignored.
Unlike a routine criminal case where “malice” is a latent question of fact,
the malice here is patent and manifest, rendering any further
investigation a futility in law.
7.6.9. It is the considered view of this Court that the impugned FIR
represents a transparent attempt to provide a “Litigation Shield” to an
54 CRR 2164 of 2022
individual already under the investigative scanner of a federal agency. To
permit such a proceeding to continue would be to sanction a dangerous
precedent where every high-profile accused, or even a recalcitrant
witness, could effectively paralyze a CBI investigation by simply
orchestrating a parallel, retaliatory FIR in a remote police station. Such a
practice would have a “chilling effect” on the independence and
fearlessness of investigative agencies, rendering them vulnerable to
administrative and political sabotage under the guise of local police
inquiries. This case, therefore, falls squarely within the restorative ambit
of Category 7 of the Bhajan Lal guidelines, as it is a manifest abuse of the
process of law, instituted with the singular and ulterior motive of
obstructing a national investigation of immense public importance.
7.6.10. The cumulative effect of the geographical anomalies, the temporal
delay, the sophisticated legal tailoring of the complaint, and the high-
stakes institutional context leads this Court to a singular and inescapable
conclusion that the impugned FIR is a manifest abuse of the process of
law. It has been maliciously instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking
vengeance upon a federal Investigating Officer and to obstruct a sensitive
investigation of national importance. To allow such a proceeding to
continue would be to permit the criminal justice system to be hijacked by
those seeking to create a “Procedural Veto” against the rule of law. This
case falls squarely within the restorative ambit of Category 7 of the
Bhajan Lal guidelines, warranting the immediate and total intervention of
55 CRR 2164 of 2022
this Court to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice. Question No. 6 is,
accordingly, answered in the AFFIRMATIVE in favour of the Petitioners.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
8.1. On a cumulative assessment of the discussions held in respect of
questions 1 to 6, this Court arrives at the following inescapable
conclusions:
I. The preliminary objection regarding locus standi is rejected.
Petitioner No. 1 (CBI) is an “aggrieved person” as the
impugned FIR targets its institutional integrity and the
legality of its core investigative processes at Nizam Palace.
II. The acts complained of summoning and examining a witness
possess an “inseparable nexus” with official duty. The failure
of the State Police to obtain prior sanction under Section 197
Cr.P.C. at the threshold renders the registration of the FIR a
manifest illegality.
III. The allegations pertaining to the “fabrication of evidence”
(Sec. 193, 195, 196 IPC) are hit by the absolute statutory
embargo of Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C., as they relate to
proceedings destined for a Special Court.
IV. The “Forgery Paradox” in the complainant’s narrative, alleging
coercion to sign while simultaneously admitting a successful
refusal and subsequent release, renders the FIR “inherently
improbable” under Category 3 of Bhajan Lal.
56 CRR 2164 of 2022
V. The choice of a distant jurisdiction (Bishnupur), the timing of
the complaint, and the one-day delay collectively establish
that the FIR is a “Counter-Blast” designed to intimidate
federal officers and derail the Coal Scam probe.
9. THE RATIO DECIDENDI (The Points of Law)
9.1. The legal principles emanating from this discussion, which govern the
resolution of this case, are as follows:
a) On the “Nexus Test” for Investigation, the protection under
Section 197 Cr.P.C. is not restricted to the lawful discharge of
duty but extends to any act committed under the colour of
office. Allegations of “excess” or “high-handedness” during a
statutory interrogation do not strip an officer of this
protection; rather, they reinforce the necessity of a prior
sanction to prevent “investigative sabotage.”
b) On the institutional Locus Standi, a federal investigating
agency has the locus standi to challenge a state-registered
FIR when that FIR criminalizes the agency’s internal, statutory
investigative procedures, as such an FIR constitutes a direct
interference with the “Institutional Autonomy” of the agency.
c) On the Supremacy of the “Judicial Filter,” the mandatory bar
under Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C. cannot be bypassed by a
private individual filing an FIR. When an offence affects the
administration of justice in a Court, only that Court has the
jurisdiction to initiate prosecution.
57 CRR 2164 of 2022
d) On the limits of Cognizability (Section 195A), the fact that an
offence is “cognizable” (such as threatening a witness) does
not serve as a “jurisdictional hook” to override the
requirement of prior executive sanction for public servants
under Section 197 Cr.P.C.
10. CONSEQUENTIAL ORDER AND FINAL DIRECTIONS
10.1. In view of the detailed findings as recorded in the preceding
paragraphs, and for the reasons set forth therein, this Court concludes
that the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the Petitioners is
not only legally unsustainable but also detrimental to the administration
of justice. Therefore, the present Criminal Revisional Application being
CRR 2164 of 2022 is allowed on the following directions:
i. The Bishnupur Police Station Case No. 361 of 2022 dated
27.05.2022, registered under Sections 120B, 193, 195, 195A,
196, 465, 467, 468, 471, 506(ii), and 34 of the Indian Penal
Code, along with all consequential proceedings, including any
charge-sheet, summons, or warrants emanating therefrom, are
hereby quashed and set aside in its entirety as against all the
Petitioners and “unknown officials” named therein.
ii. All investigative steps taken by the State Police, including but
not limited to the recording of statements, collection of
documents, or any forensic analysis conducted in connection
with the said FIR, are hereby declared null and void.
58 CRR 2164 of 2022
iii. The State Police is directed to immediately cease any ongoing
inquiry or surveillance related to this matter.
iv. Any documents, digital devices, or personal records belonging to
the Petitioners or Petitioner No. 1 (CBI) that may have been
seized or obtained during the pendency of the investigation shall
be returned to the office of the Additional Superintendent of
Police, CBI (Petitioner No. 2) at Nizam Palace within seven (7)
days from the date of this order.
v. The interim order of stay granted by this Court on 29.06.2022,
and subsequently extended from time to time, has served its
purpose in protecting the Petitioners from coercive action during
the pendency of this litigation, is hereby vacated.
vi. All pending applications connected with this Revisional
Application, if any, shall stand disposed of in terms of this order.
vii. Petitioner No. 2 and the team of officers at Petitioner No. 1
(CBI) are directed to proceed with the investigation into the
“Coal Scam” (RC0102020A0022) with full professional rigor and
independence, without any apprehension of retaliatory
prosecution or state interference.
viii. The State of West Bengal and its police machinery are directed
to ensure that federal investigators are allowed to discharge
their statutory duties at Nizam Palace in an environment free
from “Counter-Blast” litigations.
59 CRR 2164 of 2022
ix. The Officer-in-Charge of Bishnupur Police Station is directed to
transmit a copy of this judgment and the closed case file to the
Learned Special Judge, CBI Court, for the purpose of the Court’s
record, ensuring that no further proceedings are entertained in
relation to the quashed FIR.
x. This Court finds no reason to impose costs, as the primary
objective is the preservation of the rule of law and the
prevention of the abuse of the process of the Court.
xi. Let a copy of this judgment be communicated to the Director
General of Police, West Bengal, and the Head of Branch, CBI,
Kolkata, for immediate compliance with the directions contained
herein.
10.2. CRAN 15 of 2026 is also disposed of accordingly.
10.3. The Trial Court Record (TCR), if any, shall be sent down to the Trial
Court, at once.
10.4. Case diary, if any, be returned forthwith.
10.5. The judgment is delivered.
10.6. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
given to the parties, as expeditiously as possible, upon compliance with
the necessary formalities in this regard.
(Uday Kumar, J.)
