A criminal prosecution spanning nearly twenty-five years culminated in the acquittal of a husband convicted of dowry death after serious deficiencies emerged in the investigation and evaluation of evidence. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to establish continuous dowry demands or marital cruelty, while substantial medical, documentary, and oral evidence produced by the defence supported a reasonable hypothesis of accidental death and innocence.
Title of the Case: Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar
Judges: Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran
The appellant, Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh, was married to the deceased, who lived with him at her matrimonial home in Mirzapur. According to the prosecution, the matrimonial family continuously demanded ₹50,000 as dowry despite sufficient gifts having been given by the bride’s family at the time of marriage. The father of the deceased alleged that his daughter frequently complained of harassment whenever she visited her parental home. It was further alleged that she continued to face cruelty during her pregnancy and even after the birth of the couple’s son.
On April 13, 2000, the deceased suffered serious burn injuries at her matrimonial home. She was initially taken to the District Hospital, Mirzapur, and was subsequently shifted to a private hospital at Allahabad for further treatment.
She died on May 2, 2000. The father of the deceased filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Munger, on May 15, 2000. The complaint was forwarded to the police under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Section 175(3) of BNSS].
Consequently, FIR No. 272 of 2000 was registered at Kotwali Police Station, Munger, on June 1, 2000. Seventeen persons belonging to the matrimonial family were named as accused for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Sections 85, 80, 3(5) of BNS], along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
The investigation resulted in an unusual procedural situation. The first final report dated October 31, 2000, stated that the investigation had revealed the commission of the alleged offences. However, the charge sheet was filed only against the father-in-law and mother-in-law because they were already in judicial custody.
The Superintendent of Police directed the investigation to continue against the remaining fifteen accused. The first charge sheet resulted in Sessions Case No. 592 of 2001.
Subsequently, another Investigating Officer conducted further investigation and filed Final Report No. 215 of 2005 dated May 31, 2005. The subsequent Investigating Officer found no further evidence against the remaining fifteen accused and concluded that there was no justification for filing a supplementary charge sheet against them.
Nevertheless, the court took cognizance against those accused, resulting in Sessions Case No. 504 of 2006. The two trials initially proceeded separately. After considerable evidence had been recorded, they were clubbed together and further evidence was recorded jointly. Subsequently, the cases were again separated and decided independently.
On December 17, 2012, the father-in-law and mother-in-law were acquitted in Sessions Case No. 592 of 2001. In Sessions Case No. 504 of 2006, fourteen other members of the matrimonial family were also acquitted. The appellant-husband alone was convicted. The appellant challenged his conviction before the High Court.
The High Court remanded the matter to the Trial Court primarily on the ground that the appellant had not been present when certain witnesses were examined in the other sessions case before the two cases were clubbed. The appellant thereafter approached the Supreme Court.
Considering that the incident had occurred in 2000 and that another remand would merely prolong criminal proceedings that had already continued for nearly twenty-five years, the Supreme Court decided to examine the case on the merits.
Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant of all charges.
Superintendent of Police Had No Authority to Interfere With the Investigating Officer’s Opinion
The Supreme Court held that the direction issued by the Superintendent of Police to file a charge sheet only against the father-in-law and mother-in-law was without authority.
The Court examined Sections 158 and 173(3) CrPC [Sections 177 and 193 of BNSS] and observed that a superior police officer may exercise certain powers where the State Government has issued a general or special order requiring police reports to be submitted through such superior officer.
There was no evidence of any such general or special order in the present case. The Court observed:
“The order of the S.P hence was clearly without any authority.”
The Supreme Court reiterated that the formation of an opinion regarding whether sufficient material exists to place an accused on trial falls within the domain of the officer in charge of the investigation.
Referring to Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, the Court observed:
“It was categorically held that the formation of opinion as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial is exclusively with the officer in charge of the investigation.”
Criminal Court Has Primacy in Taking Cognizance
The Supreme Court rejected the contention that cognizance taken against the remaining fifteen accused was illegal. The Court explained that the opinion expressed by the police in its final report is not binding upon the Magistrate.
Where a closure report is filed, the Magistrate may accept the report and close the proceedings, take cognizance on the basis of the materials collected during investigation, or direct further investigation.
The Court observed:
“The Magistrate, hence, is not bound to accept the opinion of the police that there is no case to place the accused on trial as it is always open to take a contrary view on the facts disclosed in the report.”
Emphasising the independent role of the criminal court, the Supreme Court stated:
“The primacy of the Court to take cognizance or deny it is the law discernible from the very provisions of the CrPC.”
In the present case, the first investigation report had found material against all seventeen accused. Therefore, while considering the subsequent final report, the court was entitled to examine the entire material and take cognizance against the remaining accused.
Separate Trials Did Not Cause Prejudice to the Appellant
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the conduct of two separate trials had caused prejudice to the appellant.
Although the two trials initially proceeded separately, were subsequently clubbed, and were thereafter separated before final adjudication, the Trial Court had considered only the evidence of witnesses examined in the presence of the appellant.
The Court observed:
“There could be claimed an irregularity but there is no illegality, miscarriage of justice or prejudice caused to the accused since split trials, in the same offence is not unheard of.”
The Supreme Court further clarified:
“The opinion in the final report filed is not decisive of the cognizance and the committal order/s is/are not determinative of whether the trial is single/separate/joint; which is at the exclusive discretion of the Court.”
Serious Deficiencies in the Investigation
Turning to the merits, the Supreme Court expressed serious concern regarding the investigation. No postmortem examination of the deceased had been conducted. No wound certificate explaining the nature and extent of the burn injuries was produced.
The prosecution failed to obtain and produce complete medical records, while the doctor who treated the deceased at the Allahabad hospital was not examined as a prosecution witness.
The Court observed:
“It is distressing that no postmortem was conducted of the deceased who died in the hospital at Allahabad nor is any wound certificate produced.”
The Court also criticised the failure to meaningfully investigate the circumstances surrounding the treatment and death of the deceased:
“What is more disturbing is that the I.O has not attempted to bring out what transpired after the victim sustained the burns.”
The Investigating Officer admitted that he had learned about a statement of the deceased recorded before a Magistrate but failed to obtain and produce it. Describing this failure, the Court observed that it was “clearly a lackadaisical approach.”
Evidence of Dowry Demand Was Vague and Unconvincing
The Supreme Court found that the evidence concerning the alleged demand of ₹50,000 largely consisted of repetitive statements made by relatives of the deceased.
There were no convincing details regarding particular incidents of cruelty connected with the alleged demand. No independent person from the neighbourhood supported the allegation of marital discord.
The Court observed:
“Even then we cannot but opine that the testimonies were in the nature of a soulless reiteration of a demand of Rs.50,000/-, having been made right from the inception of the marital life till the death occurred.”
After examining the evidence, the Supreme Court strongly observed:
“The hollow statement made of demand of dowry echoed listlessly by the witnesses; all relatives of the victim, raise not a grain of doubt but a sea of suspicion regarding the entire story set up.”
Dying Declaration Raised a Reasonable Doubt
The defence produced the Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration and the doctor who certified that the deceased was conscious and medically fit to make the statement.
The deceased stated that the incident occurred accidentally while she was boiling milk for her child. The rubber pipe connected to the gas stove became disconnected, and the flames engulfed her. Her husband attempted to extinguish the fire, and other family members also helped put out the flames.
She categorically stated that none of her in-laws was responsible for the incident. The Trial Court had doubted the declaration partly because it was not recorded in question-and-answer form.
Rejecting this approach, the Supreme Court observed:
“There is no hard and fast rule that a dying declaration should be in the question-and-answer form.”
The Court initially examined the exculpatory declaration cautiously because the deceased was under the care of her matrimonial family when the statement was recorded.
However, considering the surrounding circumstances and other evidence, the Court held:
“The dying declaration, even if not reckoned to absolve the husband and the family members, at least raises a reasonable doubt regarding their culpability coupled with the other circumstances.”
Documentary and Medical Evidence Supported the Defence Version
The appellant had produced substantial documentary evidence. Investments had been made in the joint names of the husband and wife and their value exceeded the ₹50,000 allegedly demanded as dowry.
The appellant had also obtained an insurance policy in which his wife was the nominee. Telephone and telegram receipts showed that the appellant had informed the family of the deceased about the incident.
Medical records, prescriptions, and receipts showed that the appellant had arranged treatment and incurred expenses for his wife. The appellant himself had suffered a burn injury while attempting to save her.
The doctors examined by the defence and the Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration were independent witnesses whose evidence remained substantially uncontroverted.
The Court found that these circumstances supported the possibility that the deceased had suffered accidental burn injuries.
Prosecution Failed to Establish Dowry Death or Cruelty
The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the fundamental allegations forming the basis of the criminal case.
The Court observed:
“The prosecution has failed to establish the constant demands of dowry, a bitter matrimony or any other circumstance which could lead to a conclusion that the family of the husband or the husband alone had instigated or perpetrated the crime of dowry death or subjected her to cruelty leading to the death.”
The Court also criticised the failure to obtain expert medical evidence that could have assisted in determining the cause of the burn injuries.
It observed:
“Sadly, the prosecution has completely failed to bring forth the nature of the burn injuries suffered by the victim.”
The absence of a postmortem examination and the unsatisfactory explanation offered for such failure assumed considerable significance.
Defence Evidence Must Receive Equal Judicial Consideration
One of the most significant findings of the judgment concerned the manner in which Trial Courts should evaluate defence evidence.
The Supreme Court found that the Trial Court had virtually ignored the evidence produced by the defence despite the appellant examining independent witnesses and producing credible documentary evidence.
The Court observed:
“The defence evidence was given a complete go by without any valid reasons, despite the substantive testimonies and credible documents produced, remaining uncontroverted.”
The Court then laid down an important principle:
“The trial courts would do well to bestow equal attention to the defence evidence as that bestowed on the prosecution evidence.”
It further emphasised:
“There is no cause to approach the defence evidence with distrust, suspicion or even scepticism.”
Clarifying the burden placed upon an accused, the Supreme Court observed:
“The accused is not obliged to prove his/her innocence and if a reasonable doubt is raised either from the unsatisfactory evidence led by the prosecution or from the evidence led by the defence its benefit should inure to the accused.”
The Court emphasised that credible defence evidence must be tested alongside the prosecution case, particularly where the prosecution evidence is weak or incomplete:
“A valid defence plea, substantiated through testimonies of independent witnesses and documents, as in this case, tested alongside the sketchy evidence led on behalf of the prosecution ought to have raised the judicial antenna of caution especially when the standard of proof is that of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”
Prosecution Must Travel From “May Be True” to “Must Be True”
Reiterating the high standard of proof applicable in criminal trials, the Supreme Court relied upon Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab.
The Court observed:
“In travelling from ‘may be true’ to ‘must be true’ the whole of the distance should be paved with ‘legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence’.”
The prosecution evidence failed to satisfy this standard. The deficiencies in the investigation, absence of reliable evidence establishing dowry demand, failure to conduct a postmortem examination, non-production of material medical evidence, and credible defence evidence cumulatively created a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.
Supreme Court Calls the Proceedings a “Clear Travesty of Justice”
Before concluding, the Supreme Court strongly criticised the manner in which seventeen persons had been prosecuted and the proceedings had continued for nearly twenty-five years.
The Court observed:
“Before leaving the matter, we are constrained to notice the clear travesty of justice which has occurred in the above case, putting on the dock seventeen persons for reason only of having marital ties with the victim who, in all probability, sustained burn injuries in an accidental fire at her matrimonial home.”
The Court also criticised the High Court for remanding the matter despite the long passage of time and the absence of actual prejudice to the appellant:
“The High Court also should have bestowed better care in disposing of a criminal appeal from a conviction for an offence alleged to have been committed a quarter century back.”
The Supreme Court found that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt and that the defence evidence created a probable hypothesis consistent with innocence.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction passed by the Sessions Court and the remand order passed by the High Court, and acquitted the appellant.
