For decades, Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and now Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, have stood as important criminal law provisions protecting women from cruelty inflicted by their husbands and relatives of their husbands. Yet, as Indian society gradually acknowledged relationships outside formal marriage, an inevitable legal question emerged: Can a man in a live-in relationship be prosecuted under Section 498A IPC (Section 85 BNS) merely because the relationship resembles a marriage?
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. (2026 INSC 784). Rather than deciding only a dispute between two individuals, the Court examined the very boundaries of criminal liability. It analysed competing principles of statutory interpretation, revisited decades of precedent, examined the object behind Section 498A IPC (Section 85 BNS), considered the evolution of live-in relationships under Indian law, and ultimately clarified whether criminal law could be expanded beyond the words chosen by Parliament.
Background of the Case
The dispute arose after criminal proceedings were initiated against Dr. Lokesh B.H. under Section 498A IPC (Section 85 BNS) and other penal provisions. The complainant asserted that the parties had married according to Hindu rites and that she had been subjected to cruelty during the relationship. The appellant, however, disputed the very existence of a valid marriage and contended that since there was no lawful marriage, prosecution under Section 498A IPC (Section 85 BNS) could not continue.
The Karnataka High Court rejected this contention. Adopting a purposive interpretation, it held that the expression “husband” under Section 498A IPC (Section 85 BNS) should not be confined to a legally valid marriage where the facts disclose a relationship in the nature of marriage. The High Court observed:
“The term “husband” in Section 498A must be given a purposive and expansive construction, and the protection afforded by the provision cannot be denied merely on the technical ground of a void marriage. Where a man induces a woman to believe that she is lawfully married to him, and thereafter subjects her to cruelty, such a man cannot be permitted to evade criminal responsibility on the plea that no valid marriage existed in law”
Aggrieved by this interpretation, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, raising an important question concerning the scope of Section 498A IPC and, by implication, its successor provision, Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
The Supreme Court’s Approach: Strict Interpretation and Purposive Interpretation
Strict Interpretation of Penal Statutes
The rule of strict interpretation requires that penal statutes be interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning because they affect a person’s life, liberty, and rights. Courts cannot extend the scope of a penal law by implication or analogy.
In Commissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co., the Supreme Court reaffirmed that where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning. Hardship or inconvenience cannot justify departing from the statutory language. However, where a literal interpretation leads to absurdity or defeats the legislative purpose, the court may adopt an interpretation that reflects the true intention of the legislature.
The Court also relied on United States v. Wiltberger, where Chief Justice Marshall observed that although penal laws must be construed strictly, they should not be interpreted so narrowly as to frustrate the obvious legislative intent. Courts cannot create offences by analogy or punish conduct that the legislature has not expressly criminalised.
A penal statute must be interpreted strictly but sensibly. The primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent from the words used in the statute. Strict interpretation does not mean rigid literalism; rather, it means that no person can be punished unless the law clearly covers the alleged offence.
Purposive Interpretation and the Mischief Rule
The Supreme Court turned to the doctrine of purposive interpretation and the mischief rule. The Court observed that statutes should be interpreted in a manner that furthers the object sought to be achieved by the legislature. Where a literal interpretation defeats the legislative purpose or leads to an absurd result, courts should adopt an interpretation that advances the remedy intended by Parliament.
Tracing the doctrine to Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a, the Court reiterated that judges must identify the defect in the existing law, the remedy introduced by Parliament, and the interpretation that suppresses the mischief while advancing the remedy.
In support of these principles, the Court relied on several landmark decisions. Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619 explained that purposive interpretation seeks to realise the object of a statute and that statutory interpretation is dynamic. D. Vinod Shivappa v. Nanda Belliappa, (2006) 6 SCC 456 reaffirmed that the mischief rule requires courts to adopt an interpretation that remedies the legislative defect. The Constitution Bench decisions in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India reiterated that statutory interpretation must be guided by the purpose and history of the legislation. Likewise, MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan, (2013) 1 SCC 177, Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424, and the seven-Judge Bench decision in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, (2017) 2 SCC 629 emphasised that courts should prefer an interpretation that advances the legislative objective rather than one that frustrates it.
Relying on these authorities, the Supreme Court held that while the language of a statute remains the starting point of interpretation, welfare legislation must be construed in a manner that furthers its purpose and suppresses the mischief it was enacted to remedy.
Relationship in the Nature of Marriage under the Domestic Violence Act
The expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” finds statutory recognition under Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act), which defines a domestic relationship to include persons who live or have lived together in a shared household and are related by marriage, consanguinity, adoption, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage.
Although the Act does not define this expression, the Supreme Court has interpreted it through a series of landmark judgments.
D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010)
In D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469, the Supreme Court clarified that Parliament intentionally distinguished marriage from a relationship in the nature of marriage. While both categories receive protection under the DV Act, they are not identical.
The Court observed that a relationship in the nature of marriage is comparable to a common law marriage and ordinarily requires the following features:
- The couple must present themselves to society as spouses.
- Both parties must be of legal age to marry.
- They must be legally competent to marry, including being unmarried.
- They must voluntarily cohabit for a significant period while holding themselves out as husband and wife.
- They must live together in a shared household.
The Court further emphasised that casual relationships, occasional cohabitation, weekend arrangements, or one-night encounters do not constitute a relationship in the nature of marriage. Similarly, a relationship maintained merely for financial support or sexual purposes without the characteristics of marriage would not receive protection under the DV Act.
Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013)
The Supreme Court further elaborated the concept in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755, where it examined whether every live-in relationship falls within the meaning of a relationship in the nature of marriage.
The Court held that all live-in relationships are not relationships in the nature of marriage. To determine whether such a relationship attracts protection under the DV Act, the Court identified several illustrative indicators, including:
- A reasonable duration of cohabitation.
- Living together in a shared household.
- Pooling of financial resources and joint economic arrangements.
- Shared domestic responsibilities.
- An intimate and emotional relationship resembling marriage.
- Having and raising children together.
- Holding themselves out publicly as husband and wife.
- The common intention and conduct of the parties demonstrating a marital-type relationship.
The Court clarified that these factors are illustrative rather than exhaustive, and every case must be decided on its own facts.
Importantly, the Court also held that where one partner knowingly enters into a relationship with a person who is already legally married, such a relationship ordinarily cannot be regarded as one in the nature of marriage, since recognising it would prejudice the rights of the legally wedded spouse and children.
Supreme Court Clarifies Section 498A IPC: Protection for Live-in Relationships Exists Only Where There Is an Intent to Marry
The Supreme Court has held that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) (Section 85 of BNS) can extend to certain live-in relationships, but only where the relationship qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and the parties intended to marry. The Court made it clear that mere cohabitation or a live-in arrangement is not sufficient to attract criminal liability under Section 498A of IPC/Section 85 of BNS.
Intent to Marry Is the Defining Factor
The Court observed that the absence of an intention to marry fundamentally distinguishes an ordinary live-in relationship from one that closely resembles marriage. Since Section 498A IPC (Section 85 BNS) is a penal provision carrying serious criminal consequences, its scope cannot be expanded to cover every live-in relationship.
Accordingly, the Court held that only those relationships that:
- qualify as a relationship in the nature of marriage, and
- demonstrate a mutual intention to marry,
would be entitled to protection under Section 498A IPC (Section 85 BNS).
The Court explained that this additional requirement differentiates the standard applicable under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) from that under Section 498A. While the DV Act is a beneficial civil legislation, Section 498A IPC (Section 85 BNS) creates criminal liability and therefore demands a higher standard of proof.
The initial burden of proving the existence of such intention lies upon the woman seeking protection under the provision.
Higher Threshold Because Section 498A IPC/Section 85 BNS Is a Penal Provision
Recognising the severe consequences flowing from criminal prosecution under Section 498A IPC/Section 85 BNS, the Court restricted its application to relationships that genuinely resemble marriage. It emphasised that criminal law should not be invoked merely because two consenting adults lived together.
The Court also clarified that all judicial safeguards developed to prevent misuse of Section 498A IPC/Section 85 BNS would equally apply in cases arising out of qualifying live-in relationships.
Reaffirmation of the Arnesh Kumar Safeguards
The Supreme Court reiterated the safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, stressing that arrest cannot be automatic merely because an FIR under Section 498A IPC/Section 85 BNS has been registered.
The Court reaffirmed that:
- Police officers must first determine whether arrest is genuinely necessary under the statutory requirements.
- Arrest should never be made routinely or solely because the offence is cognisable and non-bailable.
- Police must record reasons justifying the arrest and furnish those reasons before the Magistrate.
- Magistrates must independently examine whether detention is warranted instead of mechanically authorising custody.
- Where arrest is unnecessary, the police should follow the statutory procedure by issuing notices of appearance.
- Failure to comply with these safeguards may expose police officers to departmental action and contempt proceedings, while Magistrates may also face disciplinary consequences for mechanically authorising detention.
The Court underscored that these safeguards must be strictly followed in cases involving live-in relationships that are alleged to be relationships in the nature of marriage.
Application to the Present Case
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court noted that the proceedings before it arose from petitions seeking quashing of criminal proceedings.
The FIR alleged that:
- the accused had concealed his existing marriage,
- subjected the complainant to dowry-related harassment,
- and caused physical injuries, including burn injuries.
The Court held that these allegations, if accepted at face value, disclosed the commission of cognizable offences. Whether the allegations were ultimately true was a matter for trial and not for determination at the stage of quashing.
Consequently, the Court found no ground to interfere and allowed the criminal trial to proceed.
Supreme Court’s Decision
The Court summarised the legal position as follows:
- Section 498A IPC/Section 85 BNS applies to live-in relationships only where they qualify as relationships in the nature of marriage and where an intention to marry is established.
- The protection is confined to consenting adult partners.
- This interpretation is restricted solely to Section 498A IPC/Section 85 BNS and does not automatically extend to other statutory provisions.
- The safeguards against arrest laid down in Arnesh Kumar must be rigorously observed before any arrest is made in such cases.
- This is not a fit case for the proceedings to be quashed.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. (2026 INSC 784) represents a significant development in Indian criminal jurisprudence.
Instead of treating the issue as a conflict between strict and liberal interpretation, the Court harmonised both approaches. It reaffirmed that criminal statutes cannot be expanded by judicial legislation, yet they also cannot be interpreted so narrowly that they defeat the very social evil Parliament intended to address.
By recognising that qualifying relationships in the nature of marriage may attract prosecution under Section 498A IPC and Section 85 BNS, the Court has aligned criminal law more closely with the realities of modern domestic relationships. At the same time, it has ensured that only genuine marriage-like relationships, not every live-in arrangement, receive the protection of these penal provisions.
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