Jharkhand High Court
Bhikhan Ganjhu @ Bhikanjee @ Deepak … vs The State Of Jharkhand on 10 April, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P (Cr.) (DB) No.740 of 2025
Bhikhan Ganjhu @ Bhikanjee @ Deepak Kumar @ Neta Jee, aged about 44
years, Son of Late Bandhu Ganjhu, Resident of Village-Bijain, PO-Bahera, P.S-
Piparwar, District-Chatra, Jharkhand. .................. Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Secretary, Department of Home, Jharkhand Government, Project Building,
Dhurwa, PO & PS-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
3. Under Secretary, Home, Jail and Disaster Management Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, PO & PS-Dhurwa,
District-Ranchi.
4. The Deputy Commissioner cum District Magistrate, Chatra, PO and P.S-
Chatra, District-Chatra, Jharkhand.
5. The Superintendent of Police, P.O. and P.S.- Chatra, District Chatra,
Jharkhand.
6. Jail Superintendent, Birsa Munda Central Jail, Hotwar, Ranchi, PO and PS-
Bariatu, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand. ................ Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Sahil, Advocate
For the Resp-State of Jharkhand: Mr. Jai Prakash, AAG-IA
Ms. Omiya Anusha, AC to AAG-IA
C.A.V on 02.04.2026 Pronounced on 10/04/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India initially for the following reliefs:
“That in the instant writ application the petitioner prays for issuance
of a writ of or in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the order
dated 06.10.2025 (Annexure- 1) vide letter no. 1063 passed by learned
Deputy Commissioner cum District Magistrate, Chatra (respondent
no. 4) whereby and whereunder order has been passed for preventive
detention of the petitioner for the period of 12 months using the power
conferred u/s 12(1) and (2) of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002
without giving any opportunity to the petitioner as well as all the steps
taken by the concerned respondents pursuant to order dated
06.10.2025 (Annexure- 1) passed by learned Deputy Commissioner
cum District Magistrate, Chatra (respondent no. 4).1
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AND/OR
The petitioner further prays for issuance of a writ of or in the nature
of Mandamus commanding upon the respondents to restrain from
passing such unconstitutional orders depriving the right to life and
liberty of the petitioner.
AND/OR
For issuance of such other writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) as Your
Lordships may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of
the case.”
2. Thereafter, an amended writ petition has been filed on behalf of the
petitioner by way of an interlocutory application being I.A No.1677 of 2026
which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 18.02.2026 and the following
prayers have been made in the said amended petition:
“That in the instant writ application the petitioner prays for issuance
of a writ of or in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the order
dated 06.10.2025 (Annexure-1) vide letter no. 1063 passed by learned
Deputy Commissioner cum District Magistrate, Chatra (respondent
no. 4) whereby and whereunder order has been passed for preventive
detention of the petitioner for the period of 12 months using the power
conferred u/s 12(1) and (2) of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002
without giving any opportunity to the petitioner as well as all the steps
taken by the concerned respondents pursuant to order dated
06.10.2025 (Annexure-1) passed by learned Deputy Commissioner
cum District Magistrate, Chatra (respondent no. 4).
AND/OR
For issuance of the writ in the nature of the certiorari for quashing
the order dated 5.12.2025 whereby the earlier order of the detention
of the petitioner dated 6.10.2025 has been confirmed and the
petitioner has been ordered to detained for three months from
6.10.2025 till 5.01.2026.
AND/OR
For the issuance of the writ in the nature of the Certiorari for quashing
the order dated 31.12.2025 whereby the period of detention of the
petitioner has been further extended for a period of three months from
6.01.2026 till 5.04.2026.
AND/OR
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2026:JHHC:10405-DBThe petitioner further prays for issuance of a writ of or in the nature
of Mandamus commanding upon the respondents to restrain from
passing such unconstitutional orders depriving the right to life and
liberty of the petitioner.
AND/OR
For issuance of such other writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) as Your
Lordships may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of
the case.”
Factual Aspect:
3. The factual aspect which has been pleaded in the writ petition are as
follows:
i. The petitioner is a small contractor who has been labeled as the
zonal commander of TSPC, a banned extremist organization and the
local authorities in connivance with the respondents have lodged
several false cases and have implicated the petitioner in the said cases
without any evidence and it will be relevant to mention that in most
of the cases the petitioner has been granted the privilege of regular
bail by this Hon’ble Court.
ii. The respondent no. 4 solely on the basis of the said false cases
has passed an order dated 06.10.2025, vide memo no.
1063(Annexure-1) for preventive detention of the petitioner for a
period of 12 months without hearing and without giving any
opportunity to the petitioner which is contrary to the provisions of
section 12(1) and (2) of the Jharkhand Crime Control Act,
2002(hereinafter to be referred as Act of 2002).
iii. Respondent no. 3 vide order dated 05.12.2025(Annexure-2),
confirmed the order of detention dated 06.10.2025 and extended the
detention of the petitioner from 06.10.2025 to 05.01.2026.
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iv. Further, respondent vide order dated 31.12.2025(Annexure-3),
extended the detention of the petitioner for three months from
06.01.2026 to 05.04.2026.
v. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent no. 4 by passing
the order dated 06.10.2025, vide letter no 1063 has curtailed and
denied of his right to life of the petitioner which has been awarded to
him by the Constitution, and taking away or denial of the same is
violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
vi. Simply registration of police case under several section and acts
is not sufficient to take away the freedom of the petitioner who is
behind the bar since 17.03.2022 and the same does not justify the
fastening of label upon the petitioner of being an anti-social element.
vii. The act and action on the part of the respondents by passing the
order of preventive detention against the petitioner is illegal, invalid
and not sustainable in the eyes of laws as the petitioner was not given
ample opportunity of putting his defense before passing any order.
viii. The respondent no.4 has passed an order for preventive
detention of the petitioner for 12 months which is absolute illegally,
unconstitutionally and without jurisdiction.
4. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order of detention, its confirmation
and orders of extension of detention, the present writ petition has been
preferred.
Submission on behalf of the writ petitioner:
5. Mr. Sahil, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken
the following grounds in assailing the impugned order:
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i. It has been contended that the petitioner has been illegally detained
on the false allegation as the impugned order has been passed by the
same authority without any addition of any criminal case.
ii.It has been contended that the act of the respondents in passing the
impugned detention order under the provisions of section 12(2) of
the Jharkhand Crime Control Act is improper as Section 12(2) of
Jharkhand Crime Control Act,2002, provides that detention order in
the first instance shall not exceed three months, but, respondent no.4
has passed the impugned order of preventive detention of the
petitioner for 12 months, which is illegal and unconstitutional.
iii.As per the settled principle of law, order for preventive detention can
be passed against a person only for a maximum period of three
months at the first instance but the respondents without considering
the law have passed the impugned order which is illegal and fit to be
set aside.
iv.On going through the law as envisaged under section 12(2) of the
Jharkhand Crime Control Act, 2002 it is evident that the respondent
no. 4 has not only violated the law but also has taken away the
constitutional rights of the petitioner as guaranteed under the
Constitution of India by passing such order.
v.It has been contended that the act of the respondents in passing the
impugned order under the provisions of section 12(2) of the
Jharkhand Crime Control Act, has not taken into consideration that
mere registration of police case under several sections, is not
sufficient to take away the freedom of the petitioner who is behind
the bar since 17.03.2022.
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vi.It has been contended that out of 64 FIRs mentioned in the detention
order dated 06.10.2025, petitioner has been acquitted in most of the
cases and in several cases, petitioner has been enlarged on bail, but
this fact has been ignored by the detaining authority.
vii.It has been contended that respondents have passed the impugned
detention order under the provisions of section 12(2) of the
Jharkhand Crime Control Act, 2002, without subjective satisfaction
and a mere reference to criminal cases registered against the
petitioner, without any independent analysis or assessment of their
relevance to public order, demonstrates a non-application of mind.
viii.It has been contended that the detention order is based upon non-
application of mind by detaining authority as it acted mechanically
under a delegated power in violation of the settled law as laid down
in the case of Pesala Nookaraju vs. The Government of Andhra
Pradesh& Ors., 2023 INSC 734 and Bachubhai Mansukhbhai
Bhavsar vs. The Commissioner of Police and another,1981 SCC
Online Guj 117.
ix.The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, based upon
the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned order,
therefore, needs interference by this Court.
Submission on behalf of the Respondent-State:
6. Per contra, Mr. Jai Prakash, the learned AAG-IA appearing for
the respondent-State to defend the impugned order has raised the
following grounds:
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i.It has been contended that the impugned detention order is
issued under the provision of section 12(2) of Jharkhand Crime
Control Act, 2002 as the petitioner is a notorious criminal having
many criminal antecedents of serious nature. The petitioner is the
zonal commander of the militant organization TSPC and his main
profession is to collect extortion money from coal traders and other
contractors under the umbrella of the banned militant organization
TSPC and not only that he extorts people of the locality under fear of
life, several cases of arson, damage to public property, Arms Act,
CLA Act, UAP Act, murder due to militant activity have been
registered against him and, as such, the present writ petition is not
maintainable in the law as well as on facts.
ii.It has been contended that prior to issuance of detention order the
petitioner has been given reasonable opportunity to defend
himself and, as such, the orders impugned are in accordance
with law which requires no interference.
iii.It has been contended that the petitioner is habitual offender and he
is having more than 60 cases of Arms Act, CLA, UAPA including
major sections of IPC out of which two matters are being investigated
by NIA and number of Sanhas are also there against the petitioner.
As per the intelligence input received, the petitioner is having deep
root in organized crime and in connivance with his other associates
of banned extremist organization and on his instructions his
associates used to take levy from the local people, transporters and
businessman. As such, the orders of extension of detention have been
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2026:JHHC:10405-DBpassed and further there is strong possibility of conviction of the
petitioner in the said cases.
iv.It has further been contended that there is possibility that when the
petitioner comes out from the detention he may involve in the illegal
and unlawful activity with his associates, since, he has been history
of antecedent, thus, the detention order is fully justified in order
to maintain public order within the district concerned.
v.It has been contended that Barkagaon PS Case No.45 dated
22.03.2026 was registered under Arms Act against various persons
in which the arrested persons were interrogated and they said that
they are members of banned militant organization TSPC and they are
in contact with the present petitioner who is currently in jail and by
the weapons provided by the petitioner, they are spreading terror.
v.It has been contended that it was necessary to extend preventive
detention of petitioner in order to control organized crime in the
locality as well as in order to reduce the intensity of same.
vi.It has further been submitted that contention of the petitioner that in
the first instance detention order cannot exceed 3 months as
mentioned in section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, is
misconstrued as said provision has got no relevance to the period of
detention rather it talks about the delegation of power by the State
Government to District Magistrate and that delegation in the first
instance cannot exceed three months.
vii.It has been contended that at first occasion detention order was
confirmed after obtaining report from Advisory Board and thereafter
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on requisition given by the competent authority the same has been
extended for a period of 3 months vide order dated 05.12.2025 for a
period 06.10.2025 to 5.01.2026 in accordance with provision laid
down under section 21(1) and section 22 of Jharkhand Control of
Crimes Act, 2002.
viii. It has been further contended that as per maximum permissible
detention under section 22 of the Act being 12 months from the date
of detention, the continuation of detention to that limit is statutorily
sanctioned and, hence, the impugned detention order was lastly
extended vide order dated 31.12. 2025 for a period of 3 months from
06.01.2025 to 05.04.2026.
7. The learned State counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that the impugned orders, thus, need no interference and the
present writ petition is fit to be dismissed.
Analysis:
8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
gone through the pleadings made in the writ petition along with the
relevant documents annexed therewith.
9. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect the following
issues require consideration herein:
i.Whether the criminal activities of petitioner come under the
purview of definition of ”Anti-social Elements” as defined
under section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,
2002?
ii.Whether the recommendation of the District Magistrate for
detaining the detenue for period of 12 months, is in violation
of section 12(2) of the Act of 2002?
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iii.Whether acquittal and grant of bail to the detenue/petitioner
in some cases is ground for his release from the preventive
detention passed under 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes Act, 2002?
Re: First issue
10. But, before considering the first issues, the statutory provision
as contained under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,2002 needs to be
referred herein.
11. The relevant provisions which require consideration herein are
Section 2(d) and Section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes, 2002,
(referred herein as Act 2002).
12. “Anti-social Element” has been defined in section 2(d) of the Act
of 2002, which reads hereunder as: –
” 2(d) Anti-social element” means a person who-
(i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang
habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission
of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the
Indian Penal Code;or
(ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under
the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956;
or
(iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote,
on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or any
other grounds whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between
different religions, racial or language groups or castes or
communities; or
(iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to, or
teasing women or girls; or
(v)who has been convicted of an offence under sections 25,26, 27,
28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959.”
13. From perusal of Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Crime Control
Act, 2002, it is evident that “anti-social element” is a person who
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habitually commits or abets offenses listed in Chapters XVI or XVII of
the Indian Penal Code, or certain other specific crimes. It needs to refer
herein that this definition requires a pattern of behaviour, not isolated
incidents, and aims to identify individuals whose acts cause alarm or terror
among the public, warranting preventive detention to maintain public
order.
14. It requires to refer herein that the Act of 2002 was meant to make
special provisions for the control and suppression of anti-social elements
with a view to maintenance of public order. It also needs to refer herein
that the “Law and Order” problems typically affect only individuals or
small groups, whereas “public order” disruptions affect the community’s
normal functioning on a broader scale often generating fear or anxiety
among the general public.
15. It is pertinent to mention herein that the primary element with
respect to Section 2(d)(i) of the Act of 2002 seems to be the word
“habitual”. It would thus mean that a person who is frequently engaged in
committing or attempting or abating commission of an offence in terms of
Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code would be an anti-
social element. In this context, we may refer to the case of Vijay Narayan
Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in (1984) 3 SCC 14 wherein the word
“habitually” has been sought to be enumerated in the following manner:
“31. It is seen from Section 12 of the Act that it makes
provision for the detention of an anti-social element. If a
person is not an antisocial element, he cannot be detained
under the Act. The detaining authority should, therefore, be
satisfied that the person against whom an order is made
under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social element as
defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Sub-clauses (ii), (iii) and
(v) of Section 2(d) of the Act which are not quite relevant for
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2026:JHHC:10405-DBthe purposes of this case may be omitted from consideration
for the present. The two other sub-clauses which need to be
examined closely are sub clauses (i) and (iv) of Section 2(d).
Under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who
either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang
habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the
commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI
dealing with offences affecting the human body or Chapter
XVII dealing with offences against property, of the Penal
Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social element. Under
subclause (iv) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who has
been habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing
women or girls, is an anti-social element. In both these sub
clauses, the word “habitually” is used. The expression
“habitually” means “repeatedly” or “persistently”. It implies
a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive
acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated,
individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an
inference of habit. It connotes frequent commission of acts or
omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub
clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions. This
appears to be clear from the use of the word “habitually”
separately in subclause (i), sub-clause (ii) and sub- clause
(iv) of Section 2(d) and not in sub clauses (iii) and (v)
of Section 2(d). If the State Legislature had intended that a
commission of two or more acts or omissions referred to in
any of the sub- clauses (i) to (v) of Section 2(d) was sufficient
to make a person an “anti-social element”, the definition
would have run as “Anti-social element” means “a person
who habitually is. ..”. As Section 2(d) of the Act now stands,
whereas under sub-clause (iii) or sub-clause (v) of Section
2(d) a single act or omission referred to in them may be
enough to treat the person concerned as an ‘antisocial
element’, in the case of sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii) or sub-
clause (iv), there should be a repetition of acts or omissions
of the same kind referred to in sub-clause (i), subclause (ii)
or in sub-clause (iv) by the person concerned to treat him as
an “anti-social element”. Commission of an act or omission
referred to in one of the sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) and of
another act or omission referred to in any other of the said
sub-clauses would not be sufficient to treat a person as an
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“anti-social element”. A single act or omission falling under
subclause (i) and a single act or omission falling under sub-
clause (iv) of Section 2(d) cannot, therefore, be characterized
as a habitual act or omission referred to in either of them.
Because the idea of “habit” involves an element of persistence
and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of the same
class or kind, if the acts or omissions in question are not of
the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they
are committed with a long interval of time between them they
cannot be treated as habitual ones.”
16. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if a person is not an
antisocial element, he cannot be detained under the Act of 2002. The
detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against
whom an order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social
element as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Under sub-clause (i)
of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or as a member
of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets
the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with
offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences
against property, of the Penal Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social
element. Further the expression “habitually” means “repeatedly” or
“persistently”. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar
repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated,
individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit.
17. It requires to refer herein that Section 12 of the Act contains the
word “anti-social” which qualifies the section 12 of Act 2002 for passing
the order of detention of any individual or others. Section 12 of the Act is
the initiation of the process of detaining a person under the Act, for ready
reference the same is being quoted herein, which reads as under-
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“12. Power to make order detaining certain persons. – The State
Government may- (1) if satisfied with respect to any person that
with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason
to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be
prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person,
make an order directing that such anti-social element be
detained.
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to
prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a
District Magistrate, the State Government is satisfied that it is
necessary so to do, it may by an order in writing direct, that
during such period as may be specified in the order, such District
Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1)
exercise the powers conferred upon by the said sub-section:
Provided that the period specified in an order made by the State
Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance
exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied
as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to
extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding
three months at any one time.
(3) When any order is made by District Magistrate, he shall
forthwith report, the fact to the State Government together with
the grounds on which the order has been made and such other
particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and
no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days after
the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved
by the State Government:
Provided that where under Section 17 the grounds of detention
are communicated by the officer making the order after five days
but not later than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-
section shall apply subject to the modification that, for the words
“twelve days”, the words “fifteen days” shall be substituted.”
18. Thus, from the perusal of Section 12 of the Act of 2002, it is
evident that power to make orders detaining certain persons are provided
in section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. Section
12(1) provides that if State Government is satisfied with respect to any
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2026:JHHC:10405-DBperson that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear
that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise
than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that
such anti-social element be detained.
19. Hence, section 12(1) of the Act empowers the State Government
to detain anti-social element if there is reason to fear that the activities of
anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate
arrest of such person. The anti-social element has been defined in Section
2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and section 2(d)(i) of
the Act provides that “Anti-social Element” means a person who either by
himself or as a member of or leader of gang habitually commits, or
attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under
Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code.
20. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law this Court
is now, reverting to the first issue whether the criminal activities of
petitioner come under the purview of definition of “Anti-social Elements”
as defined under section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,
2002.
21. On going through the impugned detention order dated
06.10.2025 (Annexure-1) wherein involvement of the petitioner
in 64 criminal cases is mentioned, this Court finds that impugned
detention order was passed by the respondent no.4- the Deputy
Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Chatra, on the recommendations
made by the Superintendent of Police, Chatra vide letter no. 576/DCB
dated 08.09.2025.
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22. We find from the impugned detention order dated 06.10.2025
(Annexure-1) that the following FIRs have been registered against the
detenue/petitioner in different police stations of Chatra, Lathar,
Hazaribagh, Ramgarh and Ranchi district of Jharkhand-
Chatra District:
1. Piparwar PS Case No.66/2022 dated 26.12.2022 under
sections 385/387/120B/34 IPC and under sections 25(1-A), 25 (1-B)
a/26/35 of Arms Act and Section 17 CLA Act;
2. Piparwar PS Case No.63/2022 dated 15.12.2022 under
sections 384/385/ 386/387/504/506/34 of the IPC, Section 27 of the
Arms Act and Section 17 CLA Act;
3. Piparwar PS Case No.5/2021 dated 16.1.2021 under sections
386/387/120B/34 of the IPC, Section 25 (1-B) a/26/35 of Arms Act
and Section 17(i) (ii) CLA Act;
4. Piparwar PS Case No.47/2020 dated 14.12.2020 under sections
386/387/120B/414/34 of the IPC, and Section 17(i) (ii) CLA Act;
5. Piparwar PS Case No.38/2020 dated 30.09.2020 under
sections 147/148/149/353/307/325/333 of the IPC, and Section 17(i)
(ii) CLA Act;
6. Piparwar PS Case No.36/2019 dated 15.09.2019 under sections
385/386/387/120B of the IPC, Section 17(i) (ii) CLA Act and
Section 16/17/20/23 of UAP Act;
7. Piparwar PS Case No.70/2018 dated 01.11.2018 under
sections 174A of the IPC;
8. Piparwar PS Case No.57/2018 dated 21.09.2018 under
sections 25 (1-B) a/26/35 of Arms Act and Section 17(i)(ii) CLA
Act;
9. Piparwar PS Case No.45/2017 dated 28.11.2017 under
sections 147/148/149/302/201 of IPC, Section 27 of Arms Act and
Section 17 (i) (ii) CLA Act, Section 16/18/20 of UAP Act;
10. Piparwar PS Case No.15/2017 dated 12.06.2017 under
sections 147/148/149/341/342/302/323/325/326/436/427/504/506
of IPC, Section 17 (i) (ii) CLA Act, Section 16/18/20 of UAP Act;16
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11. Piparwar PS Case No.25 of 2015 dated 19.04.2015 under
sections 147,148,149,302,201 of IPC and Section 27 of Arms Act;
12. Piparwar PS Case No.17 of 2015 dated 23.03.2015 under
sections 384/385/386/387of IPC and Section 17 (i) (ii) CLA Act;
13. Piparwar PS Case No. 50/2009, dated 15/10/2009, section
414/387/34 IPC and Section 17(i) (ii) CLA Act;
14. Piparwar PS Case No. 29/2009 dated 08/07/2009, Sections
147/148/149/342/353/387/504/506/120(B) IPC and Section 17(i) (ii)
CLA Act;
15. Piparwar PS Case No. 28/2009, dated 06/07/2009, sections
387/353/427/506 of IPC and Section 17(i) (ii) CLA Act;
16. Piparwar PS Case No. 25/2003, dated 01.04.2003 Section 124
(A), 17(i) (ii) CLA Act;
17. Pathalgadda PS Case No. 35/18, 19.07.2018, section
147/148/145/323/325/307/302/452/379/387//385/120(B) of IPC and
Section 17(i) (ii) CLA Act;
18. Sadar PS Case No. 390/17, dated 25.12.2017, Section 387/34
IPC, 17(1) CLA Act and 16/18/20 UAPA Act;
19. Tandwa PS Case No. 31/21, dated 05.03.2021, Section
323/307/504/120(B)/34 IPC and 27 Arms Act;
20. Tandwa PS Case No. 58/21, dated 27.04.2021, Section
147/148/149/342/307/387/427/ IPC, Section 04 Prevention of
Damage to Public Property Act 1984 and 17(i)(ii) CLA Act;
21. Tandwa PS Case No. 22/2018, dated 09.02.2018, Section
384/385/386/387/120(B) IPC, 20(B) NDPS Act., 17(i) (ii) CLA Act
and 16/17/20/23 UAPA Act.
22. Tandwa PS Case No. 90/18, dated 21.05.2018 Section 17(i)
(ii) CLA Act;
23. Tandwa PS Case No. 94/18, dated 24.05.2018, section
384/387/34 IPC and Section 17(i) (ii) CLA Act;
24. Tandwa PS Case No. 82/18, dated 14.05.2018, Section
17(i)(ii) (CLA) Act;
25. Tandwa PS Case No. 11/19, dated 23.01.2019, Sections
385/387/120B IPC and Sections 17(i) (ii) CLA Act;
26. Tandwa PS Case No. 52/21, dated 14.04.2021, Sections
147/148/149/342/307/387/427 IPC, Sections 04 Prevention of
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Damage to Public Property Act 1984, Section 27(ii) Arms Act and
Section 17(i) (ii) CLA Act;
27. Tandwa PS Case No. 17/15, dated 01.03.2015, Sections
324/307/427/34 IPC and 27 Arms Act;
28. Tandwa PS Case No. 02/2016, dated 11.01.2016, Sections
414/384/386/387/120B IPC, Section 25(1-B)a/26/35 of Arms Act
and 17(i)(ii) of CLA Act.
29. Tandwa PS Case No.07/17, dated 01.02.2017, Sections
147/148/149/307/427 IPC, section ¾ of Explosive Substance Act, 27
and 17(i)(ii) of CLA Act;
30. Tandwa PS Case No. 15/21, dated 03.02.2021, section
324/326/307/120B of IPC, Section 27 of Arms Act and Section 17(i)
(ii) CLA Act;
31. Tandwa PS Case No. 60/21, dated 05.05.2021, section 25(1-
B) a/26/35 of Arms Act
32. Lawalog PS Case No. 11/18, dated 15.02.2018, section 414 of
IPC and Section 25(1-B) a/26/35 of Arms Act and Section 17(i) (ii)
CLA Act;
Latehar District:
33. Balumath PS Case No. 02/2018,
34. Balumath PS Case No. 96/2022,
35. Balumath PS Case No. 124/2022, Sections 147/148/149/387
of IPC
36. Balumath Police Station Case No. 150/2022, Sections
147/148/149/399/402/387/120B of IPC, Section 25(1-A)/25(1-B)
/26(2) of Arms Act /35 Arms Act and Section 4/5 EXP. SUB. Act.
37. Balumath PS Case No. 83/2022, Sections 302/120/34 IPC and
Section 27(3) of Arms Act and Section 17 of the CLA Act;
Hazaribagh District:
38. Barkagaon PS Case No. 114/2017, section 385/387/34 IPC and
Section 17CLA Act;
39. Keredari PS Case No. 13/2019, Sections
147/148/149/307/353 IPC, 25 (1-AA)/25 (1-B) a / 26(2)/27/35 Arms
Act and 17 CLA Act;
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40. Keredari PS Case No.27/2017, Sections 147/ 148/ 149/ 307/
302/120B IPC, 27 Arms Act and 17 CLA Act;
41. Katkamdag PS Case No. 106/2018, Sections 386/34 IPC, 17
CLA Act and 10/11/13 UAPA Act
Ramgarh District:
42. Mandu PS Case No. 115/2008, Section 147/328/448/384 IPC
17 CLA Act
43. Mandu PS Case No. 129/2008 Section 147/ 148/ 149/ 323/
427/435 IPC and 17 CLA Act
44. Patratu PS Case No. 141/2009 Section 147/148/149/342/384/
IPC and 17 CLA Act;
45. Patratu PS Case No. 262/2019, Section 25 (1-A)/25 (1-B) A/26
(i)(ii)/35 Arms Act;
46. Patratu PS Case No. 258/2019, Sections 353/387/120B/ 34 IPC
47. Rajrappa PS Case No. 99/2012
Ranchi District:
48. Khalari PS Case No. 128/2022, Section 302/34 IPC 27 Arms
Act;
49. Kanke PS Case No. 217/2021, Section 324/307/120B/34 IPC
27 Arms Act;
50. Kanke PS Case No. 226/2021, Sections 115/212/120B of the
IPC, 25(1-A)/25(1AA)/25(1-B)A/25(6)/25(7)/25(8)/26/35 of the
Arms Act, and 17 of the Criminal Law Act;
51. Ranchi Sadar PS Case No. 116/2022, Sections 384/386/34 of
the Indian Penal Code and 17(i)(ii) of the CLA.
52. Khalari PS Case No 117/2006, Sections 386/353/34 of the IPC
and 27 of the Arms Act;
53. Khalari PS Case No 37/3002, Section 302/349 IPC
54. Bundu PS Case No. 13/2010
55. Khalari PS Case No. 111/2007;
56. Khalari PS Case No.117/2007;
57. Khalari PS Case No. 02/2002;
58. Burmu PS Case No. 13/2010;
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59. Khalari PS Case No. 87/2002;
60. Bariatu PS Case No. 52/2020, section 302/34 IPC and 27 Arms
Act;
61. Makluskiganj PS Case No. 24/21, Sections 302/34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 27 of the Arms Act, and 17 of the CLA Act
62. Ratu PS Case No. 09/24, Sections 385/387/326/302/120B of
the Indian Penal Code, 27 of the Arms Act, and 17 of CLA Act
NIA Cases:
63. Special NIA, Ranchi 03/18 under sections
414/384/386/387/120B of IPC, Section 25(1B) a/26/35 of Arms Act,
Sections 17 (1) (2) of CLA Act and Section 16/17/20/23 of UAPA
Act;
64. Special NIA, Patna 02/21, under sections
414/467/468/471/474 of IPC Sections 25(1) (a) (25(1-A) (251-aa)
25(B)a/26/29/35 of Arms Act and Section 16/17/18/18B/19 UAPA
Act.
Case Diary Entry No.
65. Piparwar PS Sanha No. 18/25 dated 26.08.2025;
66. Piparwar PS Sanha No. 11/25 dated 27.08.2025
67. Piparwar PS Sanha No. 11/25 dated 29.08.2025
23. Hence, from the FIRs mentioned in the impugned detention order
dated 06.10.2025 (Annexure-1), this Court finds that 64 FIRs were
registered against the detenue/petitioner including the two NIA cases in
different district of Chatra, Lathar, Hazaribagh, Ramgarh and Ranchi
across the state of Jharkhand. Further, from the aforesaid FIRs, it is also
apparent that the crime committed by the detenue/petitioner ranges to
murder, attempt to murder, extortion etc. and cases under Explosive
Substance Act, Arms Act as well as under CLA Act and UAP Act have
also been registered against the petitioner. Hence, this Court is of the view
that detenue/petitioner is a habitual offender.
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24. Thus, petitioner habitually commits offences punishable under
section Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code as defined
in section 2(d)(i) of the Act.
25. Further, the detaining authority respondent no.4 while passing
the detention order 06.10.2025 (Annexure-1), under section 12(2) of the
Act of 2002 was satisfied that the dentition of the petitioner was
necessary as continuous criminal activities of the petitioner was causing
threat to maintenance of public order.
26. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid factual aspect is of
the view that the authority concerned has rightly considered that the act of
the detenue/petitioner comes under the purview of the “Anti-social
Elements” as stipulated under Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes Act, 2002. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the orders of
detention on this score need no interference.
27. Accordingly issue no. (i) is hereby answered.
Re: Second issue
28. Regarding the issue whether the recommendation of the District
Magistrate for detaining the detenue for a period of 12 months, is in
violation of section 12(2) of the Act of 2002? Submission has been made
by the learned counsel for the detenue/petitioner that Detaining Authority
has at the very outset imposed the detention of 12 months, but, as per
section 12(2) of the Act of 2002, no detention can initially exceed a period
of three months.
29. Section 12 of the Act of 2002, is the initiation of the process of
detaining a person, who is an anti-social element under the Act and in the
present case this Court on going through the impugned detention order
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dated 06.10.2025 (Annexure-1), finds that District Magistrate in exercise
of power conferred on him under Section12(2) of the Act has made
recommendation before the Government of necessity to detain the
detenue/petitioner for a period of 12 months.
30. But, proviso to the Section 12(2) of the Act of 2002 provides that
period specified in an order made by the State Government under this sub-
section shall not in the first instance exceed three months, but, the State
Government may, if satisfied that it is necessary so to do, amend such
order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding
three months at any one time.
31. Hence, under section 12(2) of the Act, District Magistrate makes
recommendation for detaining an anti-social element to the State
Government and it is the state Government, who at the first instance has
to pass the order of detention which shall not exceed three months at the
first instance as per proviso provided under section 12(2) of the Act of
2002.
32. In the present case, it is the State Government who has initially
passed detention order for three months i.e. from 06.10.2025 to
05.01.2026 vide Memo No. 5/CCA/01/56/2025-416/CCA/Ranchi dated
05.12.2025 (Annexure-2) and thereafter, further extension order was
passed by the State Government extending the detention for further three
months vide Memo No. 5/CCA/01/56/2025-477/CCA/Ranchi dated
31.12.2025(Annexure-3).
33. Hence, the submission made by the learned counsel for the
detenue/petitioner that Detaining Authority has at the very outset imposed
the detention of 12 months, whereas, as per section 12(2) of the Act of
2002, no detention can initially exceed a period of three months is
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misconceived as detention order under the Act is passed by the State
Government under proviso to section 12(2) which at the first instance shall
not exceed three months and in the present case, the State Government
while extending the period of detention vide Annexure-2 and Annexure-
3, had never exceeded period of detention for three months at any time.
34. Accordingly issue no. (ii) is hereby answered.
Re: Third issue
35. Regarding this issue i.e. whether acquittal and grant of bail to the
detenue/petitioner in some cases is ground for his release from the
prevention detention passed under 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes Act, 2002?
36. In the aforesaid context, learned counsel for the
detenue/petitioner has filed rejoinder to the counter affidavit filed by the
respondent and contended that petitioner has been acquitted in some cases
and has been enlarged on bail in several cases and the said cases were
relied by the detaining authority while passing the impugned order of
detention dated 06.10.2025 (Annexure-1) and hence, detention order
cannot be sustained.
37. This Court finds that in the impugned detention order dated
06.10.2025 (Annexure-1), there is reference of 64 criminal cases against
the detenue/petitioner. On going through the rejoinder filed by the
detenue/petitioner, this Court finds that the detenue/petitioner has been
acquitted in some cases, in some cases he has been enlarged on bail and
some cases are pending.
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38. Hence, so far as acquittal of the detenue/petitioner in some of
the cases and his release on bail, in aforesaid pending cases is
concerned, this Court finds that it is the subjective satisfaction of the
Detaining Authority that inspite of his continuous activities causing
threat to maintenance of public order and in such circumstances, based
on the relevant materials and satisfying itself, that it would not be
possible to control his habituality in continuing the criminal activities
by resorting the normal procedures, the Detaining Authority had passed
an order detaining him under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,
2002.
39. Further, acquittal and enlargement on bail, of the
detenue/petitioner, in some of the cases cannot be said to affect the
decision taken by the competent authority of detention, rather the
accusation so made in the First Information Report is to be seen for the
purpose to have the subjective satisfaction of the nature of accusation
made in the said FIR. Since the detention order is to be passed by the
competent authority anticipating the criminality of the concerned and it
would be evident from the accusation made in the impugned detention
order dated 06.10.2025 (Annexure-1), passed by the Respondent No.4
Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Chatra, and the
detenue/petitioner himself has stated in his rejoinder that apart from
acquittal and bail in some cases, there are some pending criminal cases
against him.
40. The consideration of coming from judicial custody by virtue of
order passed by the Court to release on bail has been taken into
consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court in D.M Nagaraja Versus
Government of Karnataka and others reported in (2011) 10 SCC 215
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wherein detenue had challenged his detention order. The Hon’ble Apex
Court in this case had noted in paragraph-17 that the even after release on
bail the detenue again started indulging in the same type of offences,
particularly, threatening the public life, damaging public property, etc. and
hence, the detenue’s appeal was dismissed. Further in paragraph-20 of the
aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court had noted the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order
against the detenue, for the ready reference Paragraph-17 and 20 of D.M.
Nagaraja(supra) case is quoted herein below –
“17. All the abovementioned details which have been correctly stated
in the detention order clearly show that the appellant is not amenable
to ordinary course of law. It also shows that even after his release on
bail from the prison on various occasions, he again started indulging
in the same type of offences, particularly, threatening the public life,
damaging public property, etc. All these aspects have been
meticulously considered by the detaining authority and after finding
that in order to maintain public order, since his activities are
prejudicial to the public, causing harm and danger, the detaining
authority detained him as “goonda” under Karnataka Act 12 of 1985
for a period of 12 months and the same was rightly approved by the
Advisory Board and the State Government. Inasmuch as the detaining
authority has taken note of all the relevant materials and strictly
followed all the safeguards as provided in the Act ensuring the liberty
of the detenue, we are in entire agreement with the decision of the
detaining authority as well as the impugned order of the High Court
affirming the same.”
xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
20. In the case on hand, we have already extracted criminality,
criminal activities starting from the age of 30 and details relating to
eleven cases mentioned in the grounds of detention. It is not in dispute
that in one case he has been convicted and sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a term of nine years. He had been acquitted
in two cases and four cases are pending against him wherein he was
granted bail by the courts. It is the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority that in spite of his continuous activities causing25
2026:JHHC:10405-DBthreat to maintenance of public order, he was getting bail one after
another and indulging in the same activities. In such circumstances,
based on the relevant materials and satisfying itself, namely, that it
would not be possible to control his habituality in continuing the
criminal activities by resorting to normal procedure, the detaining
authority passed an order detaining him under Act 12 of 1985.”
41. In the present case, from the impugned detention order dated
06.10.2025 (Annexure-1), it is apparent that crime committed by the
detenue/petitioner ranges to murder, attempt to murder, extortion etc. and
cases under Explosive Substance Act, Arms Act as well as cases under
CLA Act and UAP Act has also been registered against the petitioner.
42. From, the impugned detention order dated 06.10.2025, and
rejoinder filed by the detenue/petitioner, it also appears that out of the
pending cases against the detenue/petitioner, the oldest FIR is of the year
2017 and thereafter, petitioner did not repent and again in years 2018,
2019, 2021 and 2022, FIRs have been registered against the
detenue/petitioner, one after another.
43. The authority concerned while passing the impugned detention
order which was passed on 06.10.2025 (Annexure-1) has taken into
consideration the entire history of accusation against the petitioner and
only thereafter has passed the order of detention. Hence, satisfaction has
been arrived by the detaining authority bearing in mind existence of live
and proximate link between the past conduct of the petitioner and
material which is not stale.
44. Herein, the absence of ground of subjective satisfaction has
been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. But this Court has
found from the order of detention that the copy of the detention order
has been served to the writ petitioner personally through the jail
authority as finds mention in the last page of the impugned order of
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detention, however, it has been admitted fact that even no representation
has been filed by petitioner in order to make out his defence before the
authority concerned.
45. The question herein is that the ground of lack of subjective
satisfaction is being taken, then it is the bounden duty of the concerned
to bring the fact to the notice of the authority, countering the process of
making recommendation for order of detention and then only it is
available for the concerned litigant to take the ground of no subjective
satisfaction. Law is well settled that if the opportunity to put forth the
defence has not been availed, then, it is not available to the litigant
concerned to raise the issue of not providing an opportunity or non-
consideration of the defence.
46. The factual aspect as has been dealt with hereinabove while
deciding the issue, we are of the view that the detaining authority has
taken into consideration the fact in entirety which shows the subjective
satisfaction based upon the document as found to be available with the
recommending authority which has been accepted by the detaining
authority.
47. Thus, from the impugned detention order dated 06.10.2025
(Annexure-1), it is evident that the detenue/petitioner is habitually
involved in offences which ranges from murder, attempt to murder,
extortion etc. and cases under Explosive Substance Act, Arms Act as well
as cases under CLA Act and UAP Act has also been registered against
the detenue/petitioner and further on the basis of subjective satisfaction
the detaining authority has arrived to conclusion that the well-organized
manner in which such pre-judicial activities have been carried on and
nexus between dates of incidents and passing of the detention order and
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the said observation is according to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of D.M Nagaraja Versus Government of
Karnataka and others(supra) therefore, the said observation of the
detaining authority cannot be said to be suffered from an error.
48. Accordingly, Issue No.(iii) is hereby answered
49. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the orders of detention
need no interference.
50. Accordingly, the detention order dated 06.10.2025 (Annexure-1)
passed by the Respondent No.4 and order dated 05.12.2025 (Annexure-2)
passed by the Respondent No.3, confirming the detention order dated
06.10.2025 and subsequent extension order dated 31.12.2025(Annexure-
3), extending the period of preventive detention are sustained and upheld.
51. Consequent thereto, the instant writ petition stands dismissed.
52. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree.
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
Sudhir
Dated: 10/04/2026.
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
AFR
Uploaded on 10/04/2026
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