Bhaurao Pandit Wagh Since Deceased … vs Mangal Sahadu Darade on 16 July, 2026

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    Bombay High Court

    Bhaurao Pandit Wagh Since Deceased … vs Mangal Sahadu Darade on 16 July, 2026

                                                                     CNR No : HCBM010593952025
    2026:BHC-AS:30162
    
                                                                    5-SA-439-2020 (1).docx
    
    
                        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                 SECOND APPEAL NO. 439 OF 2020
       Swapnil
                   Bhaurao Pandit Wagh and Ors.               ...     Appellants
                         Vs.
                   Mangal Sahadu Darade.                      ...     Respondent
                                                  WITH
                               INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 13579 OF 2025
    
                   Mr. Sanjay Shinde for the appellants.
    
                                           CORAM : GAURI GODSE, J.
    
                                           DATE :        16th JULY 2026
    
                   ORDER :

    INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 13579 OF 2025

    1. This application is filed for bringing on record the

    SPONSORED

    names of the heirs and legal representatives of appellant

    no.1.

    2. There is delay in filing the application. Office remark

    shows that the notice is served upon the sole respondent.

    Though served, none appears for the respondent.

    3. In the facts and circumstances of the case and for the

    reasons stated in the application, delay is condoned, and the

    application is allowed in terms of prayer clause ‘a’ to ‘d’.

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    5-SA-439-2020 (1).docx

    4. Amendment to be carried out within four weeks.

    5. The interim application is allowed in the aforesaid

    terms.

    SECOND APPEAL NO. 439 OF 2020

    1. This second appeal is filed by the original plaintiffs to

    challenge the concurrent judgments and decrees dismissing

    their suit for declaration, specific performance of contract

    and, in the alternative, for possession. The plaintiffs

    contended that the sale deed dated 16 th March 1999,

    executed by their father, was null and void and not binding

    upon them as the suit property was ancestral and their share

    could not have been transferred by their father. They have

    also pleaded fraud against the defendant for getting the

    nominal and sham document of sale executed from their

    father.

    2. The plaintiffs further pleaded that immediately the next

    day, i.e. 17th March 1999, a separate agreement was

    executed, under which the defendant agreed to reconvey the

    property on payment of Rs. 1,40,000/-. According to the

    plaintiffs, the last payment was to be made on 15 th March

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    5-SA-439-2020 (1).docx

    2004, and the deed of reconveyance was to be executed.

    The plaintiffs further contended that an amount of Rs.

    75,000/- was paid. Their father expired sometime in 2007.

    Thereafter, the plaintiffs called upon the defendant to execute

    the deed of reconveyance and to refrain from interfering with

    the plaintiffs’ possession. In the alternative, the plaintiffs

    prayed that if the defendant is found in possession, the

    defendant should be directed to hand over possession to the

    plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also made one more alternative

    prayer that in the event the sale deed cannot be executed in

    their favour, the defendant should be directed to refund the

    amount of Rs. 65,000/- and damages to the tune of Rs.

    1,40,000/-. This suit was filed on 6 th August 2011. The

    defendant denied the execution of any agreement for

    reconveyance. The defendant further contended that the suit

    property was validly transferred to the defendant and no

    amounts were received by the defendant in pursuance of the

    alleged agreement for reconveyance.

    3. The trial court held the issues regarding execution of

    the sale deed to be null and void in favour of the plaintiffs.

    The alternative prayer regarding execution of the agreement

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    for reconveyance was also held in favour of the plaintiffs. The

    trial court further held that the plaintiffs proved the payment

    of Rs. 41,000/- based on the receipts produced on record.

    The trial court, however, held the issue of readiness and

    willingness against the plaintiffs, as the payment agreed as

    per the terms of the agreement relied upon by the plaintiffs

    was not proved. The defendant was held to be in possession

    of the suit property. The suit was dismissed on the ground

    that it was barred by limitation.

    4. In an appeal preferred by the plaintiffs, the trial court’s

    judgment and decree is confirmed. The first appellate court

    held that the plaintiffs failed to prove the alleged agreement

    dated 17th March 1999 and further held that the suit was

    barred by limitation. In view of the plaintiffs’ theory that

    payment of the consideration amount was to be made by 15 th

    March 2004, was considered as an important factor for

    deciding the issue of limitation for the prayer for specific

    performance. Considering that the suit was filed beyond the

    period of limitation for the purpose of specific performance,

    the first appellate court dismissed the suit as barred by

    limitation. On the issue of the sale deed in favour of the

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    5-SA-439-2020 (1).docx

    defendant being null and void, the first appellate court held

    that the prayer for declaration was also barred by limitation.

    5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that as the

    suit is filed for various reliefs, the issue of limitation needs to

    be decided based on the longer period of limitation available

    for one of the prayers. He submits that since the suit was

    filed for possession on the ground of title, the prayer for

    possession would be within limitation as it is filed within 12

    years from the cause of action of 2004 pleaded by the

    plaintiff. He, therefore, submits that in view of Article 65 of the

    Limitation Act, 1963. The prayer for possession being within

    limitation, the entire suit cannot be dismissed as barred by

    limitation.

    6. He relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in

    Sopanrao and Anr. Vs. Syed Mehmood and Ors 1 to

    support his submissions that even if one of the prayers is

    within limitation, the suit cannot be dismissed as barred by

    limitation if some of the prayers are barred by limitation. To

    support his submissions that the suit is within limitation as

    possession is prayed on the ground of title, he relies upon

    1 (2019) 7 SCC 76

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    5-SA-439-2020 (1).docx

    the relevant averments in the plaint to contend that the suit

    was filed on the ground that they were co-owners of the suit

    property as it was a joint family property. He, therefore,

    submits that since the suit for possession was on the ground

    of title, both the courts erred in dismissing the suit as barred

    by limitation. He, therefore, submits that the second appeal

    raises a substantial question of law on the incorrect dismissal

    of the suit as barred by limitation.

    7. I have perused the plaint. The substantial prayer in the

    suit for seeking title is based on the prayer for declaration

    that the sale deed executed on 16 th March 1999 is null and

    void ab initio, nominal, sham and bogus. The second prayer

    in the suit is for specific performance of the agreement which

    is pleaded to have been executed on 17 th March 1999 for

    reconveyance of the suit property. The third prayer is an

    alternative prayer for possession, as the plaintiffs pleaded to

    be in possession of the suit property. The second alternative

    prayer is for damages and refund. The pleadings regarding

    the cause of action is the notice issued by the plaintiffs on 8 th

    June 2011 calling upon the defendant to specifically perform

    the agreement dated 17th March 1999 and a subsequent

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    incident of 4th August 2011 to contend that the defendant was

    personally called upon to execute the sale deed.

    8. It is further contended by the plaintiffs that the

    defendant refused to perform her part of the contract by

    executing the sale deed and attempted to obstruct the

    plaintiffs’ possession over the suit property. Thus, the cause

    of action is pleaded for the purpose of seeking specific

    performance of the contract. The substantial pleadings in the

    plaint are based on the ground that, though the sale deed

    and the agreement were executed, possession remained

    with the plaintiffs. The prayer for possession is an alternative

    prayer without any supporting cause of action for seeking the

    prayer for possession on the ground of title, as required

    under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

    9. A perusal of the plaint indicates that the entire claim is

    based on the prayer for declaration that the sale deed was

    illegal and for seeking specific performance for reconveyance

    of the property. The plaint is bereft of any pleadings of any

    cause of action for seeking possession based on title as

    required under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Though

    the prayer for possession is in the alternative, there is

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    nothing on record to show that the plaintiff has selected one

    of the prayers at the relevant time of framing issues or

    recording evidence or at the time of final arguments. Hence,

    based on the substantial prayer for declaration of the sale

    deed to be illegal and the substantial prayer for declaration

    and specific performance, both the courts have held that the

    suit is barred by limitation.

    10. For seeking a declaration that the sale deed of 1999

    was illegal, the plaintiffs have not pleaded and proved any

    cause of action, as required under Article 58 of the Limitation

    Act, 1963. For seeking specific performance, even according

    to the plaintiffs, the deed for reconveyance was to be

    executed by making the last payment by 15 th March 2004. If

    the plaintiffs’ case is accepted as it is, in view of the first part

    of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the

    suit for specific performance was required to be filed within

    three years from the date fixed for specific performance.

    Even otherwise, admittedly, the payment was not made by

    15th March 2004. Thus, Hence, even the prayer for specific

    performance is rightly held to be barred by limitation. So far

    as the alternative prayer for possession is concerned, even if

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    the plaintiffs did not elect one of the alternative prayers and if

    the prayer for possession is to be considered as based on

    title, the cause of action for seeking possession as per Article

    65 of the Limitation Act is not pleaded and proved. Hence,

    the legal principles settled by the Apex Court in Sopanrao

    would not be of any assistance in the present case.

    11. In the facts before the Apex Court, the substantive

    prayer was for possession based on the title, and the prayer

    was for seeking a declaration that the plaintiffs were

    Inamdars of the suit land. In view of the pleadings and cause

    of action regarding the prayer for possession and the cause

    of action for the prayer for declaration, it was held that, in

    view of Article 65, which deals with a suit for possession

    based on title, the suit could not have been dismissed as

    barred by limitation. However, in view of the different facts of

    the present case, as discussed in the above paragraphs,

    legal principles settled by the Apex Court would not apply in

    the present case. In view of the concurrent findings recorded

    by both the courts, the grounds argued on behalf of the

    appellant would not require any consideration in this second

    appeal.

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    12. The second appeal does not raise any substantial

    question of law. Hence, the second appeal is dismissed.

    [GAURI GODSE, J.]

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