Bhagwat Rathore vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 8 July, 2026

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    Chattisgarh High Court

    Bhagwat Rathore vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 8 July, 2026

    CGHC010002722019                                          2026:CGHC:28102
    
                                                                           NAFR
    
    
             HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
    
                                 WPL No. 8 of 2019
    1 - Bodhram Rathore S/o Shri Maheshram Rathor Aged About 51 Years
    Carpenter R/o Village - Seoni, Thana - Champa, District Janjgir Champa
    Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
                                                            --- Petitioner
    
                                         versus
    1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Water
    Resources, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, District Raipur
    Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
    
    2 - Executive Engineer Hadeo Nahar Water Management, Janjgir, District
    Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh
                                                           --- Respondent(s)

    WPL No. 10 of 2019

    1 – Chaitram Sahu S/o Shri Vedram Sahu Aged About 52 Years R/o Village
    Mudpar, Thana- Navagarh, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh., District :

    SPONSORED

    Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

    —Petitioner

    Versus

    1 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Water
    Resources, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, District Raipur
    Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

    2 – Executive Engineer Hadeo Nahar Water Management, Janjgir, District
    Janjgir- Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

    — Respondent(s)

    WPL No. 3 of 2020

    1 – Phulesh Ram Kashyap S/o Chhotu Ram Kashyap Aged About 48 Years R/o
    Village – Mudpar, Post – Khisora, Tahsil Pamgarh, District – Janjgir – Champa
    Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

    —Petitioner

    Versus
    -2-

    1 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Water
    Resources, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Raipur Chhattisgarh.,
    District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

    2 – Executive Engineer, Hasdeo Nahar Water Management, Janjgir, District –

    Janjgir – Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh

    — Respondent(s)

    WPL No. 11 of 2019
    1 – Bhagwat Rathore S/o Shri Kanhai Rathore Aged About 51 Years R/o Village
    Seoni, Thana Champa, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh, District : Janjgir-
    Champa, Chhattisgarh

    —Petitioner

    Versus

    1 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Water
    Resources, Mantralaya, Mahanandi Bhawan, Atal Nagar District Raipur
    Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

    2 – Executive Engineer Hasdeo Nahar Water Management, Janjgir
    District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh, District : Janjgir-Champa,
    Chhattisgarh —- Respondents

    For respective Petitioners : Mr. KPS Gandhi, Advocate and
    Mr. Ravindra Sharma, Advocate
    For State : Mr. Vinay Pandey, Dy. A.G.

    Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
    Order on Board
    08.07.2026

    1. Heard.

    2. In these batch of writ petitions filed under Article 226/227 of the

    Constitution of India, the petitioners/workmen have challenged the

    award passed by the learned Labour Court, Janjgir-Champa

    (C.G.), in Case No. 14/I.D. Act/Reference/2013, Case No. 16/I.D.

    Act/Reference/2013, Case No. 34/I.D. Act/Reference/2013 and

    Case No. 39/I.D. Act/Reference/2012, dated 14.09.2018,

    respectively, whereby the statement of claim filed by the petitioners

    have been dismissed.

    3. The facts, in brief, according to the statement of claim, are that the

    petitioners were engaged by the respondent department between

    1980 to 1984; their services were discontinued by the department.

    Thereafter, they moved an application before the Assistant Labour

    Commissioner, Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) and in turn, appropriate

    Government referred the matter to the concerned Labour Court for

    adjudication as to whether the termination of services of the

    petitioners is valid and proper. In the first round of litigation, the

    learned Labour Court answered the question in favour of the

    workmen and held that they were entitled to reinstatement without

    back wages. Those awards were challenged by filing writ petitions,

    bearing WPL No. 150/2014, WPL No. 153 of 2014, WPL No. 155

    of 2014 and WPL No. 253 of 2014, preferred by the

    employer/State Government. Above-referred writ petitions were

    allowed, and cases were remitted back to the concerned Labour

    Court to consider the cases afresh by recording specific findings

    with regard to (i) continuous work for a period of 240 days in a

    calendar year preceding the date of termination, and (ii) the

    principle of ‘last come, first go’.

    4. The petitioners herein, in their statement of claim, pleaded that

    they had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year

    preceding the date of termination of their services, and that the

    said decision of termination of services of the respondent/employer

    was contrary to the provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the

    Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act of 1947’).”

    5. The Learned Labour Court recorded a specific finding that the
    -4-

    workmen failed to establish the fact that they had worked for 240

    days in a calendar year preceding the date of termination of their

    service, and that they also failed to prove that the employees

    appointed after the petitioners/workmen were working with the

    department. Therefore, it is held that the principle of ‘last come,

    first go’ has not been proved by leading cogent evidence. Learned

    Labour Court dismissed the statement of claim filed by the

    petitioners.

    6. Learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners/workmen would

    argue that the petitioners adduced sufficient evidence to establish

    the fact that they had worked for 240 days in a calendar year

    preceding the date of termination of their services. It is also

    contended that the Learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the

    said piece of evidence. They would further contend that the

    workmen who were engaged in the department after the

    engagement of the petitioners are still working, whereas, the

    services of the petitioners were terminated, and thus the

    department failed to comply with the provisions of Section 25G of

    the Act of 1947. It is also argued that petitioners moved

    applications before the learned Labour Court seeking a direction to

    the respondent/employer to provide material documents regarding

    engagement of the petitioners but no order was passed on those

    applications. They would submit that as the applications were

    moved by the petitioners, this Court may draw an adverse

    inference against the employer. Mr. Gandhi, Advocate, has placed

    reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Division
    Bench in Writ Appeal No.278 of 2021, parties being Smt. Kunti

    Bai Kashyap and the State of Chhattisgarh and others,

    decided on 01.02.2023, wherein it is held that where a daily-wage

    employee fails to produce evidence to show that he continuously

    worked for five years under the employer, such employee would be

    entitled to monetary compensation. They would pray that a

    direction may be issued to the respondent employer to make

    payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement of services, as

    most of the petitioners have already attained the age of

    superannuation.

    7. On the other hand, Mr. Pandey, learned Deputy Advocate General

    appearing for the State would oppose the submissions. He would

    submit that the petitioners could not lead clinching evidence to

    establish the fact that they worked for 240 days in a calendar year

    preceding the date of termination of their services. It is further

    argued that sufficient documents were not produced before the

    Court below in this regard. Mr. Pandey would submit that the

    employer examined the Sub-Divisional Officer of the department,

    who categorically stated that the petitioners/workmen did not work

    for the period pleaded in the statement of claim. This witness

    further stated that the workmen never worked continuously for 240

    days in a calendar year with the department and that their

    engagement was casual in nature. With regard to compensation,

    Mr. Pandey would argue that the petitioners/workmen have to

    establish the fact that they worked for 240 days in a calendar year

    and they are entitled to reinstatement; and in such a situation, a
    -6-

    direction with regard to payment of monetary compensation can be

    considered. He has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by

    the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Krishna Bhagya Jal

    Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi, reported in (2006) 9 SCC 697.

    8. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties at

    length and perused the records.

    9. Perusal of the statements of claim filed by the petitioners show that

    the petitioners/workmen specifically pleaded that they worked for

    240 days in a calendar year under the respondent department.

    10.Perusal of the record would show that the petitioners could not

    adduce documentary evidence to establish this fact. The oral

    evidence adduced by the petitioners/workmen would not suffice,

    and therefore the learned Labour Court recorded a specific finding

    that the petitioners failed to prove the fact of their engagement for

    more than 240 days in a calendar year preceding the date of

    termination of their services.

    11.It is a well-settled principle of law that the burden of proof lies on

    the workman so as to entitle him to the benefits of Section 25-F of

    the Act of 1947. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of

    Mohd. Rafi (supra) held that where a workman fails to discharge

    the initial burden, an award of the Labour Court holding the

    termination of services as illegal on the ground of non-compliance

    with Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 and directing his

    reinstatement would be erroneous. Relevant paragraphs 6 to 10
    are reproduced herein below :

    “6. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State
    of Rajasthan and Anr.
    (2004 (8) SCC 161), the position
    was again reiterated in paragraph 6 as follows:

    “6.It was the case of the workman that he
    had worked for more than 240 days in the
    year concerned. This claim was denied by
    the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead
    evidence to show that he had in fact worked
    up to 240 days in the year preceding his
    termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is
    only his own statement which is in his favour
    and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
    evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come
    to the conclusion that in fact the claimant
    had worked for 240 days in a year. These
    aspects were highlighted in Range Forest
    Officer v. S.T. Hadimani
    (2002 (3) SCC 25).
    No proof of receipt of salary or wages for
    240 days or order or record in that regard
    was produced. Mere non-production of the
    muster roll for a particular period was not
    sufficient for the Labour Court to hold that
    the workman had worked for 240 days as
    claimed.”

    7.In Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas
    (2004 (8) SCC 195), it was held that the burden was on
    the workman to show that he was working for more than
    240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged
    retrenchment.
    In M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004
    (8) SCC 246) the position was again reiterated in
    paragraph 11 as follows:

    “11.The above burden having not been
    discharged and the Labour Court having
    held so, in our opinion, the Industrial Court
    and the High Court erred in basing an
    order of reinstatement solely on an
    adverse inference drawn erroneously. At
    this stage it may be useful to refer to a
    judgment of this Court in the case of
    Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri
    Niwas JT
    2004 (7) SC 248 wherein this
    Court disagreed with the High Court’s view
    of drawing an adverse inference in regard
    to the non-production of certain relevant
    documents. This is what this Court had to
    say in that regard:

    “15. A court of law even in a case where
    provisions of the Indian Evidence Act
    apply, may presume or may not presume
    that if a party despite possession of the
    best evidence had not produced the same,
    it would have gone against his
    contentions. The matter, however, would
    be different where despite direction by a
    court the evidence is withheld.

    Presumption as to adverse inference for
    non-production of evidence is always
    -8-

    optional and one of the factors which is
    required to be taken into consideration is
    the background of facts involved in the lis.
    The presumption, thus, is not obligatory
    because notwithstanding the intentional
    non-production, other circumstances may
    exist upon which such intentional non-
    production may be found to be justifiable
    on some reasonable grounds. In the
    instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not
    draw any adverse inference against the
    appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do
    so particularly having regard to the nature
    of the evidence adduced by the
    respondent.”

    8. In Manager, Reserve Bank of India,
    Bangalore v. S. Mani and Ors. (2005(5)
    SCC 100) a three-Judge Bench of this
    Court again considered the matter and
    held that the initial burden of proof was on
    the workman to show that he had
    completed 240 days of service. Tribunal’s
    view that the burden was on the employer
    was held to be erroneous. In Batala
    Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Sowaran
    Singh
    (2005 (8) Supreme 481) it was held
    as follows:

    “13.So far as the question of onus
    regarding working for more than 240 days
    is concerned, as observed by this Court in
    Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani the
    onus is on the workman.”

    The position was examined in detail in Surendranagar
    District Panchayat v. Dehyabhai Amarsingh (2005 (7)
    Supreme 307) and the view expressed in Range
    Forest Officer, Siri Niwas, M.P. Electricity Board cases
    (supra) was reiterated.

    9. In R.M. Yellatti v. The Asst. Executive Engineer (JT
    2005 (9) SC 340), the decisions referred to above were
    noted and it was held as follows:

    “17. Analyzing the above decisions of this
    court, it is clear that the provisions of the
    Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the
    proceedings under section 10 of the
    Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying
    general principles and on reading the
    aforestated judgments, we find that this
    court has repeatedly taken the view that the
    burden of proof is on the claimant to show
    that he had worked for 240 days in a given
    year. This burden is discharged only upon
    the workman stepping in the witness box.
    This burden is discharged upon the
    workman adducing cogent evidence, both
    oral and documentary. In cases of
    termination of services of daily waged
    earner, there will be no letter of appointment
    or termination. There will also be no receipt
    or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the
    workman (claimant) can only call upon the
    employer to produce before the court the
    nominal muster roll for the given period, the
    letter of appointment or termination, if any,
    the wage register, the attendance register
    etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately
    would depend thereafter on facts of each
    case. The above decisions however make it
    clear that mere affidavits or self-serving
    statements made by the claimant/workman
    will not suffice in the matter of discharge of
    the burden placed by law on the workman to
    prove that he had worked for 240 days in a
    given year. The above judgments further lay
    down that mere non-production of muster
    rolls per se without any plea of suppression
    by the claimant workman will not be the
    ground for the tribunal to draw an adverse
    inference against the management. Lastly,
    the above judgments lay down the basic
    principle, namely, that the High Court under
    Article 226 of the Constitution will not
    interfere with the concurrent findings of fact
    recorded by the labour court unless they are
    perverse. This exercise will depend upon
    facts of each case.”

    10.The above position was again re-iterated in ONGC Ltd.
    and Anr. v. Shyamal Chandra Bhowmik
    (2006 (1) SCC

    337) and Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam and Anr. v.
    Sham Lal
    (2006 AIR SCW 3574).”

    12. After going through the pleadings made by the petitioners in the

    statement of claim, the evidence adduced by them and the law laid

    down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mohd. Rafi

    (supra), in my opinion, the learned Labour Court rightly held that

    the petitioners/workmen failed to establish the fact that they worked

    for more than 240 days in a calendar year preceding the date of

    termination of their services.

    13.With regard to the application of Section 25-G of the Act of 1947, it

    is necessary on the part of the workmen to plead and prove that

    the employees were workmen, who belong to a particular category

    of workmen in that establishment. In the absence of any

    agreement, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman
    -10-

    who was the last person to be employed in that category.

    14.In the present case, the workmen failed to plead and prove the fact

    that the workmen who were employed after the petitioners are still

    working with the establishment. In absence of such evidence, in

    opinion of this Court, provisions of Section 25-G of the Act of 1947

    would not attract and the learned Labour Court rightly denied relief

    under said provision.

    15.One more submission was made by the learned counsel appearing

    for the petitioners that an adverse inference should be drawn

    against the establishment/employer because documents were not

    provided before the learned Labour Court despite applications

    having been filed.

    16. It is a well-settled principle of law that the workmen must establish

    the primary foundation of their case, and if the establishment or

    employer thereafter fails to rebut that foundation and further fails to

    produce necessary documents, an adverse inference may be

    drawn against the establishment or employer.

    17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matter of State of

    Uttarakhand and Others v. Sureshwati, reported in (2021) 3 SCC

    108, held that the burden to prove that the workman had worked for

    240 days lies on the workman himself. The question whether an

    adverse inference could be drawn against the employer, in case he

    did not produce the best evidence available with it, arises

    thereafter. If some of the documents have not been produced by

    the establishment, an adverse inference could not be drawn.
    Relevant para 26 is reproduced herein below :

    “26. A Division Bench of this Court in Bhavnagar Municipal
    Corpn. v. Jadeja Govubha Chhanubha
    , 2014(16) SCC 130
    held that :

    “7. It is fairly well-settled that for an order of termination of the
    services of a workman to be held illegal on account of non-
    payment of retrenchment compensation, it is essential for the
    workman to establish that he was in continuous service of the
    employer within the meaning of Section 25-B of the Industrial
    Disputes Act, 1947. For the respondent to succeed in that
    attempt he was required to show that he was in service for
    240 days in terms of Section 25-B(2)(a)(ii). The burden to
    prove that he was in actual and continuous service of the
    employer for the said period lay squarely on the workman.
    The decisions of this Court in Range Forest Officer v. S.T.
    Hadimani
    ,(2002) 3 SCC 25, Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v.
    Siri Niwas
    , 2004(8) 195,, M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram,
    (2004) 8 SCC 246. Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd.

    v. State of Rajasthan,(2004) 8 SCC00000000000 161,
    Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Jethabhai Pitamberbhai
    ,
    2005(8) SCC 450 and R.M. Yellatti v. Executive Engineer,
    2006(1) SCC 106 unequivocally recognise the principle that
    the burden to prove that the workman had worked for 240
    days is entirely upon him.
    So also the question whether an
    adverse inference could be drawn against the employer in
    case he did not produce the best evidence available with it,
    has been the subject-matter of pronouncements of this Court
    in Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas and M.P.
    Electricity Board v. Hariram [M.P. Electricity Board
    v. Hariram,
    , reiterated in RBI v. S. Mani18. This Court has held that only
    because some documents have not been produced by the
    management, an adverse inference cannot be drawn against
    it.”

    18. With regard to the monetary compensation claimed by the

    petitioners herein, as they failed to prove the fact that they had

    worked continuously for 240 days in a calendar year preceding

    the date of termination of their services, and further failed to

    establish that the employees engaged after the appointment of

    the petitioners are still working with the establishment, no such

    relief can be granted.

    19. In the matter of Smt. Kunti Bai Kashyap (supra), she was

    offered engagement as a daily-wage earner on a

    compassionate basis and had worked for 6½ years.
    -12-

    Accordingly, the Hon’ble Division Bench in that matter granted

    monetary compensation. However, the facts of the present

    case are entirely different. In the opinion of this Court,

    therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in the form

    of monetary compensation. Accordingly, these petitions fail and

    are hereby dismissed.

    Sd/-

    (Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
    Judge
    Rekha



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