Bhag Singh vs State Of H.P on 10 March, 2026

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    Himachal Pradesh High Court

    Bhag Singh vs State Of H.P on 10 March, 2026

    ( 2026:HHC:6364 )

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

    SPONSORED

    Criminal Revision No. 418 of 2015.

    Reserved on: 24.02.2026.

    Decided on: 10 March, 2026.

    .

        Bhag Singh                                                                 .... Petitioner.
                                             Versus
    
    
    
    
    
        State of H.P.                                                             ...Respondent.
    
    
    
    
                                                           of
        Coram:
    

    The Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
    Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
    rt
    For the Petitioner: Dr Lalit K. Sharma, Advocate.

    For the Respondent: Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
    General

    Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

    The present revision petition is directed against the

    judgment dated 12.10.2015 passed by learned Additional

    Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned

    Appellate Court) in Criminal Appeal No. 33/10 of 2015 vide

    which the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence

    dated 18.05.2015 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class,

    Court No.2, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial

    Court) in Criminal Case No. 3/2 of 2014/12 were upheld. (Parties

    1
    Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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    shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were

    arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

    .

    2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

    revision petition are that the police presented a challan before

    the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission

    of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian

    of
    Penal Code (for short “IPC“). It was asserted that the

    informant Subhash Chander Chandel (PW-1) was riding a
    rt
    motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-23B-0279 on

    09.08.2012. Pyare Lal (PW-2) was sitting as a pillion rider.

    They reached Awari at about 8.45 A.M., when a private bus

    bearing registration No. HP-69-2252 attempted to overtake

    the motorcycle at a high speed. However, a vehicle came from

    the opposite side, and the bus driver turned the bus to avoid the

    accident and hit the motorcycle. The motorcyclists fell and

    sustained injuries. The accident occurred due to the high speed

    and negligence of the bus driver. The injured were taken to the

    hospital, and intimation was given to the police. An entry

    (Ex.PW11/A) was recorded in the police station, and H.C. Bodh

    Raj (PW-13) was sent to the hospital for verification. He filed

    an application (Ex.PW10/A) for medical examination of the

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    injured. Dr Deepak (PW-10) examined Pyare Lal and found

    that he had sustained simple injuries. He issued MLC

    (Ex.PW10/B). He also examined Subhash Chander and found

    .

    that he had sustained multiple injuries. He issued MLC

    (Ex.PW10/E). These injuries could have been caused in a motor

    vehicle accident. H.C. Bodh Raj recorded the statement

    of
    (Ex.PW1/A) of Subhash Chander and sent it to the police

    station, where FIR (Ex.PW12/A) was registered. H.C. Bodh Raj
    rt
    investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared a site

    plan (Ex.PW13/A). He took the photographs (Ex. 13/B-1 to

    Ex.PW13/B-6) with the help of the official camera. He seized

    the bus and motorcycle along with documents vide memos

    (Ex.PW4/A and Ex.PW1/B). The owner of the bus, Mahender

    Singh (PW-7), issued a certificate (Ex.PW7/A) stating that the

    accused was driving the bus at the time of the accident.

    Sukhdev (PW-5) examined the bus and found that there was no

    mechanical defect in it that could have led to the accident. He

    issued the report (Ex.PW5/A). Dev Raj (PW-9) examined the

    motorcycle and found that there was no mechanical defect in it

    that could have led to the accident. However, damage to head

    light cover, mud guard and rear-view mirror was caused in the

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    accident. He issued the report (Ex.PW9/A). The statements of

    witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the

    completion of the investigation challan was prepared and

    .

    presented before the learned trial Court.

    3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

    summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of

    of
    accusation was put to him for the commission of offences

    punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC, to which he
    rt
    pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

    4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its

    case. Subhash Chander Chandel (PW-1) and Pyare Lal (PW-2)

    had sustained injuries in the accident. Manmohan (PW-3),

    Constable Pankaj Kumar (PW-6) and Bhag Singh (PW-8)

    witnessed the recoveries. Abhishek Chandel (PW-4) is an

    eyewitness. Sukh Dev (PW-5) examined the bus. Mahender

    Singh (PW-7) is the owner of the bus. Dev Raj (PW-9)

    examined the motorcycle. Dr Deepak (PW-10) examined the

    injured. Constable Rajneesh Kumar (PW-11) proved the entry

    in the daily diary. Inspector Sohan Lal (PW-12) signed the FIR

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    and prepared the challan. H.C. Bodh Raj (PW-13) investigated

    the matter.

    5. Accused in his statement recorded under Section

    .

    313 of Cr.P.C. admitted that he was driving the bus bearing

    registration No. HP-69-2252 on 09.08.2012 at about 8.45 A.M.

    A motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-23B-0279 was going

    of
    ahead of the bus towards Bilaspur, and Subhash and Pyare Lal

    had fallen from the motorcycle, however, he denied that the
    rt
    bus had hit the motorcycle. He admitted that the police had

    visited the spot, prepared the site plan, seized the bus and took

    the photographs. He also admitted that the bus was

    mechanically examined and that the owner had issued a

    certificate showing that he (accused) was driving the bus at the

    time of the accident. He stated that a false FIR was registered

    against him, and he had not caused any accident. He did not

    produce any evidence in defence.

    6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused had not

    disputed that he was driving the bus at the time of the accident.

    The statements of the injured proved that the bus had

    attempted to overtake the motorcycle, the driver steered the

    bus towards the motorcycle when a truck came from the

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    opposite side, and the bus hit the motorcycle, causing injuries

    to the motorcycle rider and pillion rider. The statement made

    by the mechanic in his cross-examination that the motorcycle

    .

    would have fallen towards the left side was not probable. The

    defence taken by the accused that the motorcycle had fallen due

    to the difference in height of the metalled and unmetalled

    of
    portions of the road was also not believable. The accused

    should not have attempted to overtake the motorcycle when
    rt
    the truck was coming from the opposite side. His negligence

    was the proximate cause of the accident, causing injuries to the

    motorcyclists. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the

    accused for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337

    of the IPC and sentenced him as under: –

    Sr. No. Offence under Sentence imposed
    which convicted

    1. Sec. 279 IPC Simple imprisonment for six
    months.

    2. Sec. 337 IPC Simple imprisonment for six
    months and fine to the tune of ₹
    500/-. In default of payment of
    fine to further undergo simple
    imprisonment for 15 days.

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    Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered

    to run concurrently.

    .

    7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and

    order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused

    filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional

    Sessions Judge (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate

    of
    Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial

    Court that the accused was negligent in attempting to overtake
    rt
    the motorcycle on a curve when a truck was coming from the

    opposite side. He steered the bus, hitting the motorcycle and

    causing injuries to the motorcyclists. Plea taken by the

    accused that the motorcycle had lost balance was not probable.

    The admission made by the mechanic that the motorcycle

    should have fallen towards the left side was not believable.

    Learned Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced the

    accused. There was no infirmity in the judgment and order

    passed by the learned Trial Court; hence, the appeal was

    dismissed.

    8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed

    by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present

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    petition asserting that the learned Courts below have erred in

    appreciating the material on record. It was brought on record

    that the place of occurrence was a busy place on the National

    .

    Highway, but no independent witness was joined by the police.

    The truck was going downhill, whereas the bus and the

    motorcycle were moving uphill. The difference in height of the

    of
    metalled and unmetalled portions of the road was 2 ½ inch

    which made it highly probable that the motorcycle had skidded
    rt
    on its own. The prosecution had failed to prove the exact

    rashness and negligence of the accused. The admission in the

    cross-examination of the mechanic that the motorcycle would

    have fallen on the left side of the road was wrongly ignored by

    the learned Courts below. Therefore, it is prayed that the

    present petition be allowed.

    9. I have heard Dr Lalit K. Sharma, learned counsel for

    the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate

    General for the respondent/State.

    10. Dr Lalit K. Sharma, learned counsel for the

    petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below

    have erred in appreciating the material on record. There is no

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    evidence of rashness and negligence on the part of the accused.

    Learned Courts below wrongly ignored the admission made by

    the mechanic that the motorcycle would have fallen towards

    .

    the left side of the road after it was hit by the bus. Injuries

    were noticed by the medical officer on the right side of the body

    of the injured, which made it probable that the motorcycle had

    of
    skidded on its own. Learned Courts below erred in not

    extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the
    rt
    accused. He prayed that the present revision be allowed,

    judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set

    aside, or in the alternative, the benefits of the Probation of

    Offenders Act be granted to the accused. Hence, he relied upon

    Manoj Chauhan vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, Cr. R. No. 326 of

    2014, decided on 23.09.2025; State of H.P. vs. Ram Pal, Cr. Appeal

    No. 332 of 2012 decided on 11.09.2025, Lekh Raj @ Raju vs. State of

    H.P., Cr. R. No. 4166 of 2013 decided on 27.08.2025, Pawan Kumar

    vs. State of H. P., Cr. R. No. 227 of 2015 decided on 08.01.2026 and

    Chellammal & Anr. vs. State represented by the Inspector of Police,

    Criminal Appeal No. 2065 of 2025, decided on 22.04.2025 in

    support of his submissions.

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    11. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General

    for the respondent-State, submitted that both the learned

    Courts below have rightly held that the accused was negligent

    .

    in attempting to overtake the motorcycle on a curve when the

    truck was coming from the opposite side. The mechanic is not

    shown to be an expert in physics, and his statement was rightly

    of
    rejected by the learned Courts below. The motorcycle was

    moving uphill, and the motorcyclists would have attempted to
    rt
    save the motorcycle after it was hit by the bus; therefore, the

    possibility of falling towards the right side could not be ruled

    out. This Court should not disturb the concurrent findings of

    fact recorded by the learned Courts below while exercising the

    revisional jurisdiction; hence, he prayed that the present

    petition be dismissed.

    12. I have given considerable thought to the

    submissions made at the bar and have gone through the

    records carefully.

    13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

    Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:

    (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional

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    court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent

    defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page

    207: –

    .

    “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at
    the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent

    findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a
    detailed appreciation of the material and evidence
    brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision

    of
    against conviction is not supposed to exercise the
    jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of
    interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397
    of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC“) vests
    rt
    jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the
    correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,

    sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the
    regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The
    object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or
    an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-

    founded error which is to be determined on the merits of
    individual cases. It is also well settled that while
    considering the same, the Revisional Court does not

    dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to
    reverse those findings.

    14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

    Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

    1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

    “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court
    under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the
    power to call for and examine records of an inferior
    court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the
    legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made
    in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a

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    patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the
    perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

    15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
    Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit

    .

    Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC

    (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section
    397 has been considered and succinctly explained as
    under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

    “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
    the power to call for and examine the records of an

    of
    inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself
    as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings
    or order made in a case. The object of this provision
    rtis to set right a patent defect or an error of
    jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded
    error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to

    scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it,
    bear a token of careful consideration and appear to
    be in accordance with law. If one looks into the
    various judgments of this Court, it emerges that

    the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where
    the decisions under challenge are grossly
    erroneous, there is no compliance with the

    provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on
    no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or

    judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
    perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but

    are merely indicative. Each case would have to be
    determined on its own merits.

    13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
    revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
    limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
    manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it
    should not be against an interim or interlocutory
    order. The Court has to keep in mind that the
    exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not
    lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing

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    with the question as to whether the charge has
    been framed properly and in accordance with law
    in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in
    the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the
    case substantially falls within the categories

    .

    aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a
    much-advanced stage in the proceedings under
    CrPC.”

    15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8

    SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC

    of
    OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to

    reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the
    rt
    absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

    “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope
    of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising

    the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of
    Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri
    ,
    (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering

    the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High
    Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp.

    454-55, para 5)

    5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court

    can call for and examine the record of any
    proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness,
    legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
    order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
    supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High
    Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But
    the said revisional power cannot be equated with
    the power of an appellate court, nor can it be
    treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
    Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate
    for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence

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    and come to its conclusion on the same when the
    evidence has already been appreciated by the
    Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal,
    unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice
    of the High Court which would otherwise

    .

    tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On
    scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High
    Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no

    hesitation in concluding that the High Court
    exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the
    conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the

    of
    oral evidence. …”

    13. Another judgment which has also been referred to
    and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this
    rt
    Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray
    Gulabrao Phalke
    , (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19].
    This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of

    revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order
    of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly
    unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any

    relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely
    on the ground that another view is possible. The
    following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

    “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is
    perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly

    unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
    relevant material or there is palpable misreading

    of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in
    setting aside the order, merely because another
    view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant
    to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of
    the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power
    in the court to do justice in accordance with the
    principles of criminal jurisprudence. The
    revisional power of the court under Sections 397
    to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an
    appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose
    decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be

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    perverse or untenable in law or is grossly
    erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the
    decision is based on no material or where the
    material facts are wholly ignored or where the
    judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or

    .

    capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the
    decision in exercise of their revisional
    jurisdiction.”

    16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

    Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)

    of
    309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page

    205: rt

    “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
    jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal
    Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence
    of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not

    for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret
    the evidence on record.

    17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales &

    Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008)

    14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that
    the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong
    order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the

    absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first
    question is, therefore, in the negative.”

    17. The present revision has to be decided as per the

    parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

    18. The accused did not dispute in his statement

    recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he was driving the

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    bus on 09.08.2012 at 8.45 A.M. He has also admitted that the

    motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-23B-0279 was moving

    ahead of the bus. He also did not dispute that Subhash Chander

    .

    and Pyare Lal had fallen. The only dispute is whether the bus

    had hit the motorcycle or the motorcycle had skidded on its

    own.

    of

    19. Subhash Chander Chandel (PW-1) stated that when

    the motorcycle reached near Awari, a bus bearing registration
    rt
    No. HP-69-2252 attempted to overtake it on a curve. A truck

    came from the opposite side, and the driver steered the bus

    towards the motorcycle and hit it. The motorcycle lost its

    balance and fell on the spot. The accused was driving the bus

    at the time of the accident. He stated in his cross-examination

    that there was a school towards the left side and shops towards

    the right side. He could not say the time from which the bus

    was following the motorcycle or the number of times the horn

    was sounded by the driver of the bus. There was a curve 40

    meters behind the place of the accident, and the bus had to be

    slowed to negotiate the curve. He volunteered to say that the

    bus could be moved in third gear at the curve. He admitted that

    the road goes uphill for about 16 meters, and 25-30 passengers

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    were sitting in the bus. The bus driver had attempted to

    overtake the motorcycle wrongly. The truck was coming down

    hill. The mirror of the motorcycle was broken because of the

    .

    accident. He denied that he was driving the motorcycle on the

    edge and fell off.

    20. Payare Lal (PW-2) stated that when the motorcycle

    of
    had reached near Awari, a bus bearing registration No. HP-69-

    2252 attempted to overtake it at a high speed.

    rt A truck came

    from the opposite side, and the bus driver steered it towards

    the motorcycle. The motorcycle fell on the unmetalled portion

    of the road. He stated in his cross-examination that the

    motorcycle was being driven at a speed of 20-25 kilometres per

    hour. The place of the accident was located at a distance of 40-

    50 meters from the bridge. There was a curve near the bridge,

    and the vehicle had to be slowed down to negotiate the curve.

    The road goes uphill after the curve. The truck was being

    driven at a slow speed, and the truck driver had attempted to

    apply the brakes. The motorcycle was being driven at a

    distance of 5-6 inches from the edge of the road. The bus

    driver had not sounded the horn before overtaking the

    motorcycle. The bus was being driven on the right side of the

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    motorcycle. The mirror was damaged by the accident. He

    admitted that a small vehicle would fall towards the opposite

    side in case it is hit by a larger vehicle, and the occupants would

    .

    sustain injuries on the left side.

    21. Abhishek Chandel (PW-4) stated that he was

    travelling in the bus on 09.08.2012, when the bus reached near

    of
    Awari school, a motorcycle fell. He got off the bus. The people

    were saying that the motorcyclists had fallen. He could not say
    rt
    whose negligence led to the accident. He was permitted to be

    cross-examined. He stated in his cross-examination that there

    was a slight curve at the site of the accident. He did not

    remember that the driver was overtaking the motorcycle when

    a vehicle came from the opposite side, and the bus driver

    steered it towards the left side of the road. He denied his

    previous statement recorded by the police. He stated in his

    cross-examination that no passengers had disclosed that the

    bus had hit the motorcycle. There was a difference in the

    height of the metalled and unmetalled portions of the road.

    22. This witness was permitted to be cross-examined

    and confronted with his previous statement. He denied his

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    previous statement recorded by the police. H.C. Bodh Raj (PW-

    13) specifically stated that he had recorded the statement of

    Abhishek Chandel as per his version. This statement was not

    .

    challenged in his cross-examination, and a general suggestion

    was put to him that he had not recorded the statements of the

    witnesses as per their version, which was denied by the

    of
    Investigating Officer. A denied suggestion does not amount to

    any proof and cannot be used for discarding the statement of
    rt
    the witnesses. Therefore, witness Abhishek Chandel is shown

    to have made two inconsistent statements — one before the

    police that the accident had occurred due to the overtaking of

    the motorcycle by the bus and another before the Court that the

    accused was not overtaking the motorcycle. Both these

    statements cannot stand together, and his credit has been

    impeached under Section 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act. It

    was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi

    Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been

    thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous

    statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However,

    when he is confronted with some portions of the previous

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    statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest

    of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed:

    .

    “52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that

    even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-
    examined and contradicted with the leave of the court
    by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a

    matter of law, be treated as washed off the record
    altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each
    case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and

    of
    contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly
    discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of
    his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the
    credit of the witness has not been completely shaken,
    rt
    he may, after reading and considering the evidence of
    the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care,

    accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record,
    that part of his testimony which he finds to be
    creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the
    whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and

    in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally
    discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence,
    discard his evidence in toto.”

    23. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman

    versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed:

    “12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has
    been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-
    examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness
    loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the
    defence. We find support for the view we have taken
    from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir
    Singh v. State (Delhi Administration
    ), AIR 1975 Supreme
    Court 1400, the Apex Court observed:

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    21 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )

    “It is now well settled that when a witness, who
    has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to
    be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution,
    the result of that course being adopted is to
    discredit this witness altogether and not merely to

    .

    get rid of a part of his testimony. ”

    24. Therefore, his testimony cannot be used to discard

    the prosecution’s case.

    of

    25. Statements of motorcyclists are corroborated by the

    report of mechanical examination (Ex.PW9/A) in which it was
    rt
    specifically mentioned that head light cover was scratched on

    the right side, the mud guard had a dent on the right side, and

    the rear-view mirror had broken. Dev Raj (PW-9) conducted

    the mechanical examination of the motorcycle. He stated in his

    examination-in-chief that the damage was caused to head

    light, mud guard and rear-view mirror in the accident.

    Photographs (Ex.PW13/B-1 to Ex.PW13/B-4) also show damage

    to the rear side of the motorcycle, proving that the motorcycle

    was hit by something. Therefore, the statements of Subhash

    Chander Chandel (PW-1) and Payare Lal (PW-2) are duly

    corroborated by the mechanical report and the photographs,

    and these were rightly accepted by the learned Courts below.

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    22 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )

    26. Sukh Dev (PW-5) conducted the mechanical

    examination of the bus and found no defect in it that could have

    led to the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that if a

    .

    large vehicle hits a small vehicle, the small vehicle would fall

    towards the left side. It was submitted that the statement of

    this witness in cross-examination makes the prosecution’s

    of
    case highly doubtful because the injuries were noticed on the

    right side of the body of the motorcyclists and not on the left
    rt
    side. This submission cannot be accepted. Sukh Dev (PW-5)

    mentioned his qualification as Matriculate and ITI, in the

    report (Ex.PW5/A). It was rightly submitted on behalf of the

    State that he is not an expert in physics but only a mechanic,

    and his testimony regarding the direction of fall could not be

    accepted. The motorcycle was moving, and the motorcyclists

    would have attempted to save themselves from falling;

    therefore, the possibility of their falling towards the right side

    cannot be ruled out.

    27. It is also submitted that the place of the accident

    was highly populated and the school and shops were located on

    the spot, but no independent witness was examined by the

    prosecution. This submission will not help the petitioner.

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    23 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )

    There is no evidence that any independent person was present

    on the spot who had witnessed the occurrence. Therefore, the

    prosecution’s case cannot be doubted because of the non-

    .

    examination of any independent witness.

    28. It was submitted that the prosecution has not

    established the negligence of the accused, and the mere high

    of
    speed of the bus is not sufficient to infer the negligence of the

    accused. This submission will not help the accused.

    rt The

    statements of Subhash Chander Chandel (PW-1) and Pyare Lal

    (PW-2) show that the bus driver had attempted to overtake the

    motorcycle on a curve when a truck was coming from the

    opposite side of the road. Rule 6 of the Rules of the Road

    Regulations, 1989 provides that the driver of a motor vehicle

    shall not pass a vehicle travelling in the same direction as

    himself on a curve if his passing is likely to cause

    inconvenience or danger to other traffic proceeding in any

    direction and without getting signal from the driver ahead of

    him. It was laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in

    Shammi Malik v. Amrik Singh, 1997 SCC OnLine P&H 1266: (1998)

    2 RCR (Civil) 14 (2) that the driver of the vehicle cannot overtake

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    24 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )

    when another vehicle is coming from the opposite side. It was

    observed at page 15:

    .

    “5. …Regulation 6 of the Rules of the Road Regulations,

    1989, provides that the driver of a motor vehicle shall
    not pass a vehicle travelling in the same direction if the
    driver ahead of him has not signalled that he may be

    over-taken and if his passing is likely to cause
    inconvenience or danger to other traffic proceeding in
    any direction. In this case, it is not the case of the truck

    of
    driver was the driver of the car who had given him a
    signal that he may be overtaken. In fact, the truck driver
    should not have overtaken the car when he had noticed a
    truck coming from the opposite direction. It is also not
    rt
    the case of the truck driver that the truck driver did not
    apply the brakes or did not slow the vehicle. Rather, it is

    the case of the truck driver that the speed of the car was
    slow. A Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in K.N.
    Nithyananda v. Mysore State Agro Industries Corporation
    ,
    by its Managing Director Bangalore and another, AIR 1973

    Mysore 314, in context with Regulation 4 (now
    Regulation 6), has held that the drivers of automatically
    propelled vehicles, when attempting to overtake

    vehicles going ahead of them should wait for the proper
    opportunity viz., slackness in traffic on the same road

    before doing so. They are duty-bound to exercise
    sufficient care and caution by looking ahead and behind

    to ascertain that it would be safe for them to overtake
    such a vehicle. A further duty is cast on them to give a
    proper signal to the driver of the vehicle ahead to
    indicate that they would be overtaking the vehicle and
    wait for a reply signal from the driver permitting them
    to overtake and thereby indicating that the road is clear
    and there would be no danger in overtaking. The
    evidence of RW-1, Amrik Singh, a truck driver, makes it
    abundantly clear that he did not at all exercise any
    caution while overtaking the Maruti car or while
    stopping his vehicle all of a sudden. In these

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    25 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )

    circumstances, I have no hesitation in holding that
    Amrik Singh, a truck driver, was not only rash in the
    manner of driving the truck while overtaking the Maruti
    car but was also negligent in stopping his vehicle all of a
    sudden, thereby causing the accident.”

    .

    29. A similar view was taken by this Court in State of

    H.P. vs Piar Chand 2003 (2) Shim. LC 341, wherein it was

    observed:

    of
    “19. In Raj Kumar v. State of H.P. 1997 (2) Sim. L.C. 161,
    learned single Judge of this Court, while dealing with a
    similar situation, has held as under: –

    rt”13. It goes without saying that the drivers of
    automatically propelled vehicles, when attempting

    to overtake vehicles going ahead of them, ought to
    wait for the proper opportunity. A duty is cast on
    them to exercise sufficient care and caution by

    looking ahead and behind to ascertain that it would
    be safe for them to overtake the vehicle moving
    ahead of them. A further duty is cast on them to

    give a proper signal to the driver of the vehicle
    ahead to indicate that they would be overtaking the

    vehicles and wait for a reply signal from that driver
    permitting them to overtake and thereby
    indicating that the road ahead is clear and there

    would be no danger in overtaking. If these
    minimum precautions are not observed by drivers
    of automatically propelled vehicles, while
    overtaking the vehicles going ahead of them, it will
    have to be considered that such driving is rash and
    negligent.”

    20. In the case in hand, the accused, while overtaking
    the truck, was required to take the minimum precaution
    to have awaited for proper opportunity to overtake the
    truck and taking necessary caution to see whether any

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    26 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )

    vehicle was not coming from the opposite side and to
    give a proper signal to the driver of the truck and wait
    for a reply signal from the driver of the truck. This has
    not been done by the accused and, therefore, he was
    negligent in driving the Jeep.”

    .

    30. In the present case, the accused overtook the

    motorcycle on a curve when another vehicle was coming from

    the opposite side, contrary to the Rules of the Road

    of
    Regulations. There is no evidence that the motorcyclist had

    signalled the petitioner to overtake him. Therefore, the
    rt
    petitioner was in breach of the statutory regulations, which led

    to the accident. Therefore, he was rightly held guilty of the

    commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the

    IPC.

    31. It is undisputed that motorcyclists Subash Chander

    Chandel and Pyare Lal had sustained injuries in the accident.

    The accused admitted this fact in his statement recorded under

    Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. Dr Deepak (PW-10) also proved that

    Subhash Chander Chandel (PW-1) and Pyare Lal (PW-2) had

    sustained injuries which could have been caused by an accident.

    This was not suggested to be incorrect. Therefore, it was duly

    proved on record that Subhash Chander Chandel (PW-1) and

    Pyare Lal (PW-2) had sustained injuries in the accident caused

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    27 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )

    by the negligence of the accused, and he was rightly convicted

    of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337

    of the IPC.

    .

    32. In Manoj Chauhan (supra), the identity of the driver

    was not proved. However. In the present case, the accused had

    not disputed his identity. Therefore, the judgment of Manoj

    of
    Chauhan (supra) does not apply to the present case.

    33. In Ram Pal (supra), the prosecution had asserted
    rt
    that the accident occurred due to the high speed of the bus,

    which was not held to be sufficient. In the present case, the

    accident occurred because of a violation of Rule 6 of the Rules

    of the Road Regulations. Therefore, the cited judgment does

    not apply to the present case.

    34. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to

    undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the

    commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the

    IPC, and for six months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of ₹

    500/-, and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 15

    days for the commission of an offence punishable under

    Section 337 of the IPC. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

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    28 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )

    Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82

    that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted

    of rash or negligent driving. It was observed:

    .

    “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is
    made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a

    convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents
    have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is
    galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is

    of
    in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them
    down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that
    “more people die of road accidents than by most dis-
    eases, so much so the Indian highways are among the
    rt
    top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents
    was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna

    Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus :

    “Rashness and negligence are relative concepts,
    not absolute abstractions. In our current condi-

    tions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the
    rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the
    fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty ve-

    hicles and speeding menaces.”

    12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC
    538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed
    on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to

    remain in force although the High Court too had con-
    firmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted
    of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the
    death of a human being. In that case, this Court en-
    hanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six
    months besides imposing a fine.

    13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents
    in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the
    victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat
    the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as at-

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    29 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )

    tracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act.
    While considering the quantum of sentence to be im-
    posed for the offence of causing death by rash or negli-
    gent driving of automobiles, one of the prime consider-
    ations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals

    .

    the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his
    working hours. He must constantly inform himself that
    he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or

    inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle
    in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance
    thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an

    of
    accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not nec-
    essarily result in the death of any human being, or even
    if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the
    offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would
    rt
    be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always
    keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the

    offence of causing the death of a human being due to his
    callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail
    sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, par-
    ticularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the

    high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of
    automobiles.”

    35. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v.

    Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: –

    “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy

    of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver,
    they must have better training in traffic laws and moral
    responsibility, with special reference to the potential
    injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased
    number of road accidents, this Court, on several
    occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing
    with the offences relating to motor accidents that they
    cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section
    304-A
    IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of
    Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We

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    30 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )

    fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir
    Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208].

    36. Similarly, the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh

    .

    Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine

    SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196:

    “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to
    observe that India has a disreputable record of road
    accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the

    of
    drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all
    they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless
    driving, where other people become their prey. The
    poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians
    rt
    think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in
    constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the

    obnoxious attitude of the people who project
    themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances,
    we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should
    scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in
    Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.”

    37. Therefore, the sentence imposed by the learned

    Courts below cannot be said to be excessive.

    38. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of

    Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused.

    However, it is not permissible because of the judgment of the

    Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dalbir (supra). This Court is bound

    by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and is unable to

    follow the judgments of this Court in Lekh Raj (supra) and in

    Pawan Kumar (supra). The Judgment of the Supreme Court in

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    31 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )

    Chellammal (supra) dealt with the commission of offences

    punishable under Sections 304-B and 498A of the IPC and not

    with the commission of offences punishable under Sections

    .

    279 and 337 of the IPC. Hence, the cited judgment does not

    apply to the present case.

    39. No other point was urged.

    of

    40. In view of above, the present revision petition fails,

    and it is dismissed and so are the pending applications, if any.

    rt

    41. Records be sent back forthwith.

    (Rakesh Kainthla)

    Judge
    10 March, 2026.

    (jai)

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