Telangana High Court
Battula Buchhaiah vs The District Collector on 22 July, 2026
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
WP No.12297 of 2019
DATE OF ORDER:22.07.2026
Between
Battula Buchhaiah
....Petitioner
And:
The District Collector
Manchiryal and three others.
.... Respondents
ORDER:
This Writ petition is filed to issue a Writ of Mandamus declaring the
Proc.Rc.No.B/2049/2013 dated 12.02.2014 issued by respondent No. 3 in
incorporating the name of respondent No.4 in the Revenue Records to the
extent of Ac.0.10 Guntas of Agriculture Land in Sy.No.18 situated at
Velganoor Village, Dandepally Mandal, Manchiryal District, (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the subject land’) basing upon an invalid decree dated
17.09.1991 in OS.No.1124/1991 without considering the objections filed by
the petitioner and further not disposing the appeal filed by the petitioner
04.09.2018 by respondent No.1 as illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and
subversive of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
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2. Heard Sri CH.Jagannatha Rao, learned Counsel for petitioner, Sri
K.Sarva Bhouma Rao, learned counsel for respondent No.4 and learned
Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue.
3. The petitioner claims to have acquired rights over agriculture land
admeasuring Ac.0.10 Guntas in Sy.No.18, situated at Velganoor Village,
Dandepally Mandal, Manchiryal District, under an Agreement of Sale dated
12.04.1999 executed by one Akkala Chandraiah, and asserts that he has been
in possession by cultivating the land since the date of the said transaction.
According to the petitioner, though registration of the sale deed was delayed
due to the requirement of obtaining the signatures of all the brothers of his
vendor, he continued to remain in possession of the land. The petitioner also
relies upon a subsequent revised sale agreement dated 05.09.2003, which,
clarified the extent and boundaries of the land agreed to be sold.
4. Respondent No.4, on the other hand, claims title and possession over
the very same extent of land on the strength of a decree and judgment dated
17.09.1991 passed by the Court of the District Munsif, Luxettipet, in
O.S.No.1124 of 1991, which was filed for declaration of title and injunction.
Respondent No.4 approached the revenue authorities seeking
implementation of the said decree by effecting consequential mutations in
the revenue records. Pursuant thereto, proceedings were initiated by the
Tahsildar, Dandepally Mandal, in Proc.No.B/2049/2013, notices were issued
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to the concerned parties, objections were received, and upon conclusion of
the enquiry, the Tahsildar, by proceedings dated 12.02.2014, directed
implementation of the civil court decree by incorporating the name of
respondent No.4 in the relevant revenue records in respect of the subject
land.
5. Aggrieved by the proceedings dated 12.02.2014 directing mutation of
the subject land in favour of respondent No.4, the petitioner is stated to have
made several representations/appeals before the competent revenue
authorities, the last one being made on 04.09.2018, seeking to set aside the
mutation orders, dated 12.02.2014 and to incorporate his name in the
revenue records. Assailing the legality of the proceedings, dated 12.02.2014,
and alleging inaction on the part of the appellate authority in considering the
appeal filed by him, the petitioner has instituted the present Writ Petition.
6. In the counter-affidavit filed by respondent No.4, it is stated that the
decree in the suit filed in respect of the subject land has attained finality and
as such, is binding on all the parties. Respondent No.4, therefore, opposed
the claim of the petitioner and asserted that after due notice and opportunity
to being heard to the parties, the impugned proceedings was issued for
implementation of the decree passed by civil court.
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7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the dispute
essentially pertains to title and possession over the subject land, which is
already sub judice before the competent civil Court.
7.1. He further submitted though the registration of the sale deed could
not be completed due to requirement of obtaining the signatures of brothers
of the vendor, who are the joint pattadars, the petitioner has been in
continuous possession by cultivating the subject land from the date of
agreement of sale i.e. 12.04.1999. He further submitted that the original
agreement of sale mentioned the extent as Ac.0.14 guntas, which was
subsequently rectified by a revised Agreement of Sale dated 05.09.2003,
wherein the land agreed to be sold was revised to Ac.0.10 guntas, specifying
the boundaries, and the vendor undertook to execute the registered sale deed
whenever required.
7.2. Learned Counsel for petitioner further submitted that respondent
No.4, made a representation dated 10.09.2013, seeking implementation of a
decree dated 17.09.1991 passed in O.S. No.1124 of 1991, for mutation of his
name in the revenue records in respect of subject land after an unexplained
delay of nearly twenty two years. He further submitted that respondent No.4
was never in possession of the subject land, either before or after the decree
and therefore, he could not seek mutation of his name in revenue records
solely on the strength of the said decree.
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7.3. He further submitted that pursuant to the notice issued by respondent
No.3, petitioner submitted a detailed representation dated 17.12.2013 stating
that he had been in continuous possession and cultivating the subject
agricultural land since the year 1999 by raising various crops, and requested
to furnish copies of all documents relied upon by respondent No.4, including
the alleged decree, and sought reasonable time to submit a detailed
explanation. However, respondent No.3 allegedly failed to furnish the
requested documents, thereby depriving the petitioner an effective
opportunity to place his defence; that the petitioner had brought to the notice
of respondent No.3 that his name had already been entered in the pahanies
for the years 2010-11 to 2013-14, after due enquiry by respondent No.3’s
office, and further, sought to conduct field enquiry, supply of pahani copies
from the years 1999-2000 to 2012-2013; that the petitioner has made another
representation dated 19.12.2013 requesting respondent No.3 to furnish
pahanies from the year 2011-2012 onwards to substantiate his claim of
possession, but respondent No.3 did not furnish the same.
7.4. Learned Counsel further submitted that respondent No.3, acting at
the instance of respondent No.4 and in collusion with the petitioner’s vendor,
illegally issued proceedings dated 12.02.2014 directing mutation of name of
respondent No.4 in the revenue records without conducting a proper enquiry
and without considering the petitioner’s objections and hence, the impugned
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proceedings dated 12.02.2014 is contrary to the provisions of the Act, 1971
and the Rules framed thereunder and is accordingly unsustainable.
7.5. He further submitted that the decree in O.S. No.1124 of 1991, relied
upon by respondent No.4, had become incapable of execution after the
expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and therefore, could not be the
basis for effecting mutation in the revenue records; and that the impugned
mutation proceedings founded upon such a stale and unenforceable decree
are wholly invalid.
7.6. Learned Counsel for petitioner further submitted that being
aggrieved by the proceedings dated 12.02.2014, the petitioner submitted
several representations and appeals, including an appeal dated 04.09.2018
before respondent No.1 seeking cancellation of the mutation effected in
favour of respondent No.4 and requesting mutation of the petitioner’s name,
but the respondent No.1 has failed to dispose of the said appeal till date. By
contending as above, learned counsel finally submitted that the impugned
proceedings dated 12.02.2014 are arbitrary, illegal and violative of the
principles of natural justice and hence, are liable to be set aside.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.4 submitted that the
present Writ Petition is not maintainable either in law or on facts, and is
liable to be dismissed in limine, as it involves disputed questions relating to
title and possession of immovable property, which cannot be adjudicated in
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proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and required to be
adjudicated by a competent Civil Court.
8.1. Learned counsel further submitted that respondent No.4 is the
absolute owner and lawful possessor of the subject land, having obtained a
decree dated 17.09.1991, in O.S.No.1124 of 1991 on the file of the District
Munsiff, Luxettipet, declaring his title and possession over the subject land,
which has attained finality.
8.2. Learned counsel further submitted that pursuant to the said decree,
respondent No.4 approached the Mandal Revenue Officer, Dandepally, for
implementation of the decree in the revenue records, who after issuing
notice to all parties concerned, affording the petitioner adequate opportunity
of hearing, considering the written objections of the petitioner and the
material placed on record, vide Proc.No.B/2049/2013, dated 12.02.2014,
directed implementation of the civil court decree by incorporating the name
of respondent No.4 in the revenue records and consequently issued Pattadar
Passbook in his favour. He further submitted that respondent No.4 has
remained in continuous and peaceful possession of the subject land and in
fact, the pahanies from the year 1999 consistently reflect his name as owner
and possessor of the subject land.
8.3. He further submitted that the petitioner’s claim based on the alleged
Agreement of Sale dated 12.04.1999 is wholly untenable, as the said
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document is, in substance, an unregistered sale deed, which neither conveys
title nor creates any legally enforceable right in his favour; that during the
enquiry before the Tahsildar, the alleged vendor, Akkala Chandraiah, gave a
written deposition dated 17.04.2013, wherein he categorically denied
execution of the purported sale deed and stated that the document was
forged and fabricated. He further submitted that one Akkala Ramaiah,
brother of the petitioner’s alleged vendor, also confirmed that his brother
sold away the subject land to respondent No.4 and decree was passed by
civil Court in favour of respondent No.4 and as such, Akkala Chandraiah,
alleged vendor of petitioner, had no right or title to sell the subject land.
8.4. Learned counsel further submitted that respondent No.3, after
considering the oral and documentary evidence, recorded a finding that the
petitioner’s claim was founded upon an unregistered and forged document
and that the alleged vendor had no title over the subject property; that the
petitioner failed to produce any valid document establishing either title or
possession over the subject land. He further submitted that the impugned
proceedings were passed strictly in accordance with Rule 5-A of the Act,
1971 and Rule 27(4) of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books
Rules, 1989, which mandate implementation of binding civil court decrees
in the revenue records; that there is no limitation for implementation of such
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decrees and that the Tahsildar was duty-bound to give effect to the decree
passed by the competent Civil Court.
8.5. Learned counsel for Respondent No.4 further submitted that the
allegation regarding denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner is
factually incorrect, as the petitioner was issued notice, appeared through
counsel, filed his written objections and was granted sufficient time to
present his case before the Tahsildar prior to passing the impugned order;
that the petitioner has not availed the statutory remedy available under the
revenue laws and that a mere representation cannot be treated as a statutory
appeal. He further contended that having failed to pursue the prescribed
remedy, the petitioner cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court.
8.6. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner has suppressed
material facts by failing to disclose the pendency of the civil suit filed by
him for specific performance of the alleged agreement of sale dated
12.04.1999, which appears to be not yet numbered. He further submitted that
respondent No.4 has also instituted a civil suit for perpetual injunction in
respect of the subject land, wherein the Junior Civil Judge at Luxettipet
granted an interim injunction dated 07.02.2020 restraining the petitioner
from interfering with possession of respondent No.4.
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8.7. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner has no right, title or
interest over the subject property and is attempting to disturb lawful
possession of respondent No.4 by relying upon a forged, unregistered and
unstamped document; that the present Writ Petition is an attempt to
circumvent the pending civil proceedings, overreach the subsisting
injunction order and misuse the writ jurisdiction for adjudication of disputed
questions of title and possession. He finally submitted that it is well settled
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that writ jurisdiction ought not to be
exercised in cases involving disputed questions of title and possession,
particularly where an efficacious alternative remedy is available before the
Civil Court.
9. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for respondent No.4
placed reliance on the following judgments:-
10. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai1, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held as under:
“Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when
an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision
is available to the person aggrieved. So long as an error is
capable of being corrected by a superior court in exercise of
appellate or revisional jurisdiction, though available to be
exercised only at the conclusion of the proceedings, it would
be sound exercise of discretion on the part of the High Court1
(2003) 6 SCC 675
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WPNo.12297 of 2019to refuse to exercise the power of superintendence during the
pendency of the proceedings. However, there may be cases
where but for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction, the
jurisdictional error committed by the inferior court or tribunal
would be incapable of being remedied once the proceedings
have concluded.”
11. In State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani Singh2, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court at paras 7, 9 and 10 of the judgment, has held as under:
“It is evident from the facts stated hereinabove that the title of
the writ petitioner is very much in dispute. Disputed question
relating to title cannot be satisfactorily gone into or
adjudicated in a writ petition.
We make it clear that we express no opinion on the question
of title put forward either by writ petitioner or his predecessor
and the same will have to be agitated and adjudicated in an
appropriate forum if and when the occasion arises.
12. In Roshina.T. Vs. Abdul Azeez K.T. 3, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
held as under:
“The High Court unnecessarily went into all the questions of
fact arising in the case on the basis of factual pleadings in
detail and recorded a factual finding that it was Respondent 1
(writ petitioner) who was in possession of the flat and,
therefore, he be restored with his possession of the flat by the
appellant.
While so directing it exceeded its extraordinary jurisdiction
conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution which was not
2
1993 (1) SCC 306
3
(2019) 2 SCC 329
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WPNo.12297 of 2019permissible. The High Court in granting the relief had
virtually converted the writ petition into a civil suit and itself
to a civil court. The filing of the writ petition was wholly
misconceived. It deserved dismissal in limine on the ground of
availability of alternative remedy of filing a suit by Respondent
1 (writ petitioner) in the civil court.
A regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of
the disputes relating to property rights between the private
persons. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution
shall not be available except where violation of some statutory
duty on the part of statutory authority is alleged. In such
cases, the Court has jurisdiction to issue appropriate
directions to the authority concerned. The High Court cannot
allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding
disputes, for which remedies under the general law, civil or
criminal are available.”
13. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks 4, the
Hon’ble Apex Court at para 20 of the judgment held as under:
” Much water has since flown under the bridge, but there has
been no corrosive effect on these decisions which, though old,
continue to hold the field with result that law as to the
jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the
alternative statutory remedies, is not effected, especially in
case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is
shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp
jurisdiction without any legal foundation.”
4
(1998) 8 SCC 1
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14. This Court has given its earnest consideration to the rival
submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties
and perused the entire material available on record.
15. The principal issue that fall for consideration is:
Whether the impugned Proceedings dated 12.02.2014
issued by respondent No.3, incorporating the name of
respondent No.4 in the revenue records in respect of
subject land, on the basis of the decree dated 17.09.1991
passed in O.S.No.1124 of 1991, after a lapse of about 22
years, warrants interference by this Court?
16. At the outset, in order to examine the issue, it is necessary to advert to
the statutory scheme governing the incorporation of rights in the revenue
records. The controversy essentially pertains to the implementation of a
Civil Court decree after an inordinate lapse of time and the legality of the
consequential mutation effected by the revenue authorities.
17. It is pertinent to refer to Section 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Rights in
Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 and Article 136 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 in this context.
18. Section 4 of the Act, 1971 reads as follows:
“Any person acquiring by succession, survivorship,
inheritance, partition, Government patta, decree of a Court
or otherwise any right as owner, pattadar, mortgagee,
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WPNo.12297 of 2019occupant or tenant of a land and any person acquiring any
right as occupant of a land by any other method shall
intimate in writing his acquisition of such right to the Mandal
Revenue Officer within 90 days from the date of such
acquisition, and the said Mandal Revenue Officer shall give
or send a written acknowledgement of the receipt of such
intimation to the person making it.”
19. Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, mandates as under:
“For the execution of any decree (other than a decree
granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court,
the period of limitation is twelve years from the date when the
decree becomes enforceable: Provided that an application for
the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual
injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation.”
20. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions indicates that where
rights are claimed on the basis of a decree passed by a Civil Court, the
person acquiring such rights is required to intimate the competent revenue
authority within the prescribed period for incorporation of the consequential
entries in the revenue records.
21. A perusal of the material available on record discloses that
respondent No.4 claims rights over the subject land on the strength of the
judgment and decree dated 17.09.1991 passed in O.S. No.1124 of 1991. It is
not in dispute that the said decree attained finality. However, it is equally
evident from the record that respondent No.4 approached respondent No.3
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for implementation of the said decree only in the year 2013, i.e., nearly
twenty two years after the passing of the decree. Further, it is discernible
from the record that no satisfactory explanation has been placed before this
Court explaining the extraordinary delay in seeking implementation of the
decree before the revenue authorities. The record does not indicate any
circumstances which prevented respondent No.4 from approaching the
competent authority within a reasonable time after obtaining the decree.
22. The latin maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt,
which means that the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who
sleep over their rights, aptly applies to the facts of the present case. A litigant
who chooses to remain inactive for an inordinate period cannot ordinarily
seek the discretionary indulgence of the Court/quasi-judicial authorities
without offering any satisfactory explanation for such delay. The above
principle unequivocally recognizes that unexplained delay has a direct
bearing upon the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
23. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is
evident that respondent No.4 sought implementation of the decree only after
an unexplained lapse of approximately twenty two years. Such inordinate
delay undoubtedly raises serious concerns regarding the propriety of
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entertaining the request for mutation solely on the basis of a decree obtained
decades earlier.
24. That, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation, a party/litigant
is not entitled to seek equitable relief. The quasi-judicial authorities as well
as this Court while exercising discretionary jurisdiction are expected to take
into account the conduct of the parties and also the aspect of delay.
25. It is also essential to refer to Section 8(2) of the Act, 1971. A plain
reading of the aforesaid provision makes it abundantly clear that where an
entry in the record of rights gives rise to a dispute regarding title, the
appropriate remedy available to the aggrieved party is to institute a civil suit
seeking declaration of title. The statutory scheme, therefore, clearly
contemplates that disputes involving rival claims of ownership are to be
adjudicated by the competent Civil Court, and the consequential revenue
entries are required to be corrected/modified in conformity with the orders
passed therein.
26. The said principle has been consistently reiterated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the decisions cited supra, i.e., Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram
Chander Rai, State of Rajasthan Vs. Bhawani Singh and Roshina T. Vs.
Abdul Azeez K.T.
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27. In the light of the aforesaid judgments and taking into account the
facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the considered
opinion that there is clear delay of nearly twenty two years and laches on the
part of respondent No.4 in approaching the revenue authorities seeking to
implement the civil Court decree, therefore, the impugned proceedings are
liable to be set aside on that ground alone.
28. As regards the merits of the case, the petitioner asserts his claim upon
an Agreement of Sale, whereas respondent No.4 relies upon a Civil Court
decree. Futher more, the petitioner’s vendor himself has disputed the alleged
transaction during the enquiry before the revenue authorities. These
circumstances unmistakably indicate that the dispute is no longer confined to
the legality of the mutation proceedings but extends to the very foundation
of the rival claims of title.
29. Having regard to the statutory remedy contemplated under Section 8
of the Act, 1971, and in view of pendency of the civil proceedings between
the parties concerning title over the subject land, this Court is not inclined to
exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India to adjudicate the present dispute. Any adjudication by this Court on
the issues raised in the present writ petition would necessarily require
recording findings on disputed questions of fact, which fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Since a civil suit between the
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parties is already pending, it is for the competent Civil Court to adjudicate
the rival claims on the basis of the pleadings and evidence adduced by the
parties. This Court, therefore, refrains from expressing any opinion on the
merits of the rival claims.
30. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned
proceedings are set aside, on the ground of delay alone. As regards the
aspect of title over the subject land, the parties are at liberty to work out their
rights and remedies before the competent Civil Court, and any findings or
decree passed therein shall govern the consequential entries in the revenue
records in accordance with law.
31. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.
___________________________________
LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY, J
Date:22.07.2026
Dr
