Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Banshi Lal vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:18922) on 21 April, 2026
Author: Anand Sharma
Bench: Anand Sharma
[2026:RJ-JD:18922]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5847/2026
PETITIONER:
Banshi Lal S/o Balveer, Aged About 30 years, R/o Bhograna
Soorpura, District Hanumangarh (Raj.).
Versus
RESPONDENTS:
1. State of Rajasthan, through Secretary, Department of
Home, Jaipur (Raj.).
2. District Superintendent of Police, District Pali (Raj.).
For Petitioner : Mr. Divik Mathur Advocate.
For RespondentS : Mr. Ritu Raj Singh Bhati Deputy
Government Counsel.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
21/04/2026
1. Present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner
assailing order dated 24.12.2025 passed by Superintendent of Police
District Pali, whereby the petitioner has been subjected to the
penalty of dismissal from service by invoking powers under Rule
19(ii) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules of 1958”).
2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioner was
initially appointed as Constable vide order dated 25.07.2015 and
posted at Police Line, Pali. Thereafter, he was transferred to Sarada
on 02.10.2017 and subsequently to Police Station, Desuri on
05.08.2023. On 19.12.2025, an FIR bearing No. 0303/2025 was
lodged at Police Station Sadar, Pali under Sections 8/15 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and Sections
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127(2) and 308(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 against
certain named and unnamed persons. The allegations therein are
vague and unsupported by any cogent evidence insofar as the
petitioner is concerned, and he has been falsely implicated. It is
contended that at the relevant time of the alleged incident, the
petitioner was not present at the spot and was on official duty, as
reflected in the General Diary dated 18.12.2025. The petitioner has
also challenged the said FIR by filing S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.
1010/2026, which is pending adjudication.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
immediately after registration of the FIR, the petitioner was placed
under suspension vide order dated 19.12.2025, and within five days,
his services were terminated vide order dated 24.12.2025, without
issuance of any show cause notice or charge-sheet and without
conducting any departmental enquiry.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Rule 19(ii)
of the Rules of 1958 is an exception to the general rule requiring a
full-fledged enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958, and
therefore, the said power must be exercised sparingly and only in
exceptional circumstances. It is argued that the condition precedent
for invoking Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 is the recording of
satisfaction by the competent authority that it is not reasonably and
practicable to hold such enquiry.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that
the impugned orders are arbitrary, illegal and passed in a
predetermined and mala fide manner, in violation of the mandatory
procedure prescribed under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. It is
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settled principle that imposition of a major penalty such as dismissal
from service requires strict adherence to the principles of natural
justice, including issuance of charge-sheet and opportunity of
hearing.
6. It is submitted that the impugned action is also violative
of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, as the petitioner has
been dismissed without being informed of the charges and without
being afforded a reasonable opportunity of defence. The
departmental enquiry is not an empty formality and non-compliance
with the prescribed procedure renders the order unsustainable in
law.
7. Learned counsel further contended that the impugned
order does not disclose any application of mind, nor does it indicate
as to why it was not reasonably practicable to hold a regular enquiry
under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. The order is alleged to be based
merely on surmises and conjectures, thereby violating the principles
of natural justice as well as the statutory mandate.
8. It is further contended that the impugned order is
completely silent on the reasons for dispensing with the enquiry, and
no material has been brought on record to justify such action.
Reliance has been placed on judgment dated 19.02.2026 passed by
this Court at Jaipur Bench in the case of Kamrudeen Khan vs.
State of Rajasthan & Others (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
3040/2024) as well as order dated 25.11.2024 passed by the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Dinesh vs. The State of
Rajasthan & Others (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3972/2020),
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to contend that non-recording of reasons and mechanical invocation
of Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 vitiates the penalty order.
9. Per contra, learned Deputy Government Counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents supported the impugned
order and submitted that the competent authority has exercised its
discretion under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 considering the
gravity of the allegations. It is contended that in certain
circumstances, holding a regular enquiry may not be feasible and
the competent authority is empowered to dispense with the same.
10. It is further argued that the satisfaction recorded by the
authority is subjective and should not be lightly interfered with by
this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is submitted that the
impugned order has been passed in administrative exigency as also
in public interest.
11. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions
and perused the material available on record.
12. At the outset, it is to be noted that Rule 16 of the Rules of
1958 provides for the normal procedure for imposing major
penalties, which includes issuance of charge-sheet, opportunity to
submit reply, leading of evidence and affording reasonable
opportunity of hearing. Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958, on the other
hand, carves out an exception, permitting the disciplinary authority
to dispense with such enquiry where it is not reasonably practicable
to hold the same.
13. The law in this regard is well-settled that the power under
Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 is an extraordinary power and the
same cannot be exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. The
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competent authority is under statutory obligation to record cogent,
specific, and justified reasons demonstrating that holding a regular
enquiry is not reasonably practicable.
14. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that it does not
contain any such reasons. The language employed in the order
indicates that the authority has proceeded merely on assumptions
without demonstrating any objective satisfaction. There is no
discussion of circumstances which made it impracticable to conduct
an enquiry. Such an approach is contrary to the settled principles of
law.
15. In the case of Kamrudeen Khan (supra), this Court has
categorically held that dispensing with an enquiry under Rule 19(ii)
of the Rules of 1958 without recording reasons renders the order
unsustainable in law. Relevant part of the above judgment is being
reproduced as under:
“7. It is settled proposition of law that misconduct
committed by an employee may be howsoever heinous but he
has got minimal right to defend himself in a regular enquiry.
Rule 19 is apparently an exception to the general rule which
reads as under:
“19. Special procedure in certain cases:
Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 16, 17 and
18,
(i). where a penalty is imposed on a Government servant
on the ground of conduct which has led to him conviction
on a criminal charge; or
(ii) where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied for
reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably
practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said
rules; or
(iii) Where the Governor is satisfied that in the interest of
the security of the State, it is not expedient to follow
such procedure, the disciplinary Authority may consider
the circumstances of the case and pass such orders as it
may deems fit:
Provided that the Commission shall be consulted before
passing such orders in any case in which such
consultation is necessary.
Note: If any question arises whether it is reasonably
practicable to give any person an opportunity of showing
cause under clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution,
the decision thereon of the authority empowered to
dismiss, or remove such person or to reduce him in rank,
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[2026:RJ-JD:18922] (6 of 11) [CW-5847/2026]as the case may be, shall be subject to only one appeal
to the next higher authority. ”
8. Bare perusal of Rule 19(ii) would make it clear
that the respondents are required to record justified reasons so
as to show that under the exceptional circumstances, it was
not at all possible to conduct a regular enquiry. In the instant
case, it appears that the competent authority was swayed
away by the news published in newspaper and message
circulated on social media. Only on the basis of such media
reports, it was assumed by the disciplinary authority that
conducting regular enquiry under Rule 16 would be an empty
ritual against the petitioner. Thus, it is reflected from order
dated 29.12.2023 that merely on surmises and conjectures,
decision was taken by the disciplinary authority to dispense
with the regular enquiry.
9. It is also settled that in order to maintain
discipline, the respondent-Department is empowered to
penalize an employee in proportion to his misconduct, yet such
power is neither unbridled nor unfettered and is subject to the
procedure contemplated under disciplinary rules. The right of
defence, which is considered to be constitutional and statutory
right of an employee against the allegations leveled against
him, cannot be taken away in arbitrary manner and an
exercise under Rule 19, which is an exception to the general
rule, cannot be undertaken in quite mechanical and casual
manner.
10. In the case of Reena Rani (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, after considering the constitutional bench
judgment in the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Tulsi
Ram Patel 1985 (3) SCC 398 as well as the judgment of
Jaswant Singh Vs. State of Punjab 1991 (1) SCC 362 has
observed that the decision to dispense with the departmental
enquiry cannot be rested solely on ipse dixit of the concerned
authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is
questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those
authorities to show that the satisfaction is based on certain
objective facts and is not an outcome of whims and fancies of
the authorities.
11. In the case of Bihari Lal Gupta (supra) where
the exercise of Rule 19 was bereft of any cogent reasons,
Coordinate Bench of this Court quashed the order passed
under Rules 19 (ii) of the Rules of 1958.
12. This Court in the case of Mohan Singh Vs. State
of Rajasthan& Anr. reported in 2026 Live Law 15 Raj.
has observed and held as under:
” 8. It is not disputed in the instant case that prior
to passing impugned order, preliminary enquiry has been
conducted by the respondent-Department and the
reasons which have been assigned in the penalty order
dated 18.12.2006 are that as the absconded accused
were facing the charge of committing grave offence of
loot, therefore, conducting regular enquiry under the
Rules of 1958 would not be feasible, hence, it would be
proper to exercise powers under Rule 19 (2) of the Rules
of 1958. Such reasons assigned in the penalty order for
dispensing with enquiry are neither reasonable, nor
justifiable. Merely, the nature of the offence committed
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[2026:RJ-JD:18922] (7 of 11) [CW-5847/2026]petitioners cannot be a determining factor for exercising
powers under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958.
10. Even otherwise the language of impugned
penalty order would reveal that the order has been
passed simply on the basis of surmises and conjectures
where it has been mentioned that the circumstances of
real incident must be in the knowledge of the petitioners
and in case, there was any such doubt in the mind of the
competent authority, the proper course would have been
to be conduct regular enquiry for arriving at just
conclusion after affording proper opportunity of defence
to the petitioners.
11. In similar circumstances, this Court in the case
of Naresh Pal Devaniya (Supra) has observed as
under:-
“14. The reasons recorded in order dated
23.03.2021 would also reveal that a disciplinary authority
has prejudged the guilt of the petitioner even before the
trial has taken place. Thus, it is clear that the decision for
dispensing with the inquiry is based upon mere surmises
and conjectures; and cannot be said to be a judicious
decision.
15.More so, under the circumstances, where the
complainant herself has entered into a compromise with
the petitioner and appeared before this Court through her
counsel in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition)
No.3245/2021. Only on the basis of no objection
tendered by her, the FIR in question was quashed by this
Court. Thus, it was clear that the allegations leveled in
FIR could not have been taken at its face value to take
such a drastic action of dismissing the petitioner from
services without holding the regular departmental
inquiry.
16.It is a settled proposition of law that the allegations of
committing crime may be howsoever heinous in nature,
yet the accused/delinquent has constitutional rights to
defend himself and such defence can be put forward by
him only in regular inquiry. But in the instant case, in
quite arbitrarily and illegal manner, ignoring the relevant
Rules, the respondents have deprived the petitioner of
his legitimate and valuable right of hearing and putting
forward his defense.
17. In the case of Tarsem Singh (supra) the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“10. It is now a well-settled principle of law that a
constitutional right conferred upon a delinquent cannot
be dispensed with lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior
motive or merely in order to avoid the holding of an
enquiry.
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
has taken us through certain documents for the purpose
of showing that ultimately the police on investigation did
not find any case against the appellant in respect of the
purported FIR lodged against him under Section 377 IPC.
However, it may not be necessary for us to go into the
said question.
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14. In view of the fact that no material had been placed
by the respondents herein to satisfy the Court that it was
necessary to dispense with a formal enquiry in terms of
proviso (b) appended to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the
Constitution of India, we are of the opinion that the
impugned orders cannot be sustained and they are set
aside accordingly. The appellant is directed to be
reinstated in service. However, in view of our
aforementioned findings, it would be open to the
respondents to initiate a departmental enquiry against
the appellant if they so desire. Payment of back wages
shall abide by the result of such enquiry. Such an
enquiry, if any, must be initiated as expeditiously as
possible and not later than two months from the date of
communication of this order.
11. We have noticed hereinbefore that the formal enquiry
was dispensed with only on the ground that the appellant
could win over aggrieved people as well as witnesses
from giving evidence by threatening and other means. No
material has been placed or disclosed either in the said
order or before us to show that subjective satisfaction
arrived at by the statutory authority was based upon
objective criteria. The purported reason for dispensing
with the departmental proceedings is not supported by
any document. It is further evident that the said order of
dismissal was passed, inter alia, on the ground that there
was no need for a regular departmental enquiry relying
on or on the basis of a preliminary enquiry. However, if a
preliminary enquiry could be conducted, we fail to see
any reason as to why a formal departmental enquiry
could not have been initiated against the appellant.
Reliance placed upon such a preliminary enquiry without
complying with the minimal requirements of the principle
of natural justice is against all canons of fair play and
justice. The appellate authority, as noticed hereinbefore,
in its order dated 24-6-1998 jumped to the conclusion
that he was guilty of grave acts of misconduct proving
complete unfitness for police service and the punishment
awarded to him is commensurate with the misconduct
although no material therefor was available on record. It
is further evident that the appellate authority also
misdirected himself in passing the said order insofar as
he failed to take into consideration the relevant facts and
based his decision on irrelevant factors.”
18. This Court in the case of Satyendra Singh
(supra) has dealt with the extent of subjective
satisfaction under Rule 19(2) of the Rules, 1958 and has
held as under:
“(7) Having taken note of the facts and law as above,,
this Court is satisfied that the order has been passed
without subjective satisfaction and there was no
independent material to justify for dispensing with the
regular enquiry as envisaged under Rule 19(2) of the
Rules of 1958. The dispensation of the regular enquiry
could not be done on the whims and fancies of the
officers, special when preliminary enquiry has been made
a basis for passing of the order impugned. In view of the
above, this writ petition is allowed. The punishment order
impugned dt. 31.01.2007 as well as the appellate order
dt. 03.10.2007 are hereby quashed & set aside and it is
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[2026:RJ-JD:18922] (9 of 11) [CW-5847/2026]forthwith with all monetary benefits as to pay and
allowances etc. applicable to him from the date of his
dismissal. Needless to say that it would be open for the
department, if so advised, notwithstanding the lapse of
time to proceed further. The compliance of this order
shall be made by the respondents within one month from
the date of submission of certified copy of this order in
their office. No costs.”
19. This Court is satisfied that the Appellate
Authority has also failed to properly consider the grounds
of appeal whereas, as per Rule 30 of Rules, 1958, the
Appellate Authority is under an obligation to consider
each and every relevant ground raised by the delinquent
in his memo of appeal and to pass speaking order after
considering such grounds; but in the instant case,
although the fact with regard to quashing of FIR in
question was placed on record before the Appellate
Authority by the petitioner and such fact has also been
taken note of by the Appellate Authority in its order dated
09.09.2021, yet for no justified reason, the Appellate
Authority has not given any finding in the appellate order
in this regard.”
13. In the light of above discussion, this Court is of
the considered opinion that the order dated 29.12.2023 has
been passed by the disciplinary authority in utter violation of
Article 311 of the Constitution of India and in quite arbitrary
manner, instead of conducting regular enquiry, an exceptional
provision has been resorted to without there being any justified
reason for doing so.”
16. Similarly, in the case of Dinesh (supra), the Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court has reiterated that Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of
1958 cannot be invoked in a routine manner and must be supported
by compelling reasons. Following para of the above judgment, being
relevant, is quoted hereunder:
“15. The order impugned clearly shows that the State has
invoked Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 which is pari-materia
to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of
1958 is reproduced hereinfra:-
“19(ii) where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied for
reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not
reasonably practicable to follow the procedure
prescribed in the said rules; or”
Above quoted provision is unambiguous and does not
require any indepth legal understanding to decipher that the
same can be resorted to when it is not practicable to hold
inquiry or the procedure prescribed in Rule 16, 17 and 18 of
the Rules of 1958 is not feasible. That apart, it mandates the
disciplinary authority to record reasons that it is not practicable
to follow the procedure. A reading of the order and even reply
does not indicate any such satisfaction arrived much less
reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority.”
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17. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the
present case, this Court finds that the respondents have failed to
demonstrate any exceptional circumstance justifying invocation of
Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958. The impugned order is bereft of
reasons and reflects non-application of mind. The action of the
respondents appears to have been taken on the basis of surmise and
conjecture rather than objective material.
18. It is also pertinent to note that dispensing with a regular
enquiry deprives the delinquent employee of a valuable right to
defend himself/herself. Therefore, such power must be exercised
with utmost caution and only when the situation so warrants. In the
absence of any such justification, the action of the respondents
cannot be sustained.
19. The said provision permits dispensing with a regular
enquiry in certain exceptional circumstances. However, it is the case
of the petitioner that no such exceptional circumstances existed
warranting invocation of Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 and the
impugned order has been passed in a mechanical manner without
recording cogent reasons.
20. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, this Court is
of the considered opinion that the impugned order has been passed
in violation of the statutory provisions and settled legal principles.
The same suffers from arbitrariness and is liable to be set aside.
21. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned order
dated 24.12.2025 passed by the respondents under Rule 19(ii) of
the Rules of 1958 is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently,
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[2026:RJ-JD:18922] (11 of 11) [CW-5847/2026]
the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner back in
service and he shall be entitled for continuity in service as well as
other notional benefits. However, it is made clear that petitioner
shall not be entitled for actual salary for the intervening period.
22. Necessary orders in this regard be passed by the
respondents within a period of two months from the date of receipt
of certified copy of this judgment.
23. It is also made clear that mere quashing of order dated
24.12.2025 would not preclude the respondents-Government from
initiating regular departmental enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rules of
1958. The petitioner is expected to extend full cooperation, in case,
any such enquiry is initiated against him.
24. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI/62
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