Baljeet Singh vs Ut Of Chandigarh on 23 July, 2026

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    Punjab-Haryana High Court

    Baljeet Singh vs Ut Of Chandigarh on 23 July, 2026

    Author: Deepak Sibal

    Bench: Deepak Sibal

                  CRA-D-411
                        411 OF 2026
    
    
    
                             IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                                          CHANDIGARH
    
                                                     CRA-D-411-202
                                                               2026 (O&M)
                                                     RESERVED ON: MAY 22, 2026
                                                     DATE
                                                      ATE OF DECISION
                                                             DECISION: July 23, 2026
    
                  Baljeet Singh                                           ...Appellant
                                   Versus
                  State of U.T. Chandigarh                                ...Respondent
    
    
    
                  1.        The date when the judgment is reserved              22.05.2026
                  2.        The date when the judgment is pronounced            23.07.2026
                  3.        The date when the judgment is uploaded              27.07.2026
                  4.        Whether only operative part of the judgment is      Full
                            pronounced or whether the full judgment is
                            pronounced
                  5.        The delay, if any of the pronouncement of full      Not applicable
                            judgment, and reasons thereof
    
    
                  CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL
                         HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI
    
                  Present :        Mr. Prince Sangal, Advocate,
                                   Mr. Himanshu Joshi, Advocate and
                                   Mr. Gurjant Singh Bhullar, Advocate,
                                   For the appellant.
    
                                   Mr. Manish Bansal, Public Prosecutor with
                                   Mr. Ankur Bali, Additional Public Prosecutor and
                                   Ms. Diksha Sharma, Advocate,
                                   For respondent-U.T.
                                       respondent U.T. Chandigarh
    
                  LAPITA BANERJI, J.
    

    The appellant has challenged the order dated April 23, 2025,

    passed by Additional Sessions Judge,
    Judge, Chandigarh
    Chandigarh, whereby his bail

    SPONSORED

    application in FIR No.29
    No. of 26.02.2024 registered under Section

    25,54,59 of the Arms Act, 1959, Sections 419, 201, 120
    120-B of the Indian

    Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “the IPC“) and Sections 17,
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    18, 18-B,
    B, 20 of The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

    (hereinafter referred to as “the UAPA”), at Police Station Sector-36,

    Chandigarh, has been dismissed. The provisions of UAPA were later

    added to the FIR on March 11, 2024.

    2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that although it

    has been alleged that the appellant was involved in unlawful activities

    under the UAPA, but except for the disclosure statement of one Maya@

    Kashish @ Pooja Sharma, who had allegedly stated that one boy having a

    Splender bike bearing registration No.CH-01-

    No. -BR-9851 had brought her

    from ISBT, Bus Stand Sector-43,
    43, Chandigarh to House No.2906, Sector
    Sector-

    42, Chandigarh and took her back to the bus stand
    stand, there was no other

    incriminating material against him.

    him It was on the basis of the said

    statement, along with secret information that the Investigating Officer

    along with police party and accused Maya @ Kashish @ Pooja Sharma

    reached near House No.117/1, Sector-53,
    Sector 53, Phase
    Phase-3, Mohali, where the

    appellant was standing
    sta under the light on the balcony of the first floor

    and was identified by Maya @ Kashish @ Pooja Sharma. Upon reaching

    the house she disclosed that he was the same boy who transported her

    from ISBT, Sector-43,
    Sector 43, Chandigarh to the given address i.e House

    No.2906,, Sector-42,
    Sector 42, Chandigarh. Apart from that a Splender bike that

    was purportedly parked on the ground floor and a VIVO black coloured

    mobile phone,, no other incriminating material was recovered from him.

    There was also no legally admissible material on record to establish the

    involvement of appellant with any designated terrorist which could even

    suggest that the appellant has committed any offence and much less an

    offence under the UAPA.

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    3. It is further
    further argued that the case of the prosecution, at best,

    was that the appellant transported Maya @ Kashish @ Pooja Sharma on

    his Splender bike from the bus stand to a given address and transferred

    her back from that given address to the bus stand. There is no evidence

    on record to show that the said transportation was at the instance of a

    designated terrorist like Goldy Brar or gangsters like Roh
    Rohit Godara or

    Vikram Chauhan. Even if it is argued by the prosecution that the

    appellant has harboured co-accused
    co accused Maya @ Kashish @ Pooja Sharma

    then also, under
    nder Section 19 of the UAPA,, the punishment for harbouring

    any purported terrorist was three years upto
    upto life imprisonment and the

    appellant is in custody for more than two years
    years. There was no evidence to

    show that the aforesaid person was harboured at the instance of Goldy

    Brar. Therefore, on the basis of prolonged custody alone, the appellant

    should be released
    eleased on bail.

    4. He has relied on the judgment of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur

    v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1994)4 SCC 602 to submit that

    there was no allegation or the material to argue that the essential

    ingredients “constituting a terrorist act” as defined under Section 15 is

    present in this case. When such material is absent, the accused cannot be

    charged by invoking provisions
    prov of UAPA.

    5. He has further placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex

    Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713,

    Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra and another, reported in

    2024 SCC OnLine SC 498,
    498 Vernon v. The S
    State of Maharashtra and

    another,, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 885
    885, Sheikh Javed Iqbal @

    Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh
    Pradesh, reported in

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    2024 SCC OnLine SC 1755 and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of

    Maharashtra and another,
    another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693
    1693,

    wherein it has been held that long custody by itself would entitle the

    accused being tried under UAPA to the grant of bail by invoking Article

    21 of the Constitution of India.

    6. The Court had directed the State to file a comprehensive

    affidavit after filing of the supplementary challan, vide order dated

    January 15, 2026. Pursuant to the said direction, the State has filed a

    comprehensive affidavit of Dhiraj Kumar, Deputy Superinte
    Superintendent of

    Police (Crime), Chandigarh Police.

    7. Learned counsel for the State submits that the appellant

    along with his co-accused
    accused is involved in anti
    anti-national activities. The

    prosecution’s case is that on the basis of secret information, two boys

    were apprehended
    prehended at around 11:45 pm on February 25, 2024 near Bus

    Stand, Sector-43, Chandigarh. The said boys were riding a white Activa

    without helmets. Upon enquiry, they revealed their names as Sunny @

    Sachin @ Maddy Manchanda and Umang. Upon search being cond
    conducted,

    one pistol and a live cartridge was found from the right pocket of

    Sunny’s trousers and 03 live cartridges were recovered from Umang’s

    trousers. All the cartridges bore the mark of “KF 7.65” at the back. FIR

    No.29 was initially registered on February
    February 26, 2024 under Section

    25/54/59 of the Arms Act against Sunny and Umang. Upon disclosure

    made by both Sunny and Umang, co-accused
    co accused Parwinder Singh @ Pindu

    along with Kailash Chauhan @ Tiger, Anmolpreet Singh and Maya @

    Kashish @ Pooja Sharma were arrested.

    arrested. Kailash Chauhan @ Tiger was

    arrested upon identification by Sunny while taking a stroll near the wall

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    of the parking area of the gate of District Court, Sector
    Sector-43, Chandigarh.

    One pistol and 02 live cartridges were recovered from him on February

    26, 2024.

    8. Upon disclosure and identification by Sunny, Parwinder

    Singh @ Pindu was arrested on February 28, 2024 from TDI City,

    Sector-111,
    111, SAS Nagar, Mohali. A Verna car bearing registration

    No.CH01-BP–6918
    6918 and two mobile phones (one light grey coloured

    Apple phone with sim and another Oneplus Skyblue coloured phone with

    sim) were recovered from him and taken into police custody.

    9. On the very same day i.e February 28, 2024, Anmolpreet

    Singh was arrested from TDI City, Sector-111,
    Sector 111, SAS Nagar, Mohali upon

    disclosure
    closure and identification by Sunny that Anmolpreet was his friend

    and aide of Goldy Brar.

    10. One Maya @ Kashish @ Pooja Sharma was arrested near

    Counter no. 30, Sector 43 Bus Stand on the next day i.e February 29,

    2024 upon secret information and identification by Sunny. One slate

    colour backpack containing Advocate’s attire i.e. a pair of black coloured

    trousers, one black blazer and one white shirt was recovered from her.

    The said clothes were purchased
    purchased from Van Heusen showroom at Elante

    Mall. One mobile phone was recovered from her and taken into police

    custody. According to prosecution, she also got recovered one pistol and

    two live cartridges and broken pieces like battery, back body, two parts

    of touch screen of mobile by Techno Company from the jungle behind

    ISBT-43,
    43, Chandigarh.

    11. Upon secret information and identification by Maya @

    Kashish @ Pooja Sharma, the present appellant
    appellant- Baljeet Singh was

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    apprehended from House No.177/1, Phase
    Phase-3, SAS Nagar, Mohali

    (Punjab) and a mobile phone VIVO (black colour with sim) was

    recovered from him along with a Splender bike.

    12. The case of prosecution is that after co-accused Maya @

    Kashish @ Pooja Sharma was arrested, she had disclosed that a boy with

    Splender bike had transported her from ISBT, Sector
    Sector-43, Chandigarh to

    the place of residence i.e House No. 2906, Sector
    Sector-42, Chandigarh and

    transferred her back to bus stand on February 29, 2024. On the basis of

    secret information, the Investigating
    Investigat Officer found out that the boy who

    had transported Maya @ Kashish @ Pooja Sharma was a resident of

    House No.117/1, Sector-53,
    Sector Phase-3,
    3, Mohali. The Investigating Officer

    along with police party and accused Maya @ Kashish @ Pooja Sharma

    reached the said house and saw that a boy was standing under the light at

    the balcony on the first floor. The co-accused
    co accused Maya identified the present

    appellant to be the same boy who had transported her from ISBT Bus

    Stand Sector-43,
    43, Chandigarh to House No.2906, Sector
    Sector-42, Chandigarh

    on February 22, 2024 and transferred her back to the bus stand on

    February 29, 2024. A Splender bike was recovered from the ground

    floor. The Investigating Officer arrested the said boy with the help of

    police party and upon questioning the appellant
    llant, he revealed his name as

    Baljeet Singh son of Kulwant Singh resident of Flat No.117, 1st floor,

    Phase-3A,, Sector-53,
    Sector Mohali.. A VIVO black coloured mobile phone and

    Splender bike bearing registration No.CH-01
    No.CH 01-BR-9851 was recovered

    from the appellant. After questioning, the appellant was arrested on

    March 02, 2024.

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    13. Upon arrest of the appellant-

    appellant Baljeet Singh, he disclosed that

    on February 22, 2024, he received a call from his aunt’s son Navdeep

    Singh, resident of Uttarakhand and upon his instructio
    instructions, he had

    downloaded the Signal application. He was further instructed by

    Navdeep Singh to provide transportation to a girl from ISBT, Sector
    Sector-43,

    Chandigarh to a safe place of residence. The photo of a girl was shared

    with him and the said girl was co-accused
    co used Maya @ Kashish @ Pooja

    Sharma. She had the word ‘Kashish’ written on her left hand along with a

    tattoo of an AK-47
    AK rifle.

    14. The co-accused
    co accused Maya Kumari used to talk to Rohit Godara

    from the phone of the present appellant
    appellant- Baljeet Singh on the

    downloaded
    oaded Signal App. On February 29, 2024, his cousin Navdeep

    Singh called him to inform that other gang members were arrested and

    the present appellant-

    appellant Baljeet Singh was required to drop Maya Kumari

    back to the Bus Stand, Sector-43,
    Sector 43, Chandigarh
    Chandigarh. Upon such instructions,

    the present appellant-

    appellant Baljeet Singh had dropped co-accused Maya

    Kumari at the bus stand. The CCTV footage has been taken into police

    custody. The CDR (call detail records) and CAF were obtained from

    Airtel and Jio companies and the
    the location of the accused were found near

    Elante Mall, Bus stand Sector-43,
    Sector 43, Chandigarh, District Courts at Mohali,

    Chandigarh and Panchkula.

    15. From the CFSL result received from Sector
    Sector-36, Chandigarh

    and retrieval of the data from all the mobile phones
    phones, it transpired that co-

    accused Sunny and Maya were wearing Advocate’s dress and Umang

    was seen in the back drop. The
    he connection of Maya Kumari with Sunny

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    and Umang
    ng has been clearly established and ultimately Maya’s

    connection with the appellant.

    16. The prosecution has sought to project common intention

    between the appellant on the one hand and Maya Kumari, Sunny and

    Umang on the other hand to show that the appellant had the common

    intention to harbour members of a gang belonging to a designated

    terrorist and it is submitted on behalf of the prosecution that the

    appellant should not be enlarged on bail before the witnesses are fully

    examined.

    17. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and

    perused the material on record.

    18. At the outset, it is appropriate to refer to Section 43(D) of

    the UAPA. Section 43(D) of the UAPA is reproduced hereinafter for

    ready reference:-

    reference:

    “43 D. Modified application of certain provisions of the
    Code.

    Code.–

    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or
    any other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall
    be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of
    clause (c) of section 2 of the Code, and “cognizable case”

    as defined in that clause
    clause shall be construed accordingly.

    (2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a
    case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject
    to the modification that in sub-section
    sub section (2),
    (2),–

    (a) the references to “fifteen days”, “ninety days” and
    “sixty days”, wherever they occur, shall be construed as
    references to “thirty days”, “ninety days” and “ninety
    days” respectively; and

    (b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be
    inserted, namely:–

    namely:

    “Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the
    investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Court
    may if it is
    is satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor
    indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific
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    reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said
    period of ninety days, extend the said period up to one
    hundred and eighty days:

    Provided
    Pr ovided also that if the police officer making the
    investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of
    investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of any
    person in judicial custody, he shall file an affidavit stating
    the reasons for doing
    doing so and shall also explain the delay, if
    any, for requesting such police custody.

    (3) Section 268 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case
    involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the
    modification that–

    that

    (a) the reference in sub-section
    section (1) thereof
    thereof–

    (i) to “the State Government” shall be construed as a
    reference to “the Central Government or the State
    Government.”;

    (ii) to “order
    “order of the State Government” shall be construed
    as a reference to “order of the Central Government or the
    State Government, as the case may be”; and

    (b) the reference in sub-section
    section (2) thereof, to “the State
    Government” shall be construed as a reference to “the
    Central Government or the State Government, as the case
    may be”.

    (4) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation
    to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of
    having committed an offence punishable under this AcAct.

    (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no
    person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV
    and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or
    on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been
    given an opportunity of being heard on the application for
    such release: Provided
    Provided that such accused person shall not be
    released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a
    perusal of the case diary or the report made under section
    173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable
    grounds for believing that the accusation against such
    person is prima facie true.

    (6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub sub-
    section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code
    or any other law for the time being in fforce on granting of
    bail.

    (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub
    sub-sections (5)
    and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of an
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    offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian
    citizen and has entered the country unauthorisedly or
    illegally except in very exceptional circumstances and for
    reasons to be recorded in writing.”

    19. As per Section 43-D(5)
    43 D(5) of the UAPA, no pers
    person accused of

    an offence punishable under Chapter IV and VI of the UAPA shall, if in

    custody, be released on bail unless the public prosecutor has been given

    an opportunity of being heard on the application made by him for such

    relief and if the Court, on perusing the case diary or the report filed under

    Section 173 Cr.P.C is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for

    believing that the accusations against such persons are prima facie

    proved. Section 43-D(6)
    43 D(6) further stipulates that restrictions fo
    for grant of

    bail specified in Section 43-D(5)
    43 D(5) would be in addition to the restrictions

    provided under the Cr.P.C or any other law for the time being in force on

    granting of bail.

    20. It appears from the comprehensive affidavit affirmed by Shri

    Dhiraj Kumar,
    ar, DSP (Crime), Chandigarh Police, that prima-facie no

    incriminating material has been found against the appellant apart from a

    VIVO black coloured mobile phone and a Splender bike. It is only the

    disclosure of Maya Kumari and the appellant himself that has been relied

    upon by the prosecution to provide link evidence between the appellant

    and gang members of Goldy Brar.

    Brar No evidence has also been collected

    by the prosecution which would show that he had actually transported

    Maya Kumari from the bus stand to the place of her residence and also

    from her residence back to the bus stand.

    21. It is important to note that even though it has been alleged

    that the appellant has transported Maya Kumari at the request of his

    cousin Navdeep Singh son of Baldev Singh resident of Malasi Mill,
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    Udham
    dham Singh Nagar, Uttarakhand, the
    the said Navdeep Singh has not been

    arrayed as an accused in the present FIR.

    FIR. It is not even the prosecution’s

    case that the said Navdeep Singh was a designated ter
    terrorist or even

    linked to one. Even if the prosecution’s case is accepted, the appellant

    having spoken to his cousin Navdeep Singh and transported a girl from

    the bus stand, whom he identified by looking at her photograph, would

    not connect the present appellant
    appellant to any other member of Goldy Brar’s

    gang. There is not even an allegation that the present appellant worked on

    the instructions of the designated terrorist-Goldy
    terrorist Goldy Brar.

    22. Article 21 of the Constitution of India enshrines the

    fundamental right to protection of life and liberty which also includes the

    right to a speedy trial. It has been held by the Supreme Court in a catena

    of judgments that long custody by itself would enti
    entitle the accused under

    UAPA to the grant of bail by invoking Article 21 of the Constitution of

    India. The Constitutional Court would like to prevent a situation where

    the lengthy and arduous process of trial becomes the punishment in itself.

    Reference can be
    be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.A.

    Najeeb‘s case (supra), wherein it has been held that long custody would

    be an essential factor while granting bail under UAPA. Article 21 of the

    Constitution of India provides right to speedy trial and lo
    long period of

    incarceration would be a good ground
    ground to grant bail to an under
    under-trial for

    an offence punishable under UAPA. It has also been held that the

    embargo under Section 43-D
    43 D of UAPA would not negate the powers of

    the Court to give effect to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The

    relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is as follows
    follows:

    “”17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory
    restrictions like Section 43-D(5)
    43 D(5) of UAPA per se does not
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    oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on
    grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Whereas
    at commencement of proceedings, the Courts are expected to
    appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the
    rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no
    likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time
    and the period of incarceration already undergone has
    exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such
    an approach would safeguard against the possibility of
    provisions like Section
    Secti 43-D D (5) of UAPA being used as the
    sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of
    constitutional right to speedy trial.
    xxxxxxxxxxxx

    19. xxxxxx
    Instead, Section 43-D
    43 D (5) of UAPA merely provides another
    possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in
    addition to the well settled considerations like gravity of the
    offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing
    the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by
    absconsion etc.”

    etc.

    23. The Supreme
    Supreme Court in the case of Vernon (supra) has held

    that serious allegations against accused by itself cannot be a reason to

    deny bail to the accused. The relevant extract thereof is reproduced

    hereunder:-

    “44.

    44. In the case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra)
    reference was made to the judgment of Jayendra Saraswathi
    Swamigal v. State of Tamil Nadu
    [(2005) 2 SCC 13) in
    which, citing two earlier decisions of this court in the cases
    of State v. Jagjit Singh (AIR 1962 SC 253) and Gurcharan
    Singh v. State of (UT of Delhi) [(1978) 1 SCC 118), the
    factors for granting bail under normal circumstances were
    discussed. It was held that the nature and seriousness of the
    offences, the character of the evidence, circumstances which
    are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the
    presence of the accused not being secured at the trial;
    reasonable apprehension
    apprehension of witnesses being ttampered with;
    the larger interest of the public or the State would be
    relevant factors for granting or rejecting bail. Juxtaposing
    the appellants’ case founded on Articles 14 and 21 of the
    Constitution of India with the aforesai
    aforesaid allegations and
    considering the fact that almost five years have lapsed since
    they were taken into custody, we are satisfied that the
    appellants have made out a case for granting bail.
    Allegations against them no doubt are serious, but for that
    reason alone
    alone bail cannot be denied to them. While dealing
    with the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act,
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    we have referred to the materials available against them at
    this stage. These materials cannot justify continued
    detention of the appellants,
    appellants, pendi
    pending final outcome of the
    case under the other provisions of the 1860 Code and the
    1967 Act.”

    Act

    24. In the case of Shoma Kanti Sen (supra)
    (supra), the Supreme Court

    has held that generally pre-conviction
    pre conviction detention at the investigation stage

    is necessary to maintain
    maintain purity in the course of trial and also to prevent

    an accused from being a fugitive from justice or to prevent further

    commission of an offence. Once it is apparent that a timely trial is not

    possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a sign
    significant

    period of time, the Court would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them

    on bail as any form of deprival of liberty must be proportionate to the

    facts of the case and also follow a just and fair procedure. A balance must

    be made between the prosecution’s
    prosecution’s right to lead evidence of its choice

    and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously, the

    respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part-III
    Part III of the Constitution. The

    relevant extract is reproduced hereinafter:

    “xxx

    37. In the case of K.A. Najeeb v. Union of India [(2021) 3
    SCC 713], a three Judge Bench of this Court (of which one
    of us Aniruddha Bose, J was a party), has held that a
    Constitutional Court is not strictly bound by the prohibitory
    provisions of grant of bail in the 1967 Act and can exercise
    its constitutional jurisdiction to release an accused on bail
    who has been incarcerated for a long period of time, relying
    on Article 21 of Constitution of India.
    This decision was
    sought to be distinguished by Mr. Nataraj on facts relying on
    judgment of this Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh v.
    State of Punjab
    [2024 INSC 92]. In this judgment it has been
    held:

    held:-

    “32. The Appellant’s counsel has relied upon the case
    of KA Najeeb (supra) to back its contention that the
    appellant has been in jail for last five years which is
    contrary to law laid down in the said case. While this
    argument may appear compelling at first glance, it
    lacks depth and substance.
    In KA Najeeb‘s case this
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    except the respondent-accused,
    accused, other co
    co-accused had
    already undergone trial and were sentenced to
    imprisonment of not exceeding eight years therefore
    this court’s decision to consider bail was grounded in
    the anticipation of the impending sentence that the
    respondent accused might face upon conviction and
    since the respondent-accused
    accused had already served
    portion of the maximum imprisonment i.e., more than
    five years, this court took it as a factor influencing it
    its
    assessment to grant bail. Further, in KA Najeeb’s
    case the trial of the respondent accused was severed
    from the other co-accused
    accused owing to his absconding
    and he was traced back in 2015 and was being
    separately tried thereafter and the NIA had filed a
    long list of witnesses that were left to be examined
    with reference to the said accused therefore this
    court was of the view of unlikelihood of completion
    of trial in near future. However, in the present case
    the trial is already under way and 22 witnesses
    including
    luding the protected witnesses have been
    examined. As already discussed, the material
    available on record indicates the involvement of the
    appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities backed
    by members of banned terrorist organization
    involving exchangee of large quantum of money
    through different channels which needs to be
    deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the
    appellant is released on bail there is every likelihood
    that he will influence the key witnesses of the case
    which might hamper the process of justice.

    Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave
    offences as one involved in the instant case cannot
    be used as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the
    aforesaid argument on the behalf of the appellant
    cannot be accepted.”

    38. Relyingg on this judgment, Mr. Nataraj, submits that
    bail is not a fundamental right. Secondly, to be entitled to be
    enlarged on bail, an accused charged with offences
    enumerated in Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act, must
    fulfill the conditions specified in Sect
    Section 43D (5) thereof. We
    do not accept the first part of this submission. This Court
    has already accepted right of an accused under the said
    offences of the 1967 Act to be enlarged on bail founding
    such right on Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This
    was in the case of Najeeb (supra), and in that judgment, long
    period of incarceration was held to be a valid ground to
    enlarge an accused on bail in spite of the bail bail-restricting
    provision of Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act. Pre
    Pre-conviction
    detention is necessary
    necessary to collect evidence (at the
    investigation stage), to maintain purity in the course of trial
    and also to prevent an accused from being fugitive from
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    justice. Such detention is also necessary to prevent further
    commission of offence by the same accusaccused. Depending on
    gravity and seriousness of the offence alleged to have been
    committed by an accused, detention before conclusion of
    trial at the investigation and post-

    post-charge sheet stage has the
    sanction of law broadly on these reasonings. But any form of
    deprival of liberty results in breach of Article 21 of the
    Constitution of India and must be justified on the ground of
    being reasonable, following a just and fair procedure and
    such deprival must be proportionate in the facts of a given
    case. These would be the overarching principles which the
    law Courts would have to apply while testing prosecution’s
    plea of pre-trial
    pre trial detention, both at investigation and post
    post-

    charge sheet stage.”

    stage

    39. As regards second part of Mr Nataraj’s argument
    which we have noted in the preceding paragraph, we accept
    it with a qualification. The reasoning in Najeeb (supra)
    case would also have to be examined, if it is the
    constitutional court which is examining prosecution’s plea
    for retaining in custody an accused charged with bai bail-
    restricting offences.
    He cited the case of Gurwinder
    Singh
    (supra) in which the judgment of K.A. Najeeb (supra)
    was distinguished on facts and a judgment of the High Court
    rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant was upheld.
    But
    this was a judgment in the given facts of that case and did
    not dislocate the axis of reasoning on constitutional ground
    enu
    enunciated in the case of Najeeb (supra)
    (supra).
    On behalf of the
    prosecution, another order of a coordinate Bench passed on
    18
    18-1-2024, in the case of Mazhar Khan v. NIA was cited.
    In
    this order, the petitioner’s prayer for overturning a bailbail-
    rejection order of the High Court under similar provisions of
    the 1967 Act was rejected by the coordinate Bench applying
    the ratio of the case of Watali (supra) judgment and also
    considering the case of Vernon (supra)
    (supra). We have proceeded
    in this judgment accepting the restrictive provisions to be
    valid and applicable and then dealt with the individual
    allegations in terms of the proviso to Section 43
    43-D (5) of the
    1967 Act. Thus, the prosecution’s case, so far as the
    appellant is concerned, does not gain any premium from the
    reason
    reasoning forming the basis of Mazhar Khan (supra).

    (supra).’

    [emphasis supplied].

    25. In the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra), the

    Supreme Court has observed that criminals are not born but made out.

    Howsoever serious a crime may be, an accused has a right to a speedy

    trial as enshrined under the Constitution of India. Moreover, the purpose

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    of bail is only to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial and bail

    is not to be withheld as a form of punishment. The relevant extract

    thereof
    hereof is reproduced hereunder:

    “13. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
    again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya & Ors.
    v. State of Bihar
    reported in (1981) 3 SCC 671 and Abdul
    Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
    reported in (1992) 1 SCC

    225. In the latter the Court reemphasized the right to speedy
    trial, and further held that an accused, facing prolonged
    trial, has no option:

    “The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is,
    thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant,
    as the case may be, to proceed with the case with
    reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this
    country, where the large majority of accused come
    from poorer and weaker sections of the society, not
    versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get
    competent
    ent legal advice, the application of the said
    rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case,
    if an accused demands speedy trial and yet he is not
    given one, may be a relevant factor in his favour. But
    we cannot disentitle an accused from complaini
    complaining of
    infringement of his right to speedy trial on the
    ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy
    trial.”

    14. In Mohd Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi)
    reported in 2023 INSC 311, this Court observed as under:

    “21. Before parting,, it would be important to reflect that
    laws which impose stringent conditions for grant of
    bail, may be necessary in public interest; yet, if trials
    are not concluded in time, the injustice wrecked on the
    individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded and
    their living conditions, more often than not, appalling.
    According to the Union Home Ministry’s response to
    Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had
    recorded that as on 31st December 2021, over 5,54,034
    prisoners were lodged in jails against ttotal capacity of
    4,25,069 lakhs in the country. Of these 122,852 were
    convicts; the rest 4,27,165 were undertrials.

    22. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates
    are at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the
    Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State
    reported in 1993 Cri LJ 3242, as “a radical
    transformation” whereby the prisoner loses his
    identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal
    possessions. He has no personal relationships.
    Psychological problems result from lloss of freedom,
    status, possessions, dignity any autonomy of personal
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    life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be
    dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary
    standards. Self-perception
    perception changes.

    23. There is a further danger of the pprisoner turning to
    crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the
    more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the
    criminal” (also see Donald Clemmer’s ‘The Prison
    Community’ published in 1940). Incarceration has
    further deleterious effects – wh
    where the accused belongs
    to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of
    livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families
    as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from
    society. The courts therefore, have to be sensitive to
    these aspects (because
    ause in the event of an acquittal, the
    loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that
    trials – especially in cases, where special laws enact
    stringent provisions, are taken up and concluded
    speedily.”

    Xxxxxxx

    18. Criminals are not born out but made. The human
    potential in everyone is good and so, never write off any
    criminal as beyond redemption. This humanist fundamental
    is often missed when dealing with delinquents, juvenile and
    adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a
    future. When a crime is committed, a variety of factors is
    responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those
    factors may be social and economic, may be, the result of
    value erosion or parental neglect; may be, because oof the
    stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations
    in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other
    privations
    privations.”

    26. In the case of Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @

    Javed Ansari (supra),, it has been held that right to lif
    life and personal

    liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is

    overarching and sacrosanct. A Constitutional Court cannot be restrained

    from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory

    provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused
    accused-

    undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been

    infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the

    way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever

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    stringent
    gent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of

    constitutionalism and the rule of law, of which liberty is an intrinsic part.

    Furthermore, it was held that the view taken in K.A. Najeeb‘s case

    (supra) rendered by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court was binding

    on a Two Judge Bench like Sheikh Javed Iqbal’s case (supra). The

    relevant extract of Sheikh Javed Iqbal’s case ((supra) is reproduced

    hereunder:-

    “31

    31. In Gurwinder Singh‘s case (supra) on which reliance
    has been placed by the respondent, a two Judge Bench of
    this Court distinguished K.A. Najeeb‘s case (supra) holding
    that the appellant in K.A. Najeeb‘s case (supra) was in
    custody for five years and that the trial 25 of the appellant in
    that case
    was severed from the other co co-accused whose trial
    had concluded whereupon they were sentenced to
    imprisonment of eight years; but in Gurwinder Singh, the
    trial was already underway and that twenty two witnesses
    including the protected
    protected witnesses have been examined. It
    was in that context, the two Judge Bench of this Court in
    Gurwinder Singh observed that mere delay in trial
    pertaining to grave offences cannot be used as a ground to
    grant bail.

    32. This Court has, time and again, emphasized that right
    to life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the
    Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A
    constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail
    to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provi
    provisions
    in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused
    accused-

    undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has
    been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions
    would not come in the way. Even in the case of
    interpretation of a penal
    penal statute, howsoever stringent it may
    be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of
    constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an
    intrinsic part. In the given facts of a particular case, a
    constitutional court may decline to grant babail. But it would
    be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail
    cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of
    our constitutional jurisprudence. In any view of the matter,
    K.A. Najeeb‘s case (supra) being rendered by a three Judge
    Bench is binding on a Bench of two Judges like us.
    Xxxxxx

    33. xxx
    Continued incarceration of the appellant cannot be justified
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    xxx
    xxx.”

    27. In Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India reported in (2024) 10

    SCC 574,, the appellant was, inter-alia,, charged under Sections 13, 18,

    18-A
    A and 20 of the UAPA. He was arrested on July 12, 2022 and a

    charge-sheet
    sheet was filed on January 07, 2023. The relevant part of the

    charge-sheet
    sheet reads as follows:

    “xxx

    17.1 Bihar Police had received information about a plan to
    disturb the proposed visit of Hon’ble Prime Minister to
    disturb
    Bihar by some suspected persons who had assembled in
    Phulwarisharif area. On 11.07.2022 at about 19:30 hrs, on
    secret information, a raid was carried out by the police
    officers of PS Phulwarisharif, Patna at the rented
    house/premises of Athar Parvej (A (A-1) and recovered 05 sets
    of documents “India 2047 Towards Rule of Islamic India,
    Internal Document: Not for Circulation”, Pamphlets
    “Popular Front of India 20-2-2021”

    20 2021″ – 25 copies in Hindi
    and 30 copies in Urdu,
    Urdu, 49 cloth flags, 02 magazines “Mulk
    ke liye Popular Front ke saath” and one copy of rent
    agreement on non-judicial
    non judicial stamp by Farhat Bano w/o Md.
    Jalaluddin Khan (A-2)
    (A 2) with tenant Athar Parvej (A
    (A-1) son of
    Abdul Qayum Ansari. The recovered articles and a Samsung
    mobile phone having SIM card of accused Md. Jalaluddin
    (A 2) were seized in the instant case. They were related to
    (A-2)
    anti
    anti-India activities.”

    Xxx”

    28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that nothing

    in the charge-sheet
    charge showed that the appellant
    pellant had taken part in or

    committed unlawful activities as defined in UAPA. No material was

    produced on record to show that the appellant advocated, abetted,

    advised or incited the commission of terrorist acts or preparatory activity
    activity.

    Succinct reasoning leading to the grant of bail is reproduced herein

    under:

    “xxx
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    30. Therefore, on plain reading of the charge
    charge-sheet, it is
    not possible to record a conclusion that there are reasonable
    grounds for believing that the accusation against the
    appellant of commission of offences punishable under UAPA
    is prima-facie
    prima facie true. We have taken the charge
    charge-sheet and the
    statement of witness Z as they are without conducting a
    mini trial. Looking at what we have held earlier, it is
    mini-trial.

    impossible to record a prima-facie
    prima facie find
    finding that there were
    reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against
    the appellant of commission of offences under UAPA was
    prima facie true. No antecedents of the appellant have been
    prima-facie
    brought on record.

    31. The upshot of the above discussion is that there was
    no reason to reject the bail application filed by the
    appellant.

    32. Before we part with the judgment, we must mention
    here that the Special Court and the High Court did not
    consider the material in the charge charge-sheet objectively.
    Perhaps the focus was more on the activities of PFI, and
    Perhaps
    therefore, the appellant’s case could not be properly
    appreciated. When a case is made out for a grant of bail, the
    Courts should not have any hesitation in granting bail. The
    allegations of the prosecution
    prosecution may be very serious. But, the
    duty of the Courts is to consider the case for grant of bail in
    accordance with the law. “Bail is the rule and jail is an
    exception” is a settled law.

    33. Even in a case like the present case where there are
    stringent conditions
    conditions for the grant of bail in the relevant
    statutes, the same rule holds good with only modification
    that the bail can be granted if the conditions in the statute
    are satisfied. The rule also means that once a case is made
    out for grant of bail, the Court
    Court cannot decline to grant bail.
    If the Courts start denying bail in deserving cases, it will be
    a violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21 of our
    Constitution.

    xxx”

    29. In the case of “Mukesh
    “Mukesh Salam v. State of Chhattisgarh and

    another” SLP (Criminal) No.3655 of 2024,
    2024, vide an order dated August

    30, 2024, the petitioner was charged under Sections 10, 13, 17, 38 (1) (2),

    40, 22-A
    A and 22-C
    22 C of UAPA and directed to be released on bail as he

    was in custody since May 06, 2020 and 40 out of 1100 prosecution

    witnesses had been examined. The Apex Court observed that continued

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    detention of the petitioner would not subserve the ends of justice as there

    was no likelihood of early conclusion of the trial. However, along with

    the conditions that may be
    be imposed by the Special Judge (NIA Act)

    following two conditions were imposed as the conditions for grant of

    bail:

    6 (i) The petitioner shall report to the nearest police
    station once every week and

    (ii) The petitioner shall remain present before the trial
    Judge on every date of the trial without fail, unless his
    presence is dispensed with by the trial Court, and shall
    cooperate in the early conclusion of the trial.”

    30. In a recent case in Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of

    Chhattisgarh,, reported in 2025
    25 SCC OnLine SC 322
    322, by a judgment

    dated February 14, 2025, the Supreme Court set
    set-aside the impugned

    order passed by the High Court, rejecting the bail of the appellant. As per

    the prosecution’s case, the appellant was travelling in a vehicle carrying

    articles
    icles which could be ordinarily related to Naxalite activities. Upon

    search being conducted, it was alleged that the appellant was in

    conscious possession of the following articles:

    “xxx

    4. The search was undertaken and the following articles
    were recovered
    recovered from the car alleged to be in conscious
    possession of the appellant herein:

    herein:-

                                   (i)     95 pair of shoes
                                   (ii)    Green black printed cloth
    

    (iii) Two bundles of electric wire each of 100 metere

    (iv) LED lens and

    (v) Walki talki and other articles.

    Xxx”

    31. In that case, the appellant was arrested on March 24, 2020.

    After filing of the charge-sheet,
    charge sheet, the prosecution was only able to examine

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    42 witnesses and intended to examine as many as 100 witnesses. It was

    observed that even after the passing of five years of the appellant being in

    judicial custody, learned counsel appearing for the State had no idea

    regarding time that would be consumed to complete the recording of oral

    evidence. The Supreme Court recorded that in the aforesaid

    circumstances, it was left with
    with no other option but to get the appellant

    released on bail despite the seriousness of the crime alleged.

    Furthermore, it was of the view that the Public Prosecutor who was in
    in-

    charge of the trial, had to decide which of the witnesses were to be

    examined and
    nd who were to be dropped as no useful purpose would be

    served if several witnesses were examined for establishing the same fact.

    The relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced hereinafter:

    “xxx

    10. However, many times we have made ourselves very
    clear that howsoever serious a crime may be the accused
    has a fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in
    Article 21 of the Constitution.

    Xxx

    12. The aforesaid results in indefinite delay in conclusion
    of trial. It is expected of the Public Prosecut
    Prosecutor to wisely
    exercise his discretion insofar as examination of the witness
    is concerned.

    Xxx

    14. In this regard, the role of the Special Judge (NIA)
    would also assume importance. The Special Judge should
    inquire with the Special Public Prosecutor why he intends to
    examine a particular witness if such witness is going to
    depose the very same thing that any other witness might
    have deposed earlier. We may sound as if laying some
    guidelines, but time has come to consider this issue of delay
    and bail in its true and proper perspective. If an accused is
    to get a final verdict after incarceration of six to sseven years
    in jail as an undertrial prisoner, then, definitely, it could be
    said that his right to have a speedy trial under Article 21 of
    the Constitution has been infringed. The stress of long trials
    on accused persons-

    persons who remain innocent until proven
    guilty
    uilty- can also be significant. Accused persons are not
    financially compensated for what might be a lengthy period
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    of pre-trial
    pre trial incarceration. They may also have lost a job for
    accommodation, experienced damage to personal
    relationships while incarcerated, and spent a considerable
    amount of money on legal fees. If an accused person is found
    not guilty, they have likely endured many months of being
    stigmatized and perhaps even ostracized in their community
    and will have to rebuild their lives with their own resources.

    15. We would say that delays are bad for the accused and
    extremely bad for the victims, for Indian society and for the
    credibility of our justice system, which is valued. Judges are
    the masters of their Courtrooms and the Criminal Procedure
    Code
    provides many tools for the Judges to use in order to
    Code
    ensure that cases proceed efficiently.
    Xxx”

    32. In the present case, relevant material connecting the accused

    to advocating, abetting, advising, inciting or conspiring to commit any

    terrorist actt had to be brought on record to justify rejection of bail

    especially after a long period of incarceration. However, no worthwhile

    material in this regard has been brought on record by the prosecution, at

    this stage.

    33. The definition of a “terrorist
    “terrorist act” under Section 15 is

    relevant to be considered at this juncture and the same is reproduced

    hereinafter:

    “15. Terrorist Act-

    Act (1) whoever does any act with intent to
    threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security
    [economic security] or sovereignty
    sovereignty of India or with intent to
    strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any
    section of the people in India or in any foreign country,
    country,-

    (a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances
    or inflammable substances or firearms oor other lethal
    weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals
    or by any other substances (whether biological radioactive,
    nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other
    means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause –

    (i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or

    (ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or

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    (iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the
    life of the community in India or in any foreign country; or

    [(iiia) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of
    production or smuggling or circulation of high quality
    counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other
    material; or]

    (iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a
    foreign country used or intended
    intended to be used for the defence
    of India or in connection with any other purposes of the
    Government of India, any State Government or any of their
    agencies; or

    (b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of
    criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any
    public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public
    functionary; or

    (c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to
    kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to
    compel the Government of India, any St State Government or
    the Government of a foreign country or [an international or
    inter governmental organisation or any other person to do
    inter-governmental
    or abstain from doing any act; or],
    commits a terrorist act.

    [(2) The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes aan
    offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the
    treaties specified in the Second Schedule.]

    34. The charge sheet under Sections 120
    120-B, 201, 419, 471 of the

    IPC, Section 25/54/59 of the Arms Act and Sections 17, 18, 18
    18-B and 20

    of UAPA was filed
    filed on March 10, 2026 and only 01 witness out of 56

    prosecution witnesses has been examined till date. Learned State counsel

    is also unable to give any reasonable estimate of the time that may be

    required for completion of the trial. Therefore, the Court is left with no

    other option but to release the appellant on bail.

    35. In view of the aforesaid
    aforesaid discussion and the law laid down by

    the Supreme Court, especially when the appellant is in custody for almost

    two and a half years and the end
    nd of the trial is not in sight and

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    considering only 01 out of 56 prosecution witnesses has been examined,

    the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated April 23, 2025 is set

    aside. The appellant is ordered to be released on regular bail subject to

    following conditions besides furnishing of requisite bail bonds to the

    satisfaction of the trial Court/Duty Magistrate
    Magistrate concerned:

    concerned:-

    (i) He shall furnish bond of ₹10 lakh with two sureties of
    ₹10
    10 lakh each;

    (ii) He shall surrender his passport in the Trial Court, if he is
    holding the same and is still with hi
    him;

    (iii) He shall appear before the Trial Court on eac
    each and every
    date unless exempted by the Court;

    date,

    (iv) He shall appear before the Investigating Officer
    Officer, as and
    when summoned;

    v) He shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement,
    threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of
    the case or who is cited as witness;

    vi) He shall not involve in any criminal activity and if during
    the pendency of trial, he is found
    found involved in commission of
    any offence punishable under UAPA, the prosecuting
    agency would be free to approach this Court for recalling
    this order and cancellation of his bail;

    vii) He shall not sell, transfer or in any other manner create
    third party
    party right over his immovable property;

    viii) He shall furnish an undertaking to the effect that in case
    of his absence, Trial Court may proceed with the trial and he
    shall not claim re-examination
    re examination of any witness.

    ix) At the time of release of the appe
    appellant, the concerned
    SHO shall be informed. He shall appear before the SHO on
    every alternate Monday till the conclusion of the trial.

    36. In the event there is a breach of any of the abovementioned

    conditions, or of the conditions to be imposed by tthe Trial Court

    independently, it would be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation of

    the bail of the defaulting appellant without any further reference to this

    VANDANA
    2026.07.27 10:36
    I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document Page 25 of 26
    CRA-D-411
    411 OF 2026

    Court. Similarly, if the appellant seeks to threaten or otherwise influence

    any of the witnesses,
    witnesses, whether directly or indirectly, then also the

    prosecution shall be at liberty to seek cancellation of bail of the

    concerned appellant by making appropriate application before the Trial

    Court.

    37. It is clarified that the observations made through the instant

    order have been made only for the limited purpose of deciding the

    present appeal seeking regular bail and that the same would not be

    construed to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

    38. The appeal is allowed in the above
    bove terms.

                   (DEEPAK SIBAL)                                  (LAPITA BANERJI)
                       JUDGE                                            JUDGE
    
    
    
                  JULY 23, 2026
                           202
                  shalini
    
    
    
                  Whether speaking/reasoned:                 Yes/No
                  Whether reportable:                        Yes/No
    
    
    
    
    VANDANA
    2026.07.27 10:36
    I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document                                                        Page 26 of 26
    



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