Bal Krishan Sharma And Others vs State Of H.P. And Others on 20 July, 2026

July 24, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Bal Krishan Sharma And Others vs State Of H.P. And Others on 20 July, 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No.14722 of 2024
Decided on: 20th July, 2026
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bal Krishan Sharma and others .....Petitioners

Versus

State of H.P. and others .....Respondents
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coram

of
Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua

Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes.

For the Petitioners: Mr. Tara Singh Chauhan, Senior
rt Advocate with Mr. Surya Chauhan,
Advocate.

For the Respondents: Mr. L.N. Sharma, Additional Advocate
General, for respondents No.1 to 3.
Mr. Yogesh Putney, Senior Advocate

with Ms. Pallvi Sharma, Advocate, for
respondent No.4.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge

Petitioners seek the same relief as allowed to the

appellants/writ petitioners in Smt. Kamlesh and others

SPONSORED

Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others 2 as also

in Vikram Singh Versus State of H.P. & others3

primarily on the ground of parity. In terms of the aforesaid

decisions, the declaration issued by the respondents under

1
Whether reporters of print and electronic media may be allowed to see the order? Yes.

LPA No.6 of 2024, decided on 16.07.2024
3
LPA No.38 of 2024, decided on 10.9.2024

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Section 19 of the Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short ‘the Act’) was held to have

been issued beyond the statutory period of 12 months from

the date of issuance of notification under Section 11 of the

Act. The preliminary notification issued under Section 11 of

the Act on 19.02.2022 was held to be invalid qua the land

and houses of the appellants therein.

of
2 The case:-

The case pertains to acquisition of land for
rt
construction of Bhanupali-Bilaspur-Beri, New Broad Gauge

Railway Line Project spanning from Bhanupali in Punjab to

Beri in Himachal Pradesh covering a distance of about

63.10 kilometres.

2(i). Preliminary notification under Section 11 of the

Act was issued by the respondents on 19.02.2022. It was

published in the Gazette on 02.03.2022 and objections

were called for. Objections of the land owners of Villages

Raghunathpura, Rampur, Khansram Kohalwin and Manwa,

Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur were heard and disposed of

under Section 15 of the Act on 03.05.2022. According to

the respondents, such disposal was in presence of the

petitioners/their representatives. Declaration under Section

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19 of the Act was made by the respondent-State on

01.03.2023. This was published on 18.03.2023.

2(ii). It will be appropriate to note at this stage that

according to the respondents, total land sought to be

acquired was 125-4 bighas comprising in 20 villages; 90%

of the land was acquired through private negotiations. This

writ petition concerns around 2-5 bighas of land belonging

to the writ petitioners.

of
2(iii). Smt. Kamlesh and others Versus State of

Himachal Pradesh and others4 and Vikram Singh Versus
rt
State of Himachal Pradesh and others5 were instituted

seeking to set aside notification dated 01.03.2023 issued

under Section 19 of the Act, whereunder, declaration was

issued qua 125-4 bighas of land to be acquired for public

purpose, namely construction of Bhanupali-Bilaspur-Beri,

New Broad Gauge Railway Line. The main contention urged

by the petitioners therein was that declaration under

Section 19 of the Act was not made by the respondents and

published within one year, as is the mandate of Section

19(7) of the Act, therefore, the same is liable to be

rescinded. While dismissing the writ petitions, it was held

that though Section 11 of the Act clearly mandates that a

4
CWP No.4829 of 2023, decided alongwith connected matter on 11.12.2023
5
CWP No.4300 of 2023, decided alongwith connected matter on 11.12.2023

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notification in terms of Section 11 has to be published in

the manner prescribed therein, but Section 19 does not

envisage that declaration made thereunder shall be effective

only from the date of its publication. Therefore, whereas

publication is sine qua non as far as the notification issued

under Section 11 is concerned, but the same is not so, as

far as making a declaration as provided in Section 19 is

concerned. Section 19(7) of the Act further provides that

of
where no declaration is made under Sub-section (1) within

12 months from the date of preliminary notification, then
rt
such notification shall be deemed to have been rescinded;

In this sub-section, there is no mention that the declaration

has to be construed as from the date of its publication.

Relevant paras from the decision are as under:-

“14. This Court is of the considered view that whereas
Section 11 of the Act clearly mandates that a

notification in terms of Section 11 has to be published in
the manner prescribed therein, Section 19 of the Act
does not envisage that the declaration made thereunder

shall be effective only from the date of its publication. In
fact, whereas on one hand, Sub-section (1) of the
Section 11 provides that whenever it appears to the

appropriate Government that land in any area is
required for the public purpose, a notification to the said
effect shall be published in the manner prescribed, on
the other hand, Sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides
that when appropriate Government is satisfied, after
considering the report, if any, made under Sub-section
(2) of Section 15, that any particular land is needed for
a public purpose, then a declaration shall be made to
that effect etc. Therefore, whereas publication is sine
qua non as far as notification issued under Section 11
is concerned, but the same is not so, as far as making a

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declaration as provided in Section 19 is concerned. In
fact, Subsection (7) of Section 19 further provides that
where no declaration is made under Sub-section (1)
within twelve months from the date of preliminary
notification, then such notification shall be deemed to
have been rescinded and in this Sub-section also there
is no mention that the declaration has to be construed

.

as from the date of its publication.

19. As observed by me hereinabove, the provisions of
Section 11 and 19 of the 2013 Act are pari materia to
Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Therefore, the adjudication made by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court as well as Hon’ble Division Bench of this
Court holds good while interpreting the provisions of the
Statute in force also and the only conclusion that can be

of
arrived at by the Court is that though declaration has to
be made within one year as from the date of publication
of notification under Section 11(1) of the 2013 Act, but
the same need not be published within one year in the
rt
official gazette etc. to make it effective. If such a
declaration is made within one year as from the date of
issuance of notification under Section 11, then there is

compliance of Section 19 of the Act and declaration is
not bad simply because it has not been published
within one year from the date of publication of
notification issued under Section 11 of the Act.”

2(iv). Feeling aggrieved against the above decision,

Smt. Kamlesh and others2 was preferred. Hon’ble Division

Bench considered the contentions of the appellants that

declaration issued under Section 19(7) of the Act ought to

be issued within 12 months from the date of preliminary

notification under Section 11(1) thereof, but in the instant

case, the date of preliminary notification under Section

11(1) was 19.02.2022, whereas the date of declaration

under Section 19(1) of the Act was 01.03.2023; The latter

was issued beyond 12 months from the former, therefore,

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the proceedings ought to have been quashed. This

contention was accepted. The appeal was accordingly

allowed. It was held that:- The preliminary notification

under Section 11(1) of the 2013 Act bears the date

‘19.02.2022’ and it was published on 02.03.2022, but the

date of preliminary notification cannot be taken to be

02.03.2022 having regard to the language used in Section

11(1) of the Act and it has to be taken to be 19.02.2022;

of
Since declaration under Section 19 bears the date

01.03.2023 and was published on 18.03.2023, irrespective
rt
of whichever of these dates is taken into account, it had to

be held that declaration was not issued within 12 months

from the date of preliminary notification, which was

19.02.2022. Relevant portion from the decision is extracted

hereinafter:-

“4) It is contention of the appellants before the learned
Single Judge that declaration issued u/s 19 (7) of 2013
Act ought to be issued within 12 months from the date

of preliminary notification under Section 11(1) thereof ;

in the instant case the date of the preliminary
notification u/s 11(1) was 19.02.2022, but the date of

declaration under Section 19(1) of the 2013 Act was
01.03.2023; that the latter was issued beyond 12
months from the former; and therefore the said
proceedings ought to be quashed.

30) Admittedly, in the instant case, the preliminary
notification u/s 11(1) of the 2013 Act bears the date
19.02.2022 and it was published on 02.03.2022. But
the date of such preliminary notification cannot be
taken to be 02.03.2022 in view of the language of
section 11(1) of the 2013 Act and it has to be taken to

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be 19.02.2022 only having regard to the language used
in Section 11 (1) of 2013 Act.

31) Since the declaration u/s 19 bears the date 01.03.2023
and was published on 18.03.2023, irrespective of
whichever of these dates is taken into account, it is
clear that the declaration is not issued within 12

months from the date of preliminary notification, which

is 19.02.2022.

32) The learned Single Judge unfortunately does not appear
to have noticed the difference in language between the
provisions dealing with preliminary notification in the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and in Section 11 (1) of the
2013 Act and instead proceeded on the question
whether the declaration made u/s 19 is required to be

of
published within 12 months from the date of
preliminary notification or not.

33) While it may be true that the declaration u/s 19 is not
required to be published within the period of 12 months
from the date of preliminary notification, it is still
rt
required to be issued within 12 months from the date of
the preliminary notification.

34) If the date of the preliminary notification is 19.02.2022,
then a declaration issued u/s 19 on 01.03.2023 (
though published later) would not be valid in view of
Section 19(7) which automatically rescinds the
preliminary notification u/Section 11. In the result the

preliminary notification dated 19.02.2022 issued u/s
11 becomes invalid qua the appellants. As regards them
the preliminary notification would have to be deemed to
be rescinded.

37) Therefore, in the light of the fact that the declaration
under Section 19 of the 2013 Act was issued beyond

the period of 12 months from the date of issuance of
Section 11 preliminary notification dt.19.2.2022, this
Court has no choice but to allow the LPA and grant

relief to the appellants.

38) For the aforesaid reasons, the LPA is allowed; and the
order of learned Single Judge dismissing the Writ
petition is set aside; and the said Writ petition is
allowed only as regards the land and houses of the
petitioners, if any, notified for acquisition by the
respondents. No costs.”

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2(v). Following the same ratio, Vikram Singh3 was

allowed by the Hon’ble Division Bench with the following

order:-

“14. Accordingly, this appeal is also disposed of in terms of

.

order dt. 16.7.2024 in LPA no. 6 of 2024; the order of

learned Single Judge dismissing the Writ Petition is set
aside; and the said Writ Petition is allowed only with
regard to lands and houses of the petitioners in the said

Writ Petition, if any, notified for acquisition by the
respondents. Pending applications, if any also stand
disposed of.”

of
2(vi). Significantly, while deciding Smt. Kamlesh and

others2, Hon’ble Division Bench allowed the appeal and the
rt
writ petition only as regards the land and houses of the

petitioners (therein), if any, notified for acquisition by the

respondents or in other words, the notifications in question

were not set aside as such, but were held invalid qua the

petitioners therein. The benefit of the decision was confined

only to the writ petitioners (therein). In Vikram Singh3 also,

Hon’ble Division Bench allowed the writ petition, but only

with regard to the lands and houses of the petitioners in

that writ petition and not qua other land owners. The

notifications were not set aside as a whole. These were

made inoperative qua the petitioners in both the writ

petitions.

It also needs to be noticed that in Vikram Singh3,

CMP Nos.16104 & 16294 of 2024 were moved by some

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persons/land owners seeking impleadment, contending

that in view of the decision rendered in Smt. Kamlesh and

others2, the respondents were delaying release of payment

of compensation to them. They sought a clarification from

the Court that Smt. Kamlesh and others2 will not be applied

to the proposed parties, whose lands and houses were also

the subject matter of the same land acquisition notification

in view of specific directions issued in the said decision,

of
whereunder, the writ petition was allowed only qua the land

and houses of the writ petitioners in that case. These
rt
applications were allowed by the Hon’ble Division Bench.

The proposed parties were impleaded as respondents in

Vikram Singh3. The applications were disposed of with the

order that the decision in Smt. Kamlesh and others2 was

very clear that it would apply only to the appellants in the

said appeal/writ petitioners in Smt. Kamlesh and others2.

That the said decision will not apply to the impleaded

respondents. Being relevant, this portion of the order is

extracted hereinafter:-

“CMP Nos.16104 & 16294 of 2024
These applications are filed by the persons,
seeking impleadment in LPA no. 38 of 2024, contending
therein that the official respondents in this LPA are
delaying the payment of compensation to them in view
of the order passed by this Court in LPA no. 6 of 2024
dt. 16.7.2024; and they seek a clarification from this
Court that the said judgment will not be applied to the

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proposed parties, whose lands and houses are also the
subject matter of the same land acquisition notification,
in view of the specific directions in the said order that
the said LPA no.6 of 2024 is allowed only as regards
the land and houses of the appellants in that case.

2. The counsel for the non-applicant/appellant in

.

LPA has no objection to the impleadment of the said

parties, and also for clarifying the order in the manner
sought by the proposed parties.

3. The proposed parties also contend that the relief
which may be granted to the appellant in LPA no. 38 of

2024 may be on the same lines as the relief granted in
LPA no. 6 of 2021, but notwithstanding the pendency of
LPA no. 38 of 2024, the official respondents be directed

of
not to delay the proceedings for payment of
compensation under the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 (For short 2013 Act).

4. rt Having regard to the said submission, these
applications for impleadment are ordered, and the
proposed parties are impleaded as party respondents in

LPA no.38 of 2024.

5. We have heard the counsel for the appellant in
LPA, the impleaded respondents, and the learned
Additional Advocate General.

6. In LPA no.6 of 2024 in para-38, this Court has

held as under:-

“For the aforesaid reasons, the LPA is
allowed; and the order of learned Single Judge

dismissing the Writ Petition is set aside; and the
said Writ Petition is allowed only as regards the
land and houses of the petitioners, if any,

notified for acquisition by the respondents. No
costs.”(emphasis supplied)

7. In view of the said order, there is no ambiguity
about the order passed in LPA no. 6 of 2024. The said
order dt. 16.7.2024 would apply only to the appellant in
the said Appea/writ petitioner in CWP no.4300 of 2023.
The clarification is therefore issued as above that it will
not apply to the impleaded respondents. The
applications thus stand disposed of.”

2(vii). Petitioners, 11 in number, have instituted this

writ petition on 04.12.2024, seeking the same relief as

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allowed to Smt. Kamlesh and others2 and Vikram Singh3.

The substantive reliefs prayed for in this writ petition are as

under:-

“i) That a writ of mandamus may kindly be issued by

.

quashing the setting aside annexure P-1, P-3 and P-7,

as the same has been deemed to be rescinded by
section 19(7) of the act as the Notification has not been
issued within twelve months and in violation of the

judgment passed by this Hon’ble Court LPA No.6 and
38 of 2024.

ii) That the respondent may be restrained to pass the final
award and if during the pendency of the Writ petition

of
same is passed same may kindly be quashed and set
aside.

iii) That the respondents may be directed to prepare and
enact the resettlement and rehabilitation plan as per the
rt
mandate of the act qua the petitioners.

iv) That the respondent may be directed to pay damages to
the petitioner as they have restrained from developing

the land.”

2(viii). During hearing of the case, it was apprised by

learned counsel for the parties that the decisions rendered

in Smt. Kamlesh and others2 and Vikram Singh3 have

attained finality. Consequently, land acquisition process

was initiated afresh from the requisite stage and award in

accordance with law has been passed for the writ

petitioners (therein). That qua the subject land, vide order

dated 05.12.2024 passed in this writ petition, respondent

No.3 was directed not to announce the award, if not already

announced. The aforesaid order is still continuing and

consequently the award has not yet been announced.

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3. Submissions:-

3(i). Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners

submits that the petitioners had also preferred objections

against the notification dated 19.02.2022, as published on

.

02.03.2022. Another representation was preferred by the

petitioners on 16.05.2023. The respondents had not

decided these representations. In the given facts and

circumstances, the petitioners are similarly placed both on

of
facts and law as the petitioners in Smt. Kamlesh and others2

and Vikram Singh3. The reliefs granted to Smt. Kamlesh and
rt
others2 and Vikram Singh3 are liable to be granted to the

present petitioners as well. Preliminary notification dated

19.02.2022 issued under Section 11 of the Act has to be

held invalid qua the present petitioners as well.

Reliance in support of these submissions was

placed upon Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad

and others6 to urge the well settled principle that if a

Statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular

manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no

other manner. Relevant para of the judgment is as under:-

“17. In our opinion insofar as an election petition is
concerned, proper presentation of an election petition in
the Patna High Court can only be made in the manner
prescribed by Rule 6 of Chapter XXI-E. No other mode of
presentation of an election petition is envisaged under

6
(1999) 8 SCC 266

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the Act or the Rules thereunder and, therefore, an
election petition could, under no circumstances, be
presented to the Registrar to save the period of
limitation. It is a well-settled salutary principle that if a
statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular
manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no
other manner. (See with advantage: Nazir Ahrnad v.

King Emperor7, Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr. V. State

of V.P.8, State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh9. An election
petition under the Rules could only have been presented
in the open Court upto 16-5-1995 till 4.15 P.M. (working

hours of the Court) in the manner prescribed by Rule 6
(supra) either to the Judge or the Bench as the case
may be to save the period of limitation. That, however,
was not done. However, we cannot ignore that the

of
situation in the present case was not of the making of
the appellant. Neither the designated election Judge
before whom the election petition could be formally
presented in the open Court nor the Bench hearing civil
applications and motions was admittedly available on
rt
16-5-1995 after 3.15 P.M., after the Obituary Reference
since admittedly the Chief Justice of the High Court had
declared that “the Court shall not sit for the rest of the

day” after 3.15 P.M. Law does not expect a party to do
the impossible – impossiblium nulla obligation est – as in
the instant case, the election petition could not be filed
on 16-5-1995 during the Court hours, as for all intents

and purposes, the Court was closed on 16-5-1995 after
3.15 p.m.”

Vidya Devi Versus State of H.P.10 and

Tukaram Kana Joshi and others Versus Maharashtra

Industrial Development Corporation and others 11 were

also pressed into service to submit that delay & laches, if

any, on part of the petitioners would not extinguish their

right to put forth a lawful claim.

(1935-36) 63 IA 372 : AIR 1936 PC 253 (II)
8
AIR 1954 SC 322 : 1954 SCR 1098
9
AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964) 1 SCWR 57
10
(2020) 2 SCC 569
11
(2013) 1 SCC 353

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State of Haryana and another Versus

Devander Sagar and others12 was relied upon, which

after tracing several precedents in the timeline, reiterated

that quashing of acquisition proceedings at the instance of

one or two land owners does not have the effect of nullifying

the entire acquisition. Land owners, who are aggrieved by

the acquisition proceedings, would have to lay challenge to

the proceedings at least before an award is announced and

of
possession of land is taken over by the Government.

Relevant paras from the decision read as under:-

rt
“11. It would be pertinent to clarify that the quashing of the
entire acquisition proceeding has to be explicitly

expressed. This Court has in Shyam Nandan Prasad v.

State of Bihar13, Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban14,
Delhi Admn.v. Gurdip Singh Uban 15 and T.N. Housing
Board v. S. Saraswathy16 reiterated and restated the
established and consistent view that quashing of

acquisition proceedings at the instance of one or two
landowners does not have the effect of nullifying the
entire acquisition. In A.P. Industrial Infrastructure

Corpn. Ltd.v. Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao17 this
Court has reiterated the established proposition that
landowners who are aggrieved by the acquisition

proceedings would have to lay a challenge to them at
least before an award is pronounced and possession of
the land is taken over by the Government. Numerous

decisions of this Court have been discussed obviating
the need to analyse all of them once again. However,
generally speaking, the courts come to the succour of
those who approach it. In some instances, equities are
equalised by allowing subsequent slothful petitioners,

12
(2016) 14 SCC 746
13
(1993) 4 SCC 255
14
(1999) 7 SCC 44
15
(2000) 7 SCC 296
16
(2015) 8 SCC 723
17
(2012) 12 SCC 797

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belatedly and conveniently jumping on the
bandwagons, to receive, at the highest, compensation
granted to others sans interest.”

Delhi Development Authority Versus Godfrey

Phillips (I) Limited and others18 was pressed into service

to highlight the point that duty of the land owners is only to

challenge the acquisition proceedings at least before the

award is announced and possession is taken. Relevant

portion from the decision reads as under:-

of
“36. In another judgment in State of Haryana v. Devander
Sagar9, this Court has held that the acquisition
proceedings cannot be quashed of one or two
landowners. It is the duty of the landowners to
rt
challenge the acquisition proceedings at lease before
award is pronounced and possession is taken. It was

held as under: (SCC p. 755, para 11)
“11. It would be pertinent to clarify that the quashing of
the entire acquisition proceeding has to be
explicitly expressed. This Court has in Shyam
Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar20, Delhi Admn. v.

Gurdip Singh Uban12, Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh
Uban13 and T.N. Housing Board v. S.
Saraswathy22 reiterated and restated the

established and consistent view that quashing of
acquisition proceedings at the instance of one or
two landowners does not have the effect of

nullifying the entire acquisition. In A.P. Industrial
Infrastructure Corpn. Ltd. v. Chinthamaneni
Narasimha Rao26 this Court has reiterated the

established proposition that landowners who are
aggrieved by the acquisition proceedings would
have to lay a challenge to them at least before an
award is pronounced and possession of the land is
taken over by the Government. Numerous
decisions of this Court have been discussed
obviating the need to analyse all of them once
again. However, generally speaking, the courts
come to the succour of those who approach it. In

18
(2022) 8 SCC 771

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some instances, equities are equalised by allowing
subsequent slothful petitioners, belatedly and
conveniently jumping on the bandwagons, to
receive, at the highest, compensation granted to
others sans interest.”

Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners

submits that in the instant case, award has not been

passed as yet, therefore, petitioners’ challenge to the

validity of notifications has to be treated on the same lines

as was accorded in Smt. Kamlesh and others2 and Vikram

of
Singh3.

    3(ii).          Opposing
                      rt         the   above   stand,     learned       Senior

Counsel for respondent No.4 on facts submitted that the

petitioners had not raised any grievance qua the

notification in question at the relevant time. The only

objection ever raised was by petitioner No.1 on 13.04.2022.

The said objection though was in reference to the

notification dated 19.02.2022, but the objection pertained

to quantum of compensation, to which the said petitioner

was seeking entitlement to. The other petitioners did not

raise any objection. This very petitioner (No.1) raised

further objection on 16.05.2023, but the objection was

against the notification issued by the respondents under

Section 21 of the Act. In none of the representations/

objections, petitioner No.1 ever objected to the validity of

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notifications, which is now being sought to be held as

inapplicable. Further, the remaining petitioners, viz.

petitioners No.2 to 11, have not filed any objection at all.

Placing reliance upon the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in Abhey Ram (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors. Vs.

Union of India (UOI) and Ors. 19; V. Chandrasekaran and

Ors. Vs. The Administrative Officer and Ors. 20; Tamil

Nadu Housing Board Vs. L. Chandrasekaran and Ors.21

of
and The State of West Bengal and Others versus M/S

Santi Ceramics Pvt. Limited and another22, it was
rt
submitted that quashing of acquisition proceedings at the

instance of and for Smt. Kamlesh and others2 & Vikram

Singh3 will not have the effect of nullifying the entire

acquisition. The acquisition process in the instant case is

valid qua the petitioners. The petitioners are not entitled to

the reliefs as prayed for by them.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and

considered the case file.

4(i). Facts of the case are not in dispute. It comes out

from the record that notification dated 19.02.2022 issued

under Section 11 of the Act has been held to be inoperative

19
Civil Appeal No.3358 of 1997, decided on 22.04.1997
20
Civil Appeal Nos.6342-6343 of 2012, decided on 18.09.2012
21
Civil Appeal Nos.3148-3149 of 2002, decided on 29.01.2002
22
SLP(C) No.33701/2018, decided on 13.10.2025

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and invalid qua the land & houses of the petitioners in Smt.

Kamlesh and others2 and Vikram Singh3 only. The

notification has not been set aside as a whole. While

deciding Vikram Singh3, the impleadment applications

moved by certain other land owners, bearing CMP

Nos.16104 & 16294 of 2024, were also decided with the

order that the decision rendered in Smt. Kamlesh and

others2 would apply to the appellants in that appeal only

of
and will have no applicability to the applicants, who had

prayed for their impleadment and were consequently
rt
impleaded as parties in Vikram Singh3. Hon’ble Court was

cautious of the fact that while disposing of the impleadment

applications on 10.09.2024, Vikram Singh3 was also being

decided finally. It was also decided in light of Smt. Kamlesh

and others2, yet under the same decision, the applicants in

the impleadment applications were allowed to have the

payment of compensation assessed in their favour under

the awards passed in light of very notifications, which were

held to be invalid and inoperative qua the appellants in

Smt. Kamlesh and others2 and Vikram Singh3.

4(ii). It is also an admitted position on record that no

objection had been raised by petitioners No.2 to 11,

whatsoever, against any notification as also against the

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acquisition process undertaken by the respondents qua the

subject land. The only objection preferred was by petitioner

No.1, that too, did not relate to the validity of the

notifications. It pertained to the abstract quantum of

compensation, to which, the said petitioner was seeking

entitlement to.

4(iii). In Abhey Ram (Dead) by Lrs.19, Hon’ble Apex

Court examined the issue as to whether the quashing of

of
declaration by the Division Bench in respect of other

matters would enure the benefit to the other land owners. It
rt
was held that when the Division Bench confined the

controversy to the quashing of declaration in respect of the

writ petitioners before the Division Bench, the benefit of

quashing of declaration does not enure to the fence

sitters/appellants. Relevant portion from the decision reads

as under:-

“3. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (for short the “Act”) was published on
November 5,1980 acquiring a large extent of land
admeasuring 50,000 bighas situated in several villages

including Khirkee village. The land in Khirkee Village
admeasures 1011 bighas of which the appellant is in
possession of 25 bighas. Declaration under Section 6
was published on June 7, 1985. Challenging the
declaration, several writ petitions came to be filed in the
High Court. The primary contention was that the
declaration having been published after 3 years, is
barred by law. The notification under Section 4(1)
stands lapsed. Similar to the appellants, several
persons approached the High Court. The Full Bench in
Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India C.W.P. No.1639/85

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decided on May 27, 1987 upheld the validity of the
notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under
Section 6 on the ground that some of the land owners
whose land was covered under the common notification
under Section 4(1) had already approached the High
Court and obtained stay of further proceedings
including publication of declaration under Section 6. As

.

a consequence, the stay obtained continuing in

operation stood excluded by operation of Explanation II
to Section 6(1) of the Act. Accordingly, the declaration
published under Section 6(1) was held valid in law.

When the present writ petition had come up for hearing,
the Division Bench of the High Court passed an order
stating that the controversy raised was covered by the
judgment of the full Bench and no other point has been

of
raised or argued before the Division Bench. The writ
petition has been dismissed. Thus this appeal by
special leave.

4. Shri Rajinder Sachhar, learned senior counsel
rt
appearing for the appellants, contends that the view
taken by the Full Bench of the High Court is not correct
in law. In view of the fact that the appellants had not

obtained any stay pending the writ petition qua the
appellants, there is no prohibition for the respondent
U.O.I. to proceed further by publicating the declaration
under Section 6 and that, therefore, the declaration
having been published beyond three years, is invalid in

law. He further contends that after the Full Bench
judgment was rendered, the matter was remitted to the
Division Bench, which quashed the declaration under
Section 6 on the ground that the objections filled under

Section 5A were not properly considered and that,
therefore, publication of the declaration under Section 6

was quashed in respect of t he writ petitioners therein.
The same benefits should inure to the appellants as
well. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the

judgment of this Court in Delhi Development Authority v.
Sudan Singh & Ors. (1991) DLT 602. He also sought
support from the judgment in Yusufbhai Noormohmed
Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat & Anr.

MANU/SC/0474/1991 : AIR 1991 SC 2153. Learned
counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,
contends that the appellants have not filed any
objections before the Land Acquisition Collector for
enquiry under Section 5-A. Therefore, the need to
consider their objections does not arise. The Division
Bench, after remittance, confined the controversy of

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quashing the declaration in respect of the lands of the
writ petitioners. Therefore, it operates only with regard
to them and not the persons who were not economies
parties to that judgment. In fact, many persons had
accepted the award, received the compensation and
sought and had reference. Therefore, the publication of
the declaration under Section 6 was not bad in law on

.

the ground of non-consideration of the objections. Under

these circumstances, the view taken by the Full Bench
is correct in law.

10. The question then arises is: whether the quashing of the

declaration by the Division Bench in respect of the other
matters would enure the benefit to the appellants also?
Though, prima facie, the argument of the learned
counsel is attractive, on deeper consideration, it is

of
difficult to give acceptance to the contention, it is
difficult to give acceptance to the contention of Mr.
Sachhar. When the Division Bench expressly limited the
controversy to the quashing of the declaration qua the
rt
writ petitioners before the Bench, necessary
consequence would be that the declaration published
under Section 6 should stand upheld.

11. It is seem that before the Division Bench Judgment was
rendered, the petition of the appellants stood dismissed
and the appellants had filed the special leave petition in
this Court. If it were a case entirely relating to Section 6

declaration as has been quashed by the High Court,
necessarily that would enure the benefit to others also,
though they did not file any petition, except to those
whose lands were taken possession of and were vested

in the State under Sections 16 and 17(2) of the Act free
from all encumbrances. But it is seen that the Division
Bench confined the controversy to the quashing of the

declaration under Section 6 in respect of the persons
qua the writ petitioners before the Division Bench.
Therefore, the benefit of the quashing of the declaration

under Section 6 by the Division Bench does not enure to
the appellants.”

4(iv). In V. Chandrasekaran and Ors.20, Hon’ble

Apex Court deliberated the issue as to where acquisition

has been challenged by one land owner, can the other also

take the benefit of the same decision. It was held that relief

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obtained by some persons by approaching the Court

immediately after the cause of action arose, cannot be made

the basis for other persons, who belatedly filed their

objections to take the benefit of earlier relief for the reason

that such persons cannot be permitted to take impetus of

an order passed by the Court at the behest of more vigilant

persons. Portion relevant to the context is as under:-

“The acquisition challenged by one-whether others can

of
also take the benefit of the same.

10. The relief obtained by some persons, by approaching
the Court immediately after the cause of action has
arisen, cannot be the basis for other persons who have
rt
belatedly filed their petition, to take the benefit of earlier
relief provided, for the reason that, such persons cannot
be permitted to take impetus of an order passed by the

court, at the behest of another more diligent person.
(Vide: Ratan Chandra Sammanta & Ors. v. Union of
India & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2276; State of Karnataka &
Ors. v. S.M. Kotrayya & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 267; and

Jagdih Lal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1997
SC 2366).

15. Therefore, the law on the issue can be summarised to
state that, in the event that the person interested has

not filed objections in response to a notice issued under
Section 5-A, and has not challenged the acquisition

proceedings, the quashing of the declaration issued
under Section 6 in some other case, would not enure
any benefit to such person. More so, where the
possession of land has already been taken, and such

land stands vested in the State, free from all
encumbrances as provided under Sections 16 and 17(2)
of the Act, prior to the date of decision of the Court
quashing the declaration in toto, no benefit can be taken
by him. Where a party has not filed objections to the
notice issued under Section 5-A, the declaration qua
such persons is generally neither quashed, nor does it
stand vitiated qua him, by any error of law warranting
interference. There is also another view with respect to
this matter, which is that, in case the said land has

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been acquired for a Scheme, which does not fall within
the ambit of “public purpose” then, in such a case, it
would not be a case of acquisition under the Act,
instead, it would amount to colourable exercise of
power.”

4(v). In Tamil Nadu Housing Board21, one of the

issue considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court was whether

the order passed in a previous case has the effect of

nullifying the acquisition in its entirety. It was held that

quashing of acquisition was only in relation to the land of

of
the petitioner of that case. At the belated stage, it cannot be

declared that the order passed in the said case would have
rt
the effect of nullifying the entire acquisition process.

Portion relevant to the context is extracted hereinbelow:-

“12. The first issue which requires consideration is whether
the order passed by this Court in A.S. Naidu’s case has

the effect of nullifying the acquisition in its entirety. In
this context, it is apposite to mention that neither the
appellant-Board nor the respondents have placed before
the Court copies of the writ petitions in which the

acquisition proceedings were challenged, order(s)
passed by the High Court and the special leave
petitions which were disposed of by this Court on

21.8.1990 and without going through those documents,
it is not possible to record a finding that while disposing
of the special leave petitions preferred by A.S. Naidu

and others, this Court had quashed the entire
acquisition proceedings. So far as A.S. Naidu is
concerned, he did not even make a prayer before the
High Court for quashing the preliminary notification
issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. This is evident from
the prayer made by him in Writ Petition No. 7499/1983,
which reads as under:

“For the reasons stated in the accompanying
affidavit, it is most respectfully prayed that this
Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of

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certiorari or any other proceeding or any other
appropriate writ or direction or order in the nature
of a writ to call for the records of the First
Respondent relating to G.O.Ms. No.1502 Housing
and Urban Development dated 7.11.1978
published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette
Extraordinary dated 10.11.78 in Part II Sec.2 on

.

pages 22 to 26 and quash the said notification

issued under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 in so far as it relates to the land in the
Petitioners lay out approved by the Director of

Town Planning in LPDM/DTP/2/75 dated 7.3.75
in Survey Nos.254, 257, 258, 260, 268 and 271 in
Mogapperi Village, No.81, Block V, Saidapet Taluk,
Chingleput District and render Justice.”

13. From the above reproduced prayer clause, it is crystal
clear that the only relief sought by Shri A.S. Naidu was
for quashing the notification issued under Section 6 in
so far it related to the land falling in Survey Nos.254,
rt
257, 258, 260, 268 and 271 in Mogapperi Village,
No.81, Block V, Saidapet Taluk and in the absence of a
specific prayer having been made in that regard, neither

the High Court nor this Court could have quashed the
entire acquisition. This appears to be the reason why
the Division Bench of the High Court, while disposing of
Writ Appeal Nos.676 of 1997 and 8/9 of 1998 observed
that quashing of acquisition by this Court was only in

relation to the land of the petitioner of that case and, at
this belated stage, we are not inclined to declare that
order dated 21.8.1990 passed by this Court had the
effect of nullifying the entire acquisition and that too by

ignoring that the appellant-Board has already utilized
portion of the acquired land for housing and other

purposes. Any such inferential conclusion will have
disastrous consequences inasmuch as it will result in
uprooting those who may have settled in the flats or

houses constructed by the appellant-Board or who may
have built their houses on the allotted plots or
undertaken other activities. We may also usefully refer
to the judgments of this Court in Shyamnandan Prasad
and others v. State of Bihar and others (1999) 4 SCC
255, Abhey Ram v. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 421
(paragraph 11), Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh
Uban and others (1999) 7 SCC 44 (paragraphs 8, 9 and

11) and Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and
others (2000) 7 SCC 296, in which it has been
consistently held that quashing of acquisition

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proceedings at the instance of one or two landowners
does not have the effect of nullifying the entire
acquisition. Moreover, in the absence of challenge by L.
Chandrasekaran to the order passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court in Writ Appeal No.9/1998, his
legal representatives do not have the locus to contend
that order dated 21.8.1990 passed by this Court in

SLP(C) Nos.11353-11355/1988 had the effect of

nullifying the entire acquisition.”

It would also be in place to take note of The

State of West Bengal and Others22, wherein a distinction

was drawn between the orders quashing acquisition

of
proceedings operating either in personam or in rem. It was

held that benefits of quashing do not accrue to persons,
rt
who were not parties unless the Court has struck down the

entire acquisition on fundamental grounds applicable to all.

It was held as under:-

“19. Beyond this distinction, we are constrained to add that
even the established procedural principles preclude
Respondent No.1’s claim. Orders quashing acquisition
proceedings may operate either in personam or in rem.

Where the Court quashes acquisition on grounds
personal to individual objectors–such as vitiated
consideration of their specific objections under Section

5-A–the relief operates in personam and benefits only
those parties who contested the matter before judicial
forums. On the other hand, where the Court declares

the entire process void ab initio on grounds going to the
root of acquisition–the relief operates in rem. It is thus
clear that the benefits of quashing do not accrue to
persons who were not parties unless the Court has
struck down the entire acquisition on fundamental
grounds applicable to all.”

4(vi). In the background of above settled legal

position, in the instant case, the notifications in question

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have not been struck down in Smt. Kamlesh and others2

and Vikram Singh3. The notifications have only been held

inoperative qua the land and houses belonging to the

appellants/writ petitioners in Smt. Kamlesh and others2 and

Vikram Singh3. While deciding Vikram Singh3, the same

notifications have been applied to the applicants in CMP

Nos.16104 and 16294 of 2024. The petitioners had not

objected to the notifications. No objection/representation

of
was ever preferred by them at the relevant time. They were

fence-sitters and have moved this writ petition only after
rt
the decision of Smt. Kamlesh and others2 and Vikram

Singh3.

5. For all the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any

merit in the instant writ petition. The same is accordingly

dismissed alongwith pending miscellaneous application(s),

if any.






                                             Jyotsna Rewal Dua





    July 20, 2026                                  Judge
         Mukesh




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Bal Krishan Sharma And Others vs State Of H.P. And Others on 20 July, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court