Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench
Badavath Kishan vs Union Of India & Ors on 7 August, 2026
Author: Sanjay Dhar
Bench: Sanjay Dhar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
Reserved on: 09.07.2026
Pronounced on:07.08.2026
Uploaded on: 07.08.2026
Whether the operative part
or full judgment is
pronounced: Full
WP(C) No.1087/2025
BADAVATH KISHAN
...PETITIONERS/APPELLANT(S)
Through: - Mr. Tapas Das, Advocate, with
Mr. Syed Faheem Indrabi, Advocate.
Vs.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)
Through: - Mr. Hakim Aman Ali, Dy. AG.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1) Through the medium of present writ petition, the
petitioner has challenged order dated 2nd August, 2024,
issued by respondent No. 2, whereby disciplinary action,
inter-alia, against the petitioner under the provisions of the
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1965 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1965’), has been set into
motion. Challenge has also been thrown to order dated 7th
February 2025, issued by respondent No. 2, whereby the
Disciplinary Authority has, in exercise of its powers under
sub-Rule (5) of Rule 15 of the Rules of 1965, imposed the
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 1 of 27
penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay
by one stage for a period of three years against the petitioner
and it has been further provided that he will earn increments
of pay during the period of such reduction and, on expiry of
the said period, the reduction will not have the effect of
postponing the future increments of his pay.
2) According to the petitioner, he is serving in the rank of
Major of 81 RCC. He was served with a Memorandum of
Charges dated 2nd August, 2024 in terms of Rule 16 of the
Rules of 1965, alleging non-compliance of guidelines issued
by the Office of the Director General Border Roads
Organization vide letter dated 10th May 2005. It has been
submitted that reply to the Memorandum of Charges was
submitted by the petitioner but without considering the said
reply, the impugned penalty order dated 7th February 2025
has been issued against him.
3) According to the petitioner, he had denied the
Memorandum of Charges and stated that all payments made
to Casual Pay Laborers (CPLs) during the COVID-19
pandemic period were approved by the of the Audit Authority.
It was also submitted by the petitioner that all payments were
made through bank accounts only. It was further submitted
in the reply that preventive checks were carried out by Higher
Headquarter from time to time in the case of release of
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 2 of 27
payments to casual labourers. It was also projected by the
petitioner that, as per established practice and procedure,
CPLs were having their respective valid Identity Cards and
Aadhaar cards and the payments were deposited into their
bank accounts, which were drawn by them through debit
cards. Therefore, the petitioner had no role in the matter of
payment to casual paid labourers.
4) It has been contended by the petitioner that the
respondents have not adhered to the requirements of Rule
180 of the Army Rules, which is mandatory in nature,
inasmuch as the petitioner has not been associated with the
Court of Inquiry proceedings and he has not been given the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. It has been
further contended that the Memorandum of Charges was
based on illegality and perversity, and the Commander of the
16 Task Force, who was responsible for payments, has been
left out. It has also been submitted that there were no specific
violations of any established policy guideline and that no
evidence was cited in the Memorandum of Charges.
5) According to the petitioner, he has no role in the matter
and that the respondents have not applied their mind while
considering his reply to the charges. It has also been
contended that the Memorandum of Charges has been served
upon the petitioner belatedly.
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 3 of 27
6) The writ petition has been contested by the respondents
by filing their reply. In the reply, it has been submitted that
the petitioner was posted as Commanding Officer of HQ 81
RCC (GREF) from 28th November 2019 to 14.03.2022. It has
been further submitted that during his tenure as
Commanding Officer, certain anomalies were found by higher
authorities regarding opening of bank accounts for CPLs in
nationalized banks and issuance of identity cards to CPLs as
per guidelines issued by HQ DGBR. It has been submitted
that the Board of Directors framed the Memorandum of
Charges against the petitioner and asked him to file his reply,
pursuant to which the petitioner submitted his reply dated 4th
September 2024.
7) According to the respondents, the petitioner was
responsible for recruitment of CPLs and disbursement of
wages deployed at 81 RCC, including its platoons but the
petitioner failed to follow departmental guideline/instructions
of HQ DGBR issued vide letters dated 10th May 2005 and 11th
October 2018.
8) The respondents in their reply have given complete
details of the lapses which were observed during the tenure
of the petitioner, which are reproduced as under:
(a)Non-opening of bank account in nationalize
banks in respect of CPLS who were having no bankWP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 4 of 27
accounts and were deployed within the area of his
responsibility. Lapses on this account are explained
as under:-
(i) The petitioner did not make any efforts to
open saving bank accounts of the CPLs who
did not have a bank account rather used the
ICICI Bank pay direct cards liberally , thereby
violating the procedure laid down by HQ
DGBR.
(ii) As observed in departmental inquiry
approximately 60 persons of CPLs of 81 RCC
were paid through ICICI Bank pay direct cards
and not through their Bank account in
violation of existing guidelines as prescribed
in HQ DGBR letter No. 18197/CPL/WAGES
/DGBR/50/E2A (T&C) dated 4-01-2012. No
KYC was got checked from the Bank
authorities for these cards and cards were
fraudulently got issued in bulk to the RCC. No
Bank reconciliation statement was prepared
for these accounts nor was cash book
maintained for the accounts with ICICI Bank.
The locations were cash was withdrawn from
these ICICI Bank pay direct cards was also
not ascertained thereby misusing the ICICI
Bank pay direct cards.
(b) Not maintaining proper documents during the
recruitment of CPLs at 81 RCC level. Documents
were forged for recruitment of CPLs . A large number
of recruitment documents in 81 RCC were copies of
Aadhar Cards. Which were forged due to similar
photograph is Aadhar Copy as well as medical
documents. Also a significant No. of the CPLs were
having same name and fathers name enrolled in
master rolls.
(c)Non-issuance of identity cards to CPLs
immediately after recruitment. As per procedure in
vogue the petitioner did not issue any instruction
towards early issuance of identity cards to CPLs so
as casual manner identity card have not been issued
to CPLs thus violating the policy stipulated by HQ
DGBR letter No. 18324/DGBR/E2A (R&C) dated 10th
May, 2005 which was again circulated vide HQ
DGBR letter No. 18324/T&C/CPLs/DGBR/72 (TC3)
dated 11th October, 2018.
As such petitioner was failed to maintain
absolute integrity, devotion to duty and acted in a
manner which is unbecoming of a govt. servant.
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 5 of 27
Consequently the petitioner failed to maintain
higher ethical standards and honesty . In doing so
the petitioner failed to maintain discipline in
discharging his duties thereby violated sub rule (i) ,
(ii), (iii), (vi) & (XIX) of Rule 3 of the CCS (conduct )
rules 1964.
9) It has been submitted that in view of the aforesaid
lapses, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the
petitioner in terms of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1965 and after
finalization of departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary
Authority came to the conclusion that the petitioner is guilty
for non-opening of bank accounts in nationalized banks in
respect of CPLs and irregularities/corruption in recruitment
and payment of wages and, accordingly, the competent
authority imposed minor penalty of reduction to a lower stage
in the time scale of pay by one stage for a period of three years
and it was further provided that the petitioner would earn
increments of pay during the period of reduction and, on
expiry of such period, the reduction will not have the effect of
postponing his future increments of pay. It has been further
submitted that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated
under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1965 against the petitioner with
the approval of the Disciplinary Authority and the petitioner
was called upon to submit his reply, which he did. It has been
submitted that the charges against the petitioner were
framed on the basis of the findings and opinion of the Board
of Officers in the Court of Inquiry.
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 6 of 27
10) The petitioner has filed rejoinder to the reply filed by the
respondents, in which he has reiterated the contentions
raised by him in the writ petition.
11) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
record of the case, including the record produced by learned
counsel appearing for the respondents.
12) The first contention that has been urged by learned
counsel for the petitioner for assailing the impugned
Memorandum of Charges is that, while holding the Court of
Inquiry against the petitioner, the respondents have not
adhered to the procedure prescribed under Rule 180 of the
Army Rules, inasmuch as the petitioner has not been heard
and he was not allowed to participate in the said proceedings.
In order to support his contention that adherence to Rule 180
of the Army Rules is mandatory, learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance on the judgments delivered by
the Supreme Court in the following cases:
1. Maharana Pratap Singh vs. State of Bihar & ors.
2025 SCC OnLine SC 890;
2. State of Punjab vs. V. K. Khanna & Ors.
(2021) 2 SCC 330;
3. Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan
(1986) 3 SCC 454;
4. Govt. of A. P. & ors. vs. A. Venkata Raidu
(2007) 1 SCC 338;
5. Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & ors.
(2009) 2 SCC 570;
(1995) 6 SCC 749;
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 7 of 27
13) According to the petitioner, once it is found that the
respondents have not followed the mandatory provisions of
Rule 180 of the Army Rules while holding the Court of Inquiry,
the Memorandum of Charges framed on the basis of the
report of that Court of Inquiry is illegal and hence liable to be
quashed.
14) Rule 180 of the Army Rules deals with the procedure to
be followed when the character of a person subject to the
Army Act is involved. As per this provision, whenever an
inquiry affects the character or military reputation of a person
subject to the Army Act, full opportunity has to be afforded to
such person of being present throughout the inquiry and of
making any statement and giving any evidence he may wish
to make or give, cross-examining any witness whose evidence,
in his opinion, affects his character or military reputation,
and producing any witness in defence of his character or
military reputation. It is further mandated in the provision
that the Presiding Officer of the Court of Inquiry has to take
necessary steps to ensure that any person so affected receives
notice and fully understands his rights under the said Rule.
15) As is clear from the ratio laid down by the Supreme
Court in the aforesaid judgments, the provisions contained in
Rule 180 are mandatory in nature. However, the question
that arises for determination is as to whether in the facts and
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 8 of 27
circumstances of the present case, the provisions contained
in Rule 180 of the Army Rules are attracted.
16) In the above context, it is to be noticed that the
petitioner is a member of GREF/Border Roads Organisation
(BRO). The said organization, even though is under the
control of the Army authorities, yet the petitioner is not a
regular Army Personnel. The BRO comes under the Ministry
of Defence, Government of India and the works entrusted to
the said organization are required to be carried out under the
supervision of the Army authorities. The personnel of GREF
are partly drawn from the Army and partly appointed by direct
recruitment. The Supreme Court has in the case of R. Viswan
vs. Union of India and others, (1983) 3 SCC 401, while
discussing the nature of service of personnel of GREF,
observed as under:
“5. So far as the personnel of GREF are concerned,
they are partly drawn from the Army and partly by
direct recruitment. Army personnel are posted in
GREF according to a deliberate and carefully
planned manning policy evolved with a view to
ensuring the special character of GREF as a force
intended to support the Army in its operational
requirements. The posting of Army personnel in
GREF units is in fact regarded as normal regimental
posting and does not entitle the Army personnel so
posted to any deputation or other allowance and it is
equated with similar posting in the Army for the
purpose of promotion, career planning, etc. The
tenure of Army personnel posted in GREF units is
treated as normal Regimental Duty and such Army
personnel continue to be subject to the provisions of
the Army Act 1950 and the Army Rules 1954 whilst inWP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 9 of 27
GREF. But quite apart from the Army personnel who
form an important segment of GREF, even the
directly recruited personnel who do not come from
the Army are subjected to strict Army discipline
having regard to the special character of GREF and
the highly important role it is called upon to play in
support of the Army in its operational requirements.
Since the capacity and efficiency of GREF units in the
event of outbreak of hostilities depends on their all
time capacity and efficiency they are subjected to
rigorous discipline even during peace time, because
it is elementary that they cannot be expected
suddenly to rise to the occasion and provide
necessary support to the Army during military
operations unless they are properly disciplined and
in fit condition at all times so as to be prepared for
any eventuality. The Government of India has in
exercise of the power conferred upon it by sub-
sections (1) and (4) of Section 4 of Army Act 1950
issued a Notification bearing SRO 329 dated 23rd
September 1960 applying to GREF all the provisions
of that Act with the exception of those shown in
Schedule A, subject to the modifications set forth in
Schedule B and directing that the officers mentioned
in the first column of Schedule C shall exercise or
perform, in respect of members of the said Force
under their command, the jurisdiction, powers and
duties incident to the operation of that Act specified
in the second column of Schedule C. This
Notification makes various provisions of Army
Act 1950 applicable to GREF and amongst them
is Section 21 which provides:
21. Subject to the provisions of any law
for the time being in force relating to the
regular Army or to any branch thereof, the
Central Government may, by notification,
make rules restricting to such extent and in
such manner as may be necessary the right of
any person subject to this Act:-
(a) to be a member of, or to be associated
in any way with, any trade union or
labour union or any class of trade of
labour unions, or and society,
institution or association or any class of
institution or associations;
(b) to attend or address any meeting or to
take part in any demonstration
organised by any body of persons for
any political or other purposes;
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 10 of 27
(c) to communicate with the press or to
publish or cause to be published any
book, letter or other documents.
The other sections which are made applicable deal
with special privileges, offences, punishments,
penal deductions, arrest and proceedings before
trial, Court-Martial and other incidental matters.
These section which are made applicable are
primarily intended to impose strict discipline on the
members of GREF– the same kind of discipline
which is required to be observed by the regular Army
personnel. The Government of India has also in
exercise of the powers of conferred by Section 21,
sub-section (4) of Section 102 and section 191 of the
Army Act 1950 issued another Notification bearing
SRO 330 on the same day, namely, 23rd September
1960, directing that the Army Rules 1954 as amended
from time to time shall, with the exception of Rules 7
to 18, 168, 172 to 176, 190 and 191, be deemed to be
Rules made under the Army Act 1950 as applied to
GREF. Rules 19, 20 and 21 of the Army Rules 1954 are
material for the purpose of the present writ petitions
and they provide inter alia as follows
19. Unauthorised organisations-No person
subject to the Act shall, without the express
sanction of the Central Government:-
(i) take official cognizance of, or
assist or take any active part in,
any society, institution or
organisation not recognised as
part of the Armed Forces of the
Union; unless it be of a
recreational or religious nature in
which case prior sanction of the
superior officer shall be
obtained;
(ii) be a member of, or be associated
in any way with, any trade union
or labour union, or any class of
trade or labour unions.
20. Political and non-military
activities-(1) No person subject to the Act shall
attend, address, or take part in any meeting or
demonstration held for a party or any political
purposes, or belong to join or subscribe in the
aid of, any political association or movement.
(2) No person subject to the Act
shall issue an address to electors or in any
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 11 of 27
other manner publicly announce himself of
allow himself to be publicly announced as a
candidate or as a prospective candidate for
election to Parliament, the legislature of a
State, or a local authority, or any other public
body or act as a member of a candidate’s
election committee or in any way actively
promote or prosecute a candidate’s interests.
21. Communications to the Press,
Lectures, etc-No person subject to the Act
shall :-
(i) publish in any from whatever or
communicate directly or
indirectly to the Press any matter
in relation to a political question
or on a service subject or
containing any service
information, or publish or cause
to be published any book or letter
or article or other document on
such question or matter or
containing such information
without the prior sanction of the
Central Government, or any
officer specified by the Central
Government in this behalf; or
(ii) deliver a lecture or wireless
address, on a matter relating to a
political question or on a service
subject or containing any
information or views on any
service subject without the prior
sanction of the Central
Government or any officer
specified by the Central
Government in this behalf.
These rules obviously owe their genesis
to Section 21 and they impose restrictions on
the fundamental rights of members of GREF.
Since the Army Act 1950 and Army Rules 1954
are made applicable by virtue of SRO Nos. 329
and 330 dated 23rd September, 1960, GREF
personnel when recruited, are required to
accept certain terms and conditions of
appointment which include inter alia the
following:
“5 (iv): You will be
governed by the provisions of Central
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 12 of 27
Civil Service (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1965, as amended
from time to time. Notwithstanding the
above, you will be further subject to
certain provisions of the Army Act,
1950, and Rules made thereunder, as
laid down in SROs. 329 and 330 of 1960,
for purposes of discipline. It will be
open to the appropriate disciplinary
authority under the Army Act 1950 to
proceed under its provisions wherever it
considers it expedient or necessary to
do so.”
5 (v): You will be required to
serve anywhere in India or outside India
and when so called upon by the
Government or the appointing authority
or your superior officer, you shall
proceed on field service.
5 (vi): You shall, if required, be
liable to serve in any Defence Service or
post connected with the defence of
India.
5 (xi): On your appointment, you
will be required to wear the prescribed
uniform while on duty, abide by such
rules and instructions issued by your
superior authority regarding discipline,
turnout, undergo such training and take
such departmental test as the
Government may prescribe.”
The result is that the directly recruited GREF
personnel are governed by the provisions of
Central Civil Service (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules 1965 as amended from
time to time but for purposes of discipline,
they are subject to certain provisions of
the Army Act 1950 and the Army Rules 1954 as
laid down in SROs 329 and 330 dated 23rd
September 1960.”
17) In the same judgment, the Supreme Court has held that
members of GREF, in the matters of discipline, are governed
by both Rules of 1965 as well as the provisions of the Army
Act, 1950 and the Army Rules, 1954. While discussing as to
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 13 of 27
in what matters the members of GREF are to be governed by
the Rules of 1965 and in what manner they are to be governed
by the Army Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the
Supreme Court has, in para (13) of the aforesaid judgment
observed as under:
“13. There was also one other contention
advanced on behalf of the petitioners and it raised
a question of violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution. The contention was that the
members of GREF were governed both by the
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules 1965 and the provisions of
the Army Act 1950 and the Army Rules 1954 in
matters of discipline and therefore whenever a
member of GREF was charged with misconduct
amounting to an offence under the Army
Act 1950, it was left to the unguided and
unfettered discretion of the authorities whether to
proceed against the employee under the Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules 1965 or under the Army Act 1950 and the
Army Rules 1954 and SROs. 329 and 330 applying
the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 and the Army
Rules 1954 to members of GREF for purposes of
discipline were therefore discriminatory and
violative of Article 14. We do not think there is any
substance in this contention. In the first place, the
nature of the proceedings which may be taken
under the Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 against an erring
employee is different from the nature of the
proceedings which may be taken against him
under the provisions of the Army Act 1950 read
with the Army Rules 1954, the former being
disciplinary in character while the latter being
clearly penal. It is significant to note that Section
20 of the Army Act 1950 which deals with
dismissal, removal or reduction of any person
subject to that Act and clauses (d), (e), (f), (g) and
(k) of Section 71 which provide for punishment of
cashiering, dismissal, reduction in rank forfeiture
of seniority and forfeiture of pay and allowances,
have not been made applicable to the members
of GREF by SRO No. 329 with the result that, so far
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 14 of 27
as disciplinary proceeding are concerned, there
is no overlapping between the provisions of the
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules 1965 and the provisions of
the Army Act 1950 and the Army Rules 1954 as
applied to the members of GREF. Secondly, it is
not possible to say that the discretion vested in
the authorities whether to take action against an
erring member of GREF under Central Civil
Services (Classification Control and Appeal)
Rules 1965 or under the Army Act 1950 and the
Army Rules 1954 is unguided or uncanalised. It
has been denied in the affidavit of Lt. Col. Shergill
that unguided discretion any power is vested in
the disciplinary authority to proceed against an
employee of GREF either under the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules 1965 or the Army Act 1950 and the Army
Rules 1954 or to switch over from one proceeding
to the other at the any stage. Lt. Col. Shergill has
stated positively in his affidavit that clear and
detailed administrative guidelines have been laid
down for the purpose of guiding the disciplinary
authority in exercising its discretion whether to
take action against an employee of GREF under
the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control
and appeal) Rules 1965 of the Army Act 1950 and
the Army Rules 1954 and these guidelines have
been set out in full in Annexure R-5 to his affidavit.
Thirdly, the decision in Northern India Caterers
Ltd. v. Punjab(1) on which the contention of the
petitioners is based has been over-ruled by
this Court in Maganlal Chhaganla (P) Ltd v.
Municipal Corporation, Greater Bombay(2)
where it has been held that (SCC p.422, para 14)
“the contention that the mere availability of two
procedures will vitiate one of them, that is, the
special procedure is not supported by reason or
authority.” And lastly, it may be noted that in any
event the provisions of the Army Act 1950 and the
Army Rules 1954 as applied to the members of
GREF are protected by Article 33 against
invalidation on the ground of violation of Article
14. The present contention urged on behalf of the
petitioners must also therefore be rejected.”
18) Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme
Court in the case of Mohammad Ansari vs. Union of India
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 15 of 27
and others, (2017) 3 SCC 740, illustrated the cases in which
a member of GREF may be proceeded against under the Army
Act and the Rules and those in which resort can be taken to
the provisions of the Rules of 1965. Paras (30) and (31) of the
said judgment are relevant to the context and the same are
reproduced as under:
“30. At this juncture, it is appropriate to refer to
SRO 329. Schedule A thereof, as stated earlier,
carves out certain exceptions. Certain
provisions of the 1950 Act i.e. Sections 10, 11,
13 to 17, 20, 22 to 24 [falling under Chapter III
of the 1950 Act dealing with commission,
appointment and enrolment], Section 43, 44
[falling under Chapter VI – offences’ viz.
fraudulent enrolment and false answers on
enrolment respectively and clauses (d), (e), (f),
(g) and (k) of Sections 71, 74 to 78, clauses 9e),
(f) and (j) of Section 80 and clause (a) of Section
84, falling under Chapter VII – punishment]
have been exempted in their application to the
civilian members of the GREF, for the civilian
personnel of GREF are not commissioned or
enrolled or appointed under the 1950 Act and
they are not, therefore, members of the ‘regular
Army’ as defined in Section 3(xxi) of the 1950
Act. It is for this reason that certain provisions
of the 1950 Act as set out in Schedule B of the
SRO 329 have been modified in their
application to the members of the GREF. This is
fortified by the fact that the GREF personnel are
appointed as civilian component of the force in
various appointment(s)/ designation in GREF
and notified with equivalent ranks in the regular
army for the purpose of the 1950 Act vide SRO
1001 dated 20, May, 1961.
31.In view of the statutory framework, it is
demonstrable that the 1950 Act and the Army
Rules, 1954 have been applied to civilian
personnel of the GREF only for the purpose of
discipline. The reasons are obvious. The GREF
is a force raised and maintained under the
authority of the Central Government, its units
are set up on the lines of the Indian Army, it
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 16 of 27
works with and under close coordination with
regular army in border areas, facilitates the
Indian Army to carry out its operational role,
etc. Hence, it has been felt appropriate that the
1950 Act should be made applicable to a force
raised and maintained by the Central
Government as considered necessary in the
interest of discipline. The issue can be
perceived from a different perspective. The
GREF personnel are subjected by legislative
scheme to dual disciplinary control, and such
an arrangement is permissible as has been
held in R. Viswan. When the offence is such
that the provisions of the 1950 Act, as extended
to GREF, apply for the purpose of discipline, it
will be open to the competent disciplinary
authority under the1950 Act, to proceed
against the delinquent under its provisions, and
if found guilty, award appropriate punishment.
In this context, we may give an example. If an
offence is committed in relation to an enemy,
offences on active service, mutiny, desertion,
disobedience, etc., considering the nature and
gravity of the offence, it may warrant severe
action against the delinquent by way of trial by
a Court Martial. In other disciplinary cases, the
competent authority may decide to proceed
under CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 in which the
maximum permissible punishment is only
‘dismissal from service’.”
19) From the foregoing analysis of the legal position, it is
clear that members of GREF/BRO are subject to a dual
disciplinary authority, namely, the authority prescribed
under the Army Act and the authority prescribed under the
Rules of 1965. Thus, a member of GREF can be proceeded
against in the matters of disciplinary issues either under the
Army Act and the rules framed thereunder or under the Rules
of 1965. It is entirely the discretion of the Disciplinary
Authority to make a choice of the provisions under which a
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 17 of 27
member of the GREF has to be proceeded against. If it is a
case of grave disciplinary issue, like commission of an offence
in relation to an enemy or an offence while on active service
etc. it may warrant action against the delinquent official by a
Court Martial but in case of less graver offences, the
delinquent official can be proceeded against under the Rules
of 1965.
20) Now coming to the facts of the present case, the charges
against the petitioner, as is evident from the statement of
imputation of misconduct, are that he is guilty for non-
opening of bank accounts in nationalized banks in respect of
CPLs who were having no bank accounts, not maintaining
proper documents during recruitment of CPLs at 81 RCC and
non-issuance of identity cards to CPLs. This appears to be a
misconduct which is not of a grave nature and, therefore, the
competent authority has decided to proceed against the
petitioner in terms of the Rules of 1965 and not under the
provisions of the Army Act and the rules framed thereunder.
It is true that a Court of Inquiry was held before the framing
of Memorandum of Charges. However, holding of such Court
of Inquiry against the petitioner was not even mandatory in
the facts and circumstances of the present case having regard
to the fact that the respondents have decided to proceed
against the petitioner under the Rules of 1965 and not under
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 18 of 27
the Army Act and the rules framed thereunder. Thus, even if
Rule 180 of the Army Rules has not been adhered to by the
respondents while conducting the Court of Inquiry, the same
may not be fatal to the enquiry which has been initiated by
the respondents against the petitioner under the Rules of
1965. The judgments relied upon by the petitioner pertain to
the cases where the delinquent officials/officers were
proceeded against by the Army Authorities under the Army
Act and the rules framed thereunder and they were being
tried before a Court Martial. It is in those circumstances that
adherence to Rule 180 of the Army Rules has been held to be
mandatory. The ratio laid down in those judgments is not
attracted to the facts of the present case. The contention of
the petitioner in this regard is, therefore, without any
substance.
21) The other contention that has been raised by learned
counsel for the petitioner for assailing impugned order dated
7th February, 2025, is that the reply filed by the petitioner to
the memorandum of charges has not been properly
considered by the respondents before imposing the penalty
upon him. It has also been contended that the procedure
prescribed under the Rules of 1965 has not been following by
the respondents before passing the impugned order.
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 19 of 27
22) In the present case, the petitioner has been imposed the
penalty which is categorized as a minor penalty in terms of
Rule 11 of the Rules of 1965. Rule 16 of the Rules of 1965
provides the procedure for imposing minor penalties. It reads
as under:
16.Procedure for imposing minor penalties :
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (5) of rule 15, no
order imposing on a Government servant any of the
penalties specified in clause (i) to (iv) of rule 11 shall be
made except after-
(a) informing the Government servant in writing
of the proposal to take action against him
and of the imputations of misconduct or
misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be
taken, and giving him reasonable
opportunity of making such representation
as he may wish to make against the
proposal;
(b) holding an inquiry in the manner laid down
in sub-rules (3) to (24) of rule 14, in every
case in which the disciplinary authority is of
the opinion that such inquiry is necessary;
(c) taking the representation, if any, submitted
by the Government servant under clause (a)
and the record of inquiry, if any, held under
clause (b) into consideration;
(d) consulting the Commission where such
consultation is necessary. The Disciplinary
Authority shall forward or cause to be
forwarded a copy of the advice of the
Commission to the Government servant,
who shall be required to submit, if he so
desires, his written representation or
submission on the advice of the
Commission, to the Disciplinary Authority
within fifteen days; and
(e) recording a finding on each imputation or
misconduct or misbehaviour.
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 20 of 27
(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in
clause (b) of sub-rule (1), if in a case it is proposed after
considering the representation, if any, made by the
Government servant under clause (a) of that sub-rule, to
withhold increments of pay and such withholding of
increments is likely to affect adversely the amount of
pension payable to the Government servant or to
withhold increments of pay for a period exceeding three
years or to withhold increments of pay with cumulative
effect for any period, an inquiry shall be held in the
manner laid down in sub-rules (3) to (24) of Rule 14,
before making any order imposing on the Government
servant any such penalty.
(2) The record of the proceedings in such cases shall
include-
(i) a copy of the intimation to the Government servant
of the proposal to take action against him;
(ii) a copy of the statement of imputations of
misconduct or misbehaviour delivered to him;
(iii) his representation, if any;
(iv) the evidence produced during the inquiry;
(v) the advice of the Commission, if any;
(vi) the findings on each imputation of misconduct or
misbehaviour; and
(vii) the orders on the case together with the reasons
therefor.
23) From a perusal of aforesaid Rule it is clear that for
imposing a minor penalty, a delinquent official has to be
informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him
and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on
which it is proposed to be taken, whereafter a reasonable
opportunity of making a representation has to be afforded to
him. Upon receipt of the representation, if the Disciplinary
Authority is of the opinion that an inquiry has to be held in
the manner laid down in Rule 14, which provides for holding
of enquiry in cases relating to imposition of major penalties,
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 21 of 27
then such an inquiry has to be held. However, in a case where
the Disciplinary Authority is not of such opinion, then it can
take a decision with regard to imposition of minor penalty
upon the delinquent official after taking into account his
representation.
24) In the present case, the Memorandum of Charges and
Statement of Imputations dated 2nd August, 2024, were
admittedly served upon the petitioner. It is also an admitted
case of the parties that the petitioner submitted his
representation against the Memorandum of Charges on 4th
September, 2024. The Disciplinary Authority, after
considering the representation of the petitioner against the
Memorandum of Charges and Statement of Imputations,
imposed minor penalty of reduction to lower stage in the
timescale of pay by one stage for a period of three years upon
the petitioner and it has been further provided that he would
earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction
and on expiry of the said period, the reduction will not have
any effect of postponing the future increments of his pay.
25) If we have a look at the impugned order dated 7th
February 2025, it has been clearly stated therein that
representation of the petitioner dated 4th September, 2024,
has been examined by the Disciplinary Authority and it has
also examined other relevant documents of the case,
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 22 of 27
whereafter it has come to the conclusion that the petitioner
has been found guilty of non-opening of bank accounts in
nationalized banks in respect of CPLs. It has also been found
that the allegations relating to irregularities/corruption in
recruitment and payment of wages stand proved.
26) So far as the scope of interference in the orders of a
Disciplinary Authority which is based upon the examination
of record is, concerned, the same is very limited in nature.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, in the case of State of
Rajasthan v. Heem Singh, (2021) 12 SCC 569, summed up
the law in the following manner:
“37. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary
matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first
embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines
when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint
constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a
valid reason. The determination of whether a
misconduct has been committed lies primarily within
the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge
does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary
authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an
employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the
disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that
it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient
conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have
to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are
not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply
to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is
hence not the strict standard which governs a
criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but
a civil standard governed by a preponderance of
probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there
are varying approaches based on context and
subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on
deference and autonomy – deference to the position
of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority
and autonomy of the employer in maintaining
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 23 of 27
discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other
end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has
the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the
enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer
from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is
an incident of what the law regards as a
perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an
entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service
jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in
allowing for the authority of the court to interfere
when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate
to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial
craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the
banks of these two shores which have been termed
as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest
with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when
they exercise judicial review. To determine whether
the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some
evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is
undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the
court that there is some evidence to support the
charge of misconduct and to guard against
perversity. But this does not allow the court to re-
appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary
enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the
judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend
the first principle which has been outlined above. The
ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common
sense without which the judges’ craft is in vain.”
27) From the foregoing analysis of the legal position, it is
clear that the scope of interference in respect of a decision
taken by a Disciplinary Authority under Article 226 of the
Constitution is very limited. While exercising its powers of
judicial review, the High Court has to consider whether the
action has been taken by the competent authority, whether
the procedure prescribed under the law has been followed,
and whether the principles of natural justice in conducting
the proceedings have been followed. It is only if the
Disciplinary Authority has acted wholly arbitrarily or that
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 24 of 27
finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority is based on no
evidence, that High Court can exercise its powers of judicial
review and interfere with such an order.
28) In the instant case, there was sufficient material before
the Disciplinary Authority which demonstrated that the
petitioner had not followed the laid down guidelines with
regard to opening of bank accounts of CPLs in nationalized
banks and that there were irregularities in the recruitment
and payment of wages to CPLs. The Disciplinary Authority
has properly followed the procedure prescribed under Rule 16
of the Rules of 1965, inasmuch as the petitioner has been
given reasonable opportunity of making a representation
against the Statement of Imputations and the said
representation has been properly considered by the
Disciplinary Authority. In these circumstances, there is no
ground to interfere in the impugned action taken by the
Disciplinary Authority in terms of impugned order dated 7th
February, 2025.
29) The ground urged by learned counsel for the petitioner
with regard to the alleged vagueness of the Statement of
Imputations is without any substance as the Statement of
Imputations clearly gives the details of the allegations levelled
against the petitioner and, in fact, the petitioner has made a
detailed representation dated 4th September 2024, against
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 25 of 27
the Statement of Imputations, wherein he not raised any
issue with regard to vagueness of the allegations mentioned
in the Statement of Imputations.
30) Lastly, it is been contended by learned counsel for the
petitioner that the Memorandum of Charges has been served
upon the petitioner belatedly. In this context, it is to be noted
that the transactions which formed the basis of the impugned
Memorandum of Charges pertain to the years 2019 to 2022.
Before framing the charges, a Court of Inquiry was conducted
to ascertain the veracity of the allegations made against the
petitioner. It is thereafter that the Memorandum of Charges
dated 2nd August, 2024 came to be framed against the
petitioner. In these circumstances, there was no undue delay
in framing of memorandum of charges against the petitioner.
It is true that, ordinarily, the enquiry has to be initiated
against a delinquent official without any undue delay but
there is no straight-jacket formula laying down that if an
inquiry is initiated after a particular period of time, the same
would get vitiated. In these circumstances, the ground
projected by the petitioner cannot form a basis for quashing
the impugned order.
31) For what has been discussed hereinbefore, the petition
is devoid of merit. The same is dismissed accordingly.
WP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 26 of 27
32) The record be returned to learned counsel for the
respondents.
(Sanjay Dhar)
Judge
SRINAGAR
07.08.2026
“Bhat Altaf-Secretary”
Whether the Judgement is speaking: YES
Whether the Judgement is reportable: YES/NoWP(C) No.1087/2025 Page 27 of 27
