Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench
Badavath Kishan vs Union Of India & Ors on 7 August, 2026
Author: Sanjay Dhar
Bench: Sanjay Dhar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
Reserved on: 09.07.2026
Pronounced on:07.08.2026
Uploaded on: 07.08.2026
Whether the operative part
or full judgment is
pronounced: Full
WP(C) No.1082/2025
BADAVATH KISHAN
...PETITIONERS/APPELLANT(S)
Through: - Mr. Tapas Das, Advocate, with
Mr. Syed Faheem Indrabi, Advocate.
Vs.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)
Through: - Mr. Hakim Aman Ali, Dy. AG.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1) Through the medium of present writ petition, the
petitioner has challenged Memorandum of Charges dated 27th
February 2025, issued by respondent No. 2 in terms of the
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1965 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1965’).
2) As per the case set up by the petitioner, he is holding
the rank equivalent to that of Major in 18 RCC. It has been
submitted that the petitioner has been served with the
impugned Memorandum of Charges by respondent No.2
under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1965, alleging therein that he
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 1 of 23
entered into financial transactions with No.1691 CPL
Mazdoor Alauddin Ansari, who was deployed at Detachment
Anuthang of 81 RCC, Kargil. In the Memorandum of Charges,
it has been alleged that the petitioner inappropriately received
a sum of Rs.4.50 lakhs, by cash and digital payment from
CPL Mazdoor Alauddin Ansari. Thus, the petitioner is stated
to have indulged in misconduct in violation of Rule 16(4)(i)(a)
of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (for short,
‘the CCS (Conduct) Rules’).
3) It is further alleged in the Memorandum of Charges that
the veracity of the transaction details was checked with the
bank statements obtained from Axis Bank, Kamrup Metro,
Malegaon, Guwahati, in terms of letters dated 13th May, 2024,
and 14th May, 2024, and also from the State Bank of India,
University Branch, Jalukbari, Guwahati, in terms of letter
dated 14th May, 2024. It was found that a sum of
Rs.1,00,000/- was transferred into the Axis Bank account of
the petitioner on 4th June, 2021, which is borne out from the
statement of account of Axis Bank for the period 1st April 2021
to 31st March 2022. It is alleged that the transaction details
of Rs.1,00,000/- was found to be same with reference to the
Immediate Payment Service (IMPS) entry and the Unique
Transaction Reference (UTR) received from CPL Mazdoor
Alauddin Ansari.
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 2 of 23
4) The further allegation mentioned in the Memorandum of
Charges is that CPL Mazdoor Alauddin Ansari has transferred
an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- in five phases to Shri
Pulakhandam and Srinivasa Gupta and that there is a
possibility that the said persons and the petitioner know each
other.
5) According to the petitioner, he had taken a loan of
Rs.1,00,000/- from one Sudhir, who was running a general
store at Dett. Khalse Leh during the COVID pandemic and the
said loan was repaid by him in instalments. It has been
further submitted that the amount of Rs.1,00,000/- was
deposited into the account of the petitioner through Mr.
Farhan. In this regard, a photocopy of an affidavit sworn by
Sudhir has been annexed with the writ petition.
6) The petitioner has challenged the impugned
Memorandum of Charges on the grounds that the same has
been formulated on the basis of report of a Court of Inquiry,
but the said Court of Inquiry has been conducted by the
respondents without adhering to the mandate of Rule 180 of
the Army Rules, 1954, which, according to the petitioner, is
sine qua non for holding such an inquiry. It has been
contended that the petitioner was not present throughout the
inquiry nor was he afforded an opportunity to cross-examine
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 3 of 23
the witnesses, thereby the respondents have violated the
provisions of Rule 180 of the Army Rules.
7) The other ground that has been raised for challenging
the impugned Memorandum of Charges is that the same
suffers from vagueness. It has been contended that the
Memorandum of charges is full of surmises and conjectures.
It has also been contended that the Memorandum of Charges
has been served upon the petitioner belatedly and, on this
ground also, the same is liable to be quashed.
8) The respondents have contested the writ petition by
filing their reply, wherein it has been submitted that a Court
of Inquiry was conducted against the petitioner on account of
his involvement in financial transactions with private persons
which is not impermissible to a government officer. It has
been submitted that these financial transactions are
supported with bank statements and other documents like
cash books etc. which have been examined by the Board of
Officers while holding the Court of Inquiry, whereafter the
Memorandum of Charges has been framed against the
petitioner.
9) According to the respondents, the petitioner had
performed duties as Commanding Officer from 28.11.2019 to
14.03.2022 and during this period, he was involved in illegal
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 4 of 23
financial transactions, in respect of which the impugned
Memorandum of Charges has been framed based upon the
findings of the Board of Officers under the provisions of Rule
14 of the Rules of 1965. It has been submitted that the
petitioner, while discharging his duties as Officer
Commanding of 18 RCC, Project Vijayak, had entered into
illegal transactions with Code No.1691 CPL Mazdoor
Alauddin Ansari for recruitment of CPLs in his sector during
the said period. The details of the financial transactions
entered into by the petitioner have been mentioned in the
reply. It has been submitted that veracity of these
transactions has been checked with the bank statements
obtained from Axis Bank, State Bank of India and from other
sources, as indicated in the Memorandum of Charges.
10) It has been contended by the respondents that the writ
petition is premature, inasmuch as only the Memorandum of
Charges has been served upon the petitioner and the inquiry
into the said charges is yet to take place. It has been
submitted that the petitioner is at liberty to project his
defence during the course of the enquiry, but he cannot
scuttle the enquiry at this preliminary stage.
11) The petitioner has filed rejoinder to the reply filed by the
respondents, in which he has reiterated the contentions
raised by him in the writ petition.
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 5 of 23
12) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
record of the case, including the record produced by learned
counsel appearing for the respondents.
13) The main ground that has been urged by learned
counsel for the petitioner for assailing the impugned
Memorandum of Charges is that, while holding the Court of
Inquiry against the petitioner, the respondents have not
adhered to the procedure prescribed under Rule 180 of the
Army Rules, inasmuch as the petitioner has not been heard
and he was not allowed to participate in the said proceedings.
In order to support his contention that adherence to Rule 180
of the Army Rules is mandatory, learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance on the judgments delivered by
the Supreme Court in the following cases:
2025 SCC OnLine SC 890;
2. State of Punjab vs. V. K. Khanna & Ors.
(2021) 2 SCC 330;
3. Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan
(1986) 3 SCC 454;
4. Govt. of A. P. & ors. vs. A. Venkata Raidu
(2007) 1 SCC 338;
5. Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & ors.
(2009) 2 SCC 570;
6. B. S. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India & ors.
(1995) 6 SCC 749;
14) According to the petitioner, once it is found that the
respondents have not followed the mandatory provisions of
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 6 of 23
Rule 180 of the Army Rules while holding the Court of Inquiry,
the Memorandum of Charges framed on the basis of the
report of that Court of Inquiry is illegal and hence liable to be
quashed.
15) Rule 180 of the Army Rules deals with the procedure to
be followed when the character of a person subject to the
Army Act is involved. As per this provision, whenever an
inquiry affects the character or military reputation of a person
subject to the Army Act, full opportunity has to be afforded to
such person of being present throughout the inquiry and of
making any statement and giving any evidence he may wish
to make or give, cross-examining any witness whose evidence,
in his opinion, affects his character or military reputation,
and producing any witness in defence of his character or
military reputation. It is further mandated in the provision
that the Presiding Officer of the Court of Inquiry has to take
necessary steps to ensure that any person so affected receives
notice and fully understands his rights under the said Rule.
16) As is clear from the ratio laid down by the Supreme
Court in the aforesaid judgments, the provisions contained in
Rule 180 are mandatory in nature. However, the question
that arises for determination is as to whether in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the provisions contained
in Rule 180 of the Army Rules are attracted.
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 7 of 23
17) In the above context, it is to be noticed that the
petitioner is a member of GREF/Border Roads Organisation
(BRO). The said organization, even though is under the
control of the Army authorities, yet the petitioner is not a
regular Army Personnel. The BRO comes under the Ministry
of Defence, Government of India and the works entrusted to
the said organization are required to be carried out under the
supervision of the Army authorities. The personnel of GREF
are partly drawn from the Army and partly appointed by direct
recruitment. The Supreme Court has in the case of R. Viswan
vs. Union of India and others, (1983) 3 SCC 401, while
discussing the nature of service of personnel of GREF,
observed as under:
“5. So far as the personnel of GREF are concerned,
they are partly drawn from the Army and partly by
direct recruitment. Army personnel are posted in
GREF according to a deliberate and carefully
planned manning policy evolved with a view to
ensuring the special character of GREF as a force
intended to support the Army in its operational
requirements. The posting of Army personnel in
GREF units is in fact regarded as normal regimental
posting and does not entitle the Army personnel so
posted to any deputation or other allowance and it is
equated with similar posting in the Army for the
purpose of promotion, career planning, etc. The
tenure of Army personnel posted in GREF units is
treated as normal Regimental Duty and such Army
personnel continue to be subject to the provisions of
the Army Act 1950 and the Army Rules 1954 whilst in
GREF. But quite apart from the Army personnel who
form an important segment of GREF, even the
directly recruited personnel who do not come from
the Army are subjected to strict Army discipline
having regard to the special character of GREF and
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 8 of 23
the highly important role it is called upon to play in
support of the Army in its operational requirements.
Since the capacity and efficiency of GREF units in the
event of outbreak of hostilities depends on their all
time capacity and efficiency they are subjected to
rigorous discipline even during peace time, because
it is elementary that they cannot be expected
suddenly to rise to the occasion and provide
necessary support to the Army during military
operations unless they are properly disciplined and
in fit condition at all times so as to be prepared for
any eventuality. The Government of India has in
exercise of the power conferred upon it by sub-
sections (1) and (4) of Section 4 of Army Act 1950
issued a Notification bearing SRO 329 dated 23rd
September 1960 applying to GREF all the provisions
of that Act with the exception of those shown in
Schedule A, subject to the modifications set forth in
Schedule B and directing that the officers mentioned
in the first column of Schedule C shall exercise or
perform, in respect of members of the said Force
under their command, the jurisdiction, powers and
duties incident to the operation of that Act specified
in the second column of Schedule C. This
Notification makes various provisions of Army
Act 1950 applicable to GREF and amongst them
is Section 21 which provides:
21. Subject to the provisions of any law
for the time being in force relating to the
regular Army or to any branch thereof, the
Central Government may, by notification,
make rules restricting to such extent and in
such manner as may be necessary the right of
any person subject to this Act:-
(a) to be a member of, or to be associated
in any way with, any trade union or
labour union or any class of trade of
labour unions, or and society,
institution or association or any class of
institution or associations;
(b) to attend or address any meeting or to
take part in any demonstration
organised by any body of persons for
any political or other purposes;
(c) to communicate with the press or to
publish or cause to be published any
book, letter or other documents.
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 9 of 23
The other sections which are made applicable deal
with special privileges, offences, punishments,
penal deductions, arrest and proceedings before
trial, Court-Martial and other incidental matters.
These section which are made applicable are
primarily intended to impose strict discipline on the
members of GREF– the same kind of discipline
which is required to be observed by the regular Army
personnel. The Government of India has also in
exercise of the powers of conferred by Section 21,
sub-section (4) of Section 102 and section 191 of the
Army Act 1950 issued another Notification bearing
SRO 330 on the same day, namely, 23rd September
1960, directing that the Army Rules 1954 as amended
from time to time shall, with the exception of Rules 7
to 18, 168, 172 to 176, 190 and 191, be deemed to be
Rules made under the Army Act 1950 as applied to
GREF. Rules 19, 20 and 21 of the Army Rules 1954 are
material for the purpose of the present writ petitions
and they provide inter alia as follows
19. Unauthorised organisations-No person
subject to the Act shall, without the express
sanction of the Central Government:-
(i) take official cognizance of, or
assist or take any active part in,
any society, institution or
organisation not recognised as
part of the Armed Forces of the
Union; unless it be of a
recreational or religious nature in
which case prior sanction of the
superior officer shall be
obtained;
(ii) be a member of, or be associated
in any way with, any trade union
or labour union, or any class of
trade or labour unions.
20. Political and non-military
activities-(1) No person subject to the Act shall
attend, address, or take part in any meeting or
demonstration held for a party or any political
purposes, or belong to join or subscribe in the
aid of, any political association or movement.
(2) No person subject to the Act
shall issue an address to electors or in any
other manner publicly announce himself of
allow himself to be publicly announced as a
candidate or as a prospective candidate for
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 10 of 23
election to Parliament, the legislature of a
State, or a local authority, or any other public
body or act as a member of a candidate’s
election committee or in any way actively
promote or prosecute a candidate’s interests.
21. Communications to the Press,
Lectures, etc-No person subject to the Act
shall :-
(i) publish in any from whatever or
communicate directly or
indirectly to the Press any matter
in relation to a political question
or on a service subject or
containing any service
information, or publish or cause
to be published any book or letter
or article or other document on
such question or matter or
containing such information
without the prior sanction of the
Central Government, or any
officer specified by the Central
Government in this behalf; or
(ii) deliver a lecture or wireless
address, on a matter relating to a
political question or on a service
subject or containing any
information or views on any
service subject without the prior
sanction of the Central
Government or any officer
specified by the Central
Government in this behalf.
These rules obviously owe their genesis
to Section 21 and they impose restrictions on
the fundamental rights of members of GREF.
Since the Army Act 1950 and Army Rules 1954
are made applicable by virtue of SRO Nos. 329
and 330 dated 23rd September, 1960, GREF
personnel when recruited, are required to
accept certain terms and conditions of
appointment which include inter alia the
following:
“5 (iv): You will be
governed by the provisions of Central
Civil Service (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1965, as amended
from time to time. Notwithstanding the
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 11 of 23
above, you will be further subject to
certain provisions of the Army Act,
1950, and Rules made thereunder, as
laid down in SROs. 329 and 330 of 1960,
for purposes of discipline. It will be
open to the appropriate disciplinary
authority under the Army Act 1950 to
proceed under its provisions wherever it
considers it expedient or necessary to
do so.”
5 (v): You will be required to
serve anywhere in India or outside India
and when so called upon by the
Government or the appointing authority
or your superior officer, you shall
proceed on field service.
5 (vi): You shall, if required, be
liable to serve in any Defence Service or
post connected with the defence of
India.
5 (xi): On your appointment, you
will be required to wear the prescribed
uniform while on duty, abide by such
rules and instructions issued by your
superior authority regarding discipline,
turnout, undergo such training and take
such departmental test as the
Government may prescribe.”
The result is that the directly recruited GREF
personnel are governed by the provisions of
Central Civil Service (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules 1965 as amended from
time to time but for purposes of discipline,
they are subject to certain provisions of
the Army Act 1950 and the Army Rules 1954 as
laid down in SROs 329 and 330 dated 23rd
September 1960.”
18) In the same judgment, the Supreme Court has held that
members of GREF, in the matters of discipline, are governed
by both Rules of 1965 as well as the provisions of the Army
Act, 1950 and the Army Rules, 1954. While discussing as to
in what matters the members of GREF are to be governed by
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 12 of 23
the Rules of 1965 and in what manner they are to be governed
by the Army Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the
Supreme Court has, in para (13) of the aforesaid judgment
observed as under:
“13. There was also one other contention
advanced on behalf of the petitioners and it raised
a question of violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution. The contention was that the
members of GREF were governed both by the
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules 1965 and the provisions of
the Army Act 1950 and the Army Rules 1954 in
matters of discipline and therefore whenever a
member of GREF was charged with misconduct
amounting to an offence under the Army
Act 1950, it was left to the unguided and
unfettered discretion of the authorities whether to
proceed against the employee under the Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules 1965 or under the Army Act 1950 and the
Army Rules 1954 and SROs. 329 and 330 applying
the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 and the Army
Rules 1954 to members of GREF for purposes of
discipline were therefore discriminatory and
violative of Article 14. We do not think there is any
substance in this contention. In the first place, the
nature of the proceedings which may be taken
under the Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 against an erring
employee is different from the nature of the
proceedings which may be taken against him
under the provisions of the Army Act 1950 read
with the Army Rules 1954, the former being
disciplinary in character while the latter being
clearly penal. It is significant to note that Section
20 of the Army Act 1950 which deals with
dismissal, removal or reduction of any person
subject to that Act and clauses (d), (e), (f), (g) and
(k) of Section 71 which provide for punishment of
cashiering, dismissal, reduction in rank forfeiture
of seniority and forfeiture of pay and allowances,
have not been made applicable to the members
of GREF by SRO No. 329 with the result that, so far
as disciplinary proceeding are concerned, there
is no overlapping between the provisions of theWP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 13 of 23
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules 1965 and the provisions of
the Army Act 1950 and the Army Rules 1954 as
applied to the members of GREF. Secondly, it is
not possible to say that the discretion vested in
the authorities whether to take action against an
erring member of GREF under Central Civil
Services (Classification Control and Appeal)
Rules 1965 or under the Army Act 1950 and the
Army Rules 1954 is unguided or uncanalised. It
has been denied in the affidavit of Lt. Col. Shergill
that unguided discretion any power is vested in
the disciplinary authority to proceed against an
employee of GREF either under the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules 1965 or the Army Act 1950 and the Army
Rules 1954 or to switch over from one proceeding
to the other at the any stage. Lt. Col. Shergill has
stated positively in his affidavit that clear and
detailed administrative guidelines have been laid
down for the purpose of guiding the disciplinary
authority in exercising its discretion whether to
take action against an employee of GREF under
the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control
and appeal) Rules 1965 of the Army Act 1950 and
the Army Rules 1954 and these guidelines have
been set out in full in Annexure R-5 to his affidavit.
Thirdly, the decision in Northern India Caterers
Ltd. v. Punjab(1) on which the contention of the
petitioners is based has been over-ruled by
this Court in Maganlal Chhaganla (P) Ltd v.
Municipal Corporation, Greater Bombay(2)
where it has been held that (SCC p.422, para 14)
“the contention that the mere availability of two
procedures will vitiate one of them, that is, the
special procedure is not supported by reason or
authority.” And lastly, it may be noted that in any
event the provisions of the Army Act 1950 and the
Army Rules 1954 as applied to the members of
GREF are protected by Article 33 against
invalidation on the ground of violation of Article
14. The present contention urged on behalf of the
petitioners must also therefore be rejected.”
19) Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme
Court in the case of Mohammad Ansari vs. Union of India
and others, (2017) 3 SCC 740, illustrated the cases in which
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 14 of 23
a member of GREF may be proceeded against under the Army
Act and the Rules and those in which resort can be taken to
the provisions of the Rules of 1965. Paras (30) and (31) of the
said judgment are relevant to the context and the same are
reproduced as under:
“30. At this juncture, it is appropriate to refer to
SRO 329. Schedule A thereof, as stated earlier,
carves out certain exceptions. Certain
provisions of the 1950 Act i.e. Sections 10, 11,
13 to 17, 20, 22 to 24 [falling under Chapter III
of the 1950 Act dealing with commission,
appointment and enrolment], Section 43, 44
[falling under Chapter VI – offences’ viz.
fraudulent enrolment and false answers on
enrolment respectively and clauses (d), (e), (f),
(g) and (k) of Sections 71, 74 to 78, clauses 9e),
(f) and (j) of Section 80 and clause (a) of Section
84, falling under Chapter VII – punishment]
have been exempted in their application to the
civilian members of the GREF, for the civilian
personnel of GREF are not commissioned or
enrolled or appointed under the 1950 Act and
they are not, therefore, members of the ‘regular
Army’ as defined in Section 3(xxi) of the 1950
Act. It is for this reason that certain provisions
of the 1950 Act as set out in Schedule B of the
SRO 329 have been modified in their
application to the members of the GREF. This is
fortified by the fact that the GREF personnel are
appointed as civilian component of the force in
various appointment(s)/ designation in GREF
and notified with equivalent ranks in the regular
army for the purpose of the 1950 Act vide SRO
1001 dated 20, May, 1961.
31.In view of the statutory framework, it is
demonstrable that the 1950 Act and the Army
Rules, 1954 have been applied to civilian
personnel of the GREF only for the purpose of
discipline. The reasons are obvious. The GREF
is a force raised and maintained under the
authority of the Central Government, its units
are set up on the lines of the Indian Army, it
works with and under close coordination with
regular army in border areas, facilitates the
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 15 of 23
Indian Army to carry out its operational role,
etc. Hence, it has been felt appropriate that the
1950 Act should be made applicable to a force
raised and maintained by the Central
Government as considered necessary in the
interest of discipline. The issue can be
perceived from a different perspective. The
GREF personnel are subjected by legislative
scheme to dual disciplinary control, and such
an arrangement is permissible as has been
held in R. Viswan. When the offence is such
that the provisions of the 1950 Act, as extended
to GREF, apply for the purpose of discipline, it
will be open to the competent disciplinary
authority under the1950 Act, to proceed
against the delinquent under its provisions, and
if found guilty, award appropriate punishment.
In this context, we may give an example. If an
offence is committed in relation to an enemy,
offences on active service, mutiny, desertion,
disobedience, etc., considering the nature and
gravity of the offence, it may warrant severe
action against the delinquent by way of trial by
a Court Martial. In other disciplinary cases, the
competent authority may decide to proceed
under CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 in which the
maximum permissible punishment is only
‘dismissal from service’.”
20) From the foregoing analysis of the legal position, it is
clear that members of GREF/BRO are subject to a dual
disciplinary authority, namely, the authority prescribed
under the Army Act and the authority prescribed under the
Rules of 1965. Thus, a member of GREF can be proceeded
against in the matters of disciplinary issues either under the
Army Act and the rules framed thereunder or under the Rules
of 1965. It is entirely the discretion of the Disciplinary
Authority to make a choice of the provisions under which a
member of the GREF has to be proceeded against. If it is a
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 16 of 23
case of grave disciplinary issue, like commission of an offence
in relation to an enemy or an offence while on active service
etc. it may warrant action against the delinquent official by a
Court Martial but in case of less graver offences, the
delinquent official can be proceed against under the Rules of
1965.
21) Now coming to the facts of the present case, the charge
against the petitioner, as is evident from the Memorandum of
Charges, is that he indulged in financial transactions with a
person with whom he had official dealings, which is
prohibited in terms of Rule 16(4)(i)(a) of the Rules of 1964.
This appears to be a misconduct which is not of a grave
nature and, therefore, the competent authority has decided to
proceed against the petitioner in terms of the Rules of 1965
and not under the provisions of the Army Act and the rules
framed thereunder. It is true that a Court of Inquiry was held
before the framing of Memorandum of Charges, but holding
of Court of Inquiry against the petitioner was not even
mandatory in the facts and circumstances of the present case
having regard to the fact that the respondents have decided
to proceed against the petitioner under the Rules of 1965 and
not under the Army Act and the rules framed thereunder.
Thus, even if Rule 180 of the Army Rules has not been
adhered to by the respondents while conducting the Court of
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 17 of 23
Inquiry, the same may not be fatal to the enquiry which has
been initiated by the respondents against the petitioner under
the Rules of 1965. The judgments relied upon by the
petitioner pertain to the cases where the delinquent
officials/officers were proceeded against by the Army
Authorities under the Army Act and the rules framed
thereunder and they were being tried before a Court Martial.
It is in those circumstances that adherence to Rule 180 of the
Army Rules has been held to be mandatory. The ratio laid
down in those judgments is not attracted to the facts of the
present case. The contention of the petitioner in this regard
is, therefore, without any substance.
22) The other ground that has been urged by learned
counsel for assailing the impugned Memorandum of Charges
is that the same is vague and based on surmises and
conjectures and, therefore, liable to be quashed.
23) In the above context, it would be appropriate to
reproduce the statement of articles of charge that has been
framed against the petitioner:
“That the said Shri Badavath Kishan, EE (Civ) (GO-3367L) while
posted with 81 RCC/762 BRTF(P) Vijayak, C/O 56 APO {presently
posted at HQ 31 BRTF (P) Sampark} and functioning as Officer
Commanding for the period from Nov 2019 to 14 Mar 2022, has
indulged in an illegal financial transaction with Code No 1691 CPL
(Maz) Alauddin Ansari S/o Rahmali Miya, Vill- Domahani, PO-
Murbhanga, Dist-Dumka (Jharkhand) who was a CPL/Mazdoor
Deployed at Detachment Hanuthang within the area of
responsibility of 81 RCC (P) Vijayak. CPL/Mazdoor Alauddin Ansari
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 18 of 23
S/o Rahmali Miya was recruited on 22 Nov 2021 at Dett Hanuthang
of 81 RCC against Muster Roll No. 25471 with Code No. 4643 as per
Medical Examination form. CPL/Mazdoor Alauddin Ansari was
discharged from his duties on 01 Apr 2022 while he was holding
Code No 1691 in Muster Roll No 25420 maintained by Dett
Hanuthang of 81 RCC (P) Vijayak during the FY 2021-22.
2. As corroborated through Bank statements, the said officer,
inappropriately received a sum of Rs 4,50,000/- (Rupees four lakh
fifty thousand only) by cash and digital payments through Axis Bank
and SBI Bank accounts during the year 2021-22 from CPL/Mazdoor
Alauddin Ansari S/o Rahmali Miya for recruitment of labourers
within the area of 81 RCC. However, the officer was posted out form
81 RCC (P) Vijayak without refunding the said amount. In spite of
being aware of the Rules and Regulations governing his service,
wherein financial transactions between a Government Servant and
a Person/Firm/Institution having financial dealings/trade is
prohibited, still the officer violate Rule 16(4)(i)(a) of CCS (Conduct)
Rules, 1964.
3. By his above act, the said Shri Badavath Kishan, EE(Civ) (GO-
3367L) has failed to maintain absolute integrity and exhibited
misconduct, which is unbecoming of a Government Servant. He has
also misused his official position, thereby violating sub Rule 1(i), (iii)
& (xv) of Rule 3 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
24) From a perusal of the aforesaid statement of articles of
the charges, it is clear that the same contains the full
particulars of the charges and there is no vagueness in the
same. It is clearly indicated in the articles of charges that the
petitioner has indulged in financial transactions with CPL
Mazdoor Alauddin Ansari, with whom he had official dealings.
The memo of charges also indicates as to how much amount
the petitioner had received from the aforenamed person and,
in fact, even the details of the transaction between the
petitioner and the aforenamed Mazdoor are mentioned in the
statement of imputation of misconduct. The list of documents
attached to the articles of charge gives the details of the bank
statements and other material on the basis of which the
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 19 of 23
charges are sought to be proved against the petitioner. Thus,
contention of the petitioner that the charges are vague and
based on surmises and conjectures, is without any
substance.
25) Apart from the above, it is to be noted that there is very
limited scope for a Writ Court to interfere in the disciplinary
enquiry at the stage of framing of charges. It is only if the
charges framed are contrary to any law or the same are
absolutely vague so as to prevent the delinquent official from
making an effective defence to the same that the Court can
interfere. At this stage, the Court has no jurisdiction to go into
the correctness or otherwise of the charges. It is only the
disciplinary authority and the enquiry officer who have the
jurisdiction to go into all these issues. Reliance in this regard
is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of Union of India and others vs. Upendra Singh, (1994) 3
SCC 357. Paras (6) and 7 of the said judgment are relevant to
the context and the same are reproduced as under:
6.In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary
inquiry the tribunal or court can interfere only if on
the charges framed (read with imputation or
particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or
other irregularity alleged can be said to have been
made out or the charges framed are contrary to
any law. At this stage, the tribunal has no
jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of
the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the
functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or
otherwise of the charges is a matter for the
disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 20 of 23
the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if
the matter comes to court or tribunal, they have no
jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or
into the correctness of the findings recorded by the
disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as
the case may be. The function of the court/tribunal
is one of judicial review, the parameters of which
are repeatedly laid down by this Court. It would be
sufficient to quote the decision in H.B. Gandhi,
Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing
Authority, Kamal v. Gopi Nath & Sons5. The Bench
comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then
was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle
thus : (SCC p. 317, para
8) “Judicial review, it is trite, is not
directed against the decision but is confined
to the decision-making process. Judicial
review cannot extend to the examination of
the correctness or reasonableness of a
decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of
judicial review is to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment and not to
ensure that the authority after according fair
treatment reaches, on a matter which it is
authorized by law to decide, a conclusion
which is correct in the eyes of the Court.
Judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in which
the decision is made. It will be erroneous to
think that the Court sits in judgment not only
on the correctness of the decision making
process but also on the correctness of the
decision itself.”
7.Now, if a court cannot interfere with the truth or
correctness of the charges even in a proceeding
against the final order, it is ununderstandable how
can that be done by the tribunal at the stage of
framing of charges? In this case, the Tribunal has
held that the charges are not sustainable (the
finding that no culpability is alleged and no corrupt
motive attributed), not on the basis of the articles
of charges and the statement of imputations but 5
1992 Supp (2) SCC 312 mainly on the basis of the
material produced by the respondent before it, as
we shall presently indicate.”
26) In the face of the foregoing legal position, it is clear that
the scope of this Court in interfering in the enquiry that has
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 21 of 23
been initiated against the petitioner at this stage is very
limited. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to
convince this Court that the charges framed against him are
contrary to law or that the same are vague lacking in material
particulars. Therefore, it is not open to this Court at this stage
to interfere in the enquiry proceedings.
27) Lastly, it is been contended by learned counsel for the
petitioner that the Memorandum of Charges has been served
upon the petitioner belatedly. In this context, it is to be noted
that the transactions which form the basis of the impugned
Memorandum of Charges pertain to the years 2021 and 2022.
Before framing the charges, a Court of Inquiry was conducted
to ascertain the veracity of the allegations made against the
petitioner. It is thereafter that the Memorandum of Charges
dated 27th February 2025 came to be framed against the
petitioner. In these circumstances, there was no undue delay
in framing of memorandum of charges against the petitioner.
It is true that, ordinarily, the enquiry has to be initiated
against a delinquent official without any undue delay but
there is no straight-jacket formula laying down that if an
inquiry is initiated after a particular period of time, the same
would get vitiated. In these circumstances, the ground
projected by the petitioner cannot form a basis for quashing
the impugned Memorandum of Charges.
WP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 22 of 23
28) For what has been discussed hereinbefore, the petition,
being devoid of merit, is dismissed accordingly. The interim
order shall stand vacated.
29) The record be returned to learned counsel for the
respondents.
(Sanjay Dhar)
Judge
SRINAGAR
07.08.2026
“Bhat Altaf-Secretary”
Whether the Judgement is speaking: YES
Whether the Judgement is reportable: YES/NoWP(C) No.1082/2025 Page 23 of 23
