Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/O … vs State Of Rajasthan on 28 July, 2026
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2784/2021
URN: CRLMP / 5117U / 2021
Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/o Shri Hanuman Sahai,
Aged About 42 Years, Resident Of Plot No. 242, Taruchaya Nagar,
Opposite Airport, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.
2. Additional Commissioner Income Tax, Central Circle 1,
Ncr Building, Bhagwan Dass Road, Statue Circle, C
Scheme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan- 302005.
3. Income Tax Officer, Ward 7(2), C-95, Baba Siddhanath
Bhawan Janpath Lal Kothi Jaipur, Rajasthan-302005.
----Respondents
Connected With
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2570/2021
URN: CRLMP / 4724U / 2021
Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/o Shri Hanuman Sahai,
Aged About 42 Years, - Resident Of Plot No. 242, Taruchaya
Nagar, Opposite Airport, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.
2. Additional Commissioner Income Tax, Central Circle 1,
Ncr Building, Bhagwan Dass Road, Statue Circle, C
Shceme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan-302005.
3. Income Tax Officer, Ward No. 7(2), Ncr Building, Bhagwan
Dass Road, Statue Circle, C Scheme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur,
Rajasthan-302005.
----Respondents
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2571/2021
URN: CRLMP / 4725U / 2021
Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/o Shri Hanuman Sahai,
Aged About 42 Years, Resident Of Plot No. 242, Taruchaya Nagar,
Opposite Airport, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj).
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----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.
2. Additional Commissioner Income Tax, Central Circle 1,
Ncr Building, Bhagwan Dass Road, Statue Circle, C
Shceme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan-302005.
3. Income Tax Officer, Ward No. 7(2), Ncr Building, Bhagwan
Dass Road, Statue Circle, C Scheme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur,
Rajasthan-302005.
----Respondents
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2575/2021
URN: CRLMP / 4732U / 2021
Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/o Shri Hanuman Sahai,
Aged About 42 Years, Resident Of Plot No. 242, Taruchaya Nagar,
Opposite Airport, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.
2. Additional Commissioner Income Tax, Central Circle 1,
Ncr Building, Bhagwan Dass Road, Statue Circle, C
Shceme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan-302005.
3. Income Tax Officer, Ward No. 7(2), Ncr Building, Bhagwan
Dass Road, Statue Circle, C Scheme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur,
Rajasthan-302005.
----Respondents
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2800/2021
URN: CRLMP / 5133U / 2021
Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/o Shri Hanuman Sahai,
Aged About 42 Years, Resident Of Plot No. 242, Taruchaya Nagar,
Opposite Airport, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.
2. Additional Commissioner Income Tax, Central Circle 1,
Ncr Building, Bhagwan Dass Road, Statue Circle, C
Scheme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan- 302005.
3. Income Tax Officer, Ward 7(2), C-95, Baba Siddhanath
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Bhawan Janpath Lal Kothi Jaipur, Rajasthan-302005.
----Respondents
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2815/2021
URN: CRLMP / 5159U / 2021
Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/o Shri Hanuman Sahai,
Aged About 42 Years, Resident Of Plot No. 242, Taruchaya Nagar,
Opposite Airport, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.
2. Additional Commissioner Income Tax, Central Circle 1,
Ncr Building, Bhagwan Dass Road, Statue Circle, C
Scheme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan- 302005.
3. Income Tax Officer, Ward 7(2), C-95, Baba Siddhanath
Bhawan Janpath Lal Kothi Jaipur, Rajasthan-302005.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Prakul Khurana
Mr. Aryan Kukkar
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Manvendra Singh Shekhawat, PP
Mr. Sandeep Pathak
Ms. Jaya Pathak
Ms. Shafali Sharma
JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND
Order
1. Date of conclusion of arguments 22/07/2026
2. Date on which the order was reserved 22/07/2026
Whether the full order or only the operative part is Full
3.
pronounced Judgment
4. Date of pronouncement 28/07/2026
Reportable
For convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided in the
following parts: -
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INDEX
(1) Factual Matrix ..............................................................4
(2) Submissions of counsel for the petitioner:...................5
(3) Submission on behalf of the respondents:...................7
(4) Discussions and Analysis:.............................................9
(5) Conclusion:..................................................................23
(6) Parting Remarks:........................................................24
Factual Matrix:
1. Since common question of law and facts are involved in all
these criminal misc. petitions, hence, with the consent of counsel
for the parties, these matters are taken up together for final
disposal and are being decided by this common order.
2. In all these criminal misc. petitions, the petitioner-Babloo
Sharma has made a prayer for quashing of the proceedings
pending against him before the Court of Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate (Economic Offence), Jaipur Metropolitan-II for the
offence punishable under Section 276CC of the Income Tax Act,
1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1961").
3. For the sake of convenience, the prayer mentioned in SB
Criminal Misc. Petition No.2784/2021 has been taken into
consideration and the same reads as under:
"It is, therefore, humbly prayed that your
Lordship may be pleased to quash the prosecution
proceedings pending before the Learned Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offence) Jaipur
Metropolitan-Jaipur-I under Section 276CC of Income
Tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2006-07 in Case
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No. 71/2013, Titled As, "Additional Commissioner
Income Tax, Central Circle 1, Jaipur Vs. Babloo
Sharma" against the petitioner.
Any other appropriate order/direction, which this
Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the present case may kindly be
passed in favour of the petitioner."
Submissions of counsel for the petitioner:
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a search was
conducted on 18.11.2010 by the Income Tax Department
(hereinafter referred to as respondent-Department) at the
business and residential premises of the company-M/s Gold Sukh
Trade India Limited and its Directors, wherein the petitioner is also
one of the directors. Thereafter, a notice dated 09.08.2011, under
Section 153A of the Act of 1961 was issued by the respondent-
Department to the petitioner to file his Income Tax Returns, which
came to be received by the petitioner on 11.08.2011. Learned
counsel submits that the Income Tax Returns were supposed to be
submitted within a period of 35 days from the date of receipt of
the aforesaid notice. Learned counsel further submits that on
06.12.2010 and 19.01.2011, the petitioner sent two letters to the
respondent-Department for providing him copies of the material
seized during the course of search along with the panchnama and
statements recorded by the search party. Learned counsel submits
that despite the aforesaid repeated requests of the petitioner,
when the desired documents were not supplied to him, on
19.10.2011, a letter was once again sent by the petitioner to the
respondent-Department for providing the aforesaid documents.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that till date, the
aforesaid desired documents have not been supplied to the
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petitioner by the respondent-Department, but a note has been
appended by the respondent-Department at the bottom of the
petitioner's letter dated 19.10.2011, indicating therein the fact
that the representative of the petitioner has received the desired
documents, but in fact, these documents were never received by
his authorised representative. Learned counsel submits that in the
reply to the instant petition, a document has been placed on
record to show that certain documents were supplied by the
respondent-Department to the authorised representative of the
petitioner on 21.11.2011. Learned counsel submits that the letter
written by VKJ and Company (Chartered Accountants) dated
21.11.2011 does not give any reference of the case pertaining to
the petitioner and even the name of the petitioner is not
mentioned therein. Hence, it is clear that the desired documents
were never supplied to the petitioner. He further submits that
even at the time of filing of the complaint against the petitioner,
no documentary evidence was produced on record to show that
the desired documents were ever supplied to the petitioner. He
further submits that as per the mandate contained under Section
132 of the Act of 1961, the respondent-Department was supposed
to supply the copy of panchnama, statements recorded by the
search party and all the annexures prepared during the search
proceedings, but aforesaid exercise was not done and
straightaway, a notice was issued without supplying copies of the
same to the petitioner.
6. Learned counsel submits that since the aforesaid desired
documents were not supplied to the petitioner, he was not in a
position to file Income Tax Returns, hence, under these
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circumstances, the petitioner has not committed any offence for
which the impugned complaints have been submitted against him.
7. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed
reliance upon the following judgments:-
1. Lal Saraf Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. reported
in 1997 SCC OnLine Pat 731;
2. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Vs.
V.K. Gupta reported in [2020] 424 ITR 602
(Delhi);
3. The Income Tax Officer, Ward-2 Vs.
Rajendra Prasad Vaish reported in 2024 SCC
OnLine Raj 933
8. Lastly, it has been prayed that the impugned proceedings
arising out of the aforesaid complaint be quashed.
Submission on behalf of the respondents:
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent-Department opposed the arguments raised by learned
counsel for the petitioner and an objection has also been taken
with regard to inordinate delay of 8 years in filing the instant
petitions. Learned counsel submits that the complaint was
submitted against the petitioner in the year 2013, while these
criminal misc. petitions have been submitted in the year 2021,
i.e., after a delay of 8 years without giving any justified reason for
approaching this Court at such a belated stage. Learned counsel
submits that no request was made by the petitioner prior to expiry
of the period of limitation of submission of the Income Tax Return.
The 35-day time period, as mentioned in the notice dated
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09.08.2011, received by the petitioner on 11.08.2011, came to be
expired on 15.09.2011, while the petitioner wrote a letter to the
respondent-Department for the first time on 19.10.2011 and the
desired documents were supplied to his authorized representatives
on the same day, i.e. 19.10.2011. Learned counsel submits that
the petitioner is raising a dispute regarding receipt of the desired
documents by his authorized representative. Although, the
signatures of the petitioner's authorized representative appeared
to be a match, but still, the question whether the aforesaid
desired documents were received by the petitioner's authorized
representative or not is a disputed question of fact, which cannot
be adjudicated by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction,
contained under Section 482 Cr.P.C. He submits that whatever
arguments have been raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, in his defence, would be appreciated by the Trial Court,
at the appropriate stage of trial. The defence of the accused
cannot be looked into and appreciated by this Court by conducting
a mini trial or making fishing & roving enquiry. He submits that
now the case is posted before the Trial Court for recording of
evidence of the witnesses. He further submits that at the time of
search, the mandate contained under Section 132 of the Act of
1961 was complied with.
10. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the
respondent-Department has placed reliance upon the following
judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court:-
1. Anukul Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Anr. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060;
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2. Digvijaysinh Himmatsinh Jadeja Vs. The
State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in (2023) 20 SCC
398;
3. HMT Watches Ltd. Vs. M.A. Abida & Anr.
reported in (2015) 11 SCC 776; &
4. Rajiv Thapar & Ors. Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor
reported in (2013) 3 SCC 330.
11. Lastly, he argued that in view of the submissions made
hereinabove, these criminal misc. petitions submitted by the
petitioner be dismissed.
Discussions and Analysis:
12. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and
perused the material available on record.
13. Perusal of the record indicates that as many as six different
complaints have been submitted against the petitioner under
Section 276CC of the Act of 1961 with the allegation of non-filing
of the revised Income Tax Returns for the assessment years 2005-
06, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10 & 2010-11 within the
time prescribed in the notice dated 09.08.2011 issued to him
under Section 153A of the Act of 1961, i.e., on or before
15.09.2011. This notice was issued to the petitioner on
09.08.2011 and the same was received by him on 11.08.2011,
whereby the 35-days time period mentioned in the aforesaid
notice expired on 15.09.2011.
14. As per the provisions of Section 276CC of the Act of 1961, if
a person willfully fails to furnish the Income Tax Return by the due
date, then the same amounts to violation of the aforesaid Section.
Section 276CC of the Act of 1961 reads as under:-
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276CC. Failure to furnish returns of income.
If a person willfully fails to furnish in due time the
return of fringe benefits which he is required to
furnish under sub-section (1) of section 115WD or by
notice given under sub-section (2) of the said section
or section 115WH or the return of income which he is
required to furnish under sub-section (1) of section
139 or by notice given under clause (i) of sub-section
(1) of section 142 or section 148 or section 153-A, he
shall be punishable,-
(i) in a case where the amount of tax, which
would have been evaded if the failure had not been
discovered, exceeds twenty five hundred thousand
rupees, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than six months but which may
extend to seven years and with fine;
(ii) in any other case, with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than three months but
which may extend to two years and with fine:
Provided that a person shall not be proceeded
against under this section for failure to furnish in due
time the return of fringe benefits under sub-section
(1) of section 115WD or return of income under sub-
section (1) of section 139
-(i) for any assessment year commencing prior
to the 1st day of April, 1975; or
(ii)for any assessment year commencing on or
after the 1st day of April, 1975, if - (a) the return is
furnished by him before the expiry of the assessment
year; or
(b) the tax payable by such person, not being a
company, on the total income determined on regular
assessment, as reduced by the advance tax or self-
assessment tax, if any, paid before the expiry of the
assessment year, and any tax deducted or collected at
source, does not exceed ten thousand rupees.
15. Section 153A of the Act of 1961 deals with the provisions of
assessment in case of search or requisition. Section 153A of the
Act of 1961 reads as under:-
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"153A. Assessment in case of search or
requisition.--
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 139,
section 147, section 148, section 149, section 151 and
section 153, in the case of a person where a search is
initiated under section 132 or books of account, other
documents or any assets are requisitioned under
section 132A after the 31st day of May, 2003, the
Assessing Officer shall--
(a) issue notice to such person requiring him to
furnish within such period, as may be specified in the
notice, the return of income in respect of each
assessment year falling within six assessment years
[and for the relevant assessment year or years]
referred to in clause (b), in the prescribed form and
verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth
such other particulars as may be prescribed and the
provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply
accordingly as if such return were a return required to
be furnished under section 139;
(b) assess or reassess the total income of six
assessment years immediately preceding the
assessment year relevant to the previous year in which
such search is conducted or requisition is made [and
for the relevant assessment year or years]:
Provided that the Assessing Officer shall assess
or reassess the total income in respect of each
assessment year falling within such six assessment
years [and for the relevant assessment year or years]:
Provided further that assessment or
reassessment, if any, relating to any assessment year
falling within the period of six assessment years [and
for the relevant assessment year or years] referred to
in this [sub-section] pending on the date of initiation
of the search under section 132 or making of
requisition under section 132A, as the case may be,
shall abate:
Provided also that the Central Government may
by rules made by it and published in the Official
Gazette (except in cases where any assessment or
reassessment has abated under the second proviso),
specify the class or classes of cases in which the
Assessing Officer shall not be required to issue notice
for assessing or reassessing the total income for six
assessment years immediately preceding the
assessment year relevant to the previous year in which
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search is conducted or requisition is made [and for
the relevant assessment year or years]:
Provided also that no notice for assessment or
reassessment shall be issued by the Assessing Officer
for the relevant assessment year or years unless--
(a) the Assessing Officer has in his possession
books of account or other documents or evidence
which reveal that the income, represented in the form
of asset, which has escaped assessment amounts to or
is likely to amount to fifty lakh rupees or more in the
relevant assessment year or in aggregate in the
relevant assessment years;
(b) the income referred to in clause (a) or part
thereof has escaped assessment for such year or
years; and
(c) the search under section 132 is initiated or
requisition under section 132A is made on or after the
1st day of April, 2017.
(2) If any proceeding initiated or any order of
assessment or reassessment made under sub-section
(1) has been annulled in appeal or any other legal
proceeding, then, notwithstanding anything contained
in sub-section (1) or section 153, the assessment or
reassessment relating to any assessment year which
has abated under the second proviso to sub-section
(1), shall stand revived with effect from the date of
receipt of the order of such annulment by the Principal
Commissioner or Commissioner:
Provided that such revival shall cease to have
effect, if such order of annulment is set aside."
16. The case of the petitioner is that a search was conducted at
the business and residential premises of the company-M/s Gold
Sukh Trade India Limited and its Directors, including the
petitioner, on 18.11.2010 and the notice under Section 153A of
the Act of 1961 was issued to him on 09.08.2011 by the
respondent-Department and the same was received by him on
11.08.2011. By way of the aforesaid notice, directions were issued
to the petitioner to file Income Tax Return within 35 days of
receipt of the aforesaid notice. However, it is the case of the
petitioner that the copies of the material seized during the course
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of search along with the panchnama and statements recorded by
the search party were not provided to him by the respondent-
Department, as per the Taxpayers' Charter. Hence, under these
circumstances, the petitioner sent the letters dated 06.12.2010
and 19.01.2011 to the respondent-Department, requesting for
providing him copies of the aforesaid desired documents.
However, these documents were not supplied to him, hence, again
on 19.10.2011, a letter was sent by the petitioner to the
respondent-Department with the request for providing him the
desired documents, but the same were still not supplied to him.
Therefore, he could not file the Income Tax Returns and hence,
there was no willful default on his part.
The above facts have been contended and disputed by the
respondent-Department on the ground that they have not
received the aforementioned letters dated 06.12.2010 and
19.01.2011. It is the case of the respondent-Department that the
first letter received by them was the one dated 19.10.2011 and
the desired documents were supplied to the authorized
representative of the petitioner on the very same day, i.e. on
19.10.2011.
It is also the case of the respondent-Department that again
on 21.11.2011, the desired documents were supplied to the
authorized representative of the petitioner when the same letter
was received on 21.11.2011. This fact has been disputed and
denied by the petitioner.
17. Now the questions that remain for consideration of this Court
are "Whether the petitioner requested the respondent-Department
on 06.12.2010 and 19.01.2011 for furnishing the seizure
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documents, panchnama etc. or not?; Or "Whether for the first
time this request was made on 19.10.2011, i.e., after expiry of 35
days on 15.09.2011?; Or "Whether the desired documents were
supplied to the authorized representative of the petitioner or not?"
All these questions are disputed questions of facts which are
required to be proved by both the sides by leading evidence in this
regard.
18. At this initial stage, this Court while exercising its inherent
jurisdiction contained under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not supposed to
conduct a "mini-trial" or "fishing enquiry" or weigh the sufficiency
of the evidence. Certainly, this task falls within the domain of the
Trial Court and is supposed to be undertaken by the Trial Court
itself at the appropriate stage of trial.
19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajiv Thapar
(supra) has held in paras 25 to 28, which reads as under:-
25. Section 482 CrPC is being extracted hereunder:
"482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.--
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may
be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice."
The discretion vested in a High Court under Section 482
CrPC can be exercised suo motu to prevent the abuse of
process of a court, and/or to secure the ends of justice.
26. This Court had an occasion to examine the matter in
State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [(2005) 1 SCC 568 :
2005 SCC (Cri) 415] (incidentally the said judgment was
heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent
complainant), wherein it was held thus: (SCC p. 581, para 29)
“29. Regarding the argument of the accused having to face
the trial despite being in a position to produce material of
unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the
powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is unlimited whereunder
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in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders
as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the
parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal case [State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426].”
27. Recently, this Court again had an occasion to examine
the ambit and scope of Section 482 CrPC in Rukmini Narvekar
v. Vijaya Satardekar [(2008) 14 SCC 1 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri)
721] wherein in the main order it was observed that the width
of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, was unlimited. In
the said judgment, this Court held that the High Court could
make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the
process of any court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
In a concurring separate order passed in the same case, it was
additionally observed that under Section 482 CrPC, the High
Court was free to consider even material that may be produced
on behalf of the accused, to arrive at a decision whether the
charge as framed could be maintained. The aforesaid
parameters shall be kept in mind while we examine whether the
High Court ought to have exercised its inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC in the facts and circumstances of this
case.
28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is
not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the
allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the
accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty
the defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if the
accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in
the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it
would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial.
This is so because it would result in giving finality to the
accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without
allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence
to substantiate the same. The converse is, however, not true,
because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not
subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would
still be in a position to succeed by establishing his defences by
producing evidence in accordance with law. There is an endless
list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal
position that in a case where the prosecution/complainant has
levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charge(s)
levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie
evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial
must be held.”
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20. Even in the case of HMT Watches Ltd. (supra), the
Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the disputed question of facts
would be determined by the Trial Court and the defence of the
accused would not be looked into and adjudicated under Section
482 Cr.P.C. It has been held in paras 10 to 15, which reads as
under:-
“10. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties, we are of the view that the accused
(Respondent 1) challenged the proceedings of criminal
complaint cases before the High Court, taking factual
defences. Whether the cheques were given as security
or not, or whether there was outstanding liability or
not is a question of fact which could have been
determined only by the trial court after recording
evidence of the parties. In our opinion, the High Court
should not have expressed its view on the disputed
questions of fact in a petition under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, to come to a conclusion
that the offence is not made out. The High Court has
erred in law in going into the factual aspects of the
matter which were not admitted between the parties.
The High Court further erred in observing that Section
138(b) of the NI Act stood uncomplied with, even
though Respondent 1 (accused) had admitted that he
replied to the notice issued by the complainant. Also,
the fact, as to whether the signatory of demand
notice was authorised by the complainant company or
not, could not have been examined by the High Court
in its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure when such plea was controverted
by the complainant before it.
11. In Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Rajvir
Industries Ltd., (2008) 13 SCC 678, this Court has
made the following observations explaining the
parameters of jurisdiction of the High Court in
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure: (SCC pp. 685-87, paras
17 & 22)
“17. The parameters of jurisdiction of the High
Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure is now well settled.
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[2026:RJ-JP:28285] (17 of 24) [CRLMP-2784/2021]Although it is of wide amplitude, a great deal of
caution is also required in its exercise. What is
required is application of the well-known legal
principles involved in the matter.
* * *
22. Ordinarily, a defence of an accused although
appears to be plausible should not be taken into
consideration for exercise of the said jurisdiction. Yet
again, the High Court at that stage would not
ordinarily enter into a disputed question of fact. It,
however, does not mean that documents of
unimpeachable character should not be taken into
consideration at any cost for the purpose of finding
out as to whether continuance of the criminal
proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of
court or that the complaint petition is filed for causing
mere harassment to the accused. While we are not
oblivious of the fact that although a large number of
disputes should ordinarily be determined only by the
civil courts, but criminal cases are filed only for
achieving the ultimate goal, namely, to force the
accused to pay the amount due to the complainant
immediately. The courts on the one hand should not
encourage such a practice; but, on the other, cannot
also travel beyond its jurisdiction to interfere with the
proceeding which is otherwise genuine. The courts
cannot also lose sight of the fact that in certain
matters, both civil proceedings and criminal
proceedings would be maintainable.”
12. In Rallis India Ltd. v. Poduru Vidya Bhushan,
(2011) 13 SCC 88, this Court expressed its views on
this point as under: (SCC p. 93, para 12)
“12. At the threshold, the High Court should not
have interfered with the cognizance of the complaints
having been taken by the trial court. The High Court
could not have discharged the respondents of the said
liability at the threshold. Unless the parties are given
opportunity to lead evidence, it is not possible to
come to a definite conclusion as to what was the date
when the earlier partnership was dissolved and since
what date the respondents ceased to be the partners
of the firm.”
13. In view of the law laid down by this Court as
above, in the present case the High Court exceeded
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its jurisdiction by giving its opinion on disputed
questions of fact, before the trial court.
14. Lastly, it is contended on behalf of Respondent 1
that it was not a case of insufficiency of fund, as such,
ingredients of the offence punishable under Section
138 of the NI Act are not made out. We are not
inclined to accept the contention of the learned
counsel for Respondent 1. In this connection, it is
sufficient to mention that in Pulsive Technologies (P)
Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 13 SCC 18, this Court
has already held that instruction of “stop payment”
issued to the banker could be sufficient to make the
accused liable for an offence punishable under Section
138 of the NI Act. Earlier also in Modi Cements Ltd. v.
Kuchil Kumar Nandi, (1998) 3 SCC 249, this Court has
clarified that if a cheque is dishonoured because of
stop payment instruction even then the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act gets
attracted.
15. For the reasons as discussed above, we find that
the High Court has committed grave error of law in
quashing the criminal complaints filed by the
appellant in respect of the offence punishable under
Section 138 of the NI Act, in exercise of powers under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by
accepting factual defences of the accused which were
disputed ones. Such defences, if taken before the trial
court, after recording of the evidence, can be better
appreciated.”
21. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Anukul Singh (supra) that disputed and factual
appreciation of evidence of both sides is beyond the scope of
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and it has been
held in paras 9.2 to 11.3 as under:-
“9.2. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that
this Court has consistently held that at the stage of
charge sheet, factual disputes and appreciation of
evidence are beyond the scope of inquiry under Section
482 Cr.P.C. The veracity of allegations is a matter for
trial. Reliance was placed on Md. Allauddin Khan v.
State of Bihar, wherein this Court observed:
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[2026:RJ-JP:28285] (19 of 24) [CRLMP-2784/2021]“17. In our view the High Court had no
jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence of the
proceedings under of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, because whether there are
contradictions or/and inconsistencies in the
statements of the witnesses is essentially an
issue relating to appreciation of evidence
and the same can be gone into by the
Judicial Magistrate during Trial when the
entire evidence is adduced by the parties.”
9.3. Placing reliance on the above principle, it was
submitted that the impugned order dated 22.10.2019 passed
by the High Court dismissing the appellant’s Section 482
petition suffers from no illegality. The High Court correctly
recorded as follows:
“No material irregularity in the procedure
followed by Court below has been pointed
out. It is not a case of grave injustice
justifying interference in this application at
this stage. In view thereof, I do not find any
illegality or infirmity in impugned charge
sheet. This application lacks merit and is
accordingly dismissed.”
9.4. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel
contended that a cognizable offence is clearly made out
from the material gathered during investigation; the
matter is under trial; and if the appellant has any
defence, the same can only be established before the
trial Court. The proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
cannot be invoked to short-circuit the trial process.
Accordingly, the present Criminal Appeal is devoid of
merit and liable to be dismissed.
10. We have heard the rival submissions and
perused the materials available on record including the
judgments relied by them.
11. Before adverting to the facts of the present
case, it is necessary to recapitulate the settled legal
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principles governing the exercise of inherent powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is well established that
though the High Court possesses wide and plenary
inherent jurisdiction, such power is not unbridled or
unlimited, but circumscribed by self-imposed restraints
evolved through judicial pronouncements.
11.1. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal, at paragraph 102, laid down illustrative categories
where quashing of proceedings is justified. These are:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of
a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR
or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
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(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or, where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the Act
concerned, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.”
The categories in Bhajan Lal are illustrative and not
exhaustive, but they provide guiding principles to
balance two competing considerations – (a) preventing
abuse of process of law, and (b) ensuring that criminal
proceedings are not stifled at the threshold on disputed
questions of fact.
11.2. Equally, this Court has consistently cautioned
that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot embark upon a “mini-trial”
or weigh the sufficiency of evidence, which falls within
the domain of the trial Court. The scope of enquiry is
confined to whether, on a plain reading of the
FIR/complaint and accompanying material, the
ingredients of the alleged offence are disclosed. [See:
Rajiv Thapar v. Madal Lal Kapoor, HMT Watches v.
Abida, and Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. the
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and others].
11.3. In Md. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar, it
was reiterated that appreciation of contradictions or
inconsistencies in witness statements lies within the
exclusive domain of the trial Court and not in
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[2026:RJ-JP:28285] (22 of 24) [CRLMP-2784/2021]v. Aryan Singh, it was emphasized that the High Court
had exceeded its jurisdiction by examining the merits
of the prosecution’s case and holding that charges were
not proved, which is a matter strictly for trial.”
22. Had it been the case of the petitioner that he sent two letters
dated 06.12.2010 and 19.01.2011 to the respondent-Department
with a request for providing him the seizure documents,
panchnama, etc. and had it been his case that even after receipt
of the notice under Section 153A of the Act of 1961, the same
request was made prior to expiry of 35 days, the situation might
have been different for appreciating the arguments of the
petitioner.
23. Since, no documentary evidence or proof in this regard has
been placed on the record by the petitioner to show even prima
facie that the needful exercise was done at his end to show his
bonafides, the situation could have been different. But not a single
document/letter dated 06.12.2010 & 19.01.2011 has been placed
on record in support of the contentions. Simply a reference of
those letters is given in the letter dated 19.10.2011, which has
been placed on record. The fact of submitting and sending the
letters dated 06.12.2010 & 19.01.2011 by the petitioner to the
Department has been seriously disputed by the respondents.
24. Furthermore, no document has been placed on record by the
petitioner to demonstrate that from the date of issuance and
receipt of notice under Section 153A of the Act of 1961 and before
the expiry of the period mentioned therein, i.e., in between
09.08.2011/11.08.2011 to 15.09.2011, any such request was
made by the petitioner to the respondent-Department for
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providing him the search/seizure documents, panchnama, etc. for
submission of the revised returns.
25. Hence, in absence of such prima facie evidence, it cannot be
presumed that the petitioner was ‘innocent’ or not or that non-
filing of the Income Tax Return within the prescribed time was
willful or not? and Whether there was any ‘mensrea’ in the mind
or on the part of the petitioner or not? All these questions are
disputed questions of facts which need to be proved and
established by the petitioner and the respondents at the
appropriate stage of the trial and certainly these disputed
questions of facts would be appreciated by the Trial Court at the
appropriate stage by evaluating the evidence led by both the
sides.
26. It is a well-established principle of law that at the stage of
quashing the proceedings, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., at the stage
of taking cognizance and even at the stage of framing of charge,
only prima facie case is required to be seen. The defence of the
accused is not supposed to be looked into, at this initial stage and
the same would be appreciated by the Trial Court at the
appropriate stage of the trial.
Conclusion:
27. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, this Court finds
no merits and substance in these petitions and the judgments
relied upon by the petitioner would not apply at this stage because
in all these judgments, there was appreciation of evidence before
the Trial Court and accordingly, benefit of the same was extended
to the accused persons by giving them benefit of doubt.
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Hence, the instant petitions are liable to be and are hereby
rejected. Stay applications and all pending applications, if any,
also stand rejected.
Parting Remarks:
28. Before parting with this order, it is made clear that whatever
has been observed by this Court is not an expression of opinion by
this Court on the merits of the case. The Trial Court is directed to
decide all the pending matters, on the basis of the evidence led by
both the sides and on the basis of the merits, without being
influenced by any of the opinions or expressions made by this
Court, while passing the instant order.
29. Parties are left free to bear their own costs.
30. Let a copy of this order be placed separately in each file of
the misc. petitions.
(ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J
25-30/Karan
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