Uttarakhand High Court
BA1/885/2025 on 18 April, 2026
Office Notes,
reports, orders or
proceedings or
No Date COURT'S OR JUDGES'S ORDERS
directions and
Registrar's order
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BA1 No. 885 of 2025
Hon'ble Alok Mahra, J.
Mr. Saurabh Kumar Pandey and Ms. Sarita
Bisht, learned counsels for the applicant.
2. Mr. V.S. Pal, learned A.G.A. for the State.
3. The applicant – Bhupendra Singh @ Raju,
who is in judicial custody in connection with
FIR/Case Crime No. 37 of 2025, under Section 8
and 21 of NDPS Act and Section 109 of BNS and
Section 3/25 of Arms Act, registered at P.S.-
Nanakmatta, District Udham Singh Nagar, has
sought his release on bail.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the records.
5. The case of the prosecution is that when the
Police party was on patrolling duty, then the
applicant on seeing the Police party turned back
and drew his motorcycle in a high sped. Finding
his action suspicious, the Police party chased the
applicant and thereafter in the narrow bridge his
motorcycle slipped and the applicant ran towards
jungle. On the way, he started firing upon the
Police team. The Police team with their skills
remained unhurt. Despite warning, when the
applicant did not surrender, the Investigating
Officer fired a shot at him with his 9 mm pistol
and later on, it was discovered that the applicant
was hurt and fire shot stuck the applicant below
his knee in the right leg. When body of the
applicant was checked, 261.56 grams of smack
was recovered from his pocket. Applicant was
carried to the hospital where he was treated.
Since recovery was a chance recovery, therefore,
provisions of Section 50 were not applicable.
6. To this, learned counsel for the applicant
would submit that totally false and fabricated
story has been developed by the Police team
inasmuch as only one empty cartridge and two
live cartridges with country-made pistol were
alleged to have been recovered from the
possession of the applicant whereas in the FIR, it
is alleged that the applicant have shot several
rounds upon the Police team. It is further
submitted that as per the contents of the FIR,
inventory and the arrest memo were prepared on
the spot and FIR was lodged after a gap of almost
6 hours, but, the inventory report and the arrest
memo contains the FIR number.
7. Learned State Counsel, on instruction, has
submitted that there is no corresponding G.D.
entry reflecting the time of registration of the
F.I.R. number in inventory report and arrest
memo.
8. Learned counsel for the applicant has
further submitted that charges were framed on
11.09.2025, but, even after lapse of eight
months, not even a single prosecution witness has
been examined till date.
9. To support his case, learned counsel for the
applicant has drawn the attention of this Court to
the judgment passed by Hon’ble High Court of
Punjab and Haryana in the case of Kishori Paswan
Vs. State of Punjab. For ready reference,
paragraph 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment are
extracted hereinbelow:-
“7. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satender Kumar Antil’s case (supra) has
discussed this serious issue with regard to delay in trial and its effect
on the Right to Life of an individual under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India. Para 49 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:-
“49. Sub-section (1) mandates courts to continue the proceedings on a
day-to-day basis till the completion of evidence. Therefore, once a trial
starts, it should reach the logical end. Various directions have been
issued by this Court not to give unnecessary adjournments resulting in
the witnesses being won over. However, the non-compliance of
Section 309 continues with gay abandon. Perhaps courts alone cannot
be faulted as there are multiple reasons that lead to such
adjournments. Though the section makes adjournments and that too
not for a longer time period as an exception, they become the norm.
We are touching upon this provision only to show that any delay on
the part of the court or the prosecution would certainly violate Article
21. This is more so when the accused person is under incarceration.
This provision must be applied inuring to the benefit of the accused
while considering the application for bail. Whatever may be the nature
of the offence, a prolonged trial, appeal or a revision against an
accused or a convict under custody or incarceration, would be violative
of Article 21. While the courts will have to endeavour to complete at
least the recording of the evidence of the private witnesses, as
indicated by this Court on quite a few occasions, they shall make sure
that the accused does not suffer for the delay occasioned due to no
fault of his own”.
8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain’s case (supra)
has dealt with this issue with regard to delay in trial and long custody
of the accused person vis-a-vis the bar contained under Section 37 of
the NDPS Act. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment
contained in para Nos.19 and 20 are reproduced as under:-
19. A plain and literal interpretation of the conditions under Section
37 (i.e., that Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty
and would not commit any offence) would effectively exclude grant of
bail altogether, resulting in punitive detention and unsanctioned
preventive detention as well. Therefore, the only manner in which such
special conditions as enacted under Section 37 can be considered
within constitutional parameters is where the court is reasonably
satisfied on a prima facie look at the material on record (whenever the
bail application is made) that the accused is not guilty. Any other
interpretation, would result in complete denial of the bail to a person
accused of offences such as those enacted under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act.
20. The standard to be considered therefore, is one, where the court
would look at the material in a broad manner, and reasonably see
whether the accused’s guilt may be proved.
The judgments of this court have, therefore, emphasized that the
satisfaction which courts are expected to record, i.e., that the accused
may not be guilty, is only prima facie, based on a reasonable reading,
which does not call for meticulous examination of the materials
collected during investigation (as held in Union of India v. Rattan
Malik). Grant of bail on ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said
to be fettered by Section 37 of the Act, given the imperative of Section
436A which is applicable to offences under the NDPS Act too
(ref. Satender Kumar Antil supra). Having regard to these factors the
court is of the opinion that in the facts of this case, the appellant
deserves to be enlarged on bail.
9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dheeraj Kumar Shukla’s case (supra)
has observed as under:-
“3. It appears that some of the occupants of the ‘Honda City’ Car
including Praveen Maurya have since been released on regular bail. It
is true that the quantity recovered from the petitioner is commercial in
nature and the provisions of Section 37 of the Act may ordinarily be
attracted. However, in the absence of criminal antecedents and the
fact that the petitioner is in custody for the last two and a half years,
we are satisfied that the conditions of Section 37 of the Act can be
dispensed with at this stage, more so when the trial is yet to
commence though the charges have been framed.”
10. Though, the alleged contraband shown to be
recovered from the possession of the applicant is
commercial in quantity and provision of Section
37 of NDPS Act would be applicable, but,
considering the fact, as stated above, the whole
recovery and the incident appears to be doubtful
as arrest memo and inventory contain the FIR
number in which there is a gap of about six hours.
Furthermore, this Court has to balance the
personal liberty of the accused, as stated above,
even after a lapse of eight months, not even a
single prosecution witness has been examined.
Hence, this Court is of the view that it is a case fit
for bail and the applicant deserves to be enlarged
on bail.
11. The bail application is allowed.
12. Let the applicant be released on bail, on his
executing personal bond and furnishing two
reliable sureties, each of like amount, to the
satisfaction of Court concerned.
(Alok Mahra J.)
18.04.2026
Ujjwal
