Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ashok Kumar Saxena vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 29 July, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:57524
1 WP-14178-2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DEEPAK KHOT
ON THE 29th OF JULY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 14178 of 2019
ASHOK KUMAR SAXENA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Mr. Rahul Patel - Advocate for petitioner.
Ms. Shraddha Tiwari - Panel Lawyer for State.
ORDER
The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226
of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs:-
“1. This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the
relevant records, examine the same and quash the order dt.
19.03.2019 (Annexure-5) passed by respondent no.2.
2. To issue direction to the respondents be issuance of the
Writ of mandamus to give to the petitioner the pay scale
equivalent given to similar situated employees A.L. Thakur
(supra) Rs 515-800 from 01.04.1982, Rs.950-1530 from
01.01.1986, Rs.3050-4590 from dt. 01.01.1996 and corresponding
revised pay scale including arrears from way back and interest 8 %
per annum in the interest of justice.
3. Any other order/orders/writ/writs direction/directions this
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:57524
2 WP-14178-2019
Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper, may also be granted in
favour of the petitioner.
4. That the cost of petition Rs.20,000/- may also be awarded
to the petitioner.”
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was initially
appointed as a Time Keeper in the Work-Charged and Contingency Paid
Establishment under the Water Resources Department, Government of
Madhya Pradesh, and rendered approximately forty years of unblemished
service before attaining the age of superannuation on 31.08.2013. During his
service tenure, the petitioner was extended the pay scales of Rs.445-635 with
effect from 01.04.1982, Rs.825-1220 with effect from 01.01.1986, Rs.2750-
4400 with effect from 01.01.1996 and the corresponding revised pay scales.
The Hon’ble High Court, in the case of A.L. Thakur and Others v. State of
Madhya Pradesh and Others, directed the respondents to extend higher
revised pay scales to similarly situated Work-Charged and Contingency Paid
employees. The said judgment was duly implemented by the respondents in
respect of several similarly situated employees. The petitioner, being
identically situated to the employees who were granted the aforesaid benefit,
submitted representations seeking extension of the same pay scales. Upon
failure of the respondents to consider his claim, the petitioner approached
this Hon’ble Court by filing a writ petition. This Hon’ble Court, by order
dated 06.03.2017, directed the respondents to consider the petitioner’s claim
and to grant him the benefit if his case was found to be fully covered by the
judgment rendered in A.L. Thakur (supra) . Despite the aforesaid direction,
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:57524
3 WP-14178-2019
the respondents failed to decide the petitioner’s claim in its true perspective,
compelling the petitioner to initiate contempt proceedings. However, the
contempt petition came to be disposed of on the statement made on behalf of
the respondents that the order of this Hon’ble Court had been complied with.
Thereafter the petitioner again approached this Hon’ble Court by filing W.P.
No.685/2019, wherein this Hon’ble Court directed the respondents to pass a
reasoned order. Pursuant thereto, respondent No.2 passed an order dated
19.03.2019 rejecting the petitioner’s claim for parity with similarly situated
employees. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 19.03.2019 on the
ground that the same is arbitrary, discriminatory, contrary to the binding
judgments of this Hon’ble Court and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India.
3. It is submitted that the post of Time Keeper was re-designated as
Field Assistant (Sthal Sahayak) in the year 1996 and that the service
conditions of Time Keepers are governed by the M.P. Work Charged and
Contingency Paid Employees Pay Rules, as amended from time to time.
According to the petitioner, under the Pay Revision Rules of 1984, 1990, and
1998, he was entitled to the higher revised pay scales but was wrongly
continued in the lower scales. The petitioner further submits that the issue
regarding the pay scale of Time Keepers has already been decided in favour
of similarly situated employees in T.A. No. 993/1988, W.P. No. 16054/2003
(A.L. Thakur v. State of M.P.), and W.P. No. 17326/2003 (G.P. Shriwas v.
State of M.P.). The judgment in A.L. Thakur has been affirmed by the
Division Bench, and the Special Leave Petition filed by the State has also
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:57524
4 WP-14178-2019
been dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is contended that the post
of Amin carries the same pay scale as that of Time Keeper and that similarly
situated employees have already been granted the higher pay scales on the
principle of “equal pay for equal work” in terms of the judgment rendered in
A.L. Thakur (W.P. No. 16054/2003 arising out of O.A. No. 5178/2000,
decided on 27.06.2012). Being identically situated, the petitioner claims
entitlement to the same benefit under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
of India. Accordingly, the petitioner prays that the order dated 19.03.2019 be
quashed and the respondents be directed to grant him the pay scales
applicable to the post of Amin, along with all consequential monetary
benefits, including revision of pension and payment of arrears.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has taken objection in
regard to delay and latches as the petition has been filed after five years of
retirement. Petitioner stood retired on 31.08.2013 and the petition has been
filed by the petitioner in the year 2019 for monetary benefits akin to the
similarly situated persons in the light of the various orders passed by this
Court in various different writ petitions.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and Another
Vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011)3 SCC 436, in paragraph no.36 has held as
under:
“53. Needless to say that Limitation Act 1963 does not
apply in writ jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation
being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein areSignature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:575245 WP-14178-2019
applicable and writ petitions are dismissed at initial stage on the
ground of delay and laches. In a case like at hand, getting a
particular pay scale may give rise to a recurring cause of action. In
such an eventuality, the petition may be dismissed on the ground
of delay and laches and the court may refuse to grant relief for the
initial period in case of an unexplained and inordinate delay. In
the instant case, the respondent claimed the relief from 1.1.1986
by filing a petition on 11.11.2005 but the High Court for some
unexplained reason granted the relief w.e.f. 1.6.1984, though even
the Notification dated 6.10.1989 makes it applicable w.e.f.
1.1.1986.
54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a
petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case
the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the
relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot
furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot
wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment
in cases where some diligent person had approached the Court
within a reasonable time.”
7. It is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be allowed to take
advantage of persons who have rigorously pursued their matters before the
Courts and, after obtaining favourable orders, approach the Court after a
considerable delay to claim similar benefits.
“7. Article 7 of Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides as
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:575246 WP-14178-2019
under:-
For wages in the case of any other Three When the wages accrue
person years due
8. Thus, Article 7 of Scheduled of the Limitation Act, 1963 clearly
prescribes that the period of limitation for recovery of money/salary is three
years from the date when it became due. It is true that for filing a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, no period of
limitation is provided.
9. It is submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that merely because
the petitioner could not approach this Court at the earliest, would not mean
that he was not entitled for the benefit of pay scales applicable to the post of
Amin, along with all consequential monetary benefits, including revision of
pension and payment of arrears and relied upon a judgment passed by the
Supreme Court in the case of M.R. Gupta Vs. Union of India and Others,
1995 (5) SCC 628 in paragraph no.5 has held as under:-
“5. Having heard both sides, we are satisfied that the Tribunal has
missed the real point and overlooked the crux of the matter. The
appellant’s grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance
with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him
which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was
paid a salary which was not computed in accordance with the
rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action
arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis
of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. It is no doubt true
that if the appellant’s claim is found correct on merits, he would be
entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the
future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of
the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant’s
claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of
difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be
recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of his pay
in accordance with rules and to cessation of a continuing wrong ifSignature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:575247 WP-14178-2019
on merits his claim is justified. Similarly, any other consequential
relief claimed by him, such as, promotion etc. would also be
subject to the defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those
reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the
situation existing on 1-8-1978 without taking into account any
other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and
the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay
fixation the application cannot be treated as time barred since it is
based on a recurring cause of action.”
10. So far as the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of M.R. Gupta (supra) is concerned, it was in relation to recurring cause
of action due to non-payment of correct pay scale for current and future
payment but it has been categorically held that the arrears are subject to the
period of limitation, therefore, when a particular pay scale accrued in favour
of an employee, then from that date, the arrears are to be counted and if they
are not falling within that time period as provided under Article 7 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 i.e. three years, then those are not recoverable in the
light of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M.R.
Gupta (supra).
11. The Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpon. Ltd.
Vs. K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as under :
”6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne
in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers
if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant
to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time
and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:57524
8 WP-14178-2019
Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within
the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v.
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion
has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd (PC at p. 239)
was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir
Barnes had stated:
“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances always important in such cases are,
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval which might affect either party and
cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in
which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of
the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards
that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed
in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India that no relief can be given
to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation
approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:57524
9 WP-14178-2019
was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it
does not follow from this that it was the intention of the
Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles
and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. It was
stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High Court in
exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and
the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene
and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated
that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court
does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary
remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ
jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the
effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also
injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the
creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important
factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether
or not to exercise such jurisdiction.”
12. The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State
of T.N. reported in (2007) 9 SCC 78 has held as under :
”11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard-and-fast
rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case.
In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8-10-
1996 an order was passed by the Collector in pursuance of the
order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of the
writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The
writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the
same up to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be very serious.
A person who can sit tight for such a long time for no justifiable
reason, cannot be given any benefit.”
13. The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India
reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 has held as under :
”6. Normally, in the case of belated approach writ petition
has to be dismissed. Delay or laches is one of the factors to beSignature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:5752410 WP-14178-2019
borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke
its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on
the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction
with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to
the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the
matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in
Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of
course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and
reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, PC at p. 239
was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir Barnes
had stated:
“Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an
arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:57524
11 WP-14178-2019
Two circumstances always important in such cases are,
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval which might affect either party and
cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
8. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High
Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the
tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there
is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is
not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was
stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High
Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and
public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have
the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but
also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the
creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important
factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether
or not to exercise such jurisdiction.”
14. The Supreme Court in the case of Nadia Distt. Primary School
Council Vs. Sristidhar Biswar reported in (2007) 12 SCC 779 has held as
under :
”11. In the present case, the panel was prepared in 1980
and the petitioners approached the court in 1989 after
the decision in Dibakar Pal. Such persons should not be
given any benefit by the court when they allowed more
than nine years to elapse. Delay is very significant in
matters of granting relief and courts cannot come to the
rescue of the persons who are not vigilant of their
rights. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court
condoning the delay of nine years cannot be
countenanced.”
15. The Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Jaswant
Singh reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464 has held as under :
“12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury’s
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:5752412 WP-14178-2019
Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows:
“In determining whether there has been such
delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be
considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on
the defendant’s part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the
violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has
been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is
unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has
done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver
of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the
remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would
not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material.
Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.”
16. The Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana
reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 has held as under :
”18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay
disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or
Article 32 of the Constitution.”
17. The Supreme Court in the case of NDMC Vs. Pan Singh reported
in (2007) 9 SCC 278 has held as under :
”16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be
lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17
years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They,
as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the
earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as
parties even in the reference made by the State before theSignature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:5752413 WP-14178-2019
Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those
employees who were employed or who were recruited after the
cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a
long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been
entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the
discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those
who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are
relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of
W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and
Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan.)
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for
filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time.
(See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India and M.R. Gupta v. Union
of India.)
18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p.
277, paras 9-10) “9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a
number of cases that representations would not be adequate
explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V.
Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore. There is a limit to the
time which can be considered reasonable for making
representations and if the Government had turned down one
representation the making of another representation on similar
lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:57524
14 WP-14178-2019
Samantaray making of repeated representations was not regarded
as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition
had been dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v.
Arun Kumar Patnaik.) 10. In the case of pension the cause of
action actually continues from month to month. That, however,
cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It
would depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed
beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court
would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted
to a reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did
not examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on
merits it would have found that there was no scope for
interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that
score alone.”
19. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it was not a fit case
where the High Court should have exercised its discretionary
jurisdiction in favour of the respondents herein.”
18. From a bare reading of the provision of law, it is clear that an
employee is entitled to seek monetary benefits only for the preceding three
years and not beyond that. The analogy of a recurring cause of action will
come into play only when the petitioner is to be benefited by the grant of
such monetary benefits in present and future. Since the petitioner has already
retired, he is not entitled to arrears on the basis of the pay scale that has
accrued to him on the basis of identical matters. At the most, the petitioner
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:57524
15 WP-14178-2019
can be granted the benefit of notional fixation for the purpose of pensionary
benefits.
19. Therefore, the petition is partly allowed and the impugned order
dated 19.03.2019 (Annexure-P/5) is hereby quashed. Insofar as the arrears
of the monetary benefits of the pay scale, which could have been granted or
were denied during the petitioner’s service prior to his retirement, are
concerned, the petitioner shall be entitled only to notional fixation for the
purpose of pension.
20. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to re-fix the petitioner’s
pay on a notional basis and revise his pensionary benefits in accordance
with law.
21. With the aforesaid, petition stands disposed of.
(DEEPAK KHOT)
JUDGE
julie
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JULIE SINGH
Signing time: 31-07-2026
19:59:55
