Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ashish Kumar Katiyar (Ashish Katiyar) vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 5 May, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 5th OF MAY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 3610 of 2018
ASHISH KUMAR KATIYAR (ASHISH KATIYAR)
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Aditya Pratap Singh - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri K.K. Prajapati - Government Advocate for respondent/State.
Shri Somyadeep Dwivedi - Advocate for respondents No.2 to 6.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been filed
seeking following relief(s):-
(7.1) पपिटटीशनर ददद्वारद्वा प्रसससस ररट पपिटटीशन सदस्वीकद्वार करसते हसए पपिटटीशनर सते सममह प्रतेरक कद्वा
कद्वारर्य ललिरते जद्वानते और उसकते प्रतसफलि सदरूपि तनरस मद्वानदतेर प्रदद्वान ककरते जद्वानते एदवं पपिटटीशनर
कते लिगद्वासद्वार तनरलमस रूपि सते अपिनते कसर्यवर पिर पदकद्वास खणण्ड लमशन प्रबवंधन इकद्वाई पदकद्वास
खणण्ड लिटतेरटी मम उपिससस्थिस हहोनते कते फलिसदरूपि पपिटटीशनर कहो मद्वानदतेर मद्वाह मई, 2017 सते
दसर्यमद्वान सक ररसपिहोण्डतेनटस स ददद्वारद्वा प्रदद्वान नहटीवं ककरद्वा गरद्वा हहै उपिरहोकस समपिमरर्य मद्वानदतेर
पपिटटीशनर कहो दसर्यमद्वान सक कद्वा प्रदद्वान ककरते जद्वानते कते आदतेश /तनदर श प्रदद्वान ककरते जद्वानते कक
ककपिद्वा कक जद्वादम।
(7.2) अनर उचचिस ररट, आदतेश अस्थिदद्वा तनदर श नरद्वार हहस मम पपिटटीशनर कते पिक्ष मम जद्वारटी करनते
कक ककपिद्वा करम , प्रकरर वरर रतेसपिहोनण्डतेननस सते हदलिद्वारते जद्वानते कक ककपिद्वा करम ।
2. Respondents No.2 to 6 have filed reply on 11.10.2022 and they have stated
that the contract agreement of petitioner has already ended on 31.03.2017 and
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according to Clause 2 of the aforesaid agreement petitioner cannot claim, as a
matter of right, for continuation in contract service. It is further submitted that
petitioner is having alternate remedy to approach before the Arbitrator as per the
clause mentioned in the agreement and also having the remedy to file appeal
before the Divisional Commissioner.
3. Per contra, learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner has
received the salary for the month of April, 2017.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. Now, the question for consideration is as to whether this Court can dismiss
the petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy or not?
6. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and another v.
Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti and another,
reported in (2008) 12 SCC 675 has held as under:
“37. We have given most anxious and thoughtful consideration to the
rival contentions of the parties. So far as preliminary objection raised
by the Corporation before the High Court is concerned, in our
considered view, the same was well founded and ought to have been
upheld. It was urged before the High Court on behalf of the
Corporation and the State Government that the writ petition was
premature inasmuch as no retrenchment had been affected. Several
disputed questions of fact were involved in the petition. If the
contention of the Samiti was that there was illegal closure of
undertaking or there was non-payment of wages by the employer,
appropriate proceedings could have been initiated under industrial law.
In fact, one of the Judges of the Division Bench upheld the contention
and observed that the employees could have claimed closure
compensation under Section 25- FFF of the Act or could have
approached prescribed authority under the Payment of Wages Act
relying upon Section 33-C(2) of the Act or Section 6-H(2) of the U.P.Signature Not Verified
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Industrial Disputes Act. The other Single Judge of the Division Bench,
however, held that the writ petition had been entertained and interim
orders were also passed. Relying upon Suresh Chandra Tewari [AIR
1992 All 331], the learned Judge held that “the petition cannot be
dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy if the same has been
entertained and interim order has been passed”.
(emphasis supplied)
38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the legal position
nor such a proposition has been laid down in Suresh Chandra Tewari
[AIR 1992 All 331] that once a petition is admitted, it cannot be
dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. It is no doubt correct
that in the headnote of All India Reporter (p. 331), it is stated that
“petition cannot be rejected on the ground of availability of alternative
remedy of filing appeal”. But it has not been so held in the actual
decision of the Court. The relevant para 2 of the decision reads thus:
(Suresh Chandra Tewari case [AIR 1992 All 331], AIR p. 331)
“2. At the time of hearing of this petition a threshold question,
as to its maintainability was raised on the ground that the
impugned order was an appealable one and, therefore,
before approaching this Court the petitioner should have
approached the appellate authority. Though there is much
substance in the above contention, we do not feel inclined to
reject this petition on the ground of alternative remedy having
regard to the fact that the petition has been entertained and an
interim order passed.”
(emphasis supplied)
Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in law. True it is that
issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim orders is a relevant
consideration for not dismissing a petition if it appears to the High
Court that the matter could be decided by a writ court. It has been so
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held even by this Court in several cases that even if alternative
remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ petition is not
maintainable. In our judgment, however, it cannot be laid down as
a proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it could never
be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. If such bald
contention is upheld, even this Court cannot order dismissal of a writ
petition which ought not to have been entertained by the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of availability of
alternative and equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party,
once the High Court has entertained a writ petition albeit wrongly and
granted the relief to the petitioner.”
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Genpact India Private Limited v.
Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and another, reported in 2019 SCC
Online SC 1500 decided on 22.11.2019 in Civil Appeal No.8945/2019 has held
as under:
“23. We now turn to the question whether the High Court was justified
in refusing to entertain the writ petition because of availability of
adequate appellate remedy. The law on the point is very clear and was
summarised in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal
AIR (2014) 1 SCC 603] as under:–
“11. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would
notice the principle of law as laid down by this Court. It
is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under
writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious
alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed
limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience
and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is
within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief
under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative
remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere ifSignature Not Verified
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there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy
available to the petitioner and he has approached the
High Court without availing the same unless he has
made out an exceptional case warranting such
interference or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke
the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. (See
State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh [AIR 1958 SC 86], Titaghur
Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [(1983) 2 SCC
433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131], Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian
Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax)
131] and State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd.
[(2005) 6 SCC 499])
12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S.
Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission
[AIR 1954 SC 207], Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal
[AIR 1955 SC 425], Union of India v. T.R. Varma [AIR
1957 SC 882], State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh [AIR 1958
SC 86] and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State
of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1089] have held that though
Article 226 confers very wide powers in the matter of
issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ is
absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is
satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or
suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its
jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances,
may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that
there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice
or the procedure required for decision has not been
adopted. [See N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar
[AIR 1959 SC 422], Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal
Kumar [AIR 1965 SC 1321 : (1965) 2 SCR 653], Siliguri
Municipality v. Amalendu Das [(1984) 2 SCC 436 : 1984Signature Not Verified
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SCC (Tax) 133], S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan [(1988)
1 SCC 572], Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [(1995) 5
SCC 75 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1955) 31 ATC 110],
Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293], A.
Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan [(2000) 7 SCC
695], L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2001) 6
SCC 634], Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri
Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of
Maharashtra [(2001) 8 SCC 509], Pratap Singh v. State
of Haryana [(2002) 7 SCC 484 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 1207 :
(1995) 31 ATC 110] and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v.
ITO21 [(2003) 1 SCC 72]] …
15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has
recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative
remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in
accordance with the provisions of the enactment in
question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of
judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the
provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been
passed in total violation of the principles of natural
justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal
case [AIR 1964 SC 1419], Titaghur Paper Mills case
[(1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and other
similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an
effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved
person or the statute under which the action complained
of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for
redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore,
when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal
of grievances, a writ petition should not be
entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.”
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24. Recently, in Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v.
Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], the principles laid down in Chhabil
Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603] were reiterated as under:
“The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not
absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given
facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal
rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate
statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling
within the well-defined exceptions as observed in CIT v.
Chhabil Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603]…”
25. We do not, therefore, find any infirmity in the approach adopted
by the High Court in refusing to entertain the Writ Petition. The
submission that once the threshold was crossed despite the
preliminary objection being raised, the High Court ought not to have
considered the issue regarding alternate remedy, may not be correct.
The first order dated 25.01.2017 passed by the High Court did record
the preliminary objection but was prima facie of the view that the
transactions defined in Section 115QA were initially confined only to
those covered by Section 77A of the Companies Act. Therefore,
without rejecting the preliminary objection, notice was issued in the
matter. The subsequent order undoubtedly made the earlier interim
order absolute. However, the preliminary objection having not been
dealt with and disposed of, the matter was still at large.
26. In State of U.P. v. U.P. Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh
Samiti [(2008) 12 SCC 675] this Court dealt with an issue whether
after admission, the Writ Petition could not be dismissed on the
ground of alternate remedy. The submission was considered by this
Court as under:
“38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the
legal position nor such a proposition has been laid downSignature Not Verified
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in Suresh Chandra Tewari [AIR 1992 All 331] that once
a petition is admitted, it cannot be dismissed on the
ground of alternative remedy. It is no doubt correct that
in the headnote of All India Reporter (p. 331), it is stated
that “petition cannot be rejected on the ground of
availability of alternative remedy of filing appeal”. But it
has not been so held in the actual decision of the Court.
The relevant para 2 of the decision reads thus: (Suresh
Chandra Tewari case, AIR p. 331)“2. At the time of hearing of this petition a
threshold question, as to its maintainability was
raised on the ground that the impugned order was
an appealable one and, therefore, before
approaching this Court the petitioner should have
approached the appellate authority. Though there
is much substance in the above contention, we do
not feel inclined to reject this petition on the
ground of alternative remedy having regard to the
fact that the petition has been entertained and an
interim order passed.”
(emphasis supplied)
Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in law.
True it is that issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim
orders is a relevant consideration for not dismissing a
petition if it appears to the High Court that the matter
could be decided by a writ court. It has been so held even
by this Court in several cases that even if alternative
remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ petition
is not maintainable. In our judgment, however, it
cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that once
a petition is admitted, it could never be dismissed on
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the ground of alternative remedy. If such bald
contention is upheld, even this Court cannot order
dismissal of a writ petition which ought not to have been
entertained by the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution in view of availability of alternative and
equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party, once
the High Court has entertained a writ petition albeit
wrongly and granted the relief to the petitioner.
27. We do not, therefore, find any error in the approach of and
conclusion arrived at by the High Court. It is relevant to mention that
the concessions given on behalf of the Revenue as recorded in the
directions issued by the High Court also take care of matters of
prejudice, if any. Consequently, the appellant, as a matter of fact, will
have a fuller, adequate and efficacious remedy by way of appeal
before the appellate authority.
28. Certain issues raised during the course of hearing touching upon
the aspects whether the appellant is liable under Section 115QA of the
Act or whether the transaction of buy back of shares in the present
matter would come within the statutory contours of said Section
115QA or not, are issues which will be gone into at the appropriate
stages by the concerned authorities; and as such we have refrained
from dealing with those issues.”
8. Furthermore, though learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner
has received the salary for the month of April, 2017 but he has not filed any
rejoinder/counter-affidavit to reply dated 11.10.22 filed by respondents No.2 to 6.
9. Taking into consideration the fact that petitioner is having alternate remedy
to approach before the Arbitrator / to file appeal before the Divisional
Commissioner, present petition is disposed of with liberty to seek alternate,
efficacious remedy before the appropriate forum/appellate authority/Arbitrator
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within a period of one month. If petitioner approaches before the appropriate
forum/appellate authority/Arbitrator within a period of one month from today,
then appropriate forum/appellate authority/Arbitrator is directed to decide the
appeal/representation of petitioner on merits, ignoring the delay, within a period
of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
pd
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