Delhi High Court
Asgar @ Pakori vs State(Govt.Of Ncd Delhi) on 31 July, 2026
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of reserving order: 27th July, 2026
Date of decision: 31st July, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
CRL.A. 548/1999
ASGAR @ PAKORI .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Ram Bhadauria, Advocate.
versus
STATE (GOVT.OF NCT DELHI) .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Satinder Singh Bawa, APP for
State.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIMAL KUMAR YADAV
JUDGMENT
VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J.
1. A fraternal fracas amongst the cousin brothers on account of sharing
of rent of a shared accommodation spilled over into a physical fight and
resulted into the registration of FIR bearing number 491/1993, PS Ambedkar
Nagar, under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code 1860 („IPC‟).
2. It so happened that the Appellant herein, who was also sharing the
rented accommodation with three-four more persons, belonging to the same
clan, wanted to go back to his native in Mewat. The other co-occupants / co-
tenants asked him to pay his share of rent before going, which enraged the
Appellant to the extent that he, not only abused the co-tenant / co-occupant
Shahid Ahmed, Mohd. Iqbal and Zuber Ahmed, but also picked up a knife
lying in the room, lunged upon Shahid and gave a blow on the left side of
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his chest accompanied by the utterance that he would kill him. Iqbal and
Zuber Ahmed intervened to save victim Shahid and in the process, Iqbal also
sustained injuries on his arm.
3. In the meantime, the Appellant Asgar @ Pakori fled away from the
spot i.e. House No. E-II/236, Madangir, New Delhi. Pursuant to receipt of
the information through DD No. 14 dated 30.11.1993 at Police Post
Madangir. The vehicle from the police control room arrived at the scene and
took the victim to the hospital.
4. The victim Shahid Ahmed was declared unfit for statement at the
hospital by the doctor as per the endorsement on the application moved by
the IO Ex. PW17/A. Thus, based upon the statement of PW-1 Mohd. Iqbal,
who, albeit injured, but declared fit, the requisites of the investigations were
carried out after registration of the First Information Report (FIR) and on
conclusion of investigations; a charge-sheet was filed in the Court against
Asgar @ Pakori, the Appellant herein, under Section 307 and Section 324
IPC.
5. To the charges framed under Section 307 IPC, the accused pleaded
not guilty and claimed trial. Prosecution was thereafter, called upon to
examine the witnesses, pursuant to which 17 witnesses were examined and
thereafter, considering the contentions raised by the Appellant including his
statement recorded under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure
(hereinafter referred to as „Cr.P.C.‟), learned trial court through the
Impugned Judgment dated 07.10.1999, held the Appellant guilty under
Section 307 IPC and sentenced him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment
(„RI‟) for a period of 5 years and a fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default of payment
of fine, Simple Imprisonment („SI‟) for a period of two months vide Order
on Sentence dated 08.10.1999.
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6. Assailing the impugned judgment the appeal bearing Crl. Appeal No.
548/1999 was filed which came to be dismissed on the ground that after the
release of the Appellant, on grant of interim bail on 12.03.2001, failed to
surrender and was declared as „proclaimed offender’ vide order dated
11.04.2005.
7. The Appellant surrendered before the prison authorities on 19.02.2025
and since then, he is in custody.
8. He thereafter preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court vide SLP No. 3168/2026 and the Appeal i.e. Crl.A. No.
2510/2026. In the aforesaid SLP, leave was granted to the Appellant and the
appeal, as aforesaid was disposed of, while making following observations:-
“3. Our order dated 16.02.2026 reads thus:-
“1. Delay condoned.
2. In the present matter, the High Court has dismissed the
appeal on the ground that the appellant has remained
absconding for over eight years. The appellant has now
surrendered on 19.02.2025.
3. Our attention has been drawn to the judgment of this Court in
the case of Dhananjay Ral @ Guddu Rai vs The State Of Bihar
reported in 2022 (14) SCC 95 which holds that the appeal ought
to be heard on merits.
4. Issue notice to consider whether the matter can be remanded
to the High Court to hear the appeal on merits.
5. Dasti service, in addition, is permitted.
6. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to serve notice through the
Standing Counsel for the f State/respondent.
7. List on 23.02.2026.”
4…..
5…..
6…..
7. We believe that the ends of justice would be met if we, remand
the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of the Criminal
Appeal No.548/1999 on its own merits.
8. As almost 27 years have passed by and the convict is now in
custody, we request the High Court to take up Criminal Appeal
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No.548/1999 for hearing and decide the same on its own merits
within a period of three months from today.”
9. With the above observations, the appeal was allowed and the matter
was remitted to High Court. Against the backdrop of these facts and
circumstances, learned counsel for the Appellant focussed primarily on one
aspect that the requisite intention or knowledge, as contemplated under
Section 307 IPC, is not manifest in the evidence and, therefore, holding the
Appellant guilty under Section 307 IPC is not in consonance with either the
facts or the law. In addition to that, it is submitted that the Appellant, at the
most, can be held guilty for causing injury to the victim.
10. Learned counsel for the Appellant further challenged the Judgment by
asserting that the testimony of the public witnesses examined, cannot be
believed as all of them were the „interested witnesses‟ being brothers of the
victim. He questioned the investigation also terming it as defective on
account of the fact that the Investigating Officer did not bother to join the
neighbours in the investigations and therefore, there is, in-fact, no
independent public witness to the incident. In addition to that, it is submitted
that a very trivial issue of rent was blown out of proportion and in-fact the
victim and his brothers were the aggressors and the Appellant was at the
receiving end. During the ensuing scuffle, they fell down in a drain and that
resulted into injuries to the victim, as explained / submitted in the statement
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In any case, there was only a single blow as can
be seen from the MLC, and from the deposition of the witnesses examined,
therefore, „attempt to kill’ is not attributable to the Appellant. In order to
substantiate his contention and the proposition, learned counsel for the
Appellant has placed reliance on the judgement titled Roshan Lal vs. State
of Haryana, 2026 SCC Online SC 921.
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11. Learned APP for the State, while countering the contentions,
submitted that the incident took place insides the confines of a rented room,
therefore, there was no possibility of having any other witness, who can
strictly be termed as independent witness. Nevertheless, the testimony of a
witness cannot be thrown out of consideration, merely because he happens
to be a near relative of the victim. Incidentally, the Appellant himself
happens to be the cousin brother of the victim. Since it was the Appellant
who got enraged, abused and thereafter, assaulted the victim, accompanied
by a very clear and categorical assertion that he wanted to kill, therefore, he
is liable for his acts. It is submitted that in the process of saving the victim,
Mohd. Iqbal also sustained injuries as can be seen from the MLC
Ex.PW16/A. Learned APP for the State further elaborated that the injury
sustained by the victim Shahid Ahmed @ Kallu, is, apparently, dangerous
and life threatening, inasmuch-as the size of wound / injury was 3×4 inches.
It seems that the knife went inside the ribs and ruptured / punctured the left
lung of the Appellant. The victim, when brought to the hospital, was
profusely bleeding as reflected vide MLC Ex.PW14/A. The doctor has
categorically opined the injury, as reflected „grievous‟.
12. PW-14 Dr. Rajnish Singh, Senior Research Associate, AIIMS, New
Delhi who had examined the victim and opined about the injuries as
reflected in the MLC Ex.PW14/A. Doctor had also examined another victim
Mohd. Iqbal on that very day i.e. the date of incident 30.11.1993. He found
that the injuries sustained by him on the right hand and the left arm and
according to him, those injuries were simple in nature, caused by a sharp
weapon. In view of these facts and circumstances, learned APP for the State
asserted that the Impugned Judgment is perfectly in consonance with the
facts and circumstances and the law applicable on the subject and, therefore,
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does not require any interference.
13. Primarily, it is the intention and / or the knowledge that an act done
in a peculiar set of facts and circumstances may have the potential to cause
death, is what is of vital importance. Intention or knowledge is something
which is abstract but then the same can be inferred with the help of the acts,
actions, inactions, utterances, gesture and a combination of all or anything
of the nature such as use of weapons, body part which was attacked, single
or multiple blows, manner of assault, etc.
14. The Supreme Court in Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh and Others,
(1988) 4 SCC 551, has discussed as what the court has to see in order to
bring home a case under Section 307 IPC. The relevant portion of the
judgment is as under:-
“7. Under Section 307 IPC what the court has to see is, whether the
act irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or
knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in that section. The
intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary
to constitute murder. Without this ingredient being established, there
can be no offence of “attempt to murder”. Under Section 307 the
intention precedes the act attributed to accused. Therefore, the
intention is to be gathered from all circumstances, and not merely
from the consequences that ensue. The nature of the weapon used,
manner in which it is used, motive for the crime, severity of the blow,
the part of the body where the injury is inflicted are some of the
factors that may be taken into consideration to determine the
intention.”
15. It can be seen that it is the intention and the requisite knowledge,
which is of utmost importance irrespective of the injury. Bare reading of
Section 307 IPC clearly indicates that injury is not necessary. For ready
reference, Section 307 IPC is reproduced as under:-
307. Attempt to murder.–
Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under
such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be
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guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the
offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such
punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
Attempts by life convicts.– When any person offending under this
section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is
caused, be punished with death.
16. It can be seen that there would be enhanced punishment where there
was injury also, which, by implication, means that the offence under Section
307 IPC can be there without even there being any injury.
17. As such, it is to be ascertained that the act was accompanied by the
requisite intention or knowledge. Intention or knowledge is something
which is intangible and abstract confined within the realms of human mind
and therefore, it is nearly impossible to ascertain, that too, what exactly was
playing in the mind of a person. Nevertheless, the same can be inferred with
the existence of the available indicators before, at and after the act in
question together with other surrounding and attending circumstances.
18. Learned counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance on Roshan
Lal‘s case (supra) and submitted that in the absence of requisite intention or
knowledge, the Appellant cannot be held responsible for the offence under
Section 307 IPC for which he has been charged and convicted by the learned
Trial Court. While drawing attention towards the aforesaid judgment, it is
submitted that the Appellant, at the most, can be convicted for causing hurt.
19. Incidentally, in the aforesaid judgment, the aspect of injury has been
dealt with by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court by referring and relying upon the
judgments in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Saleem @ Chamaru, (2005) 5
SCC 554 and Prakash Chandra Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 2007 (4)
RCR (Crl.) 860 : 2007 (13) SCC 134, to emphasize that injury is neither
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essential, nor determinative, rather it is the intention, which holds the centre
stage, in order to determine as to whether the acts of the accused fall into the
scope and ambit of Section 307 IPC. As has been noted earlier, the bare
reading of Section 307 IPC itself indicates that injury is not sine-qua-non as
in the event of causing injury, the accused runs the risk of enhanced
punishment. In this context, the observations made in State of Madhya
Pradesh vs. Saleem @ Chamaru are worth noting, which is reproduced
herein under:
” 12. To justify a conviction under this Section, it is not essential
that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been
inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often
give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the
intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from
other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained
without any reference at all to actual wounds. The Section makes
a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any.
Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person
assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the
culprit would be liable under this Section. It is not necessary that
the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be
sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the
person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act,
irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge
and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. An attempt in
order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is
sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some
overt act in execution thereof.”
20. Ultimately, the issue boils down to the aspect of the intention with
which a particular act has been done by the offender/assailant or the
requisite knowledge that the act is going to result in the death of a human
being, which may amount to murder. In the event of such knowledge or
intention, being found on record then it would be enough to hold the
assailant guilty of an offence under Section 307 IPC, injury or no injury. As
such, the entire episode, narrated by the witnesses has to be appreciated,
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evaluated and determined on the aforesaid parameters. As noted earlier also,
intention or knowledge is something abstract, but intelligible provided the
overall act, the circumstances surrounding and attending it or having some
connection, which may help ascertain and decipher the intention or the
knowledge. It is this fact which holds the key to open the clock of Section
307 IPC. How else otherwise something so abstract as intention, thought or
knowledge, can be inferred or translated, so as to place that in a definition,
how it is Section 307 IPC.
21. Since the culmination of an act, could have resulted into the offence
of murder, which essentially indicates some overt and some violent act has
to be there. Thus, the act or actus reus becomes important as that would lead
to a backward reading of mens rea which otherwise, is the first and foremost
thing to be seen and ascertained.
22. Certain aspects, which may throw light on this mens rea or intention
could be, though not exhaustive, the utterances accompanied by an act, the
act itself, the weapon, if any, used in that act, the body part targeted, number
of blows given, the circumstances and the conduct of assailant in those
peculiar circumstances, for instance, how the assailant behaved when the
victim became helpless and was not able to defend, protect or protests etc.,
the conduct of the assailant when the victim was retreating or withdrawing
or running away from the scene, so on and so forth. These are some of the
tangible, visible and physical acts, which emerge out of the intention and not
otherwise. These sort of acts, individually or collectively, would be the
major and most likely the only source for anybody to get down to the
intention of the assailant.
23. In case titled as Parvinder @ Moti v. State, 2015 SCC OnLine Del
8849, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that:
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“33. “Intention”, as per Cross and Jones in Introduction to
Criminal Law (11th Ed.), is not defined in any statute and its
meaning must therefore be derived from judicial decisions. They
observe, “It is now clear from the House of Lords decisions
in Moloney ([1985] 1 All ER 1025 HL) and Hancock and
Shankland ([1986] 1 All ER 641 HL) that foresight of probability,
or even of certainty, is not intention in a legal sense nor the
equivalent of it.”
They then refer to Court of Appeals decision
in Nedrick ([1986] 3 All ER 1, CA), where it was stated that
“foresight of a consequence as “for all practical purposes
inevitable” could give rise to an irresistible inference of
intention (as opposed, in other words, to being intention
itself).” They conclude that “the irresistible inference
mentioned in Nedrick (supra) is likely to mean in practice
that foresight of inevitability, at least, will be equated with
intention in the minds of a jury”. They however, cautioned
“In some offences, the inference of intention may not be
drawn where the jury [or the Court] are not satisfied that
the prohibited consequence was the accused’s aim or
purpose.”
34. Decisions of the Indian Courts are more illustrative and
delineate the distinction between “intention” and “knowledge” in
significantly finite and articulate manner. The Supreme Court
in Kesar Singh versus State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753,
concluded to draw the distinction as, “30. It can thus be seen that
the “knowledge” as contrasted with “intention” signifies a state of
mental realisation with the bare state of conscious awareness of
certain facts in which human mind remains supine or inactive. On
the other hand, “intention” is a conscious state in which mental
faculties are aroused into activity and summoned into action for the
purpose of achieving a conceived end. It means shaping of one’s
conduct so as to bring about a certain event. Therefore in the case
of “intention” mental faculties are projected in a set direction.
Intention need not necessarily involve premeditation. Whether there
is such an intention or not is a question of fact.”
The said judgment quotes the following portion from Kenny in
Outlines of Criminal Law (17th Edn. at P.31) as:-
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“Intention: To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to
reach a desired objective; the noun ‘intention’ in the present
connection is used to denote the state of mind of a man who not
only foresees but also desires the possible consequences of his
conduct. Thus if one man throws another from a high tower or
cuts off his head it would seem plain that he both foresees the
victim’s death and also desires it: the desire and the foresight
will also be the same if a person knowingly leaves a helpless
invalid or infant without nourishment or other necessary
support until death supervenes. It will be noted that there
cannot be intention unless there is also foresight, since a man
must decide to his own satisfaction, and accordingly must
foresee, that to which his express purpose is directed. Again, a
man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it. It
may well be a thing that he dislikes doing, but he dislikes still
more the consequences of his not doing it. That is to say he
desires the lesser of two evils, and therefore has made up his
mind to bring about that one.”
Earlier in Jai Prakash vs. State (Delhi Admn.) (1991) 2 SCC 32, it
was elucidated that knowledge is bare awareness and not
something as intention, for the latter requires something more than
a mere foresight of the consequences namely, the purposeful doing
of a thing to achieve a particular end.”
24. Learned counsel for the Appellant has asserted that there is no
independent public witness to the incident and as the witnesses other than
the official witnesses are all real brothers including the complainant/victim,
therefore, they become interested witnesses as well. Merely on the testimony
of such witnesses, no inference against the Appellant should be drawn
inasmuch as all three brothers had ganged up against the Appellant and got
him entangled in this criminal case. Unless there is an independent
corroboration, the testimony of the brothers of the victim cannot and should
not be used against the Appellant. So far as the independent public witness
is concerned, there was practically no possibility of having any such witness,
for the simple reason that the incident took place within the confines of four
walls of the rented accommodation. The injured Mohd. Iqbal came out
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chasing the Appellant and that explains the presence of blood in the passage
upto the road apart from the room where the incident took place. In such
circumstances, there cannot be any other witness except those, who were
present inside the room and in the event somebody had seen the Appellant
being chased, could have at the most stated about the post incident
developments and not about the incident itself. As such, the contention with
regard to the non-joining or absence of independent public witness is
exercised, having no substance in it.
25. As regards, the plea raised by learned counsel for the Appellant about
the interested witnesses, it can be easily visualised that a person is
surrounded with family and relatives or in some cases the friends. In such
circumstances, if something takes place in the residential portion, then in
that case, the presence of only those persons could be there, who may,
according to the plea raised by learned counsel for the Appellant, as
interested witnesses. The circumstances reflect that there cannot be anybody
else and those who were there, were related to each other, but that does not
mean the genesis of the testimony, provided it is found above board beyond
any embellishment or false narrative. The sum and substance of the
judgment on this topic is about the trustworthiness, credibility and truthful
narrative of the witness irrespective of the relationship between the witness
and the victim. Thus, a witness is to be appreciated as any witness in order
to ascertain the substance of the deposition and the same being reliable and
acceptable.
26. In this context, the observations made in case titled as Sarwan Singh
& Anr. vs. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 369, as reproduced herein below,
are worth noting:
“10.. it is not the law that the evidence of an interested witness
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should be equated with that of a tainted [witness] or that of an
approver so as to require corroboration as a matter of necessity.
The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any
infirmity as such, but the courts require as a rule of prudence, not
as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be
scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made and the
court is satisfied that the evidence of the interested [witness has]
a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon even without
corroboration.”
As such, this contention of learned counsel for the Appellant also fails
to cut the ice.
27. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Balraje vs. State of Maharashtra, (2010)
6 SCC 673, observed that the mere fact of witnesses being relative to the
victim, cannot in itself be a ground to discard his evidence and further
observed that when the eye witnesses are stated to be interested and
inimically disposed towards the accused, it has to be noted that it would not
be proper to conclude that they would shield the real culprit and rope in
some innocent person. It is the truth or otherwise of the deposition has to be
weighed pragmatically and the court would be required to analyse the
evidence of related witnesses and those witnesses are not inimically
disposed towards the accused. Finally, it was held that after the careful
analysis and scrutiny of the evidence of such witnesses, the version given by
them appears to be clear, cogent and credible, then there is no reason to
discard such evidence.
Reference can also be made to the judgment in Prahalad Patel vs.
State of M.P., {(2011) 4 SCC 262}, State of U.P. vs. Naresh & Ors.,
{(2011) 4 SCC 324}, Jarnail Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab, {(2009) 9
SCC 719} and Vishnu & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan, {(2009) 10 SCC
477}.
28. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the judgment titled as Mohd. Rojali Ali
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and Ors. Vs. State of Assam, Ministry of Home Affairs Through Secretary,
{(2019) 19 SCC 567, held as under:
“13. As regards the contention that all the eyewitnesses are close
relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related
witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by
virtue of being a relative of the victim. This Court has elucidated
the difference between “interested” and “related” witnesses in a
plethora of cases, stating that a witness may be called interested
only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a
litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would mean
that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the
accused punished due to prior enmity or other reasons, and thus
has a motive to falsely implicate the accused (for instance,
see State of Rajasthan v. Kalki [State of Rajasthan v. Kalki,
(1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593] ; Amit v. State of
U.P. [Amit v. State of U.P., (2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC
(Cri) 590] ; and Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy
[Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 298 :
(2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 182] ). Recently, this difference was
reiterated in Ganapathiv. State of T.N. [Ganapathi v. State of
T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793] , in the
following terms, by referring to the three-Judge Bench decision
in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki [State of Rajasthan v. Kalki,
(1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593] : (Ganapathi
case [Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2
SCC (Cri) 793] , SCC p. 555, para 14).
“14. “Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A witness
may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some
benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil
case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who
is a natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the
circumstances of a case cannot be said to be “interested”.”
15. In case of a related witness, the Court may not treat his or
her testimony as inherently tainted, and needs to ensure only
that the evidence is inherently reliable, probable, cogent and
consistent. We may refer to the observations of this Court
in Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry) [Jayabalan v. State
(UT of Pondicherry), (2010) 1 SCC 199 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri)
966] : (SCC p. 213, para 23)
“23. We are of the considered view that in cases where the
court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested
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witnesses, the approach of the court, while appreciating the
evidence of such witnesses must not be pedantic. The court
must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence
given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be
suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the
court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a
witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it
comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to
the victim.”
29. As an overt act accompanied by the requisite intention or knowledge
is decisive in order to arrive at any conclusion about the commission of the
offence or otherwise, therefore, the most vital aspect of a matter like this, or
any other, can be ascertained by tone and tenor of the deposition made by
the witness.
30. The plea of defective investigation has also been put-forth on behalf
of the Appellant, primarily, on two counts. Firstly, that the Investigating
Officer did not join any independent public witness to corroborate the
version given by the victim. Secondly, blood stains were found in the
passage outside the room and beyond, whereas, according to the case of the
prosecution, the incident took place within the four corners of the tenanted
room, therefore, the presence of blood stains on the passage creates
suspicion in the prosecution case.
31. The evidence on record and the circumstances are self-explanatory in
this context. It has come in evidence that the PCR Officials took the victim
to the hospital and to take him to the vehicle from the room, the passage was
used and that explains the presence of blood stains as reflected in site plan
Ex.PW17/D. Similarly, the circumstances in-itself explain why there is no
so-called independent public witness. The incident was confined to the room
itself and that being a private room, was not, thus, accessible to the public at
large. Therefore, finding any independent witness was nearly impossible. In
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view of these facts and circumstances, there is, apparently, no flaw in the
investigation and in any case, the defective investigation cannot lead to
inference in favor of the accused.
32. While considering the aspect of defective investigation, it has been
observed in various pronouncements that cause of justice cannot be made to
suffer on account of the defects in the investigation, and the Investigating
Officer should not be given such liberty to dictate the outcome of the legal
proceedings. In this context, reference can be made to certain important
judgments on the subject:
In C. Muniappan Vs. State of T.N. (2010) 9 SCC 567, the
Supreme Court held that it was a case of highly defective
investigation but this was not the end of the matter, for if
primacy was given to omissions and lapses by perfunctory
investigation, faith and confidence of the people in criminal
justice administration would erode. In such case, there is a legal
obligation on the part of the Courts to examine prosecution
evidence de hors such lapses, to find out whether evidence is
reliable or not, and to what extent it is reliable and whether the
lapses had affected the object of finding the truth. Reference was
made to several decisions in support of said ratio.
In Ganga Singh Vs. State of M.P., (2013) 7 SCC 278, it was
held that Courts cannot acquit an accused on the ground that
there were some defects in the investigation, unless such defects
cast reasonable doubt on the prosecution case.
Similar findings were recorded in Sunil Kundu & Anr. Vs.
State of Jharkhand, (2013) 4 SCC, 422, holding that lapses or
irregularities in investigation would not be material if the
evidence produced on record, despite the said lapses or
irregularities, does not go to the root of the matter and dislodges
the substratum of the prosecution case.
In Surajit Sarkar Vs. State of West Bengal, (2013) 2 SCC 146,
after referring to several earlier decisions, it has been held that
deficiencies in investigation by way of omission and lapses by
the investigating agency cannot themselves justify total rejection
of the prosecution case and where prosecution evidence de hors
such lapses, when carefully scrutinised and evaluated, does not
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affect the object of finding of truth.”
In view of the above-stated facts, which points out that there was no
defect in the investigation and if at all, something was there, then the same is
inconsequential and should not be given any undue emphasis or attention.
The aforesaid judgments are very clear on this aspect.
33. Another contention put-forth on behalf of the Appellant is that the
incident took place in the heat of moment, without any planning or pre-
meditation, which takes away the aspect of „intention‟ from the zone of
consideration. In the absence of any intention or knowledge, as
contemplated by Section 307 IPC, the Appellant cannot be held responsible
for the said offence. The knives and scissors were freely available in the
room, inasmuch-as, one of the occupants of the room, was in the trade of
sharpening the knives and scissors etc. Thus, the instant availability of the
knife and its use takes away the scope for any pre-meditation, planning or
thinking. There was no motive, nor can be inferred that the Appellant had
caused such injury, or wanted to do something untoward like what has been
alleged. However, the contention is self-contradictory, inasmuch-as in the
statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., it has been stated that the Mohd. Iqbal
came alongwith the knife to assault the Appellant and a scuffle ensued in
which both Mohd. Iqbal and Appellant fell in a drain and victim sustained
injuries. Neither any evidence to that effect has been adduced on record by
the Appellant, nor any suggestion has been given to Mohd. Iqbal or to any
other witness on these lines, which takes away the substance out of this
contention. Additionally, there is no explanation as to how such an injury is
possible by falling in a drain (nala). Again some explanation should be there
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as to the injuries sustained by Mohd.Iqbal on his arms. Evidently, there is
nothing to explain. This further fortifies the case of the prosecution.
34. If there was a scuffle and both Mohd. Iqbal and Asgar @ Pakori, the
Appellant herein, fell in the drain, then in that eventuality, there must be
some injury to the Appellant as well, which is not there. It further falsifies
the claim of the Appellant. On the contrary, injuries were sustained not only
by Mohd. Iqbal but by Shahid Ahmed also, and the injuries sustained by
latter, was life threatening and dangerous, as opined by the Doctor and
reflected in MLC Ex.PW.14/A. In order to appreciate the nature of injuries,
the relevant part of the MLC is extracted as under:-
Decrease air entry in the left side of the chest and there was
increase resonance on percussion. There was sharp cut wound just
above and below left clavicle about 3 X 4 inches, which was
bleeding profusously.
35. A sharp cut just above and below the left clavicle measuring about
3×4 inches was there and that seems to have pierced into the skin and had
punctured the left lung. There is evidence of “pneumothorax” on the left side
of the chest and presence of trapped air, indicative of the puncture of left
lung, which was found collapsing towards the centre, as per the X-Ray
Report Ex.PW 15/A. Such an injury cannot be self-inflicted.
36. As compared to Shahid Ahmed, the injuries sustained by Mohd. Iqbal
were simple in nature. In these circumstances, why an injured witness
should not be believed. There are judgments to the effect that testimony of
the injured witness has been given primacy and treated to be trustworthy, for
the simple reason of presence is not only indicative of injury rather
substantiating the evidence / case also.
37. In this context, reference can be made to the observations in the case
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titled as Pritam Chauhan Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2014 (9) SCC
637, wherein while relying upon various judgments on the subject,
reaffirmed that the testimony of an injured witness should be accorded
special status in law unless no good grounds exist to disbelieve the injured.
Para 5 of the judgment goes as under:
“5. In the case of ‘Abdul Sayed vs. State of Madhya Pradesh‘,
(2010) 10 SCC 259, the Supreme Court held:
“The question of the weight to be attached to the evidence of a
witness that was himself injured in the course of the occurrence
has been extensively discussed by this Court. Where a witness to
the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the
testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very
reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of
his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his
actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone.
“Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness.”
[Vide Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar, Malkhan Singh v. State
of U.P., Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, Appabhai v. State of
Gujarat, Bonkya v. State of Maharashtra, Bhag Singh, Mohar v.
State of U.P. (SCC p. 606b-c), Dinesh Kumar v. State of
Rajasthan, Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan, Annareddy Sambasiva
Reddy v. State of A.P. and Balraje v. State of Maharashtra.]”
Reference in this context can also be made to another judgment in
State of U.P. V. Naresh and Ors., (2011) 4 SCC 324, wherein it was
observed in the following words:
“The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weightage
being a stamped witness, thus, his presence cannot be doubted.
His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is
unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely
implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has
its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the
time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his
testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the
testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in
law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant
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commission of the offence. Thus, the evidence of the injured
witness should be relied upon unless there were grounds for the
rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and
discrepancies therein.”
38. The most vital and important part is to ascertain as to whether the
assault was with the requisite intent and knowledge as contemplated under
Section 307 IPC or not, in the given circumstances. As noted earlier, the
nature and extent of injuries, is reflective of the same being life threatening
and dangerous. The testimony on record is further indicative, as can be seen
from the statement of PW-1 that the efforts were made to pacify the
Appellant, but he could not be calmed and took up the knife and stabbed the
victim. The time spent, however little it was, to pacify the Appellant gives a
window to him, to think about the consequences of his act and in turn, if he
went ahead with the assault, then intention can be attributed to him, when
taken into consideration that he used a dangerous weapon to assault the
victim accompanied by the utterances that the Appellant would kill the
victim.
39. The kind of injury sustained by the victim, is further indicative of the
fact that the Appellant intended to translate his words, into reality. The other
co-occupants of the rented room tried to save the situation and pacify him,
as can be further inferred from the fact that Mohd. Iqbal sustained two
injuries on his hands, seemingly in the process of pacifying and saving the
victim. The kind of injuries sustained by the victim where his left lung had
collapsed was also profusely bleeding, had all the potential to cause his
death, which would have amounted to murder, but for the fact that timely
medical aid could save him. Therefore, in such circumstances, the
irresistible inference, which can be drawn, is that Appellant had attempted to
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kill the victim Shahid Ahmed and is, therefore, responsible and accountable
for his acts, which fall under the scope and ambit of Section 307 IPC.
40. This, in the process, takes away the strength of the arguments raised
by learned counsel for the Appellant that the Appellant at best, can be held
guilty for causing hurt. Thus, what emerges on record is that Appellant was
rightly convicted by learned Trial Court under Section 307 IPC, as a result
of which the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly.
41. On the aspect of sentence, nothing has been put forth and there
appears no reason to dilute the sentence, notwithstanding the fact that
Appellant has spent some period in custody, for which he shall be entitled to
the benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C.
42. As a result, the appeal together with application(s), if any, stands
disposed-of. Appellant to surrender forthwith to undergo the remaining
sentence.
43. Copy of the judgment be transmitted to the learned Trial Court and
Prison Authorities for information and necessary compliance.
VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J.
JULY 31, 2026/bj/akc/NY
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