Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Anurag Gupta & Anr vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 24 July, 2026
2026:CHC-AS:1110
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 3193 of 2023
Anurag Gupta & Anr.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Moyukh Mukherjee,
Ms. Sagnika Banerjee,
Ms. Sarmistha Basak.
For the O.P. 2 : Mr. Shataroop Purkayasta,
Mr. Parikshit Basu,
Mr. Srinjan Ghosh,
Ms. Bidisha Manna,
Ms. Rajorna Mazumder.
For the State : Mr. Sagar Saha,
Mr. Sandeep Prasad Shaw.
Judgment reserved on : 15.07.2026
Judgment delivered on : 24.07.2026
SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. :
1. The revisional application has been preferred praying for
quashing of proceedings in connection with G.R. No.
09/2021 arising out of Bidhannagar (South) P. S. Case No. 1
of 2021 dated January 2, 2021 under Sections 420/406/34
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 pending before the Learned
Court of the Additional Chief Judicial Bidhannagar,
Magistrate, 24 Parganas (North).
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2. The petitioner’s case is that the dispute/case made out in the
FIR arises out of a breach of an alleged agreement for sale
for purchase of a flat wherein the opposite party no. 2
being the de facto complainant advanced a sum of money
to the developer MKHS Realty LLP for purchasing a flat.
However, the proposed flat was not constructed and handed
over in time as per the allegation of the de facto complainant
within the time limit mentioned in the agreement in spite of
receiving major part of the consideration as alleged.
3. Even though the petitioners who were the Director’s of
LGW Ltd. had no role to play in such construction of flat
and handing over the have been same to de facto
complainant, the petitioners have been made as accused
in the FIR and Chargesheet only for the sake of harassment
and to extort money.
4. It is stated that this is purely a civil dispute arising out of the
breach of a contract in relation to non handing over of flat in
spite of receiving the money by the developer in which the
petitioners have no role to play. Such civil dispute arising out
of a mere breach of an agreement for sale has been sought to
be given a criminal colour by lodging FIR by the de facto
complainant. In fact, the charge sheet also does not disclose
any criminal offence, rather the dispute is entirely civil in
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nature and as such, the FIR as well the charge sheet filed
subsequently is an abuse of process of law and thus the
charge sheet as well as the FIR should be quashed with
immediate effect by exercising the powers under Section
482/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
5. The petitioners are Director’s of LGW Ltd. involved in
manufacturing of garments and jewellery. The company also
holds substantial portion of land in various part of Kolkata
as well as around Rajarhat area. Since LGW Ltd. has
substantial portion of land in various part of Kolkata, in
respect of one of such land in Rajarhat, the company
through its Director’s being the petitioners herein
entered into six development agreements, all dated 5th
December, 2014 in respect of six plots of land with a
developer by the name of MKHS Realty LLP, which was
represented by its partners Mounthill Realty Pvt. Ltd.
and Sankalp Height pvt. Ltd. for development of a project
in the said land by the name of “The Pyramid” consisting
of 17 towers having G+10 storied. All the six development
agreements contains similar terms and conditions. Along with
the six development agreements six Powers of Attorney were
also executed by the company through its Directors in favour
of MKHS Realty LLP for construction of the said project. As
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will be evident from the clauses contained in the said powers
of attorney, the entire responsibility of construction of the
building, approval of building plan and permission from all
necessary authorities for construction of the buildings and
obtaining necessary permissions were solely responsible
upon the MKHS Realty LLP, which was represented by its
partners.
6. The company being LGW Ltd. is the land owner
represented the by its Director’s the petitioners herein
and the petitioners have no role to play for approval of
sanction plan or for construction of any part of the building
or for timely construction of the project or handing over the
flats constructed in the building to any prospective
purchaser.
7. Subsequent to the Development Agreements and Powers of
Attorney, six Allocation Agreements were also entered into on
5th December, 2014. As will be evident from the Allocation
Agreements, the proposed flat in respect of which the FIR has
been lodged by the de facto complainant being Flat No. J/2
in tower/Block No. 16 was solely falling within the
Developer’s allocation.
8. The written complaint on the basis of which the Police Case
was started is dated 02.01.2020 wherein the complainant in
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the written complaint has lodged the complaint against the
LGW Limited and its Directors and M/s. MKHS Realty LLP
and its Directors.
9. It appears from the said written complaint that it has been
categorically stated by the complainant as follows:-
“In the year 2015 an agreement for sale was executed
by and between me along with my wife Mrs. Venu
Vidastaas purchaser, MKHS Realty LLP as developer
and LGW Limited as owner.”
10. The complainant has stated in the written complaint that the
petitioner/company herein is the owner of the land and not
the developer and the other petitioners are its directors.
11. It further appears from the written complaint that part of the
construction was made but not within the estimated period.
The complainant has further stated that the developers did
not have the complete sanction plan.
12. In course of hearing, written notes was filed by the
petitioners along with judgments relied upon.
13. A supplementary affidavit has been filed. The State has
placed a Memo of Evidence along with the case diary in the
present case.
14. It appears from the said Memo of Evidence that the articles
seized includes the original agreement between the
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petitioners herein and the company MKHS Realty LLP. The
money receipts seized show that all the receipts were
issued by the MKHS Realty LLP, who is the developer in
the present case.
15. There are no money receipts seized, to show that any amount
was received by the petitioner/company herein or its
Directors.
16. The Investigating Agency has seized the agreements between
the land owner, which is the petitioner company and its
Directors and the developers. The said fact prima facie goes
to show that the petitioners herein, themselves also appear to
be prima facie victims in the present case.
17. The following judgments have been relied upon by the
petitioner:-
(i) Lalita Kumari Versus Government of Uttar Pradesh
& Ors. (2014) 2 SCC 1;
(ii) S.W. Palanitkar Versus State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC
241;
(iii) Uma Shankar Gopalika Versus State of Bihar
(2005) 10 SCC 336;
(iv) Sarabjit Kaur Versus State of Punjab (2023) 5 SCC
330
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(v) State of Kerala Versus A. Parneed Pillai & Anr.
(1972) 3 SCC 661;
(vi) Dalip Kaur & Ors. Versus Jaganar Singh (2009) 14
SCC 696;
(vii) Lalit Chaturvedi & Ors. Versus State of Uttar
Pradesh & Anr. 2024 SCC Online SC 171;
18. Affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by the opposite party
no. 2, the complainant herein who has stated as follows:-
(a) The Petitioner no. 1 and 2 are the Directors of LGW
Limited which is a body corporate registered under the
Companies Act, 1956 and is the Owner of six plots of
landslying and situated at L.R. Khatian No. 4835 at
Mouza Gopalpur, J.L. No. 02, being Holding No.
RGM/5/03, BL1, Narayanpur, under Ward No. 5 of
Rajarhat Gopalpur Municipality (Now Bidhannagar
Municipal Corporation) Police Station Airport, District
North 24 Parganas.
(b) M/s MKHS Realty LLP Limited Liability Partnership Firm,
incorporated under the Limited Liability Partnership Act,
2008, having its office at Narayanpur, P.O. Rajarhat,
Gopalpur, North 24 Parganas, West Bengal 700136, P.S
Airport, being a Real Estate Developer, entered into
six development agreements dated 5th December
2014 with the LGW Limited (being the owner), for
developing and/or constructing a housing complex
over the ‘said land’, on an advance payment of Rs 3.5
Crore in each development agreements (totalling to Rs 21
Crores in the said 6 numbers of development agreement)
to the said LGW Limited and on further terms and
conditions as contained therein.
(c) The said LGW Limited (the owners) had also entered into
6(six) numbers of Joint-Development Power of Attorney
with MKHS Realty LLP in respect to the 6(six) plots of
lands as mentioned above.
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(d) The said LGW Limited (the owners) and MKHS Realty
LLP (the developers) in pursuance to the said 6(six)
numbers of development agreement had entered into
6(six) numbers of “owners allocation” and “developers
allocation” supplementary agreement, wherein the
owners and the developers had distributed and/or
allocated amongst themselves flats in the said project
named, “The Pyramid” having G+10 storied building in 17
Towers/Block.”
19. It appears from the further statements made by the opposite
party no. 2 in the affidavit-in-opposition from paragraph 4(e)
onwards that the complainant in the present case. He has
developed his case from as stated in the initial written
complaint. The opposite party no. 2 has very cleverly
concealed his affidavit-in-opposition that the agreement for
sale entered into by the opposite party no. 2 in respect of the
flat sought to be purchased was with MKHS Realty LLP.
20. It appears that the grievance of the complainant was
regarding delay in making constructions and handing over
the property in due time as per agreement. The further
grievance was that there was no sanction plan for above five
stories.
21. It is expected that a prudent person prior to entering into an
agreement shall be prima facie satisfied with the documents
required for such investment. A sanction plan is a document
which is available to a developer at the initial stage and is
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available for inspection, which in this case it appears that the
complainant was not diligent enough to look into.
22. The opposite party no. 2 has further gone into the allegation
about the amount received by the petitioner as owners of the
land, from MKHS Realty LLP (Developers) which actually does
not concern the opposite party no. 2, who has an
agreement only with MKHS Realty LLP, the developers.
23. The Supreme Court in Rikhab Birani & Anr. Vs State of
Uttar Pradesh & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 823, decided
on 16.04.2025, held:-
“15. In Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
this Court quoted an earlier decision
in Mohammed Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, wherein,
referring to Section 420 of the IPC, it was observed
that the offence under the said Section requires
the following ingredients to be satisfied:
“18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients
of an offence of cheating are made out. The
essential ingredients of the offence of “cheating”
are as follows:
(i) deception of a person either by making a false
or misleading representation or by dishonest
concealment or by any other act or omission;
(ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that
person to either deliver any property or to consent
to the retention thereof by any person or to
intentionally induce that person so deceived to do
or omit to do anything which he would not do or
omit if he were not so deceived; and
(iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to
cause damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property.”
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16. Reference was also made to the decision
in V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat and it was
observed:
“7. Similar elucidation by this Court in “V.Y.
Jose v. State of Gujarat“, explicitly states that a
contractual dispute or breach of contract per
se should not lead to initiation of a criminal
proceeding. The ingredient of „cheating‟, as
defined under Section 415 of the IPC, is existence
of a fraudulent or dishonest intention of making
initial promise or representation thereof, from the
very beginning of the formation of contract.
Further, in the absence of the averments made in
the complaint petition wherefrom the ingredients
of the offence can be found out, the High Court
should not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Section 482 of
the Cr. P.C. saves the inherent power of the High
Court, as it serves a salutary purpose viz. a
person should not undergo harassment of
litigation for a number of years, when no criminal
offence is made out. It is one thing to say that a
case has been made out for trial and criminal
proceedings should not be quashed, but another
thing to say that a person must undergo a criminal
trial despite the fact that no offence has been
made out in the complaint. This Court in V.Y.
Jose (supra) placed reliance on several earlier
decisions in “Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI“,
“Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.“, “Vir
Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal” and “All
Cargo Movers (I) (P) Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal
Jain“.”
17. This Court, in Delhi Race Club (1940)
Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, highlighted the
fine distinction between the offences of criminal
breach of trust and cheating, observing that the
two are antithetical in nature and cannot coexist
simultaneously. Police officers and courts must
carefully apply their minds to determine whether
the allegations genuinely constitute the specific
offence alleged.
18. In Kunti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this Court
referred to Sarabjit Kaur v. State of
Punjab wherein it was observed that a breach of
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contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution
for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest
intention is shown right at the beginning of the
transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to
keep a promise will not be enough to initiate
criminal proceedings. Thus, the dishonest
intention on the part of the party who is alleged to
have committed the offence of cheating should be
established at the time of entering into the
transaction with the complainant, otherwise the
offence of cheating is not established or made out.
19. It is the duty and obligation of the court to
exercise a great deal of caution in issuing process,
particularly when the matter is essentially of civil
nature. The prevalent impression that civil
remedies, being time-consuming, do not
adequately protect the interests of creditors or
lenders should be discouraged and rejected as
criminal procedure cannot be used to apply
pressure. Failure to do so results in the
breakdown of the rule of law and amounts to
misuse and abuse of the legal process.
20. In yet another case, again arising from
criminal proceedings initiated in the State of Uttar
Pradesh, this Court was constrained to note
recurring cases being encountered wherein parties
repeatedly attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of
criminal courts by filing vexatious complaints,
camouflaging allegations that are ex
facie outrageous or are pure civil claims. These
attempts must not be entertained and should be
dismissed at the threshold. Reference was made
to a judgment of this Court in Thermax
Limited v. K.M. Johny, which held that courts
should be watchful of the difference between civil
and criminal wrongs, though there can be
situations where the allegation may constitute
both civil and criminal wrongs. Further, there has
to be a conscious application of mind on these
aspects by the Magistrate, as a summoning order
has grave consequences of setting criminal
proceedings in motion. Though the Magistrate is
not required to record detailed reasons, there
should be adequate evidence on record to set
criminal proceedings into motion. The Magistrate
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should carefully scrutinize the evidence on record
and may even put questions to the
complainant/investigating officer etc. to elicit
answers to find out the truth about the
allegations. The summoning order has to be
passed when the complaint or chargesheet
discloses an offence and when there is material
that supports and constitutes essential
ingredients of the offence. The summoning order
should not be passed lightly or as a matter of
course.
21. Lastly, we would refer to another detailed
judgment of this Court in Sharif Ahmed v. State of
Uttar Pradesh, which draws out the ingredients
required to establish an offence under
Sections 406, 415, 420, 503 and 506 of the IPC in
the following terms:
“36. An offence under Section 406 of
the IPC requires entrustment, which carries the
implication that a person handing over any
property or on whose behalf the property is
handed over, continues to be the owner of the said
property. Further, the person handing over the
property must have confidence in the person
taking the property to create a fiduciary
relationship between them. A normal transaction
of sale or exchange of money/consideration does
not amount to entrustment. Clearly, the
charge/offence of Section 406 IPC is not even
remotely made out.
37. The chargesheet states that the offence under
Section 420 is not made out. The offence of
cheating under Section 415 of the IPC requires
dishonest inducement, delivering of a property as
a result of the inducement, and damage or harm
to the person so induced. The offence of cheating
is established when the dishonest intention exists
at the time when the contract or agreement is
entered, for the essential ingredient of the offence
of cheating consists of fraudulent or dishonest
inducement of a person by deceiving him to deliver
any property, to do or omit to do anything which
he would not do or omit if he had not been
deceived. As per the investigating officer, no
fraudulent and dishonest inducement is made out
Page 13 2026:CHC-AS:1110or established at the time when the agreement
was entered.
38. An offence of criminal intimidation arises
when the accused intendeds to cause alarm to the
victim, though it does not matter whether the
victim is alarmed or not. The intention of the
accused to cause alarm must be established by
bringing evidence on record. The word „intimidate‟
means to make timid or fearful, especially : to
compel or deter by or as if by threats. The threat
communicated or uttered by the person named in
the chargesheet as an accused, should be uttered
and communicated by the said person to threaten
the victim for the purpose of influencing her mind.
The word „threat‟ refers to the intent to inflict
punishment, loss or pain on the other. Injury
involves doing an illegal act.
39. This Court in Manik Taneja v. State of
Karnataka, had referred to Section 506 which
prescribes punishment for the offence of „criminal
intimidation‟ as defined in Section 503 of the IPC,
to observe that the offence under Section 503
requires that there must be an act of threating
another person with causing an injury to his
person, reputation or property, or to the person or
reputation of any one in whom that person is
interested. This threat must be with the intent to
cause alarm to the person threatened or to do any
act which he is not legally bound to do, or omit to
do an act which he is entitled to do. Mere
expression of any words without any intent to
cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring home
an offence under Section 506 of the IPC. The
material and evidence must be placed on record to
show that the threat was made with an intent to
cause alarm to the complainant, or to cause them
to do, or omit to do an act. Considering the
statutory mandate, offence under Section 506 is
not shown even if we accept the allegation as
correct.”
22. Significantly, this Court in Sharif
Ahmed (supra) cautioned courts to check such
attempts of making out a criminal case on the
basis of vague and ex facie false assertions.”
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24. In Ramesh Chandra Gupta vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Ors., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 993, Criminal Appeal No(s). ………
of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s). 39 of 2022), the
Supreme Court held:-
“15. This Court has an occasion to consider the
ambit and scope of the power of the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of criminal
proceedings in Vineet Kumar and Others vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2017)
13 SCC 369 decided on 31st March, 2017. It may
be useful to refer to paras 22, 23 and 41 of the
above judgment where the following was stated:
“22. Before we enter into the facts of the present
case it is necessary to consider the ambit and
scope of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC
vested in the High Court. Section 482 CrPC saves
the inherent power of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to any
order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice.
23. This Court time and again has examined the
scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC and laid down several principles
which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge
Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L.
Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699 held that the High
Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes
to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to
continue would be an abuse of the process of the
Court or that the ends of justice require that the
proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7 of the
judgment, the following has been stated :
„7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the
High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it
comes to the conclusion that allowing the
proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the
process of the court or that the ends of justice
Page 15 2026:CHC-AS:1110require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers,
both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to
achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a
court proceeding ought not to be permitted to
degenerate into a weapon of harassment or
persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object
behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the
material on which the structure of the prosecution
rests and the like would justify the High Court in
quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice.
The ends of justice are higher than the ends of
mere law though justice has got to be
administered according to laws made by the
legislature. The compelling necessity for making
these observations is that without a proper
realisation of the object and purpose of the
provision which seeks to save the inherent powers
of the High Court to do justice, between the State
and its subjects, it would be impossible to
appreciate the width and contours of that salient
jurisdiction.‟
41. Inherent power given to the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and object of
advancement of justice. In case solemn process of
Court is sought to be abused by a person with
some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the
attempt at the very threshold. The Court cannot
permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls in
one of the categories as illustratively enumerated
by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. Judicial process is a
solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be
converted into an instrument of operation or
harassment. When there are materials to indicate
that a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fides and proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Court
will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceeding
under Category 7 as enumerated in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
which is to the following effect :
„102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fides and/or where the
Page 16 2026:CHC-AS:1110proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.‟ Above Category 7 is
clearly attracted in the facts of the present case.
Although, the High Court has noted the judgment
of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335 but did not advert to the relevant facts of
the present case, materials on which final report
was submitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully
satisfied that the present is a fit case where the
High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the criminal
proceedings.”
16. The exposition of law on the subject relating to
the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under
Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent
power under Section 482 CrPC are well settled
and to the possible extent, this Court has defined
sufficiently channelized guidelines, to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein
such power should be exercised. This Court has
held in para 102 in State of Haryana and
Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp.
(1) 335 as under :
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted
and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein
such power could be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein
such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
Page 17 2026:CHC-AS:1110are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order
of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only
a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted
in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding
is instituted) to the institution and continuance of
the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
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17. The principles culled out by this Court have
consistently been followed in the recent judgment
of this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt.
Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Others,
2021 SCC Online SC 315.”
25. The present case falls under category 1, 3 and 7 of Para 102 of
Bhajan Lal (Supra).
26. It appears that the dispute in the present case is regarding an
investment made by the complainant with the developer and
the petitioners had no role to play other than being the owner
of the land, which was handed over to the developer by way of
agreements.
27. The dispute is thus clearly a civil dispute and that too in
the present case not with/against the petitioners herein.
28. The materials on record, do not prima facie show presence of
the ingredients required to constitute the offences alleged
against the petitioners herein and as such the proceeding in
this case are liable to be quashed in the interest of Justice
and to prevent an abuse of the process of law.
29. CRR 3193 of 2023 is thus allowed.
30. The proceeding in connection with G.R. No. 09/2021 arising
out of Bidhannagar (South) P. S. Case No. 1 of 2021 dated
January 2, 2021 under Sections 420/406/34 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 pending before the Learned Court of the
Additional Chief Judicial Bidhannagar, Magistrate, 24
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Parganas (North), is hereby quashed in respect of the
petitioners namely Anurag Gupta and Sanjay Kumar
Gupta.
31. All connected Applications, if any, stand disposed of.
32. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
33. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for
necessary compliance.
34. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for,
be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary
legal formalities.
[Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.]
