Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Anuj Kumar And Anr vs State on 6 April, 2026
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2026:RJ-JD:15289]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 454/2018
1. Anuj Kumar S/o Keval Chand Arora, Caste Chhabara R/o
29 C-Block Ward No. 14 Srikaranpur District
Sriganganagar.
2. Neeraj Kumar S/o Keval Chand Arora, Caste Chhabara R/
o 29 C-Block Ward No. 14 Srikaranpur District
Sriganganagar.
----Petitioners
Versus
State Of Rajasthan
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Pankaj Gupta
For Respondent(s) : Mr. N.S. Chandawat, Dy.G.A.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
DATE OF CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENTS 12/02/2026
DATE ON WHICH ORDER IS RESERVED 12/02/2026
FULL ORDER OR OPERATIVE PART Full Order
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT 06/04/2026
REPORTABLE
BY THE COURT:-
1. The instant criminal revision petition has been instituted
under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, laying a challenge to the order dated 24.03.2018 passed by
the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Sri Karanpur,
District Sri Ganganagar, in Criminal Revision No. 27/2015. By
virtue of the impugned order, the learned revisional Court allowed
the revision preferred by the State, set aside the order dated
18.03.2015 rendered by the learned trial Court in Criminal Original
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Case No. 709/2013, and directed that the present petitioners be
proceeded against for offences under Sections 454, 457, 380 and
201 IPC, including issuance of warrants of arrest.
2. The factual matrix, when delineated in its essential contours,
reveals that on 25.10.2012, seed godowns belonging to the
petitioners were subjected to inspection by the competent
authorities, culminating in their seizure under the provisions of the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955, particularly under Section 3/7
read with Section 6(A).
2.1. Subsequently, by order dated 12.11.2012, the District
Collector directed auction of the seized seeds. In furtherance
thereof, the process of “Drumikaran” was undertaken on
08.01.2013 under the supervision of the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Sri Karanpur, in the presence of responsible officials.
2.2. However, during a subsequent inspection of the sealed
godowns, it was alleged that the seals had been tampered with
and certain goods were found missing. This discovery gave rise to
suspicion of offences relating to house-breaking, theft, and
destruction of evidence, culminating in registration of an FIR
against the petitioners under Sections 454, 457, 380 and 201 IPC.
2.3. Upon culmination of investigation, a charge-sheet came to be
filed. The learned trial Court, upon a conscientious evaluation of
the material on record, vide order dated 18.03.2015, discharged
the petitioners, holding that no prima facie case warranting
framing of charges was made out.
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2.4. Aggrieved thereby, the State preferred a revision petition,
which came to be allowed by the learned revisional Court on
24.03.2018. The said order not only reversed the discharge but
also directed coercive process against the petitioners. The same is
under assailment before this Court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the
impugned order as being legally unsustainable, contending that
the learned revisional Court has transgressed the well-defined
limits of revisional jurisdiction by substituting its own view in the
absence of perversity or patent illegality in the order of discharge.
It is urged that the order of the trial Court was founded upon a
judicious appreciation of the material and did not warrant
interference.
4. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor has supported the
impugned order, submitting that the material collected during
investigation discloses sufficient grounds for proceeding against
the petitioners.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
6. This Court finds that the controversy raised herein stands
squarely governed by the principles enunciated in Reema v.
State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.
581/2025, decided on 22.01.2026), wherein it was held that
although a detailed order is not obligatory at the stage of framing
of charge, the order must nonetheless reflect conscious application
of judicial mind and cannot be cryptic or mechanical. In Reema
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(supra), this Court, while relying upon an earlier decision rendered
in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 1675/2025 involving
analogous circumstances, elaborately considered the scope of
judicial scrutiny at the stage of framing of charge. The relevant
portion of the said decision is reproduced hereinbelow for ready
reference:
“9. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that this Court,
in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 1675/2025 , an
earlier matter involving analogous facts and
circumstances, had occasion to examine the legality of an
order framing charge, wherein detailed observations were
made regarding the scope of judicial scrutiny at the stage
of framing of charge, the requirement of meaningful
application of mind, and the impermissibility of mechanical
framing of charges.
10. The said order is being reproduced hereunder for
ready reference:
1. By way of filing the instant revision petition, the petitioner
calls in question the order dated 06.11.2025 passed by the
learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 1,
Udaipur, in Special Sessions Case No. 46/2025 (State v.
Ganpatlal Sharma & Anr.), arising out of FIR No. 157/2024,
CPS ACB Jaipur, whereby charges have been framed against
the petitioner under Section 07 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018) and Section
61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, despite gross violation
of the mandatory provisions of Sections 230, 249, 250(1) and
250(2) of the BNSS, resulting in serious miscarriage of justice
and infringement of the petitioner’s fundamental rights
guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India, rendering the impugned order illegal, arbitrary and
unsustainable in law.
2. The brief facts of the present are that the petitioner is
Accused No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as “A-1”) in the
Sessions Case titled State v. Ganpat Lal Sharma & Anr.,
arising out of FIR No. 157/2024 registered at Central Police
Station (CPS), Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB). Upon
completion of investigation, Charge-sheet No. 221/2025 was
filed against the petitioner for the offence punishable under
Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as
amended up to 2018) and Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita. The present Criminal Revision Petition is
directed against the order dated 06.11.2025, whereby
charges have been framed against the petitioner in blatant
violation of Sections 230, 249, 250(1), 250(2) and 252(1) of
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the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) and Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The charge-sheet was
submitted on 21.08.2025 before the learned Special Judge,
Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 1, Udaipur, by Respondent
No. 2, the Additional Superintendent of Police, ACB, Special
Unit, Udaipur.
3. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the learned Special
Judge on 17.09.2025, and on the same day, cognizance of
the alleged offence was taken, as reflected in the order sheet
dated 17.09.2025.
4. Subsequently, on 06.11.2025, the learned Special Judge
proceeded to take a decision to frame charges against the
petitioner. The order sheet dated 06.11.2025 records that
after hearing arguments on charge and perusal of the record,
a prima facie case under Section 7 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act and Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 was found to be made out, and charges were
accordingly framed, read over and explained to the accused,
who pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Directions were
further issued for summoning prosecution witnesses and for
leading prosecution evidence.
5. That the present S.B. Criminal Revision Petition is confined to
assailing the order dated 06.11.2025, whereby the decision to
frame charges and the consequent framing of charges against
the petitioner were undertaken, despite non-compliance with
the mandatory statutory safeguards contained in Sections
230, 249, 250(1), 250(2) and 252(1) of the BNSS, thereby
resulting in grave prejudice to the petitioner and causing
violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
6. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone
through the materials available on record.
OBSERVATIONS
A. Scope of Judicial Scrutiny at the Stage of Framing of
Charge
7. At the outset, it is necessary to recapitulate the well-settled
contours governing judicial scrutiny at the stage of framing of
charge. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Sections 250 (Discharge) and 251 (Framing of charge) of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), is neither
expected to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence
nor to weigh the probative value of the material as would be
done after a full-fledged trial. Equally, the Court is not to act
as a mere conduit for endorsing the opinion of the
investigating agency.
8. The seminal judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr., AIR
1979 SC 366, authoritatively lays down that while framing
charge, the Judge has the undoubted power to sift and weigh
the material for the limited purpose of finding out whether a
prima facie case exists. The Court is duty-bound to apply its
judicial mind to the broad probabilities of the case, the total
effect of the material placed on record, and to ascertain
whether the accusation is not frivolous. The expression
“ground for presuming” does not imply proof beyond
reasonable doubt but nevertheless requires existence of
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legally admissible material capable of supporting the essential
ingredients of the alleged offence.
9. At the same time, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanti
Bhadra Shah & Anr. v. State of West Bengal, (2000) 1
SCC 722, clarified that framing of charge does not require a
detailed or elaborate order akin to a judgment of acquittal or
discharge, the order must nonetheless reflect conscious
application of mind. The Court is not obliged to write lengthy
reasons while framing charges; however, it must demonstrate
that it has examined whether the basic ingredients of the
offence are disclosed from the material on record. Thus, the
law strikes a delicate balance: brevity is permissible,
mechanical endorsement is not.
B. Mandatory Nature of Procedural Safeguards under BNSS
10. The BNSS consciously preserves and strengthens procedural
safeguards at the pre-trial stage, recognising that deprivation
of liberty commences not merely upon conviction but from
the moment the criminal process is set in motion. Sections
230 (Supply to accused of copy of police report and other
documents), 249 (Opening case for prosecution), 250
(Discharge) and 251 (Framing of charge) of the BNSS are not
empty formalities; they are statutory manifestations of the
constitutional guarantee of a fair procedure under Articles 14
and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that where
a statute prescribes a particular procedure, it must be
followed in that manner or not at all. Procedural compliance is
not a matter of convenience but of jurisdiction.
C. Non-Compliance with Section 230 BNSS – Supply of
Documents
12.Section 230 of the BNSS mandates that in cases instituted on
a police report, the Court shall, without delay, and in no case
beyond fourteen days, furnish to the accused copies of all
documents forwarded with the police report under Section
193(6) BNSS.
13. From the record, it emerges that although the order sheet
dated 17.09.2025 records that copies of the charge-sheet
“along with CD” were supplied, there is prima facie substance
in the grievance that all documents forming part of the police
report were not furnished, and that the supply was effected
through the investigating agency without judicial verification
or grant of reasonable time to the accused to ascertain
completeness.
14. More importantly, where the prosecution case substantially
rests upon electronic evidence, compliance with Section 230
BNSS assumes heightened significance. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in P. Gopalakrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala,
(2020) 9 SCC 161, has categorically held that the original
memory card constitutes a document, and the accused is
entitled to receive its authenticated clone copy prepared in
accordance with law. Supply of an uncertified CD, not
prepared through hash-value authentication, does not fulfil
the statutory mandate.
15.The furnishing of incomplete or legally unrecognised copies
strikes at the very root of the accused’s right to effectively
invoke the remedy of discharge under Section 250 BNSS.
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D. Failure to Conduct Prosecutorial Opening under Section
249 BNSS
16.Section 249 BNSS obligates the Public Prosecutor to “open
the case” by describing the charge and stating by what
evidence the prosecution proposes to establish guilt. The
phrase “shall open” is peremptory and admits of no
discretion.
17.The record of proceedings dated 06.11.2025 does not reflect
that any such prosecutorial opening was undertaken. Absence
of this statutory exercise deprives the Court of an informed
basis to assess whether the materials relied upon correspond
to the essential ingredients of the offence alleged. Framing of
charge without such prosecutorial articulation reduces the
judicial exercise to a formal endorsement of the charge-
sheet, which the law expressly prohibits.
E. Curtailment of the Right to Seek Discharge under Section
250 BNSS
18.For ready reference section 250 BNSS is reproduced herein
below-
Section 250 Discharge
(1) The accused may prefer an application for discharge
within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of
the case under section 232.
(2) If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf,
the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused and record his reasons for so doing.
19.Section 250(1) BNSS confers upon the accused a valuable
right to prefer an application for discharge within sixty days
from the date of commitment. In cases under the Prevention
of Corruption Act, where the Special Judge takes cognizance
directly, the date of cognizance effectively marks the
commencement of this statutory period.
20.Learned counsel for the accused-petitioner, namely Mr. C.S.
Kotwani, Ms. Preeti Sharma and Mr. Manoj Chaudhary,
vehemently urged that the defence was in the process of
preparing an application for discharge and had unequivocally
expressed its intention to avail the statutory remedy under
Section 250 BNSS. It was submitted that despite such clear
inclination, the learned court proceeded to frame charges
without granting reasonable and adequate time to the
accused to exercise the liberty expressly conferred by law.
21. Although Section 250(1) BNSS provides a discretion to the
accused to prefer an application for discharge within sixty
days, the grant of such statutory period cannot be termed as
unreasonable or dilatory, as the same flows directly from the
legislative mandate. While it may be correct that in every
case the court is not denuded of power to consider the
question of discharge only upon the formal filing of an
application by the accused, yet where the accused manifests
a clear and bona fide intention to invoke the remedy of
discharge, the court is duty-bound to afford a meaningful
opportunity to do so. Denial of such opportunity, particularly
when the statute itself prescribes a specific time frame,
amounts to rendering the statutory right illusory and defeats
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the very object of Section 250(2) BNSS, which obligates
judicial consideration of the sufficiency of grounds before
proceeding to frame charges.
22.In the present case, charges came to be framed on the 50th
day from the date of cognizance, thereby truncating the
statutory window available to the accused.
23.Further, Section 250(2) BNSS mandates the Court to consider
the record and hear the submissions of the accused even
where no formal discharge application is filed, and to record
reasons for declining discharge. The impugned order does not
reflect such consideration or reasoning.
F. Mechanical Framing of Charge and Absence of Meaningful
Judicial Application of Mind
24. The impugned order dated 06.11.2025, when examined on
the anvil of the statutory framework and the settled principles
governing framing of charge, discloses a manifest deficiency
in judicial reasoning and application of mind. The order sheet
merely records, in a highly cursory and omnibus manner, that
arguments on charge were heard, the record was perused,
and a prima facie case under Section 7 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018) and Section
61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita was found to be made
out. Beyond this ritualistic recital, the order is conspicuously
silent as to what material, what circumstances, or what
factual substratum weighed with the learned Trial Court in
forming such an opinion.
25. It is no doubt correct that at the stage of framing of charge,
the Court is not expected to write a detailed or elaborate
order as would be warranted at the stage of discharge or final
adjudication. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanti Bhadra
Shah & Anr. v. State of West Bengal (2000) 1 SCC 722
has clarified that framing of charge does not require a
reasoned order akin to a judgment. However, the said
principle cannot be misconstrued to legitimise a mechanical
or non-speaking exercise, devoid of even minimal articulation
of judicial satisfaction. Brevity is permissible; opacity is not.
26. The distinction between a brief order and a mechanical order
is well recognised in criminal jurisprudence. Even while
framing charges, the Court must indicate, albeit succinctly,
that it has adverted to the material on record and that such
material, if taken at face value, discloses the existence of
the essential ingredients of the offence alleged for
which charges has to be framed. A mere reproduction of
statutory sections or a bare assertion that an offence is
“prima facie made out” does not fulfil this requirement.
27. This requirement assumes greater significance in prosecutions
under the Prevention of Corruption Act post the 2018
amendment. The legislative transformation of Section 7 has
introduced the element of “improper or dishonest
performance of public duty” as a sine qua non. Therefore,
even at the threshold stage, the Court is expected to advert,
howsoever briefly to the existence of material indicating
demand or acceptance of undue advantage in connection with
such improper or dishonest performance. In the absence of
even a skeletal reference to such material, the order betrays
a presumption rather than a judicial satisfaction.
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28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Prafulla
Kumar Samal & Anr., AIR 1979 SC 366, has categorically
held that the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution. The Court must consider the
broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence
and documents produced, and any basic infirmities apparent
on the face of the record. The impugned order, however,
reflects no such exercise and instead appears to have
proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the filing of a
charge-sheet ipso facto warrants framing of charge.
29. Further, the expression “arguments on charge heard”
recorded in the order sheet, without even a fleeting reference
to the nature of such arguments or the reasons for their
rejection, renders the exercise under Sections 250 and 251 of
the BNSS illusory. Such recording, unaccompanied by any
demonstrable consideration, amounts to an empty formality,
which has been consistently deprecated by constitutional
courts. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kranti Associates
Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496 has
held that “rubber-stamp reasons” or pretence of reasoning
cannot be equated with a valid judicial decision-making
process.
30. This Court, in H.G. Grover v. State of Rajasthan (S.B.
Criminal Revision Petition No. 1356/2022), has
reiterated that although meticulous appreciation of evidence
is not required at the stage of framing of charge, the Trial
Court must nonetheless satisfy itself that the material on
record discloses the essential ingredients of the offence and
must reflect such satisfaction in the order. The absence of
such reflection renders the order vulnerable to judicial
correction.
31. Thus, the impugned order dated 06.11.2025, viewed
holistically, suffers from procedural superficiality and lack of
discernible judicial reasoning. It does not demonstrate that
the learned Trial Court applied its independent judicial mind
to the statutory ingredients of the offences alleged, nor does
it indicate how the material on record satisfies the threshold
of “ground for presuming” as contemplated under Section 251
BNSS. Such an order, though brief, crosses the impermissible
line into mechanical adjudication and therefore cannot be
sustained in law.
32.At this juncture, it is of crucial significance to underscore that
Section 250 BNSS expressly enables the accused to avail a
statutory period of sixty days to prefer an application for
discharge. The provision is not merely directory but confers a
substantive procedural right upon the accused to invoke
judicial scrutiny of the sufficiency of grounds before being
compelled to face a full-fledged trial. Once the defence,
through its counsel, categorically conveys its intention to
exercise such right, the Court is obligated to facilitate and
receive such application, rather than foreclose the statutory
remedy by prematurely proceeding to frame charges.
33.This Court is conscious of the fact that the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita is a relatively new procedural code, and
situations may arise where the accused expressly seeks to
avail the entire statutory window of sixty days for moving an
application for discharge. Such procedural contingencies are
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inherent in the legislative scheme and may, in future, warrant
authoritative pronouncement by constitutional courts.
34.However, since the precise contours of such situations do not
presently fall for exhaustive adjudication, this Court refrains
from making any broader or final comment on the issue.
Nonetheless, so long as the statutory provision stands on the
statute book, adherence thereto is not optional but
mandatory. It is incumbent upon the Court, at the very least,
to examine whether the mandate of Section 250 BNSS has
been complied with in letter and spirit. The failure to do so,
particularly in the face of an expressed intent by the accused
to invoke the said provision, vitiates the procedural fairness
of the proceedings and strikes at the root of the statutory
safeguard envisaged by the legislature.
G. Nature of Present Observations and Consequential
Directions
35. It is clarified, with utmost circumspection, that the foregoing
discussion is purely academic and procedural in nature. This
Court has consciously refrained from expressing any opinion
on whether the material on record ultimately warrants
framing of charge against the petitioner or not. The merits of
the prosecution case are left completely open to be left upon
the learned trial court to adjudge whether charges are liable
to be framed or not.
36.In view of the cumulative procedural infirmities noticed
hereinabove, the impugned order dated 06.11.2025 cannot
be sustained. The matter deserves to be remanded to the
learned Special Judge for fresh consideration.
37. Accordingly, the instant revision petition is allowed in part
and the impugned order dated 06.11.2025 is set aside. The
matter is remitted with directions that:
â–ª the learned Trial Court shall afford adequate opportunity to
both parties;
â–ª the petitioner shall be granted ten days’ further time, if so
advised, to move an application for discharge;
â–ª the learned Special Judge shall thereafter pass an appropriate
order strictly in accordance with law, keeping in view the
statutory scheme of the BNSS and the settled legal position.
38. The learned Trial Court shall remain entirely free and
uninfluenced by any observation made herein and shall
decide the matter independently on the basis of the material
available on record and the submissions advanced before it.
A careful reading of the aforesaid extracted portion
unmistakably reveals that the Court, even at the stage of framing
of charge, is under a legal obligation to undertake a meaningful,
albeit limited, scrutiny of the material on record and to ensure
that the essential ingredients of the alleged offence are prima
facie disclosed. The exercise cannot be reduced to a mechanical
endorsement of the charge-sheet.
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Doctrine of “Mere Suspicion” vs. “Grave Suspicion”
a. At this juncture, it becomes apposite to advert to the
doctrinal distinction between “mere suspicion” and “grave
suspicion,” which constitutes the jurisprudential fulcrum of
adjudication at the stage of framing of charge.
b. Criminal jurisprudence has consistently underscored that the
threshold for proceeding to trial lies not in the realm of conjecture,
but in the existence of material giving rise to a reasoned and
credible inference of culpability.
c. Mere suspicion, regardless of its intensity, remains inherently
speculative. It is characterized by absence of foundational facts,
lack of evidentiary linkage, and dependence upon surmises. Such
suspicion, howsoever compelling at a superficial level, does not
possess the legal tenability required to subject an individual to the
rigours of a criminal trial.
d. Grave suspicion, in contradistinction, is rooted in tangible
material; either direct evidence or a coherent chain of
circumstances, which establishes a live and proximate nexus
between the accused and the alleged offence. It imports a degree
of probability which, if left unrebutted, would justify calling upon
the accused to stand trial.
e. The distinction, therefore, is not merely lexical but substantive:
while mere suspicion is conjectural and infirm, grave suspicion is
grounded in material particulars and carries legal weight sufficient
to justify continuation of criminal proceedings.
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[2026:RJ-JD:15289] (12 of 13) [CRLR-454/2018]Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, this Court is constrained to observe that the impugned order
passed by the learned revisional Court suffers from manifest
infirmities.
6.1. The learned revisional Court, while reversing the well-
reasoned order of discharge, has failed to indicate any perversity,
illegality, or material irregularity in the findings recorded by the
learned trial Court. There is a conspicuous absence of independent
analysis of the material on record.
6.2. The order impugned herein does not disclose as to what
specific material persuaded the revisional Court to conclude that a
prima facie case exist. The reasoning is cursory, omnibus, and
bereft of any demonstrable application of judicial mind. Such an
approach, in the considered opinion of this Court, militates against
the settled principles governing revisional jurisdiction, which is
supervisory and not appellate in nature. The infirmity is not
merely technical but strikes at the root of procedural fairness. The
direction to proceed against the petitioners, coupled with coercive
measures, entails serious consequences affecting their liberty and
reputation, and therefore necessitates a higher degree of judicial
scrutiny.
6.3. This Court is, however, mindful of the self-imposed
limitations at this stage and refrains from entering into the merits
of the evidence or recording any conclusive finding on the
culpability of the petitioners. There is not an iota of evidence
which could suggest that these petitioners may trespass or
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removed the property belonging to others in absence of the
ingredients essential to constitute the offence forcing an individual
to face the rigor of trial certainly tantamounts to infringement of
his right to liberty. In view of the cumulative analysis aforesaid,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.
7. Consequently, the instant revision petition is allowed. The
impugned order dated 24.03.2018 passed by the learned
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Sri Karanpur, District Sri
Ganganagar, in Criminal Revision No.27/2015 is hereby set aside.
The order dated 18.03.2015 passed by the learned ACJM, Sri
Karanpur District Sri Ganganagar in Criminal Original Case
No.709/2013 is affirmed.
7. The stay petition, if any, stands disposed of accordingly.
(FARJAND ALI),J
234-Mamta/-
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