Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Anr vs The Assistant Labour Commissioner on 24 April, 2026
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24.04.2026
Item No.9
Court No. 30
Piya
WPA 8503 of 2026
Bridge and Roof Company (India) Ltd. &
Anr.
-vs-
The Assistant Labour Commissioner
(Central), Kolkata and Controlling
Authority & Anr.
Mr. Soumya Majumder, Ld. Sr. Adv.
Mr. Sudarshan Kr. Agarwal
Ms. Ditsha Dhar
Ms. Debanjana Paul
Mr. Sakshi Singh
... for the Petitioner
Mr. Balai Ch. Paul
Ms. Tithi Roy
.... For the Respondents
1. The writ application has been preferred
challenging the certificate dated 9th
February, 2026 issued by the
respondent no. 1 being the controlling
authority herein, in file no.
48/56/2022-E3 and has prayed for
quashing of the same along with an
order dated 21st July, 2025 also issued
by the respondent no. 1 the controlling
authority.
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2. Learned counsel for the respondent
herein submits that the said order
dated 21st July, 2025 is an appealable
order. But as no appeal has been
preferred by the petitioners till date,
the same is barred by limitation and
the period of limitation cannot be
extended beyond the permissible limit
as provided in the statute in the
present case under Section 7(7) of the
payment of gratuity act.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent
has relied upon the following
judgments:-
i. City College, Calcutta vs
State of West Bengal and
Ors., decided on February
10, 1986.
ii. Ali Hossain vs M/s. Budge
Budge Co. Ltd. & Ors. in
FMA No. 3595 of 2015
decided on 13.07.2018.
4. The petitioner on the other hand has
relied upon the following judgment:-
(i) City College, Calcutta vs
State of West Bengal and
Ors., decided on February
10, 1986 (Para 3).
(ii) C.D. Steel Pvt. Ltd. vs
Assistant Provident Fund2
3Commissioner, 2019 SCC
OnLine Cal 9277.
5. On hearing the parties and on perusal
of the materials on record, it appears
that admittedly the employee herein
has already received the admitted
amount of gratuity. It is for the
balance amount that the order has
been passed by the controlling
authority.
6. Mr. Paul, learned counsel for the
respondent relies upon Section 7(7) of
the payment of gratuity act and
submits that there is no scope for
extending the period of limitation,
beyond the period as provided under
the statute/Act.
7. On the other hand, Mr. Majumder,
learned senior counsel appearing for
the petitioner submits that the
petitioner is not at fault for not
preferring an appeal within the
statutory period in view of the following
pleadings made in the writ application:-
“(i) During the course of the
hearings before the respondent
no. 1 authority, the petitioner
company authorized one of its
employees to take appropriate
steps to defend such application.
Accordingly he was taking all
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necessary steps. The petitioner
company has placed their
submissions vide a reply and
other submissions to defend the
interest of the petitioner
company.
(ii)To the utter shock and
surprise, the petitioners received
a certificate issued under section
8 of the said Act of 1972 dated
February 18, 2026 issued by the
respondent no. 1 directing the
respondent to pay a sum of Rs.
4,03,044/- (Rupees Four Lakh
Three Thousand Forty-Four Only)
to the respondent no. 2 along
with 10% simple interest per
annum w.e.f. 31/10/2016 till
the actual date of payment plus
15% compound interest per
annum w.e.f. 01/12/2016 till
the date of recovery.
(iii) The petitioner company
further learned that the said
representative did not take the
appropriate steps after the said
order was passed by the
respondent no. 1 authority and
further the said representative
failed to apprise the respondent
no. 1 authority of the correct
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factual circumstances. Due to
such major lapse on behest of
the said representative, the
petitioner company could not
prefer an appeal against the said
order dated August 18, 2025,
within the time limit prescribed
under Section 7(7) of the
Payment and Gratuity Act, 1972.
It is pertinent to mention herein
that the petitioner company has
taken necessary steps against
the said representative for the
said lapses, to avoid any
repetition of such conduct.”
8. It is thus submitted by Mr.
Majumder that there was no fault on
the part of the petitioner, who have
only gained knowledge about the
disposal of the proceedings before the
controlling authority, on receiving the
certificate under Section 8 of the
payment of gratuity act, issued on
09.02.2026.
9. Mr. Majumder, further argues that the
petitioner cannot be made to suffer, as
there are no fault for being unable to
prefer an appeal because of the fact
that they had no knowledge about such
proceedings being concluded by the
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controlling authority due to the laches
of their representative.
10. Mr. Majumder further submits that the
writ Court has ample powers to relegate
the petitioner before the appellate
authority and as it is the writ Court,
which shall direct so, the question of
limitation shall not arise. Reliance is
placed upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Hari Krishna
Mandir Trust vs State of
Maharashtra and Ors. (2020) 9 SCC
356, decided on August 7, 2020.
11. Mr. Paul, learned counsel for the
respondent relies upon the judgment in
Ali Hossain (Supra), wherein the
Division Bench of this Court held as
follows:-
“In view of the above, the order
impugned to this appeal is not
sustainable in law on the
following grounds:
(1) The order impugned to the
writ application was an order
passed under sub-section (4)
of Section 7 of the said Act,
1972 on March 10, 2015, the
leaned Single Judge granted
liberty to the respondent-
company to prefer an appeal
against that order within
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August 21, 2015, i.e., beyond
120 days, overreaching the
provisions of sub-section (7) of
Section 7 of the said Act, 1972
as also 1ª proviso to the above
provision;
(ii) The learned Single Judge
allowed the respondent-
company to proceed with the
appeal subject to depositing of
50% of the amount ordered by
the controlling authority in its
order dated March 10, 2015, it
was contrary to the provisions
of 2nd proviso to sub-section
(7) of Section 7 of the said Act,
1972.
Therefore, the above order
cannot be sustained in law in
view of the provisions of sub-
section (7) of Section 7 of the
said Act, 1972.
It will not be out of context to
observe that in the event the
period of limitation in initiating
of a proceeding expires during
the pendency of a writ
proceeding there is no scope to
initiate a statutory proceeding
or to prefer an appeal to
condone such delay on the
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ground of pendency of a lis
before the Writ Court.
Reference may be made to the
decision of City College,
Calcutta vs. State of W.B. &
Ors. reported in 1986(52) FLR
547 and operative portions of
the above judgment is quoted
below:
“7. In his impugned order of
the Appellate Authority has
rightly pointed out that in view
of the sub-section (7) of Section
7 of the Payment of Gratuity
Act, 1972, appeals must be
filed within 60 days from the
date of the receipt of the order
by the Controlling Authority.
Under proviso to sub-section
(7) of Section 7 of the said Act
the Appellate Authority may
extend the said period of 60
days by a further period of 60
days if he is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from filing the
appeal within the said period
of 60 days. In the above view,
after expiry of 120 days from
the date of the receipt of the
order passed by the8
9Controlling Authority there
could be no scope for further
extending under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act the period
prescribed by the law for
preferring an appeal under
Section 7(7) of the Payment of
Gratuity Act against the order
passed under sub-section (4)
of Section of the said Act.
8. For the foregoing reasons,
we hold that the Appellate
Authority did not commit any
jurisdictional error by refusing
to condone the delay beyond
120 days in preferring the
appeal of the petitioner. The
appeal provided under Section
7 of the Payment of Gratuity
Act, 1972 is not before any
Court. The Act has vested an
executive authority with
juridical quasi judicial powers
in order to enable it to act as
the Appellate Authority. In
view of the decisions of the
Supreme Court mentioned
hereinbefore it is no longer
open to us to consider whether
or not by force of Section 29(2)
of the Limitation Act, 1963, the9
10provisions of Sections 5 to 25
of the said Act have been
made applicable only in case
of appeal and applications
under any special presented to
Courts of law and not to
persoma designata or
administrative authorities.
We therefore dismiss this
Revisional Application without
any order as to costs.”………..”
12. In view of the said judgment of the
Division Bench in Ali Hossain (Supra)
which has relied upon the judgment of
City College, Calcutta (Supra),
learned counsel for the respondent
submits that even a writ court cannot
extend the period of limitation beyond
the period as provided under the
statute.
13. Similar view has also been taken by the
Supreme Court in the judgment of
Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU,
Kakinada & Ors. vs Glaxo Smith
Kline Consumer Health Care
Limited, (2020) 19 SCC 681, wherein
the Supreme Court has categorically
held that the High Court in its exercise
of powers under article 226 shall act
with self imposed restraint even
though an act cannot bar the
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jurisdiction of Courts under Article
32 or 226, constitutional Courts who
take note of the legislative intent and
exercise power consistent with
provision of statute and such power
under article 226 cannot be exercised
when invoked to under mind or defeat
the applicable statutory regime.
14. The Court has further held that
complete mechanism is provided under
the act and only that mechanism is to
be followed and a writ petition is not
maintainable so as to defeat statutory
scheme. It has been categorically held
that an appeal cannot be preferred
beyond the period as prescribed under
the act and delay cannot be condoned
by exercising power under article 142
or under article 226 of the constitution.
Nor can such delay be condoned by
invoking Section 5 of the limitation act
1963.
15. Finally the Supreme Court in the said
case held as follows in paragraph 23:-
“23.Arguendo, reverting to
the factual matrix of the
present case, it is noticed
that the respondent had
asserted that it was not
aware about the passing of
assessment order dated 21-
6-2017 although it is
admitted that the same was
served on the authorised11
12representative of the
respondent on 22-6-2017.
The date on which the
respondent became aware
about the order is not
expressly stated either in the
application for condonation of
delay filed before the appellate
authority, the affidavit filed in
support of the said application
or for that matter, in the memo
of writ petition. On the other
hand, it is seen that the
amount equivalent to 12.5% of
the tax amount came to be
deposited on 12-9-2017 for
and on behalf of respondent,
without filing an appeal and
without any demur — after the
expiry of statutory period of
maximum 60 days, prescribed
under Section 31 of the 2005
Act. Not only that, the
respondent filed a formal
application under Rule 60 of
the 2005 Rules on 8-5-2018
and pursued the same in
appeal, which was rejected on
17-8-2018. Furthermore, the
appeal in question against the
assessment order came to be
filed only on 24-9-2018
without disclosing the date
on which the respondent in
fact became aware about
the existence of the
assessment order dated 21-
6-2017. On the other hand, in
the affidavit of Mr Sreedhar
Routh, Site Director of the
respondent Company (filed in
support of the application for
condonation of delay before
the appellate authority), it is
stated that the Company
became aware about the12
13irregularities committed by its
erring official (Mr P. Sriram
Murthy) in the month of July
2018, which presupposes that
the respondent must have
become aware about the
assessment order, at least in
July 2018. In the same
affidavit, it is asserted that the
respondent Company was not
aware about the assessment
order, as it was not brought
to its notice by the
employee concerned due to
his negligence. The
respondent in the writ petition
has averred that the appeal
was rejected by the appellate
authority on the ground that it
had no power to condone the
delay beyond 30 days, when
in fact, the order examines the
cause set out by the
respondent and concludes that
the same was unsubstantiated
by the respondent. That
finding has not been examined
by the High Court in the
impugned judgment and order
[Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer
Healthcare Ltd. v. CCT, 2018
SCC OnLine Hyd 1985] at all,
but the High Court was more
impressed by the fact that the
respondent was in a position
to offer some explanation
about the discrepancies in
respect of the volume of
turnover and that the
respondent had already
deposited 12.5% of the
additional amount in terms of
the previous order passed by
it. That reason can have no
bearing on the justification for
non-filing of the appeal within13
14the statutory period. Notably,
the respondent had relied on
the affidavit of the Site Director
and no affidavit of the
employee concerned (P. Sriram
Murthy, Deputy Manager-
Finance) or at least the other
employee [Siddhant
Belgaonker, Senior Manager
(Finance)], who was
associated with the erring
employee during the relevant
period, has been filed in
support of the stand taken in
the application for condonation
of delay. Pertinently, no
finding has been recorded
by the High Court that it
was a case of violation of
principles of natural justice
or non-compliance of
statutory requirements in
any manner. Be that as it
may, since the statutory period
specified for filing of appeal
had expired long back in
August 2017 itself and the
appeal came to be filed by the
respondent only on 24-9-2018,
without substantiating the
plea about inability to file
appeal within the
prescribed time, no
indulgence could be shown to
the respondent at all.”
16. It appears that the facts as stated in
paragraph 23 of the said judgment as
reproduced hereinabove, comes to
the aid of the petitioner in the
present case.
17. The petitioner herein has specifically
pleaded that it was due to the conduct
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of their representative that they did not
have the knowledge of the order passed
by the controlling authority.
18. The said order has been passed against
the petitioners as the said
representative did not present their
case properly before the authority
concerned and as such the same has
caused severe prejudice to the
petitioner herein and that the
impugned order has been passed in
violation of the principle of natural
justice and there has been clear
abuse process of law.
19. The petitioner has also expressly stated
that their date of knowledge as to the
order passed by the controlling
authority is on the basis of the
certificate issued by the controlling
authority on 09.02.2026.
20. As such it has been prima facie proved
that the petitioner became aware of the
controlling authority’s order only on
09.02.2026.
21. Accordingly this Court is of the view
that not providing an opportunity to
prefer an appeal in such
circumstances, will cause severe
prejudice to the petitioner herein.
22. Thus, in the present case, in the
interest of justice, the date of
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knowledge to compute the period of
limitation be taken as 09.02.2026. The
statutory period for preferring an
appeal against an order of the
controlling authority under Section 7(7)
is 60 days from the date of receipt of
the order.
23. Herein it is to be held, from the date of
receiving the certificate dated
09.02.2026 and the same can be
extended for a further period of 60 days
thereafter on sufficient cause being
shown. In all period of 120 days, which
in the present case will expire on
09.06.2026.
24. Accordingly, the writ application is
disposed of with liberty granted to the
petitioner herein in the interest of
justice, to prefer a statutory appeal
within 30 days from the date of this
order.
25. The period of limitation be computed
on and from 09.02.2026, being the date
of knowledge and the cause shown
being just and sufficient.
26. Thus, the impugned order of the
controlling authority dated 21.07.2025
and the certificate dated 09.02.2026,
be stayed till the disposal of the
appeal by the appellate authority.
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27. In case, no appeal is preferred within
the period as directed by this Court,
the order of stay shall stand vacated on
expiry of 30 days and the authority
concerned shall be at liberty to proceed
in accordance with law.
28. It is made clear that this Court has not
gone into the merit of this case.
29. Writ application is accordingly
disposed of.
30. All connected application, if any,
stands disposed of.
31. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
32. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this
order, if applied for, be supplied to the
parties, expeditiously after complying
with all necessary legal formalities.
( Shampa Dutt (Paul), J. )
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