Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Anantha Chandra Reddy vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 4 May, 2026
APHC010597482025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY,THE FOURTH DAY OF MAY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 11917/2025
Between:
1. ANANTHA CHANDRA REDDY, S/O. LATE A. VENKATA REDDY,AGED
55 YEARS, D.NO. 7-370,COURT ROAD, ANANTAPUR-515001.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH STATION HOUSE
OFFICER,ANANTAPUR III TOWN POLICE STATION,ANANTAPUR
DISTRICT.REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH,AT AMARAVATHI.
2. THE ASST RETURNING OFFICER, 153 -ANANTAPURAMU URBAN
AC TAHSILDAR, ANANTAPURAMU
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1. P MADHUKAR REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 528 Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita Act, 2023 (for brevity the ‘BNSS’) by the Petitioner/Accused
No.2, seeking to quash the proceedings against him in C.C.No.485 of 2024 on
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the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate (Special Mobile Court),
Ananthapuramu.
2. The case of the prosecution is that during the enforcement of the Model
Code of Conduct for the General Elections, the Petitioner, along with other
accused, participated in the distribution of sarees to poor Muslim women on
the eve of Ramzan in Ananthapuramu town, in the presence of YSRCP
leaders, with the object of luring voters in favour of the party’s candidate. This
act, reported by the Assistant Returning Officer and corroborated by
newspaper publication, is alleged to constitute undue influence under Section
171(F) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the I.P.C.,’) and
disobedience of lawful orders under Section 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ thereby
warranting prosecution.
3. Sri P.Madhukar Reddy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that
the very substratum of the prosecution case is misconceived, inasmuch as the
Petitioner, arrayed as Accused No.2, is neither a contesting candidate nor an
agent nor a person authorised by any political party to canvass votes. The
alleged act of participating in the distribution of sarees during the Ramzan
festival is a charitable activity undertaken annually, devoid of any electoral
nexus. The invocation of Section 171(F) of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is wholly untenable, for
the offence of undue influence presupposes inducement or personation in the
conduct of an election by a candidate or his agent, which is conspicuously
absent herein. Likewise, Section 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ cannot be pressed into
service in the absence of any specific order promulgated by a lawful authority
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and knowingly disobeyed by the Petitioner. Mere reference to “violation of
Model Code of Conduct” does not satisfy the statutory ingredients of Section
188 of ‘the I.P.C.’
4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further urged that even if the charge
sheet allegations are taken at their face value, no offence is disclosed under
Sections 171(F) or 188 of ‘the I.P.C.’ The continuation of proceedings against
the Petitioner amounts to abuse of process and harassment of an innocent
person. The Petitioner therefore requests for quashment of C.C.No.485 of
2024 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate (Special Mobile
Court), Ananthapuramu.
5. Per contra, Sri A.Sai Rohith, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor
submits that the allegations are not baseless but are substantiated by
contemporaneous material including the adverse news item published in
Eenadu Telugu daily and the report of the Assistant Returning Officer. The
distribution of sarees in the presence of prominent YSRCP leaders during the
subsistence of the Model Code of Conduct clearly amounts to an attempt to
influence voters and falls within the mischief of Section 171(F) of ‘the I.P.C.’
The Petitioner, though not a candidate, acted in concert with party activists
and leaders, thereby rendering himself liable for participation in the offence.
6. It is further contended that Section 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is rightly invoked,
as the Election Commission of India and the District Election Officer had
promulgated binding instructions prohibiting distribution of freebies during the
election period. The Petitioner, having participated in the programme, cannot
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plead ignorance of the Model Code of Conduct. The proceedings are therefore
maintainable, and it is urged to dismiss the Criminal Petition.
7. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant
Public Prosecutor.
8. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by
the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.
9. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the
learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is:
“Whether the proceedings in C.C.No.485 of 2024 on the file of the
learned Judicial First Class Magistrate (Special Mobile Court),
Ananthapuramu is liable to be quashed in exercise of the inherent
powers of the High Court under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’/Section
528 of ‘the BNSS’?”
10. As per Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ there is a bar for taking cognizance
for the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188, both inclusive of, ‘the
I.P.C.,’ unless there is a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned.
11. In the instant case, there is no ‘complaint’ by the public servant, and
there was only chargesheet filed under Section 188 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The
‘complaint’ as contemplated under Section 190 read with 200 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’
was not filed.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., 1 has
categorically held that Section 195(1)(a)(i) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ imposes a
jurisdictional embargo on courts from taking cognizance of offences under
Section 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ unless preceded by a written complaint of the
1
(2010) 9 SCC 567
5
competent public servant, thereby safeguarding against vexatious or mala fide
prosecutions. This provision, being an exception to the general rule under
Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be applied in its true spirit, and any attempt
to circumvent it by mislabelling or recharacterizing the offence under other
provisions of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is impermissible. The judicial test remains whether
the allegations, in substance, disclose an offence that squarely falls within the
ambit of Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ ensuring strict adherence to legislative
intent and procedural sanctity.
13. In Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that the legality of cognizance under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be
judged at the moment it is taken, and at that stage the Magistrate must
determine whether his jurisdiction is curtailed by Section 195(1)(b) and (c) of
‘the Cr.P.C.’ Since Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is a statutory limitation on the
otherwise broad powers under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ any non-
compliance strips the learned Magistrate of authority to proceed, rendering
cognizance without adherence to its mandate wholly without jurisdiction. 1
14. In Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh3, the Hon’ble Apex Court underscored
that Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ serves to shield individuals from vexatious
private prosecutions driven by vendetta, while simultaneously safeguarding
the integrity of judicial proceedings and the administration of justice. Where
the alleged act amounts to contempt of lawful authority, offences against
public justice, or relates to documents produced in evidence, the law
2
(1971) 3 SCC 329
3
(1996) 3 SCC 533
6
mandates an absolute bar on private complaints, vesting exclusive authority in
the court to initiate proceedings under Section 340 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The ruling
makes clear that private prosecution in such circumstances is impermissible,
as public justice demands strict adherence to this statutory safeguard.
15. In State of Punjab v. Raj Singh4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
the embargo under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ applies only at the
stage of cognizance under Section 190(1) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and does not restrict
the statutory power of the police to investigate an FIR disclosing cognizable
offences under Chapter XII of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ even if committed in relation to
court proceedings. While the court cannot directly take cognizance of such
offences due to Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ it may still initiate a complaint
under Section 340 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ on the basis of the FIR and investigation
materials, provided the requisite opinion is formed and procedure followed.
Thus, police investigation remains unaffected, though cognizance by the court
is strictly subject to the statutory bar.
16. In K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy 5 , the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ applies only
when forgery is committed with respect to a document after it has been
produced or given in evidence in court, i.e., while in custodia legis. Since the
alleged forgery occurred prior to filing, the High Court erred in quashing the
prosecution on that ground. The Court further clarified that Section 195(1)(a)
of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ which covers offences under Sections 172 to 188 of ‘the
4
(1998) 2 SCC 391
5
(2005) 7 SCC 352
7
I.P.C.,’ was irrelevant because the case concerned forgery of documents
rather than falsity of a complaint before the Deputy Registrar. Accordingly, the
High Court’s order was unjustified, and prosecution was held maintainable.
17. In Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of W.B.,6 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that
Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ bars cognizance of offences under Sections 172
to 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ unless initiated by a written complaint of the concerned
public servant, but this embargo does not extend to distinct offences arising
incidentally from the same facts. Allegations may possess a dual character,
constituting contempt of public authority on one hand and distinct offences like
defamation on the other, and while cognizance of the former requires
compliance with Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the latter remains prosecutable
independently. However, the Court cautioned that prosecution cannot evade
the statutory bar by misdescribing or relabelling the offence under other
provisions of ‘the I.P.C.,’ as such circumvention would defeat the legislative
intent.
18. In State of U.P. v. Mata Bhikh7, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
the expression “public servant concerned” under Section 195(1)(a) of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ includes not only the officer who originally promulgated the order but
also his successor in office, since otherwise the continuity of proceedings
under provisions like Sections 133, 145 or 146 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ would be
disrupted if the officer retires, is transferred, or ceases to hold office. The
Court clarified that the successor lawfully steps into the shoes of the original
6
(1953) 1 SCC 637
7
(1994) 4 SCC 95
8
officer and is fully competent to lodge a complaint against disobedience of
such orders. Consequently, the High Court’s contrary view was set aside,
affirming that successors in office fall squarely within the ambit of “public
servant concerned.”
19. In State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy8, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that when, in the course of the same transaction, offences requiring a court’s
complaint under Section 195(1)(b) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and other offences not
covered by that provision are committed together, it is impermissible to split
them up and sustain prosecution only for the latter. The statutory bar under
Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be applied in its entirety, ensuring that
proceedings cannot be upheld selectively by isolating offences outside its
scope.
20. In Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh 9 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court
rejected the contention that only the Magistrate before whom the original
proceedings were taken could file a complaint under Section 195(1)(b) of ‘the
Cr.P.C.’ Referring to Section 559 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the Court held that a
successor in office is fully empowered to exercise the same powers and duties
as his predecessor, including filing complaints under Section 476 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ for offences like perjury or false evidence committed before the
predecessor. Sub-section (2) of Section 559 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ merely resolves
doubts about succession and does not limit the scope of sub-section (1) of
8
(1981) 2 SCC 185
9
1968 SCC OnLine SC 253
9
Section 559 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ Thus, the Court affirmed that the complaint filed by
the successor Magistrate was valid and within jurisdiction.
21. In Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni10, the Hon’ble
Apex Court reaffirmed that when, in the course of the same transaction,
offences are disclosed, some requiring a court’s complaint under Section
195(1)(b) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ (such as fabrication of false evidence under Sections
192 & 193 of ‘the I.P.C.,’) and others not so covered (like forgery under
Sections 467 & 471 of ‘the I.P.C.,’), it is impermissible to split them up and
sustain prosecution only for the latter. The statutory drill of Section 195 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ must be followed in its entirety, ensuring that the bar cannot be
circumvented by prosecuting under provisions outside its scope when the
gravamen of the allegations squarely attracts Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’
22. In Kantamaneni Ravishankar v. State of A.P., 11 a learned Single
Judge of this Court held that for prosecuting disobedience of an ordinance
under Section 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ a written complaint from the concerned public
servant (or one duly authorized) is mandatory. Consequently, the police are
incompetent to register a crime under Section 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ based on a
private complaint, and any such registration stands vitiated as contrary to the
settled law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and other High Courts.
23. This Court, in Kollu Ravindra v. State of A.P12 has categorically held
that a complaint invoking offences under Sections 172 to 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’
must emanate from a “public servant” as envisaged under Sections 190 and
10
(2020) 20 SCC 1
11
2020 SCC OnLine AP 726
12
2025 SCC OnLine AP 3870
10
200 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ In the absence of such a statutory complaint, the learned
Magistrate is divested of the competence to take cognizance of the alleged
offence. The bar contained in Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ therefore, operates
as a clear embargo on the assumption of cognizance based merely on a
police report.
24. This Court, further also held in Kanakamedala Ravindra Kumar v.
State of A.P 13 that when the allegations arise out of a single, indivisible
transaction giving rise to multiple offences, one falling squarely within the
ambit of Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and another ostensibly outside its sweep,
such offences, being inextricably interwoven, cannot be artificially segregated
to bypass the statutory embargo. The Court has categorically held that mere
deletion of Section 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ from the charge sheet does not efface
the bar, for the factual substratum of the alleged act continues to be integrally
connected with the disobedience of a promulgated order, thereby mandating a
complaint by the competent public servant as required under Section
195(1)(a) of ‘the Cr.P.C.’
25. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in C.
Muniappan supra, the learned Special Mobile Magistrate Court, Guntur was
not authorised to take cognizance in view of the embargo under Section 195
of ‘the Cr.P.C.’
26. On a careful consideration of the record and the settled legal position,
this Court is persuaded that the prosecution against the Petitioner is vitiated
13
Criminal Petition No: 987/2020
11
by a fundamental jurisdictional infirmity. The gravamen of the charge under
Section 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ suffers from the statutory embargo contained in
Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ which mandates a written complaint of the
competent public servant as a condition precedent for cognizance. In the
present case, no such complaint exists, and mere reliance on a police report
or newspaper publication cannot substitute the statutory requirement. Equally,
the invocation of Section 171(F) of ‘the I.P.C., is misconceived, as the
Petitioner is neither a candidate nor an authorized agent, and the alleged
charitable distribution of sarees lacks the essential electoral nexus to
constitute undue influence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held
in C. Muniappan supra, Govind Mehta supra, Surjit Singh supra, Raj Singh
supra, Vengadachalam supra, Basir-Ul-Huq supra, Mata Bhikh supra,
Hemareddy supra, Ajaib Singh supra, and Bandekar Bros supra that the
bar under Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is absolute, cannot be circumvented by
mislabelling offences, and extends to indivisible transactions where offences
are interwoven.
27. Considering these binding precedents, continuation of proceedings
against the Petitioner would amount to an abuse of process and a travesty of
justice. Therefore, the proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused No.2 in
C.C.No.485 of 2024 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate,
(Special Mobile Court), Ananthapuramu, are liable to be interfered and
quashed.
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28. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed. Accordingly, the
proceedings in C.C.No.485 of 2024 on the file of the learned Judicial First
Class Magistrate, (Special Mobile Court), Ananthapuramu, are quashed.
________________________
DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
Date: 04.05.2026
VTS
