Uttarakhand High Court
Ajay Pant vs Samrat Associates And Real Estate … on 19 June, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT
NAINITAL
Civil Revision No.65 of 2026
Ajay Pant .......Revisionist/defendant
Versus
Samrat Associates and Real Estate Limited
...... Respondent/plaintiff
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Presence:-
Mr. Anil Kumar Joshi, learned counsel for the
Revisionist/defendant.
Mr. Piyush Garg, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff.
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Hon’ble Siddhartha Sah, J. (oral)By means of the present civil revision under
Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887,
the revisionist/defendant has assailed the judgment and
order dated 25.05.2026 passed by learned 2nd Additional
District Judge/Judge, Small Causes Court, Nainital in Small
Cause Suit No.3 of 2020, “Samrat Associates and Real Estate
Limited vs. Ajay Pant”, whereby the learned 2nd Additional
District Judge/Judge, Small Causes Court, Nainital has
decreed the suit and has directed to vacate the premises
within a period of 30 days from the date of judgment and pay
the arrears of rent for a period of three years amounting to
Rs.2100 and damages @ Rs. 100 per day total amounting to
Rs.17,600/-.
Admit.
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2. The present revision emanates out of SCC suit
instituted in the court of learned District Judge/Judge, Small
Causes Court, Nainital by the plaintiff/respondent herein
with the averments that the plaintiff/respondent is the
owner/landlord of the suit premises, which has been
purchased by means of sale deeds dated 25.05.2000 from the
previous owners and the property stands mutated in Nagar
Palika, Nainital records in the name of plaintiff.
3. It is further averred in the plaint that the
revisionist/defendant is the tenant in the suit property @ 100
per month and there is relationship of landlord and tenant
between the revisionist/defendant and plaintiff/respondent.
4. It is further averred in the plaint that the
revisionist/defendant has not been residing in the tenanted
premises since many years and has also defaulted in the
payment of rent despite repeated requests.
5. It is further averred in the plaint that the
plaintiff/respondent is a private limited company duly
registered with the Registrar of Companies and as such the
provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 are not attracted to the
suit premises.
6. It is further averred in the plaint that legal notice
dated 30.07.2019 was issued to the revisionist/defendant,
which was received by the revisionist/defendant on
02.08.2019 on his Lucknow address, which was not complied
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with. Inspite of expiry of 30 days, the revisionist/defendant
has not delivered the peaceful vacant possession of the
tenanted property to the plaintiff/respondent and is in un-
authorized occupation of the suit property, hence the suit was
filed seeking possession and eviction of the tenant/defendant
from the suit property and for recovery of arrears of rent and
mesne profits.
7. The revisionist/defendant herein contested the
aforesaid suit by filing Written Statement and refuted the
plaint averments. In paragraph no.5 of the said Written
Statement inter alia the revisionist/defendant averred that he
has been continued as a tenant since time of his father @ 700
per year and has been depositing the rent under Section 30 of
the U.P. Rent Control Act in the court.
8. It was also contended that there are no arrears of
rent. It was categorically pleaded that the relationship of
landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant
had never been established, nor had the plaintiff ever
informed the defendant that he had become the landlord of
the property in question.
9. It was further pleaded in paragraph no.5 of the
Written Statement that the defendant came to know about
the purchase of the property in question by the plaintiff only
when he received summons from the Court and thereafter
inspected the case file. It was also pleaded that the provisions
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of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were applicable in entirety. The
receipt of the notice was denied. It was further pleaded that
the defendant had deposited the entire admitted rent on the
first date of hearing. It was contended that since the admitted
rent along with expenses had been deposited on the first date
of hearing, therefore, no cause of action survived either for
eviction of the defendant or for recovery of mesne profits.
10. It was also contended that the plaintiff did not
send any notice regarding the purchase of the property in
question, therefore, the plaintiff does not have any cause of
action to institute the suit. It was also asserted that no notice
had ever been served upon the defendant by the plaintiff.
11. In response, the plaintiff/respondent filed a
replica. In paragraph 4 thereof, it was categorically averred
that the plaintiff/respondent has sent a registered notice
dated 10.05.2018 to the defendant/revisionist, whereby the
plaintiff company informed him that the defendant had
become the owner and landlord of the building in question. It
was further pleaded that the defendant had, in fact, replied to
the said notice through a reply communication dated
28.05.2018.
12. In paragraph 6 of the replica, the
plaintiff/respondent further pleaded that upon receipt of the
defendant’s reply through counsel, another registered notice
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dated 06.07.2018 was sent to the defendant, enclosing all
relevant ownership documents pertaining to the property in
question.
13. In support of their respective pleadings, the
plaintiff/respondent placed on record copies of the notices
issued to the defendant along with the documents evidencing
ownership of the property. On the other hand, the defendant
relied upon challans and rent receipts to substantiate his
defence regarding the deposit of rent.
14. Based on the rival pleadings of the parties, the
trial court framed the following points for determination:
i. Whether the plaintiff is the landlord of the
property in question and whether the
relationship of landlord and tenant exists
between the plaintiff and the defendant?
ii. Whether the defendant is a tenant in respect of
the first floor of the main building (Western part)
situated in the property in question, at a
monthly rent of ₹100? If yes, what is its effect?
iii. Whether the defendant has committed any
default in the payment of rent to the plaintiff
and, on account thereof, whether the plaintiff
validly terminated the tenancy of the defendant
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by serving a legal notice? If yes, what is its
effect?
iv. Whether the provisions of the U.P. Act No.13 of
1972 are applicable to the property in question?
If yes, what is its effect?
v. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs
claimed in the suit?
These were the points for determination framed by
the trial court for adjudication of the dispute between the
parties.
15. The parties examined their respective witnesses in
support of their cases, and upon conclusion of the trial, the
matter was finally heard by the learned Judge, Small Causes
Court / Addl. District Judge, Nainital. By the impugned
judgment and decree dated 25.05.2026, the learned Judge,
SCC decreed the suit for possession, arrears of rent and
mesne profits.
16. While deciding Point for Determination No.(i), the
learned Judge, SCC came to the conclusion that upon
purchase of the property in question, the vendee has become
the landlord and the relationship of landlord and tenant came
into existence.
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17. In respect of Point for Determination No.(ii), the
learned Judge, SCC came to the conclusion that on the basis
of rent tendered to the prior landlord, the total annual rent is
reckoned as Rs.700/- per annum i.e. Rs. 58.33 per month.
18. On Point for Determination No.(iii), the learned
Judge, SCC came to the conclusion that the tenancy was
determined vide notice dated 10.05.2018. However, tenant
failed to tender the arrears of rent, hence the tenancy stands
terminated.
19. On Point for Determination No.(iv), learned Judge
SCC came to the conclusion that the provisions of UP Act
No.13 of 1972 are applicable to the property in question.
20. On Point for Determination No.(v), the learned
Judge, SCC, relied upon a number of judgments and, after
considering that the rent was not tendered despite the notice
dated 10.05.2018, held that the tenancy stood terminated.
21. Learned Judge, SCC also came to the conclusion
that the defendant/revisionist had deposited the entire
arrears of rent, taxes, and costs amounting to Rs. 18,207/-
vide challan dated 18.03.2021. Thus, the entire arrears were
deposited on the first date of hearing since the points for
determination were framed on 25.08.2022. However, in view
of paragraph 5 of the written statement, the learned Judge,
SCC came to the conclusion that it could not be said that the
deposit was conditional. Therefore, the tenant was not
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entitled to the benefit under Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No.13 of
1972. Accordingly, the learned Judge, SCC proceeded to
decree the suit for eviction/possession, arrears of rent and
mesne profits.
22. Aggrieved against the aforesaid impugned
judgment and order dated 25.05.2026, the present revision
has been preferred.
23. Assailing the aforesaid judgment and order dated
25.05.2026, learned counsel for the revisionist/defendant
would submit that in para 7 of the plaint, it has been stated
by the plaintiff/respondent that there was no resolution at
the time of sending the notice of 2018, hence the notice which
was sent would not be a valid notice.
24. Learned counsel for the revisionist defendant
would further submit that notice dated 30.07.2019, which
has been mentioned in the plaint, had returned undelivered,
hence there was no occasion for the trial court to decree the
suit.
He has further submitted that there is no whisper
of the notice of 2018 in the entire plaint and the Judge, SSC
had committed an error in decreeing the suit on the basis of
notice of 2018.
It is further submitted on behalf of the
revisionist/defendant that the application dated 12.03.2021
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for deposit of the rent is prior to the first date of hearing and
was an unconditional deposit, hence the tenant/defendant
was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of UP Act No.13 of
1972 and learned Judge, SSC has erred at law by not
extending the benefits of the provisions of Section 20(4) of UP
Act No.13 of 1972.
25. Learned counsel for the defendant/revisionist has
placed reliance upon a judgment of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in the case of “Praveen Sharma
(since deceased) and others vs. Ravi Kumar and another“,
rendered in S.C.C. Revision No.269 of 2014 and has invited
the attention of the Court to the certain portions thereof as
follows:-“The Supreme Court, while interpreting the principles
contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act in Subhash Chandra
Versus Mohammad Sharif and others, AIR 1990 SC 636 held that
“where the landlord has not himself inducted the tenant in the
disputed property and his rights are founded on a derivative
title, for example, as an assignee, donee, vendee, heir, etc., the
position is a little different. A tenant already in possession can
challenge the plaintiff’s claim of derivative title showing that
the real owner is somebody else, but this is subject to the rule
enunciated by S. 116 of the Evidence Act. The section does not
permit the tenant, during the continuance of the tenancy, to
deny that his landlord had at the beginning of the tenancy a
title to the property. The rule is not confined in its application to
cases where the original landlord brings an action for eviction,
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a transferee from a landlord also can claim the benefit, but that
will be limited to the question of the title of the original landlord
at the time when the tenant was let in.”
Where the tenant denies the title of the assignee,
landlord bonafidely, to satisfy himself that he has acquired a
valid title, it is held by the Supreme Court in Sheela & others
Versus Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, 2002 (47) ALR 415
that it would not result in forfeiture of the tenancy on the
ground of denial of title. It has also been observed by the
Supreme Court that since forfeiture on the ground of denial of
title operates harshly against the tenant, therefore, in order
that the same operates as a ground for eviction, the denial of
the title of the landlord should not be for bona fide reasons.
The relevant extract from the law report is as under : –
In our opinion, denial of landlord’s title or
disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely
to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the
landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant
within the meaning of clause (c) of sub-section (1)
of Section 12 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
To amount to such denial or disclaimer, as would entail
forfeiture of tenancy rights and incur the liability to be
evicted, the tenant should have renounced his character
as tenant and in clear and unequivocal terms set up title
of the landlord in himself or in a third party. A tenant
bona fide calling upon the landlord to prove his
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ownership or putting the landlord to proof of his title so
as to protect himself (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a
protection made available to him by Rent Control Law but
without disowning his character of possession over the
tenancy premises as tenant cannot be said to have
denied the title of landlord or disclaimed the tenancy.
Such an act of the tenant does not attract applicability
of Section 12(1)(c) abovesaid. It is the intention of the
tenant, as culled out from the nature of the plea raised by
him, which is determinative of its vulnerability…….
In the instant case, albeit the defendants having taken a
plea that the sale deed is illegal and void they not only
attorned in favour of the plaintiffs but while making deposit
under Section 20(4), they specifically pleaded that the deposit
is unconditional meaning thereby that it could be withdrawn
by the landlord forthwith. In case, there had been any pleading
that unless the plaintiffs prove their title to the disputed shop,
they should not be permitted to withdraw the amount
deposited under Section 20(4) of the Act, it would have made
the deposit conditional. Since no such condition was imposed,
therefore, in considered opinion of the Court, the deposit made
under Section20(4) of the Act cannot be said to be a conditional
deposit. The view taken by the trial Court to the contrary is
manifestly illegal.” He would submit that since the title of the
previous landlord was neither disputed nor denied, albeit
admitted by the defendant/revisionist, consequently, there
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was no occasion for the learned Judge, Small Causes Court,
to record a finding that the deposit made by the defendant
was a conditional deposit. It is thus contended that the said
finding is contrary to the settled principles of law laid down in
the aforesaid judgment and is liable to be set aside.
26. Learned counsel for the defendant/revisionist has
also referred to a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Sheela & Others vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash
as quoted in the said judgment in the case of “Praveen
Sharma (since deceased) and others vs. Ravi Kumar and
another“, and he would submit that since the defendant was
not having the knowledge of transfer of property in favour of
the plaintiff, hence that cannot be deemed to be a denial of
the title of the landlord/plaintiff.
With reference to the judgment of ‘Praveen
Sharma‘ (supra), learned counsel for the
revisionist/defendant would further submit that since no
condition was imposed by the defendant/revisionist, therefore
the deposit amount made under Section 20(4) of UP Act No.13
of 1972 cannot be said to be a conditional deposit. He further
submitted that so far as the notice of 2019 is concerned, that
is of July 2019, is not served.
27. Per contra, learned counsel for the
plaintiff/respondent would draw the attention of the Court to
paragraph nos.4 and 6 of the replica. In paragraph 4 thereof,
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it was categorically averred that the plaintiff/respondent has
sent a registered notice dated 10.05.2018 to the
defendant/revisionist, whereby the plaintiff company
informed him that the defendant had become the owner and
landlord of the building in question. It was further pleaded
that the defendant had, in fact, replied to the said notice
through a reply communication dated 28.05.2018 and in
paragraph 6 of the replica, the plaintiff/respondent further
pleaded that upon receipt of the defendant’s reply through
counsel, another registered notice dated 06.07.2018 was sent
to the defendant, enclosing all relevant ownership documents
pertaining to the property in question.
Referring to para 5 of the WS of the defendant/revisionist, learned counsel for the
plaintiff/respondent herein would submit that it is an
absolutely false averment in the WS that plaintiff did not send
any notice to the defendant about having become the landlord
of the property in question.
Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff would
make the submission that not only the notice dated
10.05.2018 was sent to the defendant regarding the
intimation, the plaintiff having become the owner of the
property in question, the defendant, in fact, replied to the
said legal notice dated 10.05.2018 by reply dated 28.05.2018.
Hence, such pleadings are absolutely false and frivolous.
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28. Supporting the findings recorded by the learned
Judge, SCC and defending the impugned judgment, learned
counsel for the plaintiff/respondent invited the attention of
the Court to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Mangal Sen v. Kanchhid Mal, reported in (1981) 4 SCC 117,
and particularly to paragraph 10 thereof. Paragraph 10 of the
said judgment is extracted hereinbelow for ready reference:-
“10. The provisions of sub-section (4) will get attracted
only if the tenant has, at the first hearing of the
suit, unconditionally paid or tendered to the landlord the
entire amount of rent and damages for use and
occupation of the building due from him together with
interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum
and the landlord’s costs of the suit in respect thereof,
after deducting therefrom any amount already
deposited by him under sub-section (1) of Section 30.
There is absolutely no material available on the record
to show that the alleged deposit of Rs 1980 was made
by the tenant on the first date of hearing itself and,
what is more important, that the said deposit was made
by way of an unconditional tender for payment to the
landlord. The deposit in question is said to have been
made by the appellant on January 25, 1974. It was
only subsequent thereto that the appellant filed his
written statement in the suit. It is noteworthy that one of
the principal contentions raised by the appellant-
defendant in the written statement was that since he
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had stood surety for the landlord for arrears of Sales
Tax, there was no default by him in the payment of rent.
In the face of the said plea taken in the written
statement, disputing the existence of any arrears of rent
and denying that there had been a default, it is clear
that the deposit, even if it was made on the date of the
first hearing, was not an unconditional tender of the
amount for payment to the landlord. Further, there is
also nothing on record to show that what was deposited
was the correct amount calculated in accordance with
the provisions of Section 20(4). In these circumstances,
we hold that the appellant has failed to establish that
he has complied with the conditions specified in sub-
section (4) of Section 20 and hence he is not entitled to
be relieved against his liability for eviction on the
ground set out in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of the said
section.”
29. Referring to the observations made by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the aforesaid paragraph, learned counsel
for the plaintiff/respondent submitted that since certain pleas
are taken in the written statement particularly in paragraph 5
thereof that the relationship of landlord and tenant was not
established between the plaintiff and the defendant, hence it
would be in the nature of conditional deposit. Consequently,
the defendant was not entitled to the benefit contemplated
under law, and the learned Judge, SCC, has rightly denied
the same.
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30. Learned counsel for plaintiff / respondent further
submitted that even if the deposit was made on the date of
first hearing, the same was not an unconditional tender of the
amount to the landlord.
31. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent would
further rely upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of “Ghoorey Lal vs. Sheo Murti Gupta and Another“,
reported in (1994) 5 SCC 339, which is extracted hereinbelow
for ready reference:-
“1. In this case having regard to the stand taken by the
appellant in his written statement, we think it is not an
unconditional deposit under Section 20(4) of the U.P.
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act XIII of 1972). In fact, after
narrating that the landlord did not have title in
paragraph 15 it is averred:
“That though the respondent, in the above
circumstances, does not admit to being the tenant of
the plaintiff, still, without prejudice to his rights
regarding the rate of rent, has deposited on
September 21, 1978, the entire alleged rent from
August 1, 1975 to July 31, 1978 at the rate of Rs 10
per month along with cost of the suit and interest
thereon, in total Rs 553.25 by tender dated
September 21, 1978 in the court of Judge, Small
Cause Court, Allahabad in Sheo Murti
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Gupta v. Ghooreylal [ Suit No. 335 of 1978] .
Therefore, the respondent is entitled to the protection
given by Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972
against eviction.”
2. The fact that even here no unmistakable term denies
the title of the landlord would amount to a conditional
deposit. The court below is correct. The civil appeal
stands dismissed. The question of grant of time is left to
the executing court. No costs.”
32. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent would
thus submit that the judgment of “Ghoorey Lal” is squarely
applicable in the present case, in as much as denial of title of
the plaintiff would amount to a conditional deposit and the
trial court has rightly denied the benefit of Section 20(4) of
U.P. Act No.13 of 1972.
33. The learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent
herein would further submit that the bona fide denial of the
title of the plaintiff would not amount to forfeiture of tenancy
and in this regard, the learned counsel for the
plaintiff/respondent has invited the attention of the Court to
provisions of Section 20(2)(f) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, but
learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent would submit
that in the present case, it is a case of malafide denial in as
much as in Para 5 of the WS, there is categorical averment
that the relationship of tenant and landlord has not been
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established despite there being service of notice dated
10.05.2018 which was duly replied by the learned counsel for
the defendant/revisionist by virtue of reply dated 28.05.2018.
34. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent would
further attract the attention of the Court to ground ‘C’ of the
memo of revision in which it has been categorically contended
that “the said finding is totally perverse as Section 20(4) only
provides the deposit unconditionally and the denial of
landlord tenant relationship has no role to play. Apart from
the above the ownership was denied on the ground of no
knowledge of purchase of premises, thus the same cannot be
treated as denial of ownership.”
35. Referring to the same, learned counsel for the
plaintiff-respondent would further submit that even in the
said ground as taken in the memo of revision, the defendant-
revisionist has categorically denied the ownership of the
plaintiff-respondent over the property in question, hence, no
latitude whatsoever can be granted to the defendant in terms
of provisions of Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 and
the impugned judgment and order are per law and do not
warrant any interference under Section 25 of Provincial Small
Cause Courts Act, 1887.
36. In rejoinder, learned counsel for the
defendant/revisionist submitted that the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Mangal Sen” (supra) is
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distinguishable on facts and, therefore, has no application to
the present case. In response, learned counsel for the
plaintiff-respondent contended that in “Mangal Sen” (supra),
the deposit had been made subject to the condition that there
was no default on the part of the tenant. He submitted that
the factual matrix of the present case is squarely covered by
the said judgment, inasmuch as the defendant, while denying
the relationship of landlord and tenant, has also denied the
allegation of default. Accordingly, it was argued that the ratio
laid down in Mangal Sen applies in its entirety to the present
dispute.
37. Having considered the rival submissions advanced
by learned counsel for the parties, perused the record, and
examined the impugned judgment, the following two key
points arise for determination in the present revision under
Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887:
(i) Whether the finding recorded by the trial court
on Point for Determination No.(iii), regarding
determination of tenancy, is sustainable in law?
(ii) Whether the finding of the trial court as to the
denial of the benefit under Section 20(4) of the
U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 is legally justified and
sustainable in law?
(I) VALIDITY OF NOTICE-
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38. On the one hand, learned counsel for the
defendant-revisionist would submit that the notice dated
30.07.2019 has been pleaded in the plaint and that there is
not even a whisper regarding the notice of the year 2018
anywhere in the plaint.
39. Per contra, learned counsel for the
plaintiff/respondent would submit that it has been
categorically pleaded in the replication that, by virtue of
notice dated 10.05.2018, an intimation regarding the
plaintiff-respondent having become the landlord of the
property in question was duly sent to the defendant-
revisionist. It is further submitted that the said notice was in
fact served upon the defendant-revisionist and was duly
replied to by him through his counsel on 28.05.2018.
40. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent
herein would contend that the defendant/revisionist was put
under due notice as to the ownership having vested in the
plaintiff/respondent and what is being pleaded is absolutely
against the record.
41. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent has,
thus, contended that in the plaint, it has rightly been pleaded
that the notice dated 30.07.2019 was served upon the
defendant/revisionist at his Lucknow address on 02.05.2019,
and the tenancy stood terminated by virtue thereof. After
considering the effect of the said notice dated 30.07.2019, it
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is clear that the tenancy of the defendant/revisionist stood
terminated upon the expiry of 30 days from the date of service
of the said notice upon the defendant/revisionist.
42. In Point for Determination No.(iii), the trial court
noted the cross-examination of the defendant/revisionist,
wherein he stated that he did not have any knowledge of the
notice sent on 30.07.2019. With regard to the notice dated
10.05.2018, the trial court came to the conclusion that the
defendant/revisionist had failed to pay the arrears of rent
despite the receipt of the said notice. Therefore, Point for
Determination No.(iii) was decided against the
defendant/revisionist.
43. After considering the pleadings, the findings
recorded on Point for Determination No.(iii), and the plaint, it
is clear that there was default in tendering of arrears of rent
on the part of the revisionist/defendant and the notice of
termination of tenancy was served on defendant, therefore,
the trial court returned a finding with respect to the
termination of tenancy and the arrears of rent.
(II) Whether the deposit made by the
defendant/revisionist was a conditional deposit?
44. After considering the rival submissions of learned
counsel for the parties, it is absolutely clear that by virtue of
an application dated 12.03.2021, the defendant/revisionist
had sought deposit of arrears of rent, costs, interest etc. The
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deposit was made by Challan dated 18.03.2021 of
Rs.18,207/-. Now what is left to be determined is whether
this deposit of Rs.18,207/- was conditional or unconditional.
45. On the one hand, learned counsel for the
revisionist/defendant would submit that the deposit was
made before the first date of hearing and that it was an
unconditional deposit. On the other hand, learned counsel for
the plaintiff/respondent would submit that the deposit was
not unconditional but was conditional. In support of his
submission, he referred to paragraph 5 of the written
statement, wherein there is a categorical averment that the
relationship of landlord and tenant has not been established.
46. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent
submitted that the deposit was conditional and, placing
reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the cases of Mangal Sen and Ghoorey Lal, contended that
since the defendant/revisionist had not admitted the
relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and
the defendant, the deposit, even though made prior to the
filing of the written statement, would be deemed to be a
conditional deposit. Therefore, the benefit of Section 20(4) of
U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 could not have been extended to the
defendant/revisionist, and the trial court has rightly declined
the same. Hence, there is no error in the judgment of the trial
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court, and the findings recorded on this point do not warrant
any interference.
47. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
revisionist/defendant, while referring to the judgment of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Praveen Sharma
(since deceased) and others vs. Ravi Kumar and another,
contended that the deposit made by the revisionist/defendant
was a bona fide deposit. Referring further to the judgment in
Sheela & others vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, he
submitted that the revisionist/defendant had, in fact,
admitted the title of the previous landlord and, as such, the
benefit of Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 ought to
have been granted.
48. On consideration of the rival submissions of the
learned counsel for the parties and upon going through the
record and after considering the judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, it is evident that the deposit of the entire
arrears of rent, costs, interest, etc., made by the
defendant/revisionist even prior to the first date of hearing,
would not amount to an unconditional deposit as mandated
under Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 if the title of
the plaintiff / landlord is denied. This is because, in
paragraph 5 of the written statement, the
defendant/revisionist has categorically pleaded that the
relationship of landlord and tenant had not come into
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existence. The same stand has, in fact, been reiterated in the
revision as well, wherein, in Ground C of the memo of
revision, there is again an attempt to deny the ownership of
the plaintiff/respondent.
49. In view of the overall facts and circumstances of
the case, the law applicable, and particularly the clear
mandate of Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, which
contemplates an unconditional deposit for seeking the benefit
of the said provision, this Court is of the considered opinion
that, in the present case, there is a clear averment in the
written statement that the relationship of landlord and tenant
had not come into existence between the parties. In such an
eventuality, the deposit being a condition deposit, the benefit
of Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 could not have
been extended to the defendant/revisionist, and the trial
court has rightly arrived at the said conclusion.
50. In such view of the matter, since the trial court
has arrived at the correct conclusion and has rightly decreed
the suit, the impugned judgment and decree dated
25.05.2026 do not warrant any interference by this Court and
this revision deserves to be dismissed.
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2026:UHC:5109
51. Accordingly, the present Civil Revision under
Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 is
hereby dismissed.
(Siddhartha Sah, J.)
19.06.2026
Akash
25
