Gujarat High Court
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation vs Parshottambhai Dhanomal Harvani on 23 July, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.A/895/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 23/07/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 895 of 2013
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
Versus
PARSHOTTAMBHAI DHANOMAL HARVANI & ANR.
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Appearance:
MS JIRGA D JHAVERI(3471) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR MD MODI(1318) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
MS JYOTI BHATT ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M.
PRACHCHHAK
Date : 23/07/2026
JUDGMENT
1. The appellant – original complainant has preferred this appeal
under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against
the judgment and order dated 17.10.2011 passed by the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate, Court no.8, Ahmedabad (hereinafter be
referred to as “the trial Court”) in Criminal Case No.17 of 2004,
whereby the trial Court has acquitted the original accused
(respondent herein) from the offences punishable under Sections 7(ii)
and 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter
referred to as “PFA Act“) and Rules framed thereunder.
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2. Short facts of the prosecution case are that on 16.07.2003 at
10:30 a.m. complainant and his peon Jagdish N. Barot visited the
Rahul Ghruh Udhyog, near Delhivadi Chali, Naroda, Ahmedabad. At
that time accused was present and he was doing his business. That,
the complainant called Shri Kalubhai Sogarajmal as an independent
panch witness and complainant introduced himself as a Food
Inspector. That, at the time of inspection, complainant found tamarind
fruits (Amli) Sangita Brand and he inquired about the food product
and its quality and price to the accused whereupon he was informed
that it is tamarind fruits (Amli) Sangita Brand, 100 pieces of one
packet costs Rs. 25/-. That, in presence of panch, complainant paid
Rs. 75 and purchased three packets of tamarind fruits (Amli) Sangita
Brand. That, then the complainant inquired about ownership of
business and accused did not produce any documentary evidence.
Accused was given oral and written intimation. After following due
procedure of sealing and packing, one part of the sample was sent to
Public Health Laboratory of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation for
analysis. That, as per the report under PFA Rules, 1955 sample was
adulterated as per the prescribed standards Rule-32 is not complied
with. Therefore, after following due procedure of sanction, complaint
came to be lodged against the accused.
2.1 The charge against the accused came to be framed by the trial
Court vide Exhibit 39 for the aforesaid offences against the accused.
On being explained it to him, the accused has denied having
committed any offence. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge
and pleaded for trial and hence, the case was tried by the
Metropolitan Magistrate, Court no.8, Ahmedabad.
3. It appears from the records that to prove the case, the
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prosecution has examined the witnesses and produced documentary
evidences.
4. After closure of the evidence, the statement of the accused
under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 has been
recorded wherein he denied of having committed any offence and has
stated that he is innocent.
5. After hearing both sides and considering the evidence on
records, the trial Court by impugned judgment and order has
acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled against him.
6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment
and order of acquittal the appellant has preferred this appeal.
7. Heard Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned counsel for the appellant, Ms.
Jyoti Bhatt, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent –
State of Gujarat and Mr. MD Modi, learned counsel for the respondent-
accused.
8. Ms. Jhaveri, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted
that trial Court has materially erred in acquitting the accused. She has
submitted that the trial court has erred in not appreciating Exh-36
which is a direct evidence of bag wherein it is clear that nothing was
written on the bag as per the Rule-32. She has submitted that the trial
court has erred in coming to the conclusion that Section-20 is not
complied with on the contrary local health authority has scrutinized all
the papers and sanctioned the prosecution. She has submitted that
the trial court has erred in not appreciating public analyst report
specifically mention about that misbranding as per Section-2 (ix) (k) of
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P.F.A. Act and Rule-32 (e) (f) (i). She has submitted that the finding
recorded by the trial Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law and
the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. She has further
submitted that the impugned judgment of acquittal is contrary to the
evidence on record, based on erroneous appreciation of material
evidence, and has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. She has further
submitted that the trial Court has materially erred in holding that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and
the findings recorded by the trial Court were therefore perverse,
illegal, and contrary to the evidence on record. She has submitted
that the trial Court has erred both on facts and in law in recording the
order of acquittal, having failed to properly appreciate the oral and
documentary evidence available on record. She has prayed to quash
and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court and
allow the present appeal.
9. Per contra, Mr. Modi, learned counsel for the respondent –
accused has supported the impugned judgment and order and has
submitted that the trial Court has not committed any error of law and
fact in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against him.
He has submitted that the ingredients of the offence alleged against
the accused are not proved beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore,
the trial Court has rightly acquitted the accused as the complainant
has failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused. He has
also submitted that there is no iota of evidence to connect the
accused with the alleged crime in question.
9.1 Mr.Modi, learned counsel has submitted that the prosecution
failed to establish the case against the respondent as the present
respondent is not a manufacturer and the articles were not packed by
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the respondent, in fact he was merely a trader and he has kept the
articles at his shop. He has submitted that the articles were
purchased from the manufacturer whose name is already mentioned
on the packet. He has further contended that in the absence of the
manufacturer being joined in the present proceedings, the
prosecution cannot be sustained against the present respondent and
thus, the learned trial Judge has rightly passed the impugned
judgment of acquittal. He has further submitted that the article falls
under the category of fruits and proprietary food and, therefore, is
governed by Rule 37A and not by Rule 32. Consequently, the sanction
for prosecution against the present respondent for misbranding was
not sustainable.
9.2 It is also further contention raised by Mr. Modi, learned counsel
that the complainant appellant herein has not produced the copy of
the label nor the packet before the concerned trial Court at the time
of conducting of the trial and therefore also, it is clearly violation of
the settled principle of law, as enunciated by this Court vide order
dated 29.07.2009 in case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
through Food Inspector, D.G. Patel vs. Abid Hussain Abdul
Majid Ansari and another passed in Criminal Appeal No.3173 of 2008
wherein this Court held as under:-
“1….Even as three samples were taken, the Food Inspector did
not produce other samples or labels before the Court, even in
the case of alleged mis-branding and thus, the Court was
deprived of primary and direct evidence of mis-branding…..”
9.3 Mr. Modi, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that
proprietary food is governed by Rules 37A and 37B of the Prevention
of Food Adulteration Rules. He submitted that where no specific
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standard has been prescribed under the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act and the Rules, it is sufficient if the label mentions the
name of the proprietary food and its category. According to him, the
packet of Sangita brand contains the requisite particulars on its label.
He further submitted that tamarind falls within the category of
proprietary food, as no standard has been prescribed for the said
article either under the Act or the Rules. He has prayed to confirm the
impugned judgment and dismiss the present appeal.
10. Section 16 of the PFA Act reads as under:
“16. Penalties.–8[(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1A)
if any person–
(a) Whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf,
imports into India or manufacturers for sale or stores, sells
or distributes any article of food–
(i) which is adulterated within the meaning of sub-clause (m)
of clause (ia) of section 2 or misbranded within the meaning
of clause (ix) of that section or the sale of which is
prohibited under any provision of this Act or any rule made
thereunder or by an order of the Food (Health) Authority;
(ii) Other than an article of food referred to in sub-clause (I),
in contravention of any of the provision of this Act or of any
rule made thereunder, or
(b) whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf,
imports into India or manufacturers for sale or stores, sells or
distributes any adulterant which is not injurious to health; or
(c) prevents a food inspector from taking a sample as authorised by
this Act; or
(d) prevents a food inspector from exercising any other power
conferred on him by or under this Act; or
(e) being a manufacturer of an article of food, has in his
possession, or in any of the premises occupied by him, any
adulterant which is not injurious to health; or
(f) uses any report or certificate of a test or analysis made by the
Director of the Central Food Laboratory or by a public analyst or
any extract thereof for the purpose of advertising any article of
food; orPage 6 of 19
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(g) whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf, give to
the vendor a false warranty in writing in respect of any article of
food sold by him.
he shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under
the provisions of section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend
to three years, and with fine which shall not be less than one
thousand rupees:
Provided that–
(i) if the offence is under sub-clause (I) of clause (a) and is with
respect to an article of food, being primary food, which is
adulterated due to human agency or is with respect to an article of
food which is misbranded within the meaning of sub-clause (k) of
clause (ix) of section 2; or
(ii) if the offence is under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a), but not being
an offence with respect to the contravention of any rule made
under clause (a) or clause (g) of sub-section (1A) of section 23 or
under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 24,
the court may, for any adequate and special reasons to be
mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for
a term which shall not be less than three months but which may
extend to two years, and with fine which may extend to two years,
and with fine which shall not be less than five hundred rupees:
Provided further that if the offence is under sub-clause (ii) of
clause (a) and is with respect to the contravention of any rule
made under clause (a) or clause (g) of sub-section (1A) of section
23 or under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 24, the court
may, for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the
judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three months and with fine which may extend to five
hundred rupees.][(1A) If any person whether by himself or by any other person on
his behalf, imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores,
sells or distributes–
(i) any article of food which is adulterated within the
meaning of any of the sub-clause (e) to (l) (both inclusive) of
clause (ia) of section 2; or
(ii) any adulterant which is injurious to health,
he shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under
the provisions of section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than one year but which extend to six
years and with fine which shall not be less than two thousand
rupees:
Provided that if such article of food or adulterant, when consumed
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by any person is likely to cause his death or is likely to cause such
harm on his body as would amount to grievous hurt within the
meaning of section 320 of the Indian Penal code (45 of 1860), he
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than three years but which may extend to term of life and
with fine which shall not be less than five thousand rupees.]
[(1AA)] if any person in whose safe custody any article of food has
been kept under sub-section (4) of section 10, tampers or in any
other manner interferes with such article, he shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
months but which may extend to two years and with fine which
shall not be less than one thousand rupees.
2[(1B) if any person in whose safe custody any article of food has
been kept under sub-section (4) of section 10, sells or distributes
such article which is found by magistrate before whom it is
produced to be adulterated within the meaning of sub-clause (h) of
clause (ia) of section 2 and which, when consumed by any person,
is likely to cause his death or is likely to cause such harm on his
body as would amount to grievous hurt within the meaning of
section 320 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), then
notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1AA), he shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than three years but which may extend to term of life and with fine
which shall not be less than five thousand rupees.](1C) if any person contravenes the provisions of section 14 or
section 14A, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to six months and with fine which shall not be
less than five hundred rupees.
(1D) if any person convicted of an offence under this Act commits a
like offence afterwards, then without prejudice to the provision of
sub-section (2), the court, before which the second or subsequent
conviction takes place, may order the cancellation of the licence, if
any, granted to him under this Act and thereupon such licence
shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in the rules
made thereunder, stand cancelled.
(2) if any persons convicted of an offence under this Act commits a
like offence afterwards it shall be lawful for the court before which
the second or subsequent conviction takes place to cause the
offender’s name and place of residence, the offence and the penalty
imposed to be published at the offender’s expense in such
newspapers or in such other manner as the court may direct. The
expenses of such publication shall be deemed to be part of the cost
attending the conviction and shall be recoverable in the same
manner as a fine.”
11. I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and
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perused the materials on record. On perusal of the impugned
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, the
questions that arise for determination are as under:-
(1) whether the trial Court has rightly justified in passing the
judgment and order of acquittal.
(2) whether the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence
led by the prosecution in recording the reasons.
(3) whether there is any illegality, irregularity and perversity in
the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.
12. On perusal of the records, it appears that the complainant, PW-
1, Vimal Kumar Bansilal Chauhan was serving as a Food Inspector
with the appellant-Corporation. On 16.07.2003, at about 10:30 a.m.,
PW-1, along with a peon, namely Jagdish Barot, visited the shop of
Rahul Gruh Udyog, the place of business of the respondent, at
Naroda, Ahmedabad. At that time, the respondent was present at the
premises. It was stated by the Food Inspector that the respondent was
the manufacturer and had packed the product under the name and
style of Sangita brand tamarind fruits. It appears that in the presence
of one panch witness, Kalubhai Sogarajmal, the Food Inspector drew a
sample of the food article, namely tamarind and upon inspection, it
was found that the particulars required under Rules 32(e), 32(f), and
32(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 were not
mentioned on the packet. Therefore, for the purpose of analysis, the
complainant purchased the food article after paying a sum of ₹75. It
appears that after purchasing the said food article and completing the
formalities for drawing and sealing the sample, the samples were sent
for analysis to the Local Health Authority. Upon receipt of the report
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from the Public Analyst through the Local Health Authority, at Exhibit
2, it was opined that the sample of tamarind was misbranded as per
Section 2(ix)(k) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, as it
was not labelled in accordance with Rules 32(e)(f) and (i) of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. After receipt of the
report, the complainant complied with the subsequent mandatory
provisions and, in accordance with Section 13(2) of the Act, forwarded
a copy of the Public Analyst’s report to the present respondent
through Registered A.D. post. It appears that the sample was sent to
the Public Analyst on 16.07.2003, the report was signed on
19.08.2003 and it was sent to the concerned respondent on
03.02.2004. On perusal of the deposition of PW-2, the peon – Jagdish
Barot, who had accompanied the complainant at the time of drawing
the sample, during his cross-examination, has stated that the sample
was sent in a glass bottle. However, the complainant (PW-1) deposed
that the sample was sent to the Local Health Authority after
complying with Rule 14 and was packed in a box. Thus, there is a
material contradiction between the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2
regarding the manner in which the sample was packed and
forwarded.
12.1 On perusal of the provision of Rule 32(e)(f) and (i) of the Rules,
it is applicable only to the item which is mentioned in schedule B of
the PFA Act and not to the proprietary food as mentioned in Rule 37A.
Rule 32 (e)(f) and (i) of the Rules reads as under:
“32(e) Adistinctive batch number or lot number or code number,
either in numericals or alphabets or in combination, representing the
batch number or lot number or code number being preceded by the
words ‘Batch No.’, or ‘Batch’ or Lot NO’.or, Lot or any distinguishing
prefix.
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Provided, that in case of canned food, the batch number may be
given at the bottom, or on the lid of the container, but the words
“Batch No”, given at the bottom or on the lid, shall appear on the
body of the container.
(f) the month and year in which the commodity is manufactured or
prepacked;
Provided that in case of package weighting 20 g or less and liquid
products marketed in bottles which are recycled for refilling,
particulars under clause (b) need not be specified.
Provided also that such declarations shall be given on the label of
multipiece package either on the label of multipiece package or in a
separate slip inside the multipiece package in such a manner that
the same is readable even without opening the package.
Provided further that in case of carbonated water containers and the
packages of biscuits, confectionery and sweets, containing more
than 60g, but not more than 120g, and food packages weighing not
more than 60g. particulars under clauses (d) and (e) need not be
specified.
Provided also that in case of packages containing bred and milk
including sterilized milk, particulars under clause (e) need not be
specified
“Provided also that in case of any package containing bread or liquid
milk, sterilized or Ultra High Temperature treated milk, Soya milk,
flavoured milk, any package containing dhokla, bhelpuri, pizza,
doughnuts, khoa, paneer or any uncanned package of fruits,
vegetables, meat, fish or any other like commodity which has a short
shelf life, the date, month and year in which the commodity is
manufactured or prepared or prepacked shall be mentioned, on the
label:
provided also that in case of package containing confectionery
weighing 20g. or less, the particulars under this clause need not be
specified.”
(i) the month and year in capital letters upto which the product is
best for consumption, in the following manner, namely:-
“BEST BEFORE …………….MONTHS AND YEAR”
OR
“BEST BEFORE ……………..MONTHS FROM PACKAGING
OR
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BEST BEFORE …………….MONTHS FROM MANUFACTURE
OR
BEST BEFORE UPTO MONTH AND YEAR……………..” ) [For the period
OR )upto and
inclusive
BEST BEFORE WITHIN…………….MONTHS )of 1st
September
FROM THE DATE OF PACKAGING/MANUFACTURE ) 2001:]
Provided that in case of wholesale packages the particulars under
clauses (b), (f), (g), (h) and this clause need not be specified:
Provided further that in case of package or bottle containing
sterilised or Ultra High Temperature treated milk, soya milk,
flavoured milk, any package containing bread, dhokla, bhelpuri,
pizza, doughnuts, khoa, paneer, or any uncanned package of fruits,
vegetable, meat, fish or any other like commodity, the declaration be
made as follows:
“BEST BEFORE……………..DATE/MONTH/YEAR”
OR
“BEST BEFORE ………….. DAYS FROM PACKAGING”
OR
“BEST BEFORE …………….DAYS FROM MANUFACTURE” ) [For the
period
OR ) upto
and inclusive
“BEST BEFORE UPTO…. DATE/MONTH/YEAR )of 1st
September
“BEST BEFORE WITHIN ………..DAYS FROM THE ) 2001.]
DATE OF PACKAGING/MANUFACTURE” )Note :(i) blank be filled up
(ii) Month and Year may be used in numerals.
(iii) Year may be given in two digits.
Provided also that in case of a package containing confectionery
weighing 20g or less, the particulars under clause(i) may not be
specified: } }
Provided also that the returnable new glass bottle manufactures and
used for packing of such beverages on the date of commencement of
the Prevention of Food Adulteration (8th Amendment) Rules 2002
shall carry these declarations on its body”
Provided also that the above provisions except date of manufacture
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(plain soda) potable water impregnated with carbon dioxide under
pressure) packed in returnable glass bottles.”
12.2 Rule 37-A of the Rules reads as under:
“37-A. Manufacture of proprietary foods and infant foods:- (1) An
article of infant milk substitutes/infant foods whose standards are not
prescribed in Appendix ‘B’ shall be manufactured for sale, exhibited
for sale or stored for sale only after obtaining the approval of such
article of food and its label from Government of India.
(2) In case of proprietary foods the name of the food or category
under which it falls in these rules shall be mentioned on the labelExplanation:- For the purpose of this rule:-
(a) and (aa) (infant food & infant)…..Omitted
(b) “Proprietary food”, means a food which has not been
standardized under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules,
1955″.”
13. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer to (1) the
decision of this Court in the case of Food Inspector Vs. Bhagwandas
Sunderlal Vatvani, Owner of Firm, Jaishanker Bakery and others
reported in 2007(2) FAC 71, more particularly, para nos. 3 and 4; (2)
the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ram
Murti Gupta Vs. State of Punjab in Criminal Misc. No. 11479 of 1993
dated 21.07.1994 wherein the Court has referred and relied upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Kishan Beej
Bhandar Vs. Chief Agricultural Officer and Anr. reported in 2001(2)
FAC 150 wherein it was observed that the liability arising out of
misbranding was not of the appellant; (3) the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Lever Ltd Vs. Food Inspector
and Anr reported in 2006 (1) SCC (Cri) 288, more particularly, para
nos. 6 and 7; (4) the decision of this Court in the case of B C Kathiria-
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Food Inspector Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. in Criminal Appeal No.
792 of 2012 dated 03.07.2026.
14. In the case of Bhagwandas Sunderlal Vatvani, Owner of Firm,
Jaishanker Bakery and others(supra) this Court has observed as under
in para nos 3 and 4:
“3. With assistance of learned APP for the State Government-
respondent no.7 herein, I have perused the material on record. The
trial Court found that the food item i.e. Gutkha in the present case
was purchased by the retailer in sealed packets. He was therefore,
granted the benefit of warranty. The accused no.1 and accused no.2
were therefore, acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The
trial Court also found that the original manufacturer has not been
joined as accused and no sanction has been obtained from the
Competent Authority to prosecute the original manufacturer. It was
held that accused no.5-Dhariwala Industries Ltd., Vadodara is shown
as manufacturer whereas at the said place, the offending goods were
not manufactured. The accused no.5-industry and accused no.6-
nominee were therefore, acquitted. The accused no.3 and accused
no.4 were the distributors. Since they were acting as agents and they
had purchased the material from Dhariwala Industries, Pune, they
were also acquitted.
4. I do not find that the trial Court committed any legal error in
acquitting the accused persons. The judgement of the trial Court is
on the basis of available evidence on record. I do not find any
illegality committed by the trial Court in appreciation of the
evidence. The reason stated for acquittal of the accused are
eminently just and acceptable. I do not find any case made out for
entertaining the application seeking permission to file the appeal.
Criminal Misc. Application is therefore, rejected.”
15. In the case of Food Inspector and Anr (supra) the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed as under in para nos. 6 and 7:
“6. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
prosecution of the appellant on the basis of the sample taken and
analysed and found to be not conforming to the standards prescribed
for skimmed milk powder, is not legally maintainable for the reasonPage 14 of 19
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that the article, sample of which has been taken, is not skimmed milk
powder and for that purpose he has drawn our attention to the
packing of the articles which indicates it as instant dairy whitener. It
is submitted that it is neither fully skimmed milk powder nor is it
given out to be so. The article contains only partly skimmed milk
powder hence it cannot be required to conform to the standards laid
down for skimmed milk powder. A perusal of the report of the Public
Analyst also indicates that the standards with which he has
compared the contents of the samples are skimmed milk powder.
The mahazar as well as the packing leave no room to doubt that the
article which has been taken into possession and analysed is not
skimmed milk powder but it is instant dairy whitener, containing only
partly skimmed milk powder with other ingredients. h Obviously,
therefore, it is not supposed to conform with the standards laid for
skimined milk powder. It is submitted that the article falls in the
category of proprietary foods and in that connection our attention
was drawn to Rule 37-A(2)(b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration
Rules, which is as under:
“37-A. (2)(b) ‘Proprietary food’ means a food which has not
been a standardised under the Prevention of Food Adulteration
Rules, 1955.”
7. Clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 37-A clearly indicates that
proprietary food means food which has not been standardised. The
learned counsel for the respondents, however, submits that in view
of sub-rule (1) the appellant was supposed to have approval of such
articles of food from the Government of India. We, however, find no
merit in the submission of the b learned counsel for the respondents,
since it applies only to infant dairy milk products or the infant dairy
milk food, the sample which has been taken and has been analysed
is neither infant milk substitute/infant food nor it is skimmed milk
powder, an article for which standards have been prescribed under
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. Any prosecution in regard
to an article for which no standards have been laid, applying the
standards for other articles would not be sustainable.”
16. In view of the facts of the case and the aforementioned
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and different High Courts, I
am of the opinion that the trial Court has not committed any error of
facts and law in passing the impugned judgment and order and there
is no any illegality and infirmity found in the judgment and order.
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17. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the an Appellate
Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However,
Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is
double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption
of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption
of their innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial Court.
18. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while
exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the
Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of
acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some
manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived
at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be
characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the
Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the
judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court
has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the
conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has
committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence
on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such
circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just
decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether
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the accused are connected with the commission of the crime with
which they are charged.
19. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka
reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, more particularly paragraph Nos.
42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, reported in
[2022] 3 SCC 471, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated
the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in
paragraph No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble
Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court.
Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149,
the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more
particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, we are in complete
agreement with the findings recorded by the trial Court.
20. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under:-
“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the
general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa
and others vs. State of Karnataka , regarding the power of
the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against a
judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus:
“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.
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(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate court on the evidence before it
may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact
and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very
strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring
mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive
powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal.
Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of
language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate
court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of
the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in
case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of
the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
available to him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial
court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not
disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential
for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly
indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for
discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able
to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It
was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it
would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a
contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it is
absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly
finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject
their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of
the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this
light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing
with the appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant
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Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the cogent and well-considered
judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the
benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”
21. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears
that there is no credible evidence to connect the present accused with
the alleged crime and the evidence on record is not so convincing to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the
alleged crime. Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the
evidence on record.
22. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it clearly
transpires that the trial Court has not committed any error of fact and
law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting the
accused from the charges levelled against him. Even on re-
appreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution
has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order of the trial Court is sustainable and the present appeal is liable
to be dismissed.
23. In view of the above, the present appeal is devoid of merits and
it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed. The
impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is
hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and
proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
ANUSRI
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