Delhi District Court
Afsana Mansoori vs Shaukeen Ahmad Mansoori on 7 March, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. ASHISH RASTOGI,
ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE-05 (EAST)
KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI
In the matter of
CA No.29/2025
Smt. Afsana Mansoori
D/o Sh. Shakeel Ahmed Mansoori
R/o H.No.434, Gali no.20, Near Water Office,
Shati Mohalla, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031.
.......Appellant
Vs.
1. Sh. Shokeen Ahmed Mansoori (Husband)
2. Sh. Musrat (Brother in law)
3. Smt. Ishrat (Sister in law)
4. Smt. Noor Jahan (Aunt in law)
All R/o H.No.102, Afganan Thana Kiratpur,
Tehsil Najibabad, District Bijnor, U.P.246731.
Also at:-
M/S Vanilla Salon & Academy
Shop No.3 & 4, Gold Crown Society, Opposite
ICICI Bank 7 Banglows, Andehri West
Mumbai
........... Respondents
Date of Institution : 13.02.2025
Arguments completed : 17.12.2025
Date of order : 07.03.2026
JUDGMENT
1. This is an appeal against Order dated 07.11.2024 Ashish
passed by Ld. JMFC, Mahila Court-01, East Rastogi
Digitally signed
by Ashish Rastogi
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 1 of 36
Date: 2026.03.07
16:59:03 +0530
District, KKD, Delhi whereby petition U/s PW
D.V. Act 2005 of the appellant was dismissed.
2. The core controversy which is to be decided
through this appeal is whether the Respondent
perpetrated domestic violence upon the Appellant
and if so of what nature and whether the
conclusion arrived by the Ld. Trial Court in
dismissing the Petition of the Appellant deserves
any interference in exercise of the Appellate
jurisdiction of this Court.
3. The Ld. Trial Court held the facts as averred by
the Appellant in her Petition and the evidence led
by her as not sufficient to bring her in the ambit
of an ‘Aggrieved person’ under Section 2(a) of
DV Act, since the primary requirement for the
petitioner to be an aggrieved person is that she
must be a woman in the domestic relationship and
should have been a victim of domestic violence in
such a relationship. After discussing the definition
of domestic violence under Section 3 of the DV
Act, the Ld. Trial Court held that she could not
prove that any domestic violence was perpetrated
upon her by the Accused persons. The reasoning
of the Ld. Trial Court primarily rests on the fact
that the allegations are vague, general and
omnibus and devoid of any specific details as to
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 2 of 36
date, time and month etc. and hence cannot be
relied upon.
4. Before moving further, it would be pertinent to
highlight the purpose and objective of DV Act,
2005. The said act was enacted to counter the
growing menace of harassment and abuse of
women within the domestic relationship. Before
the advent of the Act, Civil law remedies like
divorce existed but there was no mechanism for
quick monetary relief and no enforceable action
against the abuser. In other words, while the
women were forced to leave her matrimonial
home, the case dragged on. Therefore, the DV Act
was enacted keeping into account the above
factors and incorporated various provisions like
Residence Orders and interim maintenance during
the pendency of the dispute, so that the interest of
women in domestic relationship is protected and
she as well the children born out of the wedlock
are not reduced to state of destitution and
vagrancy. The Act also served the purpose of
bringing India at par with the international
covenants to which India is a signatory which
specifically call on the member states to protect
women within the domestic relationship from any
form of violence.
5. The relevant excerpt of Statement of objectives
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 3 of 36
and reasons of the Act is worth mentioning here:
1.”Domestic Violence is
undoubtedly a human rights
issue and serious deterrent to
development. The Vienna
Accord of 1994 and the
Beijing Declaration and the
Platform for Action (1995)
have acknowledge this. The
United Nations Committee
and Convention on
Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) in its
General Recommendation
No.XII(1989) has
recommended that state
parties should act to protect
women against violence of
any kind especially that
occurring within the family”.
2. The phenomenon of
domestic violence is widely
prevalent but has remained
largely invisible in the public
domain. Presently, where a
women is subjected to cruelty
by her husband or his
relatives, it is an offence
under section 498-A of the
Indian Penal Code. The civil
law does not however address
this phenomenon in its
entirety.
3. It is, therefore, proposed to
enact a law keeping in view
the rights guaranteed under
articles 14, 15 and 21 of
Constitution to provide for aCA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 4 of 36
remedy under the civil law
which is intended to protect
the woman from being
victims of domestic violence
and to prevent the occurrence
of domestic violence in the
society.
6. One of the most important highlights of the Act is
that it provides for a very expansive definition of
“Domestic Violence” and encompasses within its
fold not only physical abuse but also verbal,
sexual and economic abuse. The said feature and
expansive definition is also crucial to the fact
situation at hand.
7. Coming to the case at hand, as already discussed,
the Ld. Trial Court has held that the physical
violence could not be proved by the Appellant as
the allegations are general and omnibus in nature,
devoid of any specific detail. Here it can also not
be lost sight of the fact that the Respondents did
not enter appearance in the Ld. Trial Court. The
Counsel for Respondent No. 1 i.e. the Husband of
the Appellant entered appearance only once i.e.
on 24.01.2023 wherein he was given an
opportunity to file reply to the Petition u/s 12 of
the DV Act and application u/s 23 of the DV Act
within 30 days. Thereafter, the Respondent No. 1
did not appear either in person or through his
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 5 of 36
counsel and the matter was decided ex-parte and
finally disposed off vide impugned judgment
dated 07.11.2024. In the Petition as well as in the
evidence led, the Appellant levelled various
allegations of physical harassment upon the
accused persons but the same remained
uncontroverted as the matter was decided ex-parte
and the Ld. Trial Court observed that even if the
Respondents have not entered appearance, the
case of the Petitioner has to stand on its own legs
and the factum of domestic violence is to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. In this context,
the observations of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court
in case of “X” vs. State & Anr. decided on
28.07.2025 vide neutral citation No.
2025:DHC:6114.
16. It is pertinent to note that the
case of the petitioner was brushed
aside on the ground that the
petitioner had failed to provide the
exact date and manner of physical
cruelty/harassment. However,
merely because the petitioner failed
to provide the exact date and time
of the alleged tortures does not
tantamount to mean that the case of
the petitioner is without any basis.
8. Therefore, it is clear that the Hon’ble Delhi High
Court has clearly observed that even if the
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 6 of 36
petitioner has not mentioned the exact date and
time, the petition of the Petitioner cannot be
brushed aside only on that ground. Be that as it
may, the Ld. Trial Court has also mentioned about
the lack of corroborative material on record like
any prompt police complaint or any medical
document regarding the physical abuse. It has
also noted that although a complaint was given by
the Complainant in DCW (Ex CW1/7A), there is
nothing to show what action was taken by DCW
on the said complaint.
9. In these circumstances, it can be held that even if
the factum of physical abuse against the Accused
persons could not be conclusively proved, it is
the considered opinion of this Court that where
the Ld. Trial Court has erred is that in place of
physical abuse it has used the word ‘domestic
violence’. In other words, it has come to
conclusion that merely because the allegations of
physical abuse could not be proved, no domestic
violence was meted to the Appellant. What the
Ld. Trial Court has failed to observe is a very
expansive definition has been provided of
‘Domestic violence’ under Section 3 of the DV
Act in which physical abuse is not the only
constituent of domestic violence. The Ld. Trial
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 7 of 36
Court has not returned any finding on whether,
from the material on record available with the Ld.
Trial Court, any economic abuse was meted by
the Respondents or not particularly Respondent
No. 1 i.e. the husband of the Appellant. In this
context, the observations of the Hon’ble Delhi
High Court in case of “X” vs. State & Anr.
decided on 28.07.2025 vide neutral citation No.
2025:DHC:6114.
11. An examination of
Section 3 of the DV Act
makes it manifest that the
term ‘domestic violence’
includes economic abuse.
The DV Act has defined
economic abuse as
deprivation of all or any
economic or financial
resources to which the
aggrieved person is entitled
to under any law and or
which the aggrieved person
requires out of necessity
including household
necessities for the aggrieved
person and her children, if
any, stridhan, property,
jointly or separately owned
by the aggrieved person,
payment of rental related to
the shared house hold and
maintenance
10. Section 3 of Domestic Violence Act placed as
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 8 of 36
under:-
Definition of domestic
violence.–For the purposes
of this Act, any act, omission
or commission or conduct of
the respondent shall
constitute domestic violence
in case it–
(a) harms or injures or
endangers the health, safety,
life, limb or well-being,
whether mental or physical,
of the aggrieved person or
tends to do so and includes
causing physical abuse,
sexual abuse, verbal and
emotional abuse and
economic abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injures or
endangers the aggrieved
person with a view to coerce
her or any other person
related to her to meet any
unlawful demand for any
dowry or other property or
valuable security; or
(c) has the effect of
threatening the aggrieved
person or any person related
to her by any conduct
mentioned in clause (a) or
clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or
causes harm, whether
physical or mental, to the
aggrieved person.
Explanation I.–For the
purposes of this section,–
(i) “physical abuse” means
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 9 of 36
any act or conduct which is
of such a nature as to cause
bodily pain, harm, or danger
to life, limb, or health or
impair the health or
development of the aggrieved
person and includes assault,
criminal intimidation and
criminal force;
(ii) “sexual abuse” includes
any conduct of a sexual
nature that abuses,
humiliates, degrades or
otherwise violates the dignity
of woman;
(iii) “verbal and emotional
abuse” includes–
(a) insults, ridicule,
humiliation, name calling and
insults or ridicule specially
with regard to not having a
child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause
physical pain to any person in
whom the aggrieved person is
interested;
(iv) "economic abuse"
includes--
(a) deprivation of all or any
economic or financial
resources to which the
aggrieved person is entitled
under any law or custom
whether payable under an
order of a court or otherwise
or which the aggrieved
person requires out of
necessity including, but not
limited 5 to, house hold
necessities for the aggrievedCA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 10 of 36
person and her children, if
any, stridhan, property,
jointly or separately owned
by the aggrieved person,
payment of rental related to
the shared house hold and
maintenance;
(b) disposal of household
effects, any alienation of
assets whether movable or
immovable, valuables,
shares, securities, bonds and
the like or other property in
which the aggrieved person
has an interest or is entitled to
use by virtue of the domestic
relationship or which may be
reasonably required by the
aggrieved person or her
children or her stridhan or
any other property jointly or
separately held by the
aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction
to continued access to
resources or facilities which
the aggrieved person is
entitled to use or enjoy by
virtue of the domestic
relationship including access
to the shared household.
11. Coming to the facts of this case at hand, the
existence of shared household and domestic
relationship between the Appellant and
Respondent No.1 is admitted. The factum of
marriage has been proved through the marriage
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 11 of 36
certificates, it is also an admitted fact that two
children named Jainab and Farhan aged about 10
years and 9 years respectively were born out of
the wedlock and their birth certificates bear the
name of the Appellant and Respondent No. 1 as
parents.
12. Now, it is the specific allegation of the Appellant
that not even a single penny is being paid by
Respondent No. 1 towards the legitimate needs of
the Appellant and two minor children born out of
the wedlock. Since the matter proceeded ex-parte,
it can be held that no explanation has been offered
by Respondent No.1 as to why the Appellant is
living separately. Nothing is on record to show
that Respondent No. 1 made any attempts so that
the Appellant and Respondent No. 1 can reside
together rather it is the case of the Appellant that
Respondent No.1 is residing in Mumbai and
working in a beauty parlour getting Rs 70,000 a
month. There is further nothing on record to show
that any amount is being paid or has been paid
towards the legitimate expenses of the minor
children born out of the wedlock. It is the case of
the Appellant that the entire expenses towards the
minor children are being borne by herself. The
said facts remain unrebutted as there is no reply
of Respondent No.1 on record and no evidence
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 12 of 36
has been led by Respondent No. 1 to controvert
the same. The same is sufficient to bring the
conduct of Respondent No. 1 within the purview
of ‘domestic violence’ as defined in Section 3 of
the DV Act under “economic abuse”. As evident
from the conjoint reading of Section 3 and
Section 2(a) of DV Act, “economic abuse” is a
form and a subset of domestic violence sufficient
to bring the victim of “economic abuse” within
the purview of “aggrieved person”.
13. In this context, the observations of the Hon’ble
Delhi High Court in case of “X” vs. State &
Anr. decided on 28.07.2025 vide neutral citation
No. 2025:DHC:6114.
18. The petitioner has also
been raising her minor child,
and Respondent No. 2, prior
to the passing of the order
granting interim maintenance
in the petition under Section
12 of the DV Act, had failed
to provide any maintenance
to the petitioner or the minor
child. As already noted by
this Court, the term domestic
violence encapsulates
‘economic abuse.’ A
Coordinate bench of this
Court in the case of Ajay
Kumar v. Uma:
2024:DHC:80 in relation to
the scope of the term
‘domestic violence’ hadCA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 13 of 36
observed as under:-
“The ‘domestic
relationship’ between
the petitioner and
complainant is not
disputed. ‘Domestic
violence’ may be by
physical harm or injury
endangering the health
safety, life, limb, or
‘well being’ which may
be mental or physical of
‘aggrieved person’.
Further the same
includes physical,
sexual, verbal,
’emotional’ and
‘economic’ abuse. The
object of the Act is to
provide for more
effective provisions to
safeguard the rights of
the women who are
victims of violence of
any kind occurring
within the family, and
for matters connected
therewith or incidentally
thereof.”
19. Admittedly, the petitioner was
living separately from Respondent
No. 2 since 21.04.2012. As noted
above, no explanation was offered
by Respondent No. 2 as to why the
petitioner left his company except
the fact that she did so of her own
accord. However, as already noted,
no petition for restitution of
conjugal rights was preferred byCA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 14 of 36
Respondent No.2. Only a legal
notice calling upon the petitioner to
join Respondent No. 2’s company
was sent to the petitioner, which in
the opinion of this Court, does not
inspire confidence. As noted above,
the petitioner has been raising her
minor child and is stated to be not
gainfully employed. It is also not
the case of Respondent No.2 that
maintenance was offered by him for
upkeep of the Petitioner and the
minor child. This Court, thus, is of
the opinion that the petitioner is
entitled to receive compensation on
account of ‘economic abuse’.
14. Monetary Reliefs:
Having come to the conclusion that the
Respondent No. 1 is guilty of ‘economic abuse’
and hence ‘domestic violence’, the only question
which is to be decided is with respect to monetary
reliefs. In relation to the same, Section 20 of the
DV Act holds as under:
(1) While disposing of an
application under sub-section
(1) of section 12,the
Magistrate may direct the
respondent to pay monetary
relief to meet the expenses
incurred and losses suffered
by the aggrieved person and
any child of the aggrieved
person as a result of the
domestic violence and such
relief may include, but notCA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 15 of 36
limited to,–
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the
destruction, damage or
removal of any property from
the control of the aggrieved
person; and
(d) the maintenance for the
aggrieved person as well as
her children, if any, including
an order under or in addition
to an order of maintenance
under section 125 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any other
law for the time being in
force.
(2) The monetary relief
granted under this section
shall be adequate, fair and
reasonable and consistent
with the standard of living to
which the aggrieved person is
accustomed.
(3) The Magistrate shall have
the power to order an
appropriate lump sum
payment or monthly
payments of maintenance, as
the nature and circumstances
of the case may require.
(4) The Magistrate shall send
a copy of the order for
monetary relief made under
sub-section (1) to the parties
to the application and to the
in charge of the police station
within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction theCA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 16 of 36
respondent resides.
(5) The respondent shall pay
the monetary relief granted to
the aggrieved person within
the period specified in the
order under sub-section (1).
(6) Upon the failure on the
part of the respondent to
make payment in terms of the
order under sub-section (1),
the Magistrate may direct the
employer or a debtor of the
respondent, to directly pay to
the aggrieved person or to
deposit with the court a
portion of the wages or
salaries or debt due to or
accrued to the credit of the
respondent, which amount
may be adjusted towards the
monetary relief payable by
the respondent.
15.Regarding the quantum of maintenance to be
awarded, extensive guidelines have been provided
in the landmark judgment of Rajnesh v. Neha &
Anr. passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
vide Criminal Appeal No. 730 of 2020 (Arising
out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9503 of 2018) Decided On:
04.11.2020 which can be gainfully relied here.
The same are as follows:
75. The Orissa High Court in Susmita
Mohanty v. Rabindra Nath Sahu
MANU/OR/0176/1996 : 1996 (I)
OLR 361 held that the legislature
intended to provide a summary, quickCA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 17 of 36
and comparatively inexpensive
remedy to the neglected person.
Where a litigation is prolonged, either
on account of the conduct of the
opposite party, or due to the heavy
docket in Courts, or for unavoidable
reasons, it would be unjust and
contrary to the object of the provision,
to provide maintenance from the date
of the order.
76. In Kanhu Charan Jena v. Smt.
Nirmala Jena MANU/OR/0326/2000 :
2001 Cri LJ 879, the Orissa High
Court was considering an application
Under Section 125 Code of Criminal
Procedure, wherein it was held that
even though the decision to award
maintenance either from the date of
application, or from the date of order,
was within the discretion of the Court,
it would be appropriate to grant
maintenance from the date of
application. This was followed in
Arun Kumar Nayak v. Urmila Jena,
MANU/OR/0082/2010 : (2010) 93
AIC 726 (Ori) wherein it was
reiterated that dependents were
entitled to receive maintenance from
the date of application.
77. The Madhya Pradesh High Court
in Krishna Jain v. Dharam Raj Jain
MANU/MP/0156/1991 : 1993 (2)
MPJR 63 held that a wife may set up
a claim for maintenance to be granted
from the date of application, and the
husband may deny it. In such cases,
the Court may frame an issue, and
decide the same based on evidence
led by parties. The view that the
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 18 of 36
“normal rule” was to grant
maintenance from the date of order,
and the exception was to grant
maintenance from the date of
application, would be to insert
something more in Section 125(2)
Code of Criminal Procedure, which
the Legislature did not intend.
Reasons must be recorded in both
cases. i.e. when maintenance is
awarded from the date of application,
or when it is awarded from the date of
order.
78. The law governing payment of
maintenance Under Section 125 Code
of Criminal Procedure from the date
of application, was extended to
HAMA by the Allahabad High Court
in Ganga Prasad Srivastava v.
Additional District Judge, Gonda and
Ors. MANU/UP/1905/2019 : 2019 (6)
ADJ 850 The Court held that the date
of application should always be
regarded as the starting point for
payment of maintenance. The Court
was considering a suit for
maintenance Under Section 18 of
HAMA, wherein the Civil Judge
directed that maintenance be paid
from the date of judgment. The High
Court held that the normal inference
should be that the order of
maintenance would be effective from
the date of application. A party
seeking maintenance would otherwise
be deprived of maintenance due to the
delay in disposal of the application,
which may arise due to paucity of
time of the Court, or on account of the
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 19 of 36
conduct of one of the parties. In this
case, there was a delay of seven years
in disposing of the suit, and the wife
could not be made to starve till such
time. The wife was held to be entitled
to maintenance from the date of
application/suit.
79. The Delhi High Court in Lavlesh
Shukla v. Rukmani 15 held that where
the wife is unemployed and is
incurring expenses towards
maintaining herself and the minor
child/children, she is entitled to
receive maintenance from the date of
application. Maintenance is awarded
to a wife to overcome the financial
crunch, which occurs on account of
her separation from her husband. It is
neither a matter of favour to the wife,
nor any charity done by the husband.
(b) From the date of order
80. The second view that maintenance
ought to be awarded from the date of
order is based on the premise that the
general Rule is to award maintenance
from the date of order, and grant of
maintenance from the date of
application must be the exception.
The foundation of this view is based
on the interpretation of Section 125(2)
Code of Criminal Procedure which
provides:
(2) Any such allowance for the
maintenance or interim maintenance
and expenses for proceeding shall
be payable from the date of theCA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 20 of 36
order, or, if so ordered, from the
date of the application for
maintenance or interim maintenance
and expenses of proceeding, as the
case may be.
(emphasis supplied)
81. The words “or, if so ordered” in
Section 125 has been interpreted to
mean that where the court is awarding
maintenance from the date of
application, special reasons ought to
be recorded.16
82. In Bina Devi v. State of U.P.,
MANU/UP/0057/2010 : (2010) 69
ACC 19 the Allahabad High Court on
an interpretation of Section 125(2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure held
that when maintenance is directed to
be paid from the date of application,
the Court must record reasons. If the
order is silent, it will be effective
from the date of the order, for which
reasons need not be recorded. The
Court held that Section 125(2) Code
of Criminal Procedure is prima facie
clear that maintenance shall be
payable from the date of the order.
83. The Madhya Pradesh High Court
in Amit Verma v. Sangeeta Verma and
Ors.17 directed that maintenance
ought to be granted from the date of
the order.
(c) From the date of service of
summons.
84. The third view followed by some
Courts is that maintenance ought to be
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 21 of 36
granted from the date of service of
summons upon the Respondent.
85. The Kerala High Court in S.
Radhakumari v. K.M.K. Nair
MANU/KE/0031/1983 : AIR 1983
Ker 139 was considering an
application for interim maintenance
preferred by the wife in divorce
proceedings filed by the husband. The
High Court held that maintenance
must be awarded to the wife from the
date on which summons were served
in the main divorce petition. The
Court relied upon the judgment of the
Calcutta High Court in Samir
Banerjee v. Sujata Banerjee,
MANU/WB/0386/1965 : 70 CWN
633 and held that Section 24 of the
HMA does not contain any provision
that maintenance must be awarded
from a specific date. The Court may,
in exercise of its discretion, award
maintenance from the date of service
of summons.
86 . The Orissa High Court in Gouri
Das v. Pradyumna Kumar Das
MANU/OR/0189/1986 : 1986 (II)
OLR 44 was considering an
application for interim maintenance
filed Under Section 24 HMA by the
wife, in a divorce petition instituted
by the husband. The Court held that
the ordinary Rule is to award
maintenance from the date of service
of summons. It was held that in cases
where the Applicant in the
maintenance petition is also the
Petitioner in the divorce petition,
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 22 of 36
maintenance becomes payable from
the date when summons is served
upon the Respondent in the main
proceeding.
87. In Kalpana Das v. Sarat Kumar
Das, MANU/OR/0180/2009 : AIR
2009 Ori 133 the Orissa High Court
held that the wife was entitled to
maintenance from the date when the
husband entered appearance. The
Court was considering an application
for interim maintenance Under
Section 24 HMA in a petition for
restitution of conjugal rights filed by
the wife. The Family Court awarded
interim maintenance to the wife and
minor child from the date of the order.
In an appeal filed by the wife and
minor child seeking maintenance
from the date of application, the High
Court held that the Family Court had
failed to assign any reasons in support
of its order, and directed:
9. …Learned Judge. Family Court has
not assigned any reason as to why
hepassed the order of interim
maintenance w.e.f. the date of order.
When admittedly the parties are living
separately and prima facie it appears
that the Petitioners have no
independent source of income,
therefore, in our view order should
have been passed for payment of
interim maintenance from the date of
appearance of the Opposite Party-
husband…
(emphasis supplied)
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 23 of 36
Discussion and Directions:
88. The judgments hereinabove reveal
the divergent views of different High
Courts on the date from which
maintenance must be awarded.
89 . Even though a judicial discretion
is conferred upon the Court to grant
maintenance either from the date of
application or from the date of the
order in Section 125(2) Code of
Criminal Procedure, it would be
appropriate to grant maintenance from
the date of application in all cases,
including Section 125 Code of
Criminal Procedure In the practical
working of the provisions relating to
maintenance, we find that there is
significant delay in disposal of the
applications for interim maintenance
for years on end. It would therefore be
in the interests of justice and fair play
that maintenance is awarded from the
date of the application.
90. In Shail Kumari Devi and Ors. v.
Krishnan Bhagwan Pathak
MANU/SC/3353/2008 : 2008 9 SCC
632, this Court held that the
entitlement of maintenance should not
be left to the uncertain date of
disposal of the case. The enormous
delay in disposal of proceedings
justifies the award of maintenance
from the date of application. In
Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena
MANU/SC/0605/2014 : 2015 6 SCC
353, this Court held that repetitive
adjournments sought by the husband
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 24 of 36
in that case resulted in delay of 9
years in the adjudication of the case.
The delay in adjudication was not
only against human rights, but also
against the basic embodiment of
dignity of an individual. The delay in
the conduct of the proceedings would
require grant of maintenance to date
back to the date of application.
91. The rationale of granting
maintenance from the date of
application finds its roots in the object
of enacting maintenance legislations,
so as to enable the wife to overcome
the financial crunch which occurs on
separation from the husband.
Financial constraints of a dependant
spouse hampers their capacity to be
effectively represented before the
Court. In order to prevent a dependant
from being reduced to destitution, it is
necessary that maintenance is
awarded from the date on which the
application for maintenance is filed
before the concerned Court.
92. In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah
Godse MANU/SC/1084/2013 : (2014)
1 SCC 188, the Supreme Court was
considering the interpretation of
Section 125 Code of Criminal
Procedure. The Court held:
13.3. …purposive interpretation needs
to be given to the provisions of
Section 125 Code of Criminal
Procedure While dealing with the
application of a destitute wife or
hapless children or parents under this
provision, the Court is dealing withCA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 25 of 36
the marginalised Sections of the
society. The purpose is to achieve
“social justice” which is the
constitutional vision, enshrined in the
Preamble of the Constitution of India.
The Preamble to the Constitution of
India clearly signals that we have
chosen the democratic path under the
Rule of law to achieve the goal of
securing for all its citizens, justice,
liberty, equality and fraternity. It
specifically highlights achieving their
social justice. Therefore, it becomes
the bounden duty of the courts to
advance the cause of the social
justice. While giving interpretation to
a particular provision, the court is
supposed to bridge the gap between
the law and society.
(emphasis supplied)
93. It has therefore become necessary
to issue directions to bring about
uniformity and consistency in the
Orders passed by all Courts, by
directing that maintenance be
awarded from the date on which the
application was made before the
concerned Court. The right to claim
maintenance must date back to the
date of filing the application, since the
period during which the maintenance
proceedings remained pending is not
within the control of the applicant.
V Enforcement of orders of
maintenance
94. Enforcement of the order of
maintenance is the most challenging
issue, which is encountered by the
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 26 of 36
applicants. If maintenance is not paid
in a timely manner, it defeats the very
object of the social welfare
legislation. Execution petitions
usually remain pending for months, if
not years, which completely nullifies
the object of the law. The Bombay
High Court in Sushila Viresh
Chhawda v. Viresh Nagsi Chhawda
MANU/MH/0021/1996 : AIR 1996
Bom 94 held that:
The direction of interim alimony and
expenses of litigation Under Section
24 is one of urgency and it must be
decided as soon as it is raised and the
law takes care that nobody is disabled
from prosecuting or defending the
matrimonial case by starvation or lack
of funds.
(i) An application for execution of an
Order of Maintenance can be filed
under the following provisions:
(a) Section 28A of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1956 (sic1955) r.w.
Section 18 of the Family Courts Act,
1984 and Order XXI Rule 94 of the
Code of Civil Procedure for executing
an Order passed Under Section 24 of
the Hindu 17-11-2020 (Page 35 of 48)
www.manupatra.com Library Dwarka
Marriage Act (before the Family
Court);
(b) Section 20(6) of the DV Act
(before the Judicial Magistrate); and
(c) Section 128 of Code of Criminal
Procedure before the Magistrate’s
Court.
(ii) Section 18 of the Family Courts
Act, 1984 provides that orders passed
by the Family Court shall be
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 27 of 36
executable in accordance with the
Code of Civil Procedure/Code of
Criminal Procedure.
(iii) Section 125(3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that if
the party against whom the order of
maintenance is passed fails to comply
with the order of maintenance, the
same shall be recovered in the manner
as provided for fines, and the
Magistrate may award sentence of
imprisonment for a term which may
extend to one month, or until
payment, whichever is earlier.
Striking off the Defence
(i) Some Family Courts have passed
orders for striking off the defence of
the Respondent in case of non-
payment of maintenance, so as to
facilitate speedy disposal of the
maintenance petition. In Kaushalya v.
Mukesh Jain18, the Supreme Court
allowed a Family Court to strike off
the defence of the Respondent, in case
of non-payment of maintenance in
accordance with the interim order
passed.
(ii) The Punjab & Haryana High
Court in Bani v. Parkash Singh AIR
1996 P&H 175 was considering a
case where the husband failed to
comply with the maintenance order,
despite several notices, for a period of
over two years. The Court taking note
of the power to strike off the defence
of the Respondent, held that:
Law is not that powerless
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 28 of 36
as not to bring the
husband to book. If the
husband has failed to
make the payment of
maintenance and
litigation expenses to
wife, his defence be
struck out.
(iii) The Punjab & Haryana High
Court in Mohinder Verma v. Sapna
MANU/PH/3684/2014, discussed the
issue of striking off the defence in the
following words:
8. Section 24 of the Act empowers the
matrimonial court to award
maintenance pendente lite and also
litigation expenses to a needy and
indigent spouse so that the
proceedings can be conducted without
any hardship on his or her part. The
proceedings under this Section are
summary in nature and confers a
substantial right on the Applicant
during the pendency of the
proceedings. Where this amount is not
paid to the applicant, then the very
object and purpose of this provision
stands defeated. No doubt, remedy of
execution of decree or order passed
by the matrimonial court is available
Under Section 28A of the Act, but the
same would not be a bar to striking
off the defence of the spouse who
violates the interim order of
maintenance and litigation expenses
passed by the said Court. In other
words, the striking off the defence of
the spouse not honouring the court’s
interim order is the instant relief toCA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 29 of 36
the needy one instead of waiting
endlessly till its execution Under
Section 28A of the Act. Where the
spouse who is to pay maintenance
fails to discharge the liability, the
other spouse cannot be forced to
adopt time consuming execution
proceedings for realising the amount.
Court cannot be a mute spectator
watching flagrant disobedience of the
interim orders passed by it showing
its helplessness in its instant
implementation. It would, thus, be
appropriate even in the absence of any
specific provision to that effect in the
Act, to strike off the defence of the
erring spouse in exercise of its
inherent power Under Section 151 of
the Code of Civil Procedure read with
Section 21 of the Act rather than to
leave the aggrieved party to seek its
enforcement through execution as
execution is a long and arduous
procedure. Needless to say, the
remedy Under Section 28A of the Act
regarding execution of decree or
interim order does not stand
obliterated or extinguished by striking
off the defence of the defaulting
spouse. Thus, where the spouse who
is directed to pay the maintenance and
litigation expenses, the legal
consequences for its non-payment are
that the defence of the said spouse is
liable to be struck off.
(emphasis supplied)
(iv) The Delhi High Court in
Satish Kumar v. Meena
MANU/DE/0771/2001 : 2001
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 30 of 36
(60) DRJ 246 held that the
Family Court had inherent
powers to strike off the defence
of the Respondent, to ensure
that no abuse of process of the
court takes place. The Delhi
High Court in Smt. Santosh
Sehgal v. Shri Murari Lal
Sehgal,
MANU/DE/2213/2006 : AIR
2007 Delhi 210 framed the
following issue for
consideration: “Whether the
appeal against the decree of
divorce filed by the Appellant-
wife can be allowed
straightway without hearing the
Respondent/husband in the
event of his failing to pay
interim maintenance and
litigation expenses granted to
the wife during the pendency of
the appeal.”
The reference was answered as
follows:
5. The reference to the portion of the
judgment in Bani‘s case extracted
herein-above would show that the
Punjab and Haryana High Court and
Orissa Page 2216 High Court have
taken an unanimous view that in case
the husband commits default in
payment of interim maintenance to
his wife and children then he is not
entitled to any matrimonial relief in
proceedings by or against him. The
view taken by Punjab and Haryana
High Court in Bani‘s case has been
followed by a Single Judge of thisCA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 31 of 36
Court in Satish Kumar v. Meena. We
tend to agree with this view as it is in
consonance with the first principle of
law. We are of the view that when a
husband is negligent and does not pay
maintenance to his wife as awarded
by the Court, then how such a person
is entitled to the relief claimed by him
in the matrimonial proceedings. We
have no hesitation in holding that in
case the husband fails to pay
maintenance and litigation expenses
to his wife granted by the Court
during the pendency of the appeal,
then the appeal filed by the wife
against the decree of divorce granted
by the trial court in favor of the
husband has to be allowed. Hence the
question referred to us for decision is
answered in the affirmative. The
Court concluded that if there was non-
payment of interim maintenance, the
defence of the Respondent is liable to
be struck off, and the appeal filed by
the Appellant-wife can be allowed,
without hearing the Respondent. (v)
The Punjab and Haryana High Court
in Gurvinder Singh v. Murti and
Ors.19 was considering a case where
the trial court stuck off the defence of
the husband for non-payment of ad-
interim maintenance. The High Court
set aside the order of the trial court,
and held that instead of following the
correct procedure for recovery of
interim maintenance as provided
Under Section 125 (3) or Section 421
of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
the trial court erred in striking off the
defence of the husband. The error of
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 32 of 36
the court did not assist in recovery of
interim maintenance, but rather
prolonged the litigation between the
parties.
(vi) The issue whether defence can be
struck off in proceedings Under
Section 125 Code of Criminal
Procedure came up before the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Venkateshwar Dwivedi v. Ruchi
Dwivedi.20 The Court held that
neither Section 125(3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, nor Section 10 of
the Family Courts Act either
expressly or by necessary implication
empower the Magistrate or Family
Court to strike off the defence. A
statutory remedy for recovery of
maintenance was available, and the
power to strike off defence does not
exist in a proceeding Under Section
125 Code of Criminal Procedure.
Such power cannot be presumed to
exist as an inherent or implied power.
The Court placed reliance on the
judgment of the Kerala High Court in
Davis v. Thomas,21 and held that the
Magistrate does not possess the power
to strike off the defence for failure to
pay interim maintenance.
Discussion and Directions on
Enforcement of Orders of
Maintenance
95. The order or decree of
maintenance may be enforced like a
decree of a civil court, through the
provisions which are available for
enforcing a money decree, including
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 33 of 36
civil detention, attachment of
property, etc. as provided by various
provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, more particularly Sections
51, 55, 58, 60 read with Order XXI.
16. As far as awarding the monetary reliefs is
concerned, there can be no straight jacket formula
which can be employed while determining the
income of the husband. Therefore, some
guesswork on the part of the courts is inevitable
since the parties have the tendency to hide their
true income also. In this context, the observations
of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of “X”
vs. State & Anr. decided on 28.07.2025 vide
neutral citation No. 2025:DHC:6114 can be
beneficially relied, wherein has been held:
21. It is also common
knowledge and has been
observed by this Court in
many cases that it is a normal
tendency of the parties,
especially in matrimonial
disputes to not disclose their
true income. The Courts in
such circumstances are
permitted to make some
guess work and arrive at a
figure that a party may
reasonably be earning (Ref:
Bharat Hegde v. Saroj
Hegde : 2007 SCC OnLine
Del 622). Consequently, in
such circumstances, theCA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 34 of 36
assessment of Respondent
No. 2’s monthly income at
₹20,000/- is correct.
22. This Court in the case of
Annurita Vohra v. Sandeep
Vohra : 2004 (74) DRJ 99
had observed that the court
should initially determine the
net disposable income of the
Husband or the primary
earner within the family. If
the other spouse is also
employed, those earnings
should be taken into
consideration. This collective
income forms the Family
Resource Cake, which is then
distributed among the family
members. The allocation of
this “cake” should align with
the financial needs of each
family member, and an
equitable approach would
involve dividing the Family
Resource Cake into two
portions for the Husband,
acknowledging his additional
expenses incurred in earning,
and one portion each for the
other members.
17. As Respondent No.1 has not filed the income and
assets affidavit, this Court deems it fit to award
maintenance based on the Minimum wages as
applicable to semi-skilled workers in Delhi and
the same being Rs. 21,813/- which is inclusive
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 35 of 36
dearness allowance.
18. Pressing into service the approach as referred
above by the Hon’ble High Court, the said
income is to be treated as the ‘family resource
cake’ and the same is to be equitably distributed
accordingly between the family members taking
into account their needs. The Appellant is not
gainfully employed anywhere as per her affidavit
of income and assets. Therefore, this Court deems
it appropriate that the amount of maintenance to
be paid by Respondent No. 1 be determined at Rs
12,000 per month i.e. Rs 4,000 each for wife and
two minor children applicable from the date of
filing of the Application. Arrears of Maintenance
to be paid within 30 days of the passing of the
order.
19. In light of the above, the Appeal stands allowed
qua Respondent No.1.
20. TCR record be sent back to Ld. Trial Court
alongwith copy of this order.
21. File be consigned to Record Room after due
compliance.
Copy of this order be given dasti, as prayed.
Ashish
(ASHISH RASTOGI)
Rastogi
Addl. Sessions Judge -05 Digitally signed
by Ashish Rastogi
KKD Courts/EastDstt./Delhi Date: 2026.03.07
Announced in the open court 16:59:16 +0530
on this 7th March 2026
CA No.29/2025 Afsana Mansoori Vs. Shaukeen Ahmad Masnoori Page 36 of 36
