Patna High Court
Aekta Verma vs The State Of Bihar on 1 July, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.8126 of 2026
======================================================
Aekta Verma Wife of Dr. Arun Kumar Sinha, Resident of- A-47, Vimla Vila,
Housing Colony, Police Station- Kankarbagh, District- Patna.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Additional Chief Secretary, General
Administration Department, Bihar, Patna.
2. The Secretary, General Administration Department, Bihar, Patna.
3. The Special Secretary, General Administration Department, Bihar, Patna.
4. The Additional Secretary, General Administration Department, Bihar, Patna.
5. The Joint Secretary, General Administration Department, Bihar, Patna.
6. The Under Secretary, General Administration Department, Bihar, Patna.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Bindhyachal Singh, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Diksha Singh, Adv
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Rewti Kant- Raman AC to SC-11
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RITESH KUMAR
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 01-07-2026
Heard the learned senior counsel for the petitioner
and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State.
2. The present writ petition has been filed for the
following reliefs:
"(i) For issuance of writ in the nature of
mandamus or any other appropriate writ,
order direction for commanding the
respondent authorities to forward the name
of the petitioner to the UPSC, for
consideration for promotion to the Indian
Administrative Service, and to consider the
petitioner's case for inclusion in relevant
Select List without being influenced by the
impugned punishment order and its
corrigendum.
(ii) Alternatively, for holding that the
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
2/48
petitioner is entitled/ eligible for promotion
to the IAS Cadre and for holding that the
minor punishment imposed upon her vide
Resolution no. 9248 dated 11.07.2019
cannot be a ground for denial of her
promotion from Bihar Administrative
Services to Indian Administrative Services
Cadre as that would amount to a major
punishment which is impermissible in law.
(iii) For issuance of writ in the nature of
certiorari or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction for quashing of
Resolution no. 9248 dated 11.07.2019
whereby the petitioner has been subjected
to the punishment of (i) censure and (ii)
stoppage of two increments with non-
cumulative effect.
(iv) For issuance of writ in the nature of
certiorari or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction for quashing the
corrigendum no. 10667 dated 05.08.2019
whereby the punishment order has been
corrected/ clarified and treated the censure
with reference to the year of 2014- 2015,
along with the stoppage of two increments
without cumulative effect from the date of
punishment.
(v) Alternatively, the petitioner also prays
for issuance of writ in the nature of
mandamus or any other appropriate writ,
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
3/48
order or direction for commanding the
respondents to correct/ amend the
corrigendum no. 10667 dated 05.08.2019
so that the punishment of stoppage of
increments with non-cumulative effect is
shown for the same year as the censure,
namely 2014- 2015, thereby maintaining
consistency in the departmental record and
avoiding prejudice to the petitioner's
service career and promotion prospects.
(vi) For issuance of writ in the nature of
certiorari or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction for quashing the memo
no. 12292 dated 21.12.2020 whereby the
review preferred by the petitioner against
the order passed by the disciplinary
authority has been rejected.
(vii) For issuance of writ in the nature of
certiorari or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction for quashing the memo of
charge dated 03.08.2017 which was served
upon the petitioner vide letter no. 9938
dated 03.08.2017.
(viii) For such other relief(s), order(s) or
direction(s) to which the petitioner may be
entitled to in the facts and circumstances of
this case."
3. I.A. No. 1 of 2026 and I.A. No. 2 of 2026 have
been filed by the petitioner claiming therein some additional
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
4/48
reliefs, however, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the petitioner submits that the petitioner would not be
pressing the reliefs sought for in the interlocutory applications
bearing I.A. No. 1 of 2026 and I.A. No. 2 of 2026. Accordingly
both the Interlocutory applications are dismissed as not pressed.
BRIEF FACTS
4. The brief facts which are essential for adjudication
of the present writ petition are that the petitioner was selected
and appointed as a member of the Bihar Administrative Service
and pursuant thereto, she gave her joining. After serving in
different capacities. She was transferred as Senior Deputy
Collector, Purnea vide notification no. 1883 dated 11.02.2014
and accordingly, she gave her joining on 21.02.2014.
Immediately, thereafter she proceeded on medical leave w.e.f.
22.02.2014
on account of her illness. She remained under
medical leave till 03.06.2015. It is the case of the petitioner that
after getting medical fitness certificate from the treating doctor,
she went to her working place at Purnea and gave her joining on
04.06.2015. She came to know from the website of the
department that she has been transferred to the post of officer on
special duty, Bihar State Food Commission, Patna and
immediately, thereafter by relinquishing her charge Suo Moto
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
5/48
she proceeded to join at her transferred place of posting. She
gave her joining on the said post in the afternoon of 04.06.2015.
The charge was assumed by the petitioner Suo Moto. The
District Magistrate, Purnea, vide letter No. 1727 dated
24.07.2015 i.e. after a gap of 50 days reported to the General
Administrative Department of the State with regard to the
conduct of the petitioner in relinquishing her charge Suo Moto
and to take charge of her transferred place of posting Patna on
the same day, which is not feasible since the distance between
Patna to Purnea is 300 kms. An explanation was sought for from
the petitioner on 18.08.2015 by the General Administration
Department. In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted her
explanation on 04.09.2015 whereby she gave the details of her
proceeding to Purnea and returning from Purnea to Patna to give
her joining at her transferred place of posting in the State Food
Corporation/Commission. The matter was kept pending at the
level of the department and all of a sudden vide letter dated
25.10.2016, the General Administration Department requested
the District Magistrate to give his opinion with regard to the
letter written by the District Magistrate on 24.07.2015, the letter
written by the General Administration Department on
18.08.2015 and the explanation submitted by the petitioner on
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
6/48
04.09.2015. The District Magistrate, Purnea by his letter dated
02.02.2017 gave his opinion whereby he recommended for
sanction of the leave period as leave without pay and for giving
warning to the petitioner.
5. It is further case of the petitioner that a memo of
charge was issued to the petitioner on 01.08.2017 and the
petitioner was directed to file her reply to the show cause. The
petitioner submitted her reply on 23.08.2017 wherein she denied
all the charges levelled against her and requested the authorities
concerned to exonerate her from the charges leveled against her.
Again vide letter dated 22.11.2017 issued by the General
Administration Department, adressed to the District Magistrate,
Purnea, his opinion was sought for with regard to the
explanation submitted by the petitioner, to the charge. In
compliance thereof, the District Magistrate, Purnea, vide his
letter no. 158 dated 01.02.2019 forwarded his opinion with
regard to the charges leveled against the petitioner, wherein he
gave his opinion that without permission of the authority
concerned, the petitioner should not have relinquished her
charge and she should have proceeded for taking over the charge
at her transferred place of posting after obtaining permission
from the competent authority.
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
7/48
6. It is further case of the petitioner that without being
provided with the opinion of the District Magistrate, which was
forwarded vide letter dated 01.02.2019 and without asking for
any explanation from the petitioner, the impugned order of
punishment has been passed by the Additional Secretary,
General Administration Department, Government of Bihar,
Patna vide memo no. 9248 dated 11.07.2019 whereby the
petitioner has been inflicted with the punishment of censure and
stoppage of two increment with non-cumulative effect.
Immediately, thereafter a corrigendum was issued vide memo
no. 10667 dated 05.08.2019 under the signature of the
Additional Secretary to the Government, General
Administration Department, Government of Bihar, Patna,
whereby the punishment order was modified to the extent that
the censure was confined for the period 2014-15, however, the
stoppage of two increment with non-cumulative effect was kept
as it is. The petitioner preferred a review petition before the
competent authority on 16.09.2019, however, the same was
rejected vide order contained in memo no.12292 dated
21.12.2020 issued under the signature of the Additional
Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of
Bihar, Patna.
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
8/48
7. It is further case of the petitioner that subsequently
vide memo no. 984 dated 22.01.2021 issued under the signature
of the Joint Secretary, General Administration Department,
Government of Bihar, Patna the period of unauthorized absence
to the tune of 467 days was regularized and was treated to be
extraordinary leave in terms of rule 180 (kha) of the Bihar
Service Code. The petitioner filed a representation in 2022,
however, the same was not taken care of, then the petitioner
filed a mercy petition on 14.12.2025, however the same was
rejected vide memo no. 967 dated 14.01.2026 issued under the
signature of the Additional Secretary to the Government,
Department of General Administration, Government of Bihar,
Patna.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
8. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner
submits that the letter dated 18.08.2015 and 03.08.2017 cannot
be treated as show cause notice to the petitioner in terms of the
Bihar CCA rules. He further submits that even the report of the
District Magistrate dated 01.02.2019, on the basis of which the
impugned order of punishment has been passed, was never
served upon the petitioner at any time. He further submits that
even before issuance of the impugned order of punishment no
show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, which is in
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
9/48
violation of the principles of natural justice since it was
incumbent upon the authorities concerned to provide the copy of
the inquiry report/opinion of the District Magistrate and
issuance of show cause notice to the petitioner before passing
the impugned order of punishment. He further submits that even
the memo of charge was issued by the incompetent officer in as
much as that the memo of charge was issued by the Joint
Secretary to the Government who is not the appointing authority
of the petitioner.
9. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner further
submits that from perusal of the memo of charge, it would
transpire that the same does not contain any list of documents
and witnesses, which is mandatory in terms of rule 17(3) & (4)
of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005. Even the impugned order of
punishment dated 11.07.2019 cannot be said to be in terms of
the Bihar CCA Rules, since the disciplinary authority did not
apply his mind, before passing the impugned order of
punishment and only on the basis of the opinion of the District
Magistrate, he proceeded to award punishment against the
petitioner.
10. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner lastly
submits that although the punishment was a minor punishment,
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
10/48
however, due to efflux of time the same has become major,
since the petitioner has been denied an opportunity to be
considered for being granted promotion to the Indian
Administrative Service, on account of the continuance of the
order of punishment. He further submits that the department
should have taken a sympathetic approach in awarding
punishment against the petitioner and in consideration of her
case for recommendation to the Union of India for consideration
of her case for being promoted to the Indian Administrative
Service, taking into consideration, the illness of his child who
has been diagnosed with PDD-NOS (Pervasive Developmental
Disorder- Not Otherwise Specified), a developmental disorder
exhibiting several characteristic of autism.
11. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner in
support of his contention refers to and relies upon a judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in 2005 (4) SCC
480 (Kailash Vs. Nanhku & Ors.), wherein in paragraph No.
28, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as follows:-
“28. All the rules of procedure are the
handmaid of justice. The language employed by
the draftsman of processual law may be liberal
or stringent, but the fact remains that the object
of prescribing procedure is to advance the
cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no
party should ordinarily be denied the
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
11/48opportunity of participating in the process of
justice dispensation. Unless compelled by
express and specific language of the statute, the
provisions of CPC or any other procedural
enactment ought not to be construed in a
manner which would leave the court helpless to
meet extraordinary situations in the ends of
justice. The observations made by Krishna Iyer,
J. in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar [(1975)
1 SCC 774] are pertinent: (SCC p. 777, paras
5-6)“The mortality of justice at the hands of law
troubles a judge’s conscience and points an
angry interrogation at the law reformer.
The processual law so dominates in certain
systems as to overpower substantive rights
and substantial justice. The humanist rule
that procedure should be the handmaid, not
the mistress, of legal justice compels
consideration of vesting a residuary power in
judges to act ex debito justitiae where the
tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly
inequitable. … Justice is the goal of
jurisprudence — processual, as much as
substantive.”
12. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner
further refers to and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India reported in (2008) 8 SCC 648 (Union
Of India & Ors. Vs. Tarsem Singh), wherein in paragraph nos.
6 & 7, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
12/48
follows:-
“6. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India [(2007) 9
SCC 274 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 395] this
Court held: (SCC p. 277, paras 8 & 10)”8. …
The High Court does not ordinarily permit a
belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and
public inconvenience and bring in its train new
injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised
after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect
of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third
parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay
coupled with the creation of third-party rights
in the meantime is an important factor which
also weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.
***
10. In the case of pension the cause of action
actually continues from month to month. That,
however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay
in filing the petition. … If petition is filed
beyond a reasonable period say three years
normally the Court would reject the same or
restrict the relief which could be granted to a
reasonable period of about three years.”
7. To summarise, normally, a belated service
related claim will be rejected on the ground of
delay and laches (where remedy is sought by
filing a writ petition) or limitation (where
remedy is sought by an application to the
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
13/48
Administrative Tribunal). One of the
exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to
a continuing wrong. Where a service related
claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief
can be granted even if there is a long delay in
seeking remedy, with reference to the date on
which the continuing wrong commenced, if
such continuing wrong creates a continuing
source of injury. But there is an exception to
the exception. If the grievance is in respect of
any order or administrative decision which
related to or affected several others also, and
if the reopening of the issue would affect the
settled rights of third parties, then the claim
will not be entertained. For example, if the
issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or
pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay
as it does not affect the rights of third parties.
But if the claim involved issues relating to
seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others,
delay would render the claim stale and
doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied.
Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery
of arrears for a past period is concerned, the
principles relating to recurring/successive
wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High
Courts will restrict the consequential relief
relating to arrears normally to a period of
three years prior to the date of filing of the
writ petition.”
13. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner
further refers to and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
14/48
Supreme Court of India reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 (Sheo
Raj Singh deceased Through Legal Representatives & Ors.
Vs. Union Of India And Another) wherein in paragraph No.
17-28 the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as follows:-
Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] the relevant High
Court did not condone the delay of 4 (four)
days in presentation of an appeal by the
Collector in a land acquisition matter for
which the order rejecting the application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was
carried in appeal. This Court opined that
legislature had conferred power under
Section 5 in order to enable the courts to do
substantial justice to the parties by disposing
of matters on “merits”. It was further held
that the expression “sufficient cause”
employed by the legislature is adequately
elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in
a meaningful manner which subserves the
ends of justice — that being the life-purpose
for the existence of the institution of courts.
Despite the liberal approach being adopted in
such matters, which was termed justifiable,
this Court lamented that the message had not
percolated down to all the other courts in the
hierarchy and, accordingly, emphasis was
laid on the courts adopting a liberal and
justice-oriented approach. The following
passage from the decision is reflective of this
Court’s realisation that : (Katiji case
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
15/48[Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] ,
SCC p. 108, para 3)”3. … And such a liberal
approach is adopted on principle as it is
realised that:
***
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non-deliberate delay.
***
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to
legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.’ ”
18.State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao [State of
Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 :
2005 SCC (Cri) 906] arose out of an appeal
where this Court condoned the State’s delay
of 57 days in applying for grant of leave to
appeal before the High Court against
acquittal of certain accused persons. This
Court observed that in cases where
substantial justice and a technical approach
were pitted against each other, a pragmatic
approach should be taken with the former
being preferred. Further, this Court noted that
what counted was indeed the sufficiency of
the cause of delay, and not the length, where
the shortness of delay would be considered
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
16/48when using extraordinary discretion to
condone the same. This Court also went on to
record that courts should attempt to decide a
case on its merits, unless the same is
hopelessly without merit. It was also observed
therein that it would be improper to put the
State on the same footing as an individual
since it was an impersonal machinery
operating through its officers.
19. In Balwant Singh [Balwant Singh v.
Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685 : (2010) 3
SCC (Civ) 537] , this Court refused to
condone the delay of 778 days in bringing on
record the legal heirs of the petitioner therein
through an application filed under Order 22
Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
It was observed that though sufficient cause
should be construed in a liberal manner, the
same could not be equated with doing
injustice to the other party. For sufficient
cause to receive liberal treatment, the same
must fall within reasonable time and through
proper conduct of the party concerned. The
Court emphasised that for such an
application for condonation to be seen in a
positive light, the same should be bona fide,
based on true and plausible explanations, and
should reflect the normal conduct of a
common prudent person. Further, the
explained delay should be clearly understood
in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained
delay to warrant a condonation.
20.Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P.
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
17/48
[Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P., (2011)
4 SCC 363 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 257]
happened to be a case where this Court set
aside the impugned judgment condoning both
a delay of 883 days in filing the petition to set
aside the dismissal order by the relevant High
Court, along with a delay of 3703 days
caused by the respondents in bringing on
record the legal representative of the
appellant. This Court observed that whilst the
High Court admonished the Government
Pleaders concerned for their negligence in
prosecuting the appeal before it and not
providing a sufficient cause for delay, it
nonetheless proceeded to condone the delay
despite holding the same to be unjustifiable.
21. In Postmaster General v. Living Media
India Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living
Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012)
2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 :
(2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] , this Court noted
that in cases when there was no gross
negligence, deliberate inaction, or lack of
bona fides, a liberal concession ought to be
adopted to render substantial justice but on
the facts before the Court, the appellant could
not take advantage of the earlier decisions of
this Court. Further, merely because the State
was involved, no different metric for
condonation of delay could be applied to it.
Importantly, it noted that the appellant
department had offered no proper and cogent
explanation before this Court for condonation
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
18/48
of a huge delay of 427 days apart from simply
mentioning various dates. The claim on
account of impersonal machinery and
inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making file notes, it was held, not acceptable
in view of the modern technologies being
used and available. Also, holding that the law
of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody,
including the Government, this Court went on
to reject the prayer for condonation.
22. This Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v.
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Civ) 713 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450 : (2014) 2
SCC (L&S) 595] , whilst referring to various
precedents rejected the pleas of lack of
knowledge and miscarriage of justice raised
by the respondent/managing committee in
challenging an interim order of a Single
Judge of the High Court. It then proceeded to
set aside the impugned judgment condoning a
delay of 2449 days in challenging the said
interim order based on lack of bona fides.
Para 21 of the decision contains the
principles culled out by this Court from the
several precedents that it had considered in
the process.
23. A Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this
Court in State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang
[State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang, (2019)
10 SCC 408 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 163] was
faced with a delay of 312 days by the State in
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
19/48
preferring its first appeal before the High
Court. This Court, on grounds of public
interest, the impersonal nature of
governments, and the ramifications of
individual errors on State interest, condoned
the delay in filing the first appeal on payment
of costs of Rs 50,000.
24. In University of Delhi [University of
Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745] ,
another Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this
Court declined to condone the delay of 916
days by the appellant in challenging an order
[University of Delhi v. Union of India, 2015
SCC OnLine Del 9009] of a Single Judge of
the High Court. This Court, whilst
distinguishing Katiji [Collector (LA) v. Katiji,
(1987) 2 SCC 107] on facts, observed that the
consideration to condone could only be made
on presentation of a reasonable explanation,
and the same could not be done simply
because the appellant therein was a public
body. It then went on to note the conduct of
the appellant in demonstrating delay and
laches not only in filing the appeal, but also
the original writ petition before the High
Court at the first instance. While refusing to
condone the appellant’s delay, it was
specifically noted that condonation of delay
at that stage would be prejudicial to public
interest as one of the respondents therein
(Delhi Metro Rail Corporation) had received
large amounts of money years ago to carry
out development on the subject land in
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
20/48
question.
25. We may profitably refer hereunder to
some other decisions of this Court for the
purpose of the present adjudication.
26. G. Ramegowda v. LAO [G. Ramegowda v.
LAO, (1988) 2 SCC 142] , while summarising
the position of law on “sufficient cause”, had
the occasion to observe that the contours of
the area of discretion of the courts in the
matter of condonation of delays in filing
appeals have been set out in a number of
pronouncements of this Court. It was
observed to be true that there is no general
principle saving the party from all mistakes of
its the counsel. Noting that there is no reason
why the opposite side should be exposed to a
time-barred appeal if there was negligence,
deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona
fides on the part of the party or its the
counsel, it was further observed that each
case will have to be considered on the
particularities of its own special facts.
However, this Court reiterated that the
expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5
must receive a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice and generally
delays in preferring appeals are required to
be condoned in the interest of justice where
no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fides is imputable to the party
seeking condonation of the delay. This was
followed by these words : (SCC p. 148, paras
15 & 17) “15. In litigations to which
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
21/48
Government is a party there is yet another
aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If
appeals brought by Government are lost for
such defaults, no person is individually
affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis,
suffers is public interest. The decisions of
Government are collective and institutional
decisions and do not share the characteristics
of decisions of private individuals.
***
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a
particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause”
for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps,
be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the
considerations that go into the judicial
verdict, these factors which are peculiar to
and characteristic of the functioning of the
government. Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by
a considerable degree of procedural red tape
in the process of their making. A certain
amount of latitude is, therefore, not
impermissible. It is rightly said that those
who bear responsibility of Government must
have “a little play at the joints”. Due
recognition of these limitations on
governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the
judicial approach is not to be rendered
unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and
unrealistic to put government and private
parties on the same footing in all respects in
such matters. Implicit in the very nature of
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
22/48governmental functioning is procedural delay
incidental to the decision-making process.”
27. Katiji[Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2
SCC 107] was also noticed by a Bench of
three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Chandra Mani [State of Haryana
v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132] where
we find the following discussion : (Chandra
Mani case [State of Haryana v. Chandra
Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132] , SCC p. 138, para
11) “11. … When the State is an applicant,
praying for condonation of delay, it is
common knowledge that on account of
impersonal machinery and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the
note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-
the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State
is less difficult to understand though more
difficult to approve, but the State represents
collective cause of the community. It is
axiomatic that decisions are taken by
officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace
and encumbered process of pushing the files
from table to table and keeping it on table for
considerable time causing delay —
intentional or otherwise — is a routine.
Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in
the process of their making decision is a
common feature. Therefore, certain amount of
latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals
brought by the State are lost for such default
no person is individually affected but what in
the ultimate analysis suffers, is public
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
23/48
interest. The expression “sufficient cause”
should, therefore, be considered with
pragmatism in justice-oriented approach
rather than the technical detection of
sufficient cause for explaining every day’s
delay. The factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the
governmental conditions would be cognizant
to and requires adoption of pragmatic
approach in justice-oriented process.”
28. This Court in Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V.
Ayisumma [Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma,
(1996) 10 SCC 634] , had the occasion to
observe that it would not be necessary for the
State to provide a day-to-day explanation of
delay while seeking condonation of the same.
The relevant observations therein read as
follows : (SCC p. 635, para 2) “2. It is now
settled law that when the delay was
occasioned at the behest of the Government,
it would be very difficult to explain the day-
to-day delay. The transaction of the business
of the Government was being done leisurely
by officers who had no or evince no personal
interest at different levels. No one takes
personal responsibility in processing the
matters expeditiously. As a fact at several
stages, they take their own time to reach a
decision. Even in spite of pointing at the
delay, they do not take expeditious action for
ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This
case is one of such instances. It is true that
Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
24/48
explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of
the court and in matters of Limitation Act
made no distinction between the State and the
citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict
standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage
of public justice. It would result in public
mischief by skilful management of delay in
the process of filing the appeal. The approach
of the Court should be pragmatic but not
pedantic. Under those circumstances, the
Subordinate Judge has rightly adopted
correct approach and had condoned the delay
without insisting upon explaining every day’s
delay in filing the review application in the
light of the law laid down by this Court. The
High Court was not right in setting aside the
order. Delay was rightly condoned.”
14. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner
further refers to and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India reported in 1991 (2) supplementary
SCC page 363 (Nirmal Chandra Bhattacharjee And Others.
Vs. Union of India & Others.) wherein in paragraph No. 5 the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as follows
5. One of the principles of service is that any
rule does not work to prejudice of an
employee who was in service prior to that
date. Admittedly the vacancies against which
appellants were promoted had occurred
prior to restructuring of these posts. It is
further not disputed that various other posts
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
25/48
to which class ‘IV’ employees could be
promoted were filled prior to August 1,
1983. The selection process in respect of
Ticket Collectors had also started prior to
August 1, 1983. If the department would
have proceeded with the selection well
within time and would have completed it
before August 1, 1983 then the appellants
would have become Ticket Collectors
without any difficulty. The mistake or delay
on the part of the department, therefore,
should not be permitted to recoil on the
appellants. Paragraph ’31’ of the
restructuring order itself provides that
vacancies in various grades of posts covered
in different categories existing on July 31,
1983 would be filled in accordance with the
procedure which was in vogue before August
1, 1983.
15. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner
further refers to and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India reported in 2025 INSC Page 382,
(Inder Singh Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh) wherein in
paragraph No. 14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held
as follows:-
14. There can be no quarrel on the settled
principle of law that delay cannot be
condoned without sufficient cause, but a
major aspect which has to be kept in mind
is that, if in a particular case, the merits
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
26/48have to be examined, it should not be
scuttled merely on the basis of limitation.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
16. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the State raises a preliminary objection with regard to
maintainability of the writ petition submitting that the order of
punishment was passed on 11.07.2019 and was modified on
05.08.2019. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected
on 21.12.2020 and now the petitioner has filed the present writ
petition after an inordinate delay, to challenge the order of
punishment and rejection of the review petition, which is not
permissible in view of the co-ordinate bench judgment dated
18.11.2025 by this Hon’ble Court passed in CWJC No. 15881
of 2025 (Chitranjan Prasad Vs. The State of Bihar &
Others.) wherein the Hon’ble single judge by considering the
submission of the State with regard to maintainability of the writ
petition on the ground of delay and latches while referring to the
Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph
No. 4 & 5 has held as follows:-
“4. It is further submitted by the learned
Advocate on behalf of the State-respondents
that the instant writ petition is not
maintainable on the principle-delay defeats
equity. In support of his contention, he
refers to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
27/48Court in the case of Delhi Administration
& Ors. V Kaushilya Thakur & Anr.
reported in (2012) 5 SCC 412, Paragraphs
10 and 11 are relevant for our purpose and
is quoted below:-
10) We have heard Shri H.P. Raval,
learned Additional Solicitor General and
Shri Rishikesh, learned counsel for
Respondent I and perused the record. In
our view, the impugned order as also the
one passed by the learned Single Judge
are liable to be set aside because while
granting relief to the husband of
Respondent 1, the learned Single Judge
overlooked the fact that the writ petition
had been filed after almost 4 years of the
rejection of an application for allotment
of 1000 sq yd plot made by Ranjodh
Kumar Thakur. The fact that the writ
petitioner made further representations
could not be made a ground for ignoring
the delay of more than 3 years, more so
because in the subsequent communication
the authorities concerned had merely
indicated that the decision contained in
the first letter would stand.
11) It is trite to say that in exercise of the
power under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court cannot
entertain belated claims unless the
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
28/48petitioner offers tangible explanation
(State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai).
5. Relying on the above-mentioned
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme court, this
Court concurs with the view submitted by
the learned Advocate for the State-
respondents.
CONCLUSION/ANALYSIS
17. Having considered the rival submissions and
after going through the records, it appears that undisputedly
punishment order was issued against the petitioner on
11.07.2019, which was subsequently modified vide memo No.
10667 dated 05.08.2019. The petitioner preferred review of the
same, however, the same was rejected vide order contained in
memo No. 12292 dated 21.12.2020. The petitioner being aware
about rejection of her review, choose not to assail the same
before any forum and accepted the same. When the case of the
petitioner for being recommended for promotion to the Indian
Administrative Service was not considered by the State of Bihar,
on the ground of the continuance of the punishment order
against the petitioner, the petitioner approached this Hon’ble
Court by filing the present writ petition, wherein apart from the
prayer for direction for consideration of her case for being
recommended to the Indian Administrative Service, has also
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
29/48
assailed the order dated 11.07.2019 and 21.12.2020. The law
with regard to delay and latches and waiver and acquiesce has
been very much clarified and settled by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India as well as this Hon’ble Court in catena of
judgments.
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a case
reported in (2024) 15 SCC 215 (Mrinmoy Maity versus
Chhanda Koley & Ors.), in paragraph No. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13
has held as follows
“9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on
perusal of the facts obtained in the present
case, we are of the considered view that the
writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited
or in other words the writ petition ought to
have been dismissed on the ground of delay
and laches itself. An applicant who
approaches the court belatedly or in other
words sleeps over his rights for a
considerable period of time, wakes up from
his deep slumber ought not to be granted the
extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This
Court time and again has held that delay
defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the
factors which should be borne in mind by the
High Court while exercising discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. In a given case, the High Court may
refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if
laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
30/48
right has allowed the cause of action to drift
away and attempts are made subsequently to
rekindle the lapsed cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be with
care and caution. If the delay which has
occasioned in approaching the writ court is
explained which would appeal to the
conscience of the court, in such
circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the
contesting party that for all times to come the
delay is not to be condoned. There may be
myriad circumstances which gives rise to the
invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and
it all depends on facts and circumstances of
each case, same cannot be described in a
straitjacket formula with mathematical
precision. The ultimate discretion to be
exercised by the writ court depends upon the
facts that it has to travel or the terrain in
which the facts have travelled.
11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt
that no fixed period of limitation is
prescribed. However, when the extraordinary
jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has
to be seen as to whether within a reasonable
time same has been invoked and even
submitting of memorials would not revive the
dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of
action which has had a natural death. In such
circumstances on the ground of delay and
laches alone, the appeal ought to be
dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-
suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
31/48
guilty of delay and laches, the High Court
ought to dismiss the petition on that sole
ground itself, inasmuch as the writ courts are
not to indulge in permitting such indolent
litigant to take advantage of his own wrong.
It is true that there cannot be any waiver of
fundamental right but while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226,
the High Court will have to necessarily take
into consideration the delay and laches on the
part of the applicant in approaching a writ
court.
12. This Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of
W.B. [Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B.,
(2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119]
has held to the following effect: (SCC p. 784,
paras 56-58)
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is
no doubt true that there can be no waiver of
fundamental right. But while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32,
226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this
Court takes into account certain factors and
one of such considerations is delay and
laches on the part of the applicant in
approaching a writ court. It is well settled
that power to issue a writ is discretionary.
One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under
Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that
the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction
of a writ court, he should come to the Court
at the earliest reasonably possible
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
32/48
opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the
motion for a writ will indeed be a good
ground for refusing to exercise such
discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying
object of this principle is not to encourage
agitation of stale claims and exhume matters
which have already been disposed of or
settled or where the rights of third parties
have accrued in the meantime (vide State of
M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [State of M.P. v. Bhailal
Bhai, (1964) 15 STC 450 : 1964 SCC OnLine
SC 10 : (1964) 6 SCR 261 : AIR 1964 SC
1006] , Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court
[Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, 1967
SCC OnLine SC 117 : AIR 1967 SC 1450]
and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [Bhoop
Singh v. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 136] ).
This principle applies even in case of an
infringement of fundamental right (vide
Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi
[Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi,
(1969) 1 SCC 110 : (1970) 25 STC 289] ,
Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and
Exports [Durga Prashad v. Controller of
Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185] and
Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India
[Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970)
1 SCC 84] ).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower
limit as to when a person can approach a
court. The question is one of discretion and
has to be decided on the basis of facts before
the court depending on and varying from case
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
33/48
to case. It will depend upon what the breach
of fundamental right and the remedy claimed
are and when and how the delay arose.”
13. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid
down by this Court in Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan [Karnataka
Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006)
4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 791]
whereunder it has been held that the High
Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary
jurisdiction if there is negligence or
omissions on the part of the applicant to
assert his right. It has been further held
thereunder: (SCC pp. 325-26, paras 6-9)
“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is
to be borne in mind by the High Court when
they exercise their discretionary powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an
appropriate case the High Court may refuse
to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is
such negligence or omission on the part of
the applicant to assert his right as taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party. Even where fundamental right
is involved the matter is still within the
discretion of the Court as pointed out in
Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and
Exports [Durga Prashad v. Controller of
Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185] . Of
course, the discretion has to be exercised
judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
34/48
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd [Lindsay Petroleum Co. v.
Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC
221 : 22 WR 492] (LR PC at p. 239) was
approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v.
Industrial Court [Moon Mills Ltd. v.
Industrial Court, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117 :
AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC
v. Balwant Regular Motor Service
[Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular
Motor Service, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 54 :
(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] . Sir
Barnes had stated: (Lindsay Petroleum case
[Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] , LR
pp. 239-40)
‘Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of
equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust
to give a remedy either because the party has,
by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has
though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet
put the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay
are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
35/48that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances
always important in such cases are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other,
so far as it relates to the remedy.’
8. It would be appropriate to note certain
decisions of this Court in which this aspect
has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of
the Constitution. It is apparent that what has
been stated as regards that article would
apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was
observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of
India [Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,
(1970) 1 SCC 84] that no relief can be given
to the petitioner who without any reasonable
explanation approaches this Court under
Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated
that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed
right, it does not follow from this that it was
the intention of the Constitution-makers that
this Court should disregard all principles and
grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate
delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal
Jaiswal [State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal,
(1986) 4 SCC 566] that the High Court in
exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily
assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
36/48and such delay is not satisfactorily explained,
the High Court may decline to intervene and
grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
It was stated that this rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not
ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to
cause confusion and public inconvenience
and bring, in its train new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after
unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of
inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third
parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay
coupled with the creation of third-party rights
in the meantime is an important factor which
also weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.”
19. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
a case reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 (Chennai Metropolitan
Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others versus T.T.
Murali Babu), in paragraph No. 16 has held as follows:-
“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should
not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required
to weigh the explanation offered and the
acceptability of the same. The court should bear in
mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it
has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but
simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
37/48primary principle that when an aggrieved person,
without adequate reason, approaches the court at
his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be
under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis
at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be
it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but
in most circumstances inordinate delay would only
invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the
doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and
inaction on the part of a
litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the
basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the
greatest thief of time” and second, law does not
permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix.
Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to
the lis.”
20. Similarly, Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a
case reported in 2009 1 SCC 768 (Tridip Kumar Dingal and
Others versus State of West Bengal and Others and its
analogues cases) in paragraph No. nos. 56 to 58 has held as
follows:-
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is
no doubt true that there can be no waiver of
fundamental right. But while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32,
226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court
takes into account certain factors and one of
such considerations is delay and laches on the
part of the applicant in approaching a writ
court. It is well settled that power to issue a
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
38/48writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for
refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of
delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a
writ court, he should come to the Court at the
earliest reasonably possible opportunity.
Inordinate delay in making the motion for a
writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing
to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The
underlying object of this principle is not to
encourage agitation of stale claims and
exhume matters which have already been
disposed of or settled or where the rights of
third parties have accrued in the meantime
(vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964
SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261] , Moon Mills
Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450]
and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3
SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR
969] ). This principle applies even in case of
an infringement of fundamental right (vide
Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969)
1 SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1
SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of
India [(1970) 1 SCC 84] ).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower
limit as to when a person can approach a
court. The question is one of discretion and
has to be decided on the basis of facts before
the court depending on and varying from case
to case. It will depend upon what the breach of
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
39/48fundamental right and the remedy claimed are
and when and how the delay arose.”
21. The petitioner challenged the order of punishment
after almost 5 and a half years, therefore, she waived her right
and accepted the same and as per the principles of waiver and
acquiesce, the petitioner cannot be permitted to assail the same
order after a delay of almost 5 and half years without any
plausible explanation for delay in approaching this Hon’ble
Court. It is well settled law that State claims cannot be
permitted to be adjudicated by writ courts. In this connection
reference may be made to be judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in a case reported in 2015 (1) SCC 347 (State of
Uttar Pradesh and others versus Arvind Kumar Shrivastav
and others), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
paragraph No. 20, 21 & 22.2 has held as follows:-
“20. The Court also quoted the following passage
from Halsbury’s Laws of England (para 911, p.
395): (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v.
Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464: (2007) 1 SCC
(L&S) 500], SCC pp. 470-71, para 12)
“12…. ‘In determining whether there has been
such delay as to amount to laches, the chief
points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on
the defendant’s part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
40/48
standing by while the violation of a right is in
progress, but assent after the violation has been
completed and the claimant has become aware of
it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy
where, by his conduct, he has done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver
of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though
not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party
in a position in which it would not be reasonable
to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay
are most material. Upon these considerations
rests the doctrine of laches.”
21. Holding that the respondents had also
acquiesced in accepting the retirements, the
appeal of U.P. Jal Nigam was allowed with the
following reasons: (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal
Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464:
(2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500], SCC p. 471, para 13)
“13. In view of the statement of law as
summarised above, the respondents are guilty
since the respondents have acquiesced in
accepting the retirement and did not challenge
the same in time. If they would have been vigilant
enough, they could have filed writ petitions as
others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it
appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it
away and did not rise to the occasion in time for
filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the
court should be very slow in granting the relief to
the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken
into consideration the question of acquiescence
or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
41/48other parties are going to be prejudiced if the
relief is granted. In the present case, if the
respondents would have challenged their
retirement being violative of the provisions of the
Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken
appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the
liability but by not asserting their rights the
respondents have allowed time to pass and after a
lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ
petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That
will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds
which is going to have serious financial
repercussions on the financial management of the
Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue
of such persons when they themselves are guilty
of waiver and acquiescence?”
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-
recognised exceptions in the form of laches and
delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons
who did not challenge the wrongful action in their
cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up
after long delay only because of the reason that
their counterparts who had approached the court
earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then
such employees cannot claim that the benefit of
the judgment rendered in the case of similarly
situated persons be extended to them. They would
be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays,
and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground
to dismiss their claim.”
22. Similar, view has been taken by a learned co-
ordinate bench of this Court vide judgment dated 25.02.2020
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
42/48
passed in CWJC No. 2276 of 2020 (Arun Kumar Mehta Vs
the State of Bihar & Others) wherein in paragraph Nos. 4 & 8
it has been held as follows:-
“4. I have heard the learned counsel for the
parties and gone through the materials on
record. Apparently, there is a delay of about
07 years in filing the present writ petition,
even if the appellate order dated 15.12.2012
is taken into account, for which no plausible
explanation whatsoever has been furnished,
hence the writ petition is fit to be dismissed
on the ground of principles of delay and
laches, alone.
8. Having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case, considering the
submissions made by the learned counsel
for the parties as also taking into account
the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the cases referred to hereinabove,
regarding the principles of delay and
laches,this Court finds that as far as the
present case is concerned, no plausible
explanation has been furnished by the
petitioner so as to convincingly explain the
delay in question of about 07 years in
approaching this Court, hence the present
writ petition is fit to be dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches. Accordingly,
the writ petition stands dismissed.”
23. Similarly a Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court
vide judgment dated 24.03.2026 passed in in LPA No. 891 of
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
43/48
2025 (The Patna High Court through its Registrar General,
Patna High Court and others Vs Chandan Kumar & others)
in paragraph Nos. 55 & 60 has been held as follows:-
“55. Thirdly, the issue of delay and laches,
though noticed, has not been adequately
appreciated in its proper legal perspective.
The appellants had specifically contended
that the writ petitioner approached the
Court after a considerable lapse of time and,
therefore, could not claim parity with those
who had been vigilant in asserting their
rights. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State
of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava (Supra)
has clearly held that though similarly
situated persons are ordinarily entitled to
equal treatment, this principle is subject to
exceptions, particularly in cases involving
delay, laches and acquiescence. Persons
who wake up after long delay cannot claim
the same relief as those who approached the
Court in time.
60. In view of the discussions and
conclusions arrived at on the issues framed
hereinabove, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the impugned judgment and
order dated 09.07.2025 passed by the
learned Single Judge cannot be sustained in
the eyes of law, inasmuch as the same
proceeds on erroneous application of legal
principles, extends the benefit of earlier
judgments beyond their intended scope, and
overlooks material aspects relating to delay,
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
44/48laches and the statutory framework
governing the field. The reasoning so
adopted does not stand to judicial scrutiny
and has resulted in an unwarranted
direction for consideration of the writ
petitioner’s case.”
24. Similar view has been taken by a Hon’ble
Division Bench of this Court Vide its judgment dated
10.04.2026 passed in LPA No. 762 of 2025 (Raj Kumar Jha
Vs the State of Bihar and others), wherein in paragraph No. 8
it has been held as follows:-
“8. Law is well settled that mere
representation does not extend the period of
limitation and the aggrieved person has to
approach the Court expeditiously and within
a reasonable time. If it is found that the writ
petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the
High Court would be fully justified to dismiss
the writ petition at the threshold. Equity aids
the vigilant, not the indolent. Courts of equity
grant relief to only those who actively protect
their rights, not those who sleep on them. It
demands prompt action to prevent injustice.
In the case of P.S. Sadashivaswamy -Vrs.-
State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1975) 1
Supreme Court Cases 152, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has been pleased to observe
that in a service matter, an aggrieved party
should approach the Court at least within six
months or at the most a year of the arising of
the cause of action, and it would be sound
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
45/48and wise exercise of discretion for the Court
to refuse the exercise the extraordinary power
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
and in case the petitioner does not approach
it expeditiously for relief, such petition should
be dismissed in limine as entertaining such
petition is a wastage of time of the Court and
it would impede the work of the Court in
considering the legitimate grievances. It is
the settled law that when an aggrieved
person, without adequate reason, approaches
the Court at his own leisure or pleasure, the
Court would be under legal obligation to
scrutinize whether the belated approach
should be entertained or not. Inordinate delay
would invite disaster for the litigant who
knocks at the doors of the Court. Remaining
innocuously oblivious to the delay does not
foster the cause of justice, on the contrary it
brings injustice and it is likely to affect
others. A Court is not expected to give
20488indulgence to the indolent persons who
compete with Kumbhkarana and the delay
does not deserve any indulgence and on that
ground alone, the writ Court can throw the
petition overboard at the very threshold.”
25. Similar view has been taken by this court vide
judgment dated 11.05.2026 passed in CWJC No. 20448 of 2013
(Nagendra Prasad Singh Vs. The State of Bihar), wherein in
paragraph No. 19, it has been held as follows:-
“19. On the basis of the consideration
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
46/48made above, this Court is of the
considered opinion that so far the prayer
of the petitioner for quashing of Memo
No. 2414 dated 16.11.2005 is concerned,
the same is fit to be rejected in view of the
settled legal proposition of law and taking
into account the judgment passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and this
Hon’ble Court in the cases referred
hereinabove, since no plausible reason
has been furnished by the petitioner to
explain the delay of about 8 years in
approaching this Court.
26. Even in a recent judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India reported in 2026 INSC 446 (The State
of Tamil Nadu & Another Vs. R. Sasipriya & Another), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph No. 25.2 has held
as follows:-
25.2. This Court finds him to be a fence-
sitter. It is settled law that fence-sitters
cannot be permitted to raise a dispute
relating to seniority and consequential
promotion or challenge the validity of an
order after the matter has concluded. No
party can claim relief as a matter of right,
and one of the well-recognised grounds for
refusing relief is that the person
approaching the Court is guilty of delay
and laches. A court exercising public law
jurisdiction does not encourage the
agitation of stale claims, particularly in
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
47/48
matters of seniority and promotion, where
the rights of third parties have crystallised
in the interregnum [See Shiba Shankar
Mohapatra and others v. State of Orissa
and others, (2010) 12 SCC 471).
Therefore, no relief can be granted to the
impleading applicant.
27. Considering the different judicial pronouncement
of this Hon’ble Court as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner
cannot be permitted to assail the impugned order dated
11.07.2019 and 21.12.2020 after an inordinate delay, without
any plausible explanation and also taking note of the fact that
third party rights have been created, since junior to the
petitioner have already been promoted as officers of the Indian
Administrative Service.
28. Accordingly, this Court on the basis of the
considerations made above does not find any reason to interfere
with the punishment orders passed by the authorities concerned
on 11.07.2019 and 21.12.2020 on account of the delay and
latches as well as the principles of waiver and acquiesce. The
writ petition does not find any favour and is accordingly
dismissed. The dismissed of the writ petition on the ground of
delay and laches as well as waiver and acquiesce does not
preclude the petitioner from being considered for being
Patna High Court CWJC No.8126 of 2026 dt.01-07-2026
48/48
recommended to the Union of India for consideration of her
case for being promoted to the Indian Administrative Service,
after the effect of the punishment order comes to an end.
29. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stands
disposed of.
(Ritesh Kumar, J)
Kunal/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR CAV DATE NA Uploading Date 06.07.2026 Transmission Date NA
