Kerala High Court
Abdul Kareem P vs Union Bank Of India on 1 April, 2026
Author: Anil K. Narendran
Bench: Anil K. Narendran
W.A.No.824 of 2026 1 2026:KER:29991
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MURALEE KRISHNA S.
WEDNESDAY, THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL 2026 / 11TH CHAITHRA, 1948
W.A.NO.824 OF 2026
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 26.03.2026 IN WP(C)
NO.42912 OF 2025 OF THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
ABDUL KAREEM P.,
AGED 58 YEARS
S/O.MOIDU, PULLANI HOUSE, OTHUKUNGAL P.O.,
MALAPPURAM, PIN - 676528
BY ADVS.
SRI.DINESH R.SHENOY
SMT.SHANTHIPRIYA D. SHENOY
SHRI.MOHAMED SHALI NAMSHAD
SMT.ANJANA A.
SHRI.ANANDA SUBRAMANIAM
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 UNION BANK OF INDIA,
KOZHIKODE MAIN BRANCH, MARIAMBI BUILDING,
CHEROOTTY ROAD, KOZHIKODE, REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHIEF MANGER AND AUTHORISED OFFICER, PIN - 673001
2 M/S. FOOTSTEPS,
DOOR NO.8/303, OQSU MINI INDUSTRIAL ESTATE,
NALLOOR, FEROKE, KOZHIKODE, REPRESENTED BY ITS
DESIGNATED PARTNER PULLANI ASSAIN, AGED 60 YEARS,
S/O. MOIDU, PIN - 673032
3 PULLANI ASSAIN,
AGED 60 YEARS
S/O.MOIDU, PULLANI HOUSE, OTHUKUNGAL P.O.,
MALAPPURAM, PIN - 676528
W.A.No.824 of 2026 2 2026:KER:29991
4 MINI K.P.,
AGED 53 YEARS
W/O LATE.RAJEEV T.K, 15/1326, UNION HOUSE,
RARAMVEEDU PARAMBA, KOTTAMPARAMBU P.O., KOZHIKODE,
PIN - 673008
5 JISHNU RAJEEV T.K.,
S/O LATE.RAJEEV T.K., 15/1326, UNION HOUSE,
RARAMVEEDU PARAMBA, KOTTAMPARAMBU P.O., KOZHIKODE,
PIN - 673008
BY ADV SRI.C. MURALIKRISHNAN (PAYYANUR)
OTHER PRESENT:
SRI. C. MURALIKRISHNAN (PAYYANUR)
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
01.04.2026, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.A.No.824 of 2026 3 2026:KER:29991
JUDGMENT
Anil K. Narendran, J.
The petitioner has filed W.P.(C)No.42912 of 2025,
invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of
mandamus commanding 1st respondent Union Bank of India
to consider and pass orders on Ext.P7 representation dated
09.05.2025 and grant at least 12 equated monthly instalments,
after hearing the petitioner and the 2nd respondent, within a
time frame to be fixed by this Court, before any coercive
proceedings are undertaken by the bank under the provisions
of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI
Act).
2. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned
judgment dated 26.03.2026, dismissed the writ petition,
without prejudice to the contentions and right of the petitioner
to avail the statutory remedy. Paragraphs 3, 4 and also the
last paragraph of that judgment read thus;
“3. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent
vehemently opposed entertaining this writ petition and
granting the reliefs to the petitioner since, he has an
W.A.No.824 of 2026 4 2026:KER:29991
efficacious alternative remedy before the DRT.
4. I find considerable force in the submissions made by
the learned counsel for the 1st respondent. The
Honourable Apex Court in a catena of decisions,
including the decisions in Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. v.
Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir and others [2022
KHC OnLine 6040], South Indian Bank Ltd. (M/s.)
v. Naveen Mathew Philip [2023 KHC OnLine 6435]
and PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank
[2024 KHC OnLine 6208], have categorically held
that writ petitions against SARFAESI proceedings must
not be entertained since, the aggrieved persons have
an alternative and efficacious remedy before the DRT.
In such circumstances, this writ petition is dismissed
without prejudice to the contentions and right of the
petitioner to avail the statutory remedy.”
3. Challenging the judgment dated 26.03.2026 of the
learned Single Judge, the appellant-petitioner is before this
Court in this writ appeal, invoking the provisions under Section
5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner
would submit that the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ
petition without properly considering the contentions raised by
the petitioner, even without granting a breathing time to the
petitioner to avail the statutory remedy.
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 1 st
W.A.No.824 of 2026 5 2026:KER:29991
respondent bank would point out that the total amount
outstanding as on 26.03.2026 in the cash credit facility availed
by the appellant-petitioner comes to Rs.50,05,750/-. The 3rd
respondent had earlier approached this Court in
W.P.(C)No.18220 of 2025, which was disposed of by Ext.P5
judgment dated 19.05.2025. Thereafter, the 4th respondent
filed W.P.(C)No.23285 of 2025, which was disposed of by
Ext.P8 judgment dated 27.06.2025. On account of the default
committed by the borrowers in payment of the monthly
installments, the bank proceeded with the coercive steps
under the SARFAESI Act, which cannot be interfered with in a
writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
6. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon
[(2010) 8 SCC 110], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court
held that if the 1st respondent guarantor had any tangible
grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) of the
SARFAESI Act or the action taken under Section 14, then he
could have availed remedy by filing an application under
Section 17(1) before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The
expression ‘any person’ used in Section 17(1) is of wide
import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also
W.A.No.824 of 2026 6 2026:KER:29991
the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the
action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the
Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass
interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to
decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus
evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person
under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.
7. In Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], on
the facts of the case at hand, the Apex Court noted that the
High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will
ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the
aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour
in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types
of public money and the dues of banks and other financial
institutions. While dealing with the petitions involving
challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues,
etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations
enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of
such dues are a code unto themselves, inasmuch as, they not
only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the
W.A.No.824 of 2026 7 2026:KER:29991
dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for
redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore,
in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before
availing the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a
person must exhaust the remedies available under the
relevant statute.
8. In South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew
Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], in the context of the challenge
made against the notices issued under Section 13(4) of the
SARFAESI Act, the Apex Court reiterated the settled position
of law on the interference of the High Court invoking Article
226 of the Constitution of India in commercial matters, where
an effective and efficacious alternative forum has been
constituted through a statute. In the said decision, the Apex
Court took judicial notice of the fact that certain High Courts
continue to interfere in such matters, leading to a regular
supply of cases before the Apex Court. The Apex Court
reiterated that a writ of certiorari is to be issued over a
decision when the court finds that the process does not
conform to the law or the statute. In other words, courts are
not expected to substitute themselves with the decision-
W.A.No.824 of 2026 8 2026:KER:29991
making authority while finding fault with the process along
with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be
issued to remedy all violations. When a Tribunal is constituted,
it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a
statutory violation. A question as to whether such a violation
would be over a mandatory prescription as against a
discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the Tribunal.
The issues governing waiver, acquiescence and estoppel are
also primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The object
and reasons behind the SARFAESI Act are very clear as
observed in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India
[(2004) 4 SCC 311]. While it facilitates a faster and
smoother mode of recovery sans any interference from the
court, it does provide a fair mechanism in the form of the
Tribunal being manned by a legally trained mind. The Tribunal
is clothed with a wide range of powers to set aside an illegal
order, and thereafter, grant consequential reliefs, including
repossession and payment of compensation and costs. Section
17(1) of the SARFAESI Act gives an expansive meaning to the
expression ‘any person’, who could approach the Tribunal.
9. In Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC
W.A.No.824 of 2026 9 2026:KER:29991
311], the Apex Court noticed that, in matters under the
SARFAESI Act, approaching the High Court for the
consideration of an offer by the borrower is also frowned upon
by the Apex Court. A writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ.
The court cannot exercise the said power in the absence of
any legal right. More circumspection is required in a financial
transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not
come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of
India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an
attempt to circumvent that mode shall not be encouraged by
a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non-compliance of
approaching the Tribunal, which requires the prescription of
fees, and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. In
paragraph 17 of the decision, the Apex Court reiterated the
position of law regarding the interference of the High Courts
in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act by quoting its
earlier decisions in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas
[(2003) 10 SCC 733], United Bank of India v. Satyawati
Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], State Bank of Travancore
v. Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd.
v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [(2022) 5 SCC 345] and
W.A.No.824 of 2026 10 2026:KER:29991
Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu [(2023) 2 SCC
168] wherein the said practice has been deprecated while
requesting the High Courts not to entertain such cases. In
paragraph 18 of the said decision, the Apex Court observed
that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India are rather wide, but are required to be exercised only
in extraordinary circumstances in matters pertaining to
proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so
in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when
the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for
appropriate redressal.
10. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in
Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110] and reiterated in
Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], if the
appellant-petitioner has any grievance against the
proceedings initiated by the secured creditor under Section 13
or Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, he could have availed the
statutory remedy by filing an application under Section 17 of
the said Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
11. When the remedy available to an aggrieved person
under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is both expeditious and
W.A.No.824 of 2026 11 2026:KER:29991
effective, as held by the Apex Court in Satyawati Tondon
[(2010) 8 SCC 110], the borrower, the guarantor or any
other person who may be affected by the action taken by the
secured creditor under Section 13 or Section 14 of the
SARFAESI Act have to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal
availing the statutory remedy provided under Section 17 of
the said Act, instead of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
12. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the
decisions referred to supra, we find absolutely no grounds to
entertain this writ appeal, since W.P.(C)No.42912 of 2025 filed
by the appellant-petitioner is not maintainable under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
In the result, this writ appeal, which is nothing but an
abuse of the process of court, fails and the same is accordingly
dismissed.
Sd/-
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE
Sd/-
MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE
MIN
