Madras High Court
A.Sujitha vs J.Radhakrishnan on 13 July, 2026
Author: Anita Sumanth
Bench: Anita Sumanth
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 13.07.2026
CORAM
THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE ANITA SUMANTH
AND
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE SUNDER MOHAN
LPA No. 3 of 2026
and
CMP NO. 10754 OF 2026
A.Sujitha
E-105, SRM Green Pearl Apartment,
Periyar Street,
Potheri,
Previously Kancheepuram
Now Chengalpattu Dt., Pin – 603203
..Appellant(s)
Vs
1. J.Radhakrishnan
Chairman and Managing Director,
TANGENDCO,
New NO.144, Anna Salai
N.P.K.R.R.Maligai
Chennai-600002.
2. M.Ambiga
Chief Engineer (Personnel)
TANGENDCO
New No.144, Anna Salai
Chennai-600002
..Respondent(s)
__________
Page 1 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent to set aside the order
dated 28.11.2025 in Contempt Petition No.3033/2025.
For Appellant(s): Dr.A.E.Chelliah, Senior Counsel
for Mr.V.J.Arulraj
For Respondent(s): Mr.Anand Gopalan
for M/s.Advit Law Chambers
For R1 & R2
JUDGMENT
(Delivered by Dr.Anita Sumanth J.)
This Letter Patent Appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of
Courts Act 1971 (‘Act’), challenges an order dated 21.11.2025 dismissing
Contempt Petition Nos.2599 & 3033 of 2025. Those petitions arose out of
orders made on 09.03.2021 and 29.09.2023 in W.P.No.5691 of 2021 and
W.P.No.5843 of 2020, respectively. W.P.No.5843 of 2020 was filed with
the following prayer:-
Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India praying for issuance of a
writ of declaration, declaring the action of the
second respondent in not considering the
petitioner for the appointment to the post of
Assistant Engineer (Electrical) under the member
of family whose lands are acquired by the
Government priority quota as null and void and
thereby direct the second respondent herein to__________
Page 2 of 15https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753LPA No. 3 of 2026
select and appoint the petitioner with Registration
No.201601285 to the post of Assistant Engineer
(Electrical) pursuant to the notification
No.01/2018 dated 14.02.2018 in the existing
vacancy with all monetary and service benefits.
2. The writ petition came to be allowed on 29.09.2023, this Court
issuing a direction for appointment of the Appellant within a period of 8
weeks from date of receipt of a copy of the order.
3. As against the aforesaid order, W.A.No. 1401 of 2024 has been
filed by the Respondents. When the writ appeal had come up for
admission, it is the say of the appellant represented by Mr.V.J.Arulraj for
whom Dr.A.E.Chelliah, learned senior counsel appears, that it had merely
been adjourned whereas it is the say of Mr.Anand Gopalan, who appears
for the respondents that the appellant had undertaken before the Division
Bench not to press the contempt petition till disposal of the writ appeal.
4. Ultimately, the contempt petition had come to be dismissed,
learned Judge concluding that it was not maintainable as it had been
instituted beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Act.
5. Dr.Chelliah argues that the period of limitation provided under
the Act is not rigid, and that there is no fetter on the Courts in exercising
the power of contempt. He urges that the Court must accommodate the
realities of the present situation where, the appellant is unemployed
__________
Page 3 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
despite having obtained a positive order from the writ court for
employment. She should hence not be non-suited on mere technicalities.
6. For this purpose, appellant would rely on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra and another1 and
judgment of this Court in Murugesan Gounder and other v Brindhavathi
ammal and others2 confirmed in Murugesa Gounder v Brindhavathi
ammal and ors3.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent would submit that the
period of limitation provided for under Section 20 does not admit of any
flexibility or laxity. That apart, the present appeal is not even
maintainable, he would argue, relying on Section 19 of the Act, as per
which, an appeal would lie only as against an order or decision punishing
an individual for contempt. In the present case, the impugned order does
not impose any punishment.
8. Mr.Gopalan relies on the following decisions:
(i) T.Marappan v The Executive Engineer and Administrative
Officer, Salem and another4
(ii) Major S Veerasamy v The Management of Andhra Social
and Cultural Association and another51
AIR 202 SC 1771
2
S.A.No.1602 of 2008 dated 17.02.2011
3
SLP(C) No. 21528 of 2011 on 31.03.2015
4
(1996) SCC OnLine Mad 339 : (1996) 2 LW 117
5
1996 SCC OnLine Mad 625 : (1997) 2 LW 671__________
Page 4 of 15https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753LPA No. 3 of 2026
(iii) Midnapore Peoples’ COOP. Bank Ltd and others v
Chunilal Nanda and others6
(iv)Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare
Association v S.C..Sekar and others7
(v) M.Devaraj and others v Noor Mohammed, Superintending
Engineer, Thiruvannamalai Electricity Distribution Circle,
Tangedco, Vengikkal, Thiruvannamalai.8
(vi) Baradakanta Mishra v Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief
Justice of the Orissa High Court9
(vii) B.Surendra Reddy v K.Devarajan and others10
9. We have heard both learned counsel and had perused the
material papers as well as case law.
10. In W.P.No.5691 of 2021 the appellant had sought a Mandamus
directing the respondents to consider her plea for employment. The writ
petition was disposed on 09.03.2021, the writ court directing disposal of
representation of the appellant in accordance with law. No order was
passed, and instead, Notification No.1 of 2018 dated 14.02.2018 came to
be issued calling for applications for 300 vacancies for the post of
Assistant Engineer (Electrical). The appellant had applied but was
unsuccessful.
11. Notification No.2/2020 then came to be issued on 08.01.2020
6
(2006) 5 SCC 399 : 2006 SCC OnLine 628
7
(2009) 2 SCC 784 : 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1831
8
LPA No.2 of 2020 dt 4.3.2020
9
(1975) 3 SCC 535
10
Cont P No.743 of 2022 dated 20.06.2022
11
(2024) 20 SCC 188
__________
Page 5 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
inviting applications for 400 vacancies. The age limit was fixed as 32
years which rendered the appellant ineligible to apply for the post. It is
hence that Writ Petition No.5843 of 2020 had come to be filed by her
seeking a declaration that she be appointed under Notification No.1/2018
itself. The writ court allowed the writ petition on 29.9.2023 and directed
the authorities to appoint her under the 2018 Notification within 8 weeks
from date of receipt of that order.
12. The writ order dated 29.09.23 had been made ready on
08.12.2023 and the period of one year thus ended on 08.12.2024. The
contempt petition was instituted on 12.08.2025 with a delay of more than
8 months. One of the grounds on which the petition has come to be
dismissed is that it is barred by limitation and the argument on behalf of
the appellant is that period of limitation provided under the Act should
not be construed such that it defeats substantive justice.
13. Section 20 of the Act sets out the limitation for action for
contempt and states that no Court shall initiate any proceedings for
contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after expiry of a period
of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been
committed. The clear language of Section 20 leaves us in no doubt that
__________
Page 6 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
the limitation provided for is to be strictly applied.
14. In Pallav Seth Vs. Custodian and Others12, three Hon’ble
judges of the Supreme Court considered a situation where the Custodian
of the Special Court for trial of offences relating to transactions in
securities, had pursued action for contempt as against the Appellant. The
facts in Pallav Sheth’s case was that a Decree as against that Appellant
had been passed on 24.02.1994 and an Execution Petition had been
moved by the Custodian in 1994 itself.
15. The Special Court then passed an order of attachment on
24.08.94. There was a raid conducted in November 1997 in the premises
of the Appellant that had been publicised in the media following which
the Special Court directed the Custodian to ascertain from the Department
the extent of that Appellants’ assets. It was only on receiving information
from the Income tax Department vide letter dated 5.5.98, that it came to
be known that the appellant had perpetrated fraud on the Custodian. The
contempt application had been filed by the Custodian within a period of
one year from the aforesaid date.
16. On the above facts, the Court held that the period of limitation
under Section 20 would commence from the date on which the fraud
12
AIR 201 SC 2673
__________
Page 7 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
played by the party on the Court / opposite party had been discovered,
and since that Appellant had acted fraudulently by suppressing
information, the question of bar of limitation would not arise. The Court
thus held that where the party had not slept over his rights, and if the
Court were convinced that action for contempt will lie, power may be
exercised under Article 215 of the Constitution to punish for contempt.
17. The view taken by two Judges in Om Prakash Jaiswal v
D.K.Mittal13, that, filing of an application for initiating contempt did not
amount to initiation of proceedings by the Court and initiation under
Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when the Court forms a
prima facie opinion that contempt had been punished and thus issues
notice, did not find favour with the Bench in Pallav Seth.
18. The Supreme Court, in S.Tirupathi Rao v M.Lingamaiah14 has
made reference to Pallav Seth’s15 case noting the circumstances in which
the Court had considered the argument of bar of limitation. In Tirupathi
Rao’s case, the legal issue crystalised for resolution was the terminus a
quo for commencement of the point of limitation in contempt matters and
13
(2000) 3 SCC 171
14
(2024) 20 SCC 188
15
Foot Note Supra 12
__________
Page 8 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
the interplay between Section 20 of the Act read with Article 215 of the
Constitution.
19. The facts are not germane except to state that the specific
argument dealt with by the Court was that there had been a continuing
harm/offence for which that petitioner had sought exemption from the bar
of limitation. The Court held that action for contempt is essentially in the
nature of an original proceeding, citing the judgment of the Supreme
Court in High Court of Judicature at Allahabad v Raj Kishore Yadav16.
20. Hence, the express negative phraseology employed in Section
20 of the Act would act as a legislative injunction placing a fetter on the
power of the Court to initiate proceedings for contempt, where the
petition had been presented beyond the time frame stipulated statutorily.
21. However, an exception was made possible by the expression
‘date on which the contempt is alleged to be committed’ which is the
starting point of the period of one year to be reckoned for limitation, and
one of the ways by which this may be pressed into service by a petitioner,
would be by invoking the principle flowing from Order VII Rule 6 of
CPC, by showing the ground upon which the exemption is claimed.
16
(1997) 3 SCC 11
__________
Page 9 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
22. For instance, in a case where civil contempt is alleged by a
party making reference to a continuing wrong and the party satisfies the
Court of such continuing offence, then it is open to the Court to consider
the same. The discretion as to whether this approach is to be taken or not
would depend entirely upon the Court being satisfied that the benefit of
the exemption, and the principle underlying Order VII Rule 6 CPC,
should be extended in a given case.
23. In Tirupathi Rao’s case the Bench makes it clear that the Court
cannot grant exemption from limitation on equitable considerations or on
the ground of hardship. Drawing inspiration from the judgment of the
Privy Council in Maqbul Ahmad v Onkar Pratap Narain Singh 17, the
conclusion was that contempt proceedings being original proceedings
akin to a suit, the question of seeking condonation of delay in instituting a
contempt petition is not available to the petitioner. The period set out
under Section 20 of the Act was absolute, barring certain exceptions,
including for a continuing wrong / breach / offence that may be accepted
as a ground for seeking exemption in an action for contempt.
24. The power of the constitutional Courts to punish for contempt
is however an inherent power recognized by Articles 129 and 215 of the
17
AIR 1935 PC 85
__________
Page 10 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
Constitution, as distinguishable from a power derived from Statute.
Referring to the judgments in The Aligarh Municipal Board And Ors. v.
Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union And Ors18, Jhareswar Prasad Paul & Anr v.
Tarak Nath Ganguly & Ors19 and In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra20 , the
Court reiterated that no law framed by legislature can take away the
jurisdiction for contempt conferred on the Courts. Having said so, they
also refer to certain other judgments such as AK Misra v State of Uttar
Pradesh21, Pallav Seth (Footnote) and Ashok Kumar Agarwal Vs. Neeraj
Kumar wherein the Courts have held, that the power, though a
constitutional exercise, must be exercised in consonance with the
provisions of a validly enacted law.
25. Set in the context of the above discussion, we now proceed to
decide the present matter. Admittedly, the institution of the contempt
petition is barred by limitation. We have carefully perused the records
and do not find any circumstances set out therein that might persuade us
to exempt the present case from the limitation under the Act. In fact, the
Appellant has not even made any reference to limitation in her contempt
18
(1970) 3 SCC 98
19
(2002) 5 SCC 352
20
(1995) 2 SCC 584
21
(1998) 7 SCC 379
__________
Page 11 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
petition, leave along providing justification and seeking exemption from
the same.
26. Dr.Chelliah has taken us through the judgment of Murugesa
Gounder22, particularly, the observations at paragraph 33, referring to
legal maxims to the effect that it is the duty of a good judge to ensure that
justice is done. In light of our understanding of Section 20 as above based
on the judgements of the Apex Court, this decision is of no assistance to
the Appellant. We thus concur with the learned Judge that the contempt
petition was barred by limitation.
27. In the present case, the respondent has filed an appeal as
against the order passed in writ petition. There has been some discussion
on whether the appellant had undertaken not to press the contempt
petition and we do not find anything in the records to indicate so.
However, it is unnecessary for us to say anything further in that regard as
we have decided the bar of limitation against the appellant.
28. Section 19 of the Act dealing with ‘Appeals’ states that an
appeal shall lie as a matter of right in the exercise of jurisdiction ‘to
punish for contempt’ and this has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
in the case of Mindapore Peoples Coop. Bank Ltd and Others v Chunilal
22
Foot Note supra 2
__________
Page 12 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
Nanda and Others23 in the following terms:-
“1. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to
appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be
summarized thus :
I. An appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against an
order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its
jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing
punishment for contempt.
II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for
contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor
an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order
acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable
under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they
may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution.
29. The position that emerges with clarity is that an appeal under
Section 19 can be maintained only if the impugned order has imposed
punishment for contempt. There is no other situation where an appeal
may be maintained under Section 19 as against an order passed in
contempt petition.
30. Mr.Anand Gopalan, learned counsel has relied upon an order
passed by us in the case of M.Devaraj & others Vs. Noor Mohammed,
Superintending Engineer, Thiruvannamalai24. In that case too, we have
referred to the judgment in Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd25,
confirming the order of the learned Single Judge.
23
(2006) 5 SCC 399
24
LPA No. 2 of 2020 dated 4.3.2026
25
Foot note supra 5
__________
Page 13 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
31. Incidentally, in that case, there were certain observations made
on the rights of the parties, and we held that those observations were
superfluous and would not influence the learned judge when dealing with
the writ petition on merits.
32. In light of the discussion as aforesaid, we dismiss this appeal as
being not maintainable. No costs.
(A.S.M.,J.) (S.M.,J.)
-07-2026
Index: Yes/No
Speaking order
Neutral Citation: Yes
dp
1. J.Radhakrishnan
Chairman and Managing Director,
TANGENDCO,
New NO.144, Anna Salai
N.P.K.R.R.Maligai
Chennai-600002
2. M.Ambiga
Chief Engineer (Personnel)
TANGENDCO
New No.144, Anna Salai
Chennai-600002
__________
Page 14 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:2753
LPA No. 3 of 2026
DR.ANITA SUMANTH J.
AND
SUNDER MOHAN J.
dp
LPA No. 3 of 2026
AND
CMP NO. 10754 OF 2026
13.07.2026
__________
Page 15 of 15
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
