A Session Judge’s Compass for Deciding Criminal Revisions Against Orders Issuing Process

 The Core
Idea in One Line

An order issuing process cannot survive revision if it rests on no
admissible, relevant material connecting the accused to the offence — but a
Sessions Judge examining that question in revision must look only at the record
that was before the Magistrate, and must never reweigh or reappraise the
evidence found there.

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What Counts as “Legal Evidence”

“Legal evidence” is admissible material — recognized as
such under the Evidence Act — bearing a rational, probative connection to an
ingredient of the offence charged. It is not simply anything appearing in the
case file. Four elements define it:

The Founding Framework: R.P. Kapur and Bhajan Lal

R.P. Kapur
v. State of Punjab (1960)
identified three categories warranting quashing: an express legal bar to the
proceeding; allegations that, even taken at face value, disclose no offence;
and allegations that constitute an offence but for which there is no legal
evidence, or where the evidence adduced is manifestly inconsistent with the
accusation. State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal (1992) expanded this into seven illustrative categories, including the
parallel formulation that quashing lies where the allegations and material,
even if accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute an offence,
or where there is no legal evidence to support the charge. Both authorities
converge on a single test: total absence of qualifying evidence, not its
weakness, is what justifies interference.

The Counter-Evidence Exception: Sterling and
Impeccable Material

A narrower, separate route to quashing exists even where the
prosecution has adduced some material. In Rajiv
Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, the Supreme Court held that
defence material of “sterling and impeccable quality” — sound,
reasonable, indubitable, and incapable of being justifiably refuted — can
displace the prosecution case entirely if it would persuade a reasonable person
to reject the accusation as false. Courts apply this as a three-step test: is
the material sound and indubitable; would it rule out the factual assertions in
the charge; and has it gone, or can it be, unrebutted by the prosecution.

This principle was applied afresh in Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal (2026 INSC 322), where the
Supreme Court quashed proceedings under Section 482 CrPC/Section 528 BNSS after
CCTV footage forming part of the prosecution’s own chargesheet showed the
accused had arrived after the altercation and were pacifying it rather than
participating in it. The Court held that unrefuted, unimpeachable material
contradicting the prosecution’s version — even material sourced from the
chargesheet itself — can dislodge the factual foundation of the accusation and
that forcing a trial in such circumstances amounts to abuse of process. It
bears emphasis that Sajal Bose was
decided in the Section 482/528 quashing jurisdiction of the High Court, not in
a Sessions Court revision — a distinction relevant when Session Judges consider
whether and how far this specific ruling extends to their more limited
revisional role.

Summary of the Legal-Evidence Framework

Extending the Test to a Revision Against an Order
Issuing Process

The question that actually confronts a Sessions Judge is narrower
and more procedural: can this legal-evidence analysis, developed mainly for
High Court quashing petitions, be deployed while deciding a Section 397 CrPC
revision against a Magistrate’s order issuing process? The answer is yes, in
substance, but the manner of its application is materially constrained by the
nature of revisional jurisdiction itself.

Why the
Test Transposes

Revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397–401 CrPC exists to
correct improper exercise of judicial power. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that revision lies where the decision under challenge is grossly
erroneous, non-compliant with law, based on no evidence, ignores material
evidence, or reflects arbitrary or perverse exercise of discretion. This is a
direct application of the R.P. Kapur/Bhajan Lal “no legal evidence”
enquiry at one remove: the Sessions Judge asks whether the Magistrate’s order
issuing process rests on any legal evidence at all, not whether that evidence
would ultimately secure a conviction. In Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, and again in K. Ravi v. State of Tamil Nadu (2024
INSC 642), the Supreme Court confirmed this ground of interference while
simultaneously stressing that revisional power must be exercised sparingly and
is not a substitute for appeal.

The Critical Limitation: No Fresh Evidentiary
Enquiry

Three restrictions sharply narrow the doctrine’s operation in
revision, and a Sessions Judge should treat them as near-absolute:

·      No
re-appreciation of evidence. It is well
settled that “in the revisional jurisdiction the evidence cannot be
re-appreciated for looking [into] the validity or legality of the order passed
by the Court below.” The revisional court checks for existence or manifest
inconsistency of evidence — never its comparative weight or credibility.

·      No fresh
evidence, ordinarily. The
enquiry is confined to material that was before the Magistrate when process was
issued. A revisional court “must not admit further evidence which was not
the basis of the view taken by the trial court,” subject only to narrow
exceptions — such as public documents beyond suspicion, or documents whose late
admission is shown to be necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice and
could not have been produced earlier with due diligence.

·      Confined to
legality and propriety, not merits. Section 397(2) bars revision against purely interlocutory orders,
and Section 401(3) prohibits converting an acquittal into a conviction in
revision. The Supreme Court in K. Ravi
underscored that courts must be “extremely circumspect” in
interfering even with orders framing charge, since revisional jurisdiction is
not appellate rehearing on facts.

Practical Application Table

Guidance
for Disposal

A Sessions Judge deciding a revision against an order issuing
process should apply the legal-evidence test exactly as it operates at the
quashing stage — asking whether there is a total absence of legal evidence, or
a manifest inconsistency between the record and the charge — while confining
that enquiry strictly to the four corners of the record as it stood before the
Magistrate. Where the order rests on no admissible or relevant material
connecting the accused to any ingredient of the offence, or is irreconcilably
contradicted by documents already on file, the revisional court has full
authority to set aside the order. Where, instead, the real complaint is about
the credibility or weight of evidence the Magistrate has already found
sufficient, or requires consideration of material never placed before the
Magistrate, the revision must fail — the accused’s remedy lying at trial, or,
in an appropriate case involving genuinely unimpeachable material such as
chargesheet-annexed CCTV footage, before the High Court under Section 482
CrPC/Section 528 BNSS following the Rajiv
Thapar/Sajal Bose line of
authority. This calibrated approach preserves the narrow, corrective character
of revisional jurisdiction while ensuring that process orders founded on no
legal evidence do not survive merely because trial has not yet begun.

Key Case Citations 

·      R.P. Kapur
v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960
SC 866

·      State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335

·      Rajiv
Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3
SCC 330

·      Amit Kapoor
v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9
SCC 460

·      K. Ravi v.
State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 INSC
642

·      Sajal Bose
v. State of West Bengal, 2026 INSC
322 (decided 6 April 2026, under Section 482 CrPC/Section 528 BNSS — corrected
from earlier “2025” citation)

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