Delhi High Court
A.I.I.M.S vs Mohd. Rafiq & Ors on 6 August, 2026
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 28.04.2026
Date of decision: 06.08.2026
Uploaded on: 06.08.2026
# CNR No: DLHC010184541999
+ W.P.(C) 2551/1999
A.I.I.M.S. .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. V.S.R. Krishna and Mr. V.
Shashank Kumar, Advs.
Versus
MOHD. RAFIQ & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. L. Gangmei, Adv.
# CNR No : DLHC010195992000
+ W.P.(C) 2447/2000
MOHD. RAFIQ .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. L. Gangmei, Adv.
Versus
P O LABOUR COURT .....Respondent
Through: Mr. V.S.R. Krishna and Mr. V.
Shashank Kumar, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
JUDGMENT
SHAIL JAIN, J.
1. The present writ petitions have been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India assailing the Award dated 10.12.1998 passed by the
learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. X, Delhi in I.D. No. 240/95.
W.P.(C) No. 2551/1999 has been preferred by the Petitioner/Management, All
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India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), challenging the findings of the
learned Labour Court whereby the resignation of the Respondent/workman
was held to be involuntary and the Respondent/workman was directed to be
reinstated in service with continuity of service and 40% back wages. W.P.(C)
No. 2447/2000 has been preferred by the Respondent/workman challenging
the Award to the limited extent that the learned Labour Court restricted the
relief of back wages to 40% instead of granting full back wages. Since both
the writ petitions arise out of the same Award and involve common questions
of fact and law, they are being decided by this common judgment.
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:
2. Brief facts emerging from the record, necessary for adjudication of the
present writ petitions, are that the Respondent/workman was appointed as a
Nursing Orderly with the Petitioner/Management on 18.08.1964 and was
confirmed in service with effect from 01.02.1965. The Respondent/workman
continued to serve the Petitioner/Management in the said capacity for about
fifteen years.
3. The record reflects that during the year 1979, the Respondent/workman
remained absent from duty for a certain period. According to the
Respondent/workman, the said absence was occasioned by the serious illness
of his wife, who was undergoing treatment outside Delhi. Upon his return, the
Respondent/workman reported to the Petitioner/Management on 15.10.1979
for resumption of duties. It is the case of the Petitioner/Management that, on
the said date, the Respondent/workman voluntarily tendered his resignation
on account of his domestic circumstances and inability to continue in service,
whereafter the same was accepted by the competent authority. The
Respondent/workman, however, disputed the voluntary nature of the said
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resignation and asserted that he had never intended to sever his relationship
with the Petitioner/Management. According to the Respondent/workman, he
had reported for joining duties and his signatures were obtained on a
document represented to him to be necessary for facilitating his rejoining,
which was subsequently treated by the Management as a letter of resignation.
The dispute between the parties thus centres around the validity and voluntary
nature of the alleged resignation dated 15.10.1979.
4. The record further reflects that soon after the cessation of his
employment, the Respondent/workman addressed several representations to
the Petitioner/Management requesting that he be permitted to resume duties
and disputing the action taken by the Management. As the dispute remained
unresolved, conciliation proceedings were initiated. Upon failure of the
conciliation proceedings, the appropriate Government, in exercise of powers
under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, referred the industrial
dispute for adjudication to the learned Labour Court vide Reference dated
25.07.1981 on the following terms:
“Whether the resignation obtained from Shri Mohd. Rafiq
is legal and justified and, if not, to what relief is he entitled
and what directions are necessary in this respect?”
5. Pursuant thereto, the Respondent/workman filed a Statement of Claim
before the learned Labour Court contending, inter alia, that the alleged
resignation had not been voluntarily submitted and that he had been illegally
deprived of his employment. The Respondent/workman sought reinstatement
in service with continuity of service, full back wages and all consequential
benefits.
6. The Petitioner/Management contested the claim by filing its Written
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Statement. It was contended that the Respondent/workman had remained
absent from duty for a considerable period due to personal difficulties and had
voluntarily tendered his resignation, which was accepted by the competent
authority. It was, accordingly, contended that the relationship of employer and
employee had come to an end on account of the voluntary resignation of the
Respondent/workman and that there was no termination of service by the
Management.
7. The Respondent/workman filed a rejoinder reiterating the averments
made in the Statement of Claim and denying the assertions contained in the
Written Statement. Upon completion of the pleadings, the learned Labour
Court framed the necessary issues for adjudication. Thereafter, both parties
led oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective cases.
The Respondent/workman examined himself as WW-1, whereas the
Petitioner/Management examined MW-1 and MW-2 and relied upon the
documentary record pertaining to the service of the Respondent/workman and
the alleged resignation.
8. Upon appreciation of the pleadings, evidence and material placed on
record, the learned Labour Court passed the impugned Award dated
10.12.1998, holding that the resignation relied upon by the
Petitioner/Management could not be regarded as a voluntary resignation.
Consequently, the learned Labour Court directed reinstatement of the
Respondent/workman with continuity of service and awarded 40% back
wages from the date of cessation of service till reinstatement.
9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Award, the Petitioner/Management has
preferred W.P.(C) No. 2551/1999 challenging the findings of the learned
Labour Court directing reinstatement of the Respondent/workman with
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continuity of service and back wages. The Respondent/workman has also
preferred W.P.(C) No. 2447/2000 challenging the Award to the limited extent
that the learned Labour Court awarded only 40% back wages instead of full
back wages.
10. It is pertinent to note that during the pendency of the present writ
petition, the respondent-workman expired. Consequently, upon an application
being moved in that regard, his legal representatives were brought on record
and have been substituted in his place for the purposes of the present
proceedings.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:
11. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner/Management,
AIIMS, assailed the impugned Award dated 10.12.1998 on the ground that
the learned Labour Court had erred in holding that the resignation of the
Respondent/workman was not voluntary. It was submitted that the findings
returned by the learned Labour Court are contrary to the pleadings and
evidence available on record and are therefore liable to be set aside.
12. It is submitted that the respondent/workman, being employed as a
Nursing Orderly, was governed by the Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, as well as the applicable Recruitment Rules.
It is contended that the respondent/workman was a civil servant governed by
the statutory service rules and, therefore, the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 were inapplicable to his case. Reliance is placed upon The
Director of Postal Services (South), Kerala Circle & Ors. v. K.R.B. Kaimal &
Ors. MANU/KE/0097/1983 in support of the proposition that the provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act are not applicable to an employee holding a
civil post.
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13. It is further submitted that the Labour Court travelled beyond the terms
of reference made by the Appropriate Government. Learned counsel submits
that the reference was confined to determining whether the services of the
respondent/workman had been illegally and/or unjustifiably terminated.
However, the Labour Court exceeded the scope of the reference by framing
and adjudicating an issue as to whether the respondent/workman had tendered
or withdrawn his resignation. According to the petitioner, the question of
resignation did not form part of the reference and, therefore, the Labour Court
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the said issue. It is contended that although
the Labour Court itself observed that it could not travel beyond the terms of
reference, it nevertheless proceeded to decide an issue dehors the reference,
thereby rendering the Award unsustainable in law.
14. The petitioner/Management further contends that the Labour Court
failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its proper perspective and
instead proceeded on a selective and piecemeal appreciation of the material
available before it. It is submitted that the respondent/workman had tendered
his resignation on 15.10.1979 and his case before the Labour Court was that
the same had been withdrawn on 20.10.1979, prior to its acceptance on
31.10.1979. However, according to the petitioner/Management, none of the
subsequent communications addressed by the respondent/workman,
including his letters dated 05.11.1979 and 12.11.1979, or the notice issued
under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, made any reference
whatsoever to the alleged withdrawal of resignation.
15. Lastly, it is submitted that the Labour Court erred in granting back
wages despite there being no evidence on record to establish that the
respondent/workman remained unemployed during the intervening period. It
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is contended that the burden of proving non-gainful employment rested upon
the respondent/workman, who neither pleaded nor adduced any evidence to
show that he was not gainfully employed after cessation of service. In the
absence of any such evidence, the grant of back wages is stated to be contrary
to settled principles of law and liable to be interfered with.
16. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent/workman supported the findings recorded by the learned Labour
Court insofar as they declared the cessation of service to be illegal and
directed reinstatement with continuity of service. It was submitted that the
Respondent/workman had served the Petitioner/Management since the year
1964 and had remained absent only on account of the serious illness of his
wife. Upon reporting back for duties on 15.10.1979, he was not permitted to
resume duties and his signatures were obtained on certain papers under the
representation that they were required for his joining report. It was contended
that the said document was subsequently treated by the
Petitioner/Management as a resignation letter without the knowledge or
consent of the Respondent/workman.
17. Learned counsel for the Respondent/workman further submitted that
the conduct of the Respondent/workman immediately after the alleged
resignation clearly demonstrated that he had never intended to sever his
relationship with the Petitioner/Management. Attention of this Court was
drawn to the several representations dated 20.10.1979, 05.11.1979,
13.11.1979, 07.12.1979 and 20.12.1979 addressed by the
Respondent/workman requesting the Management to permit him to rejoin
duties. It was submitted that the last representation dated 20.12.1979, which
stood exhibited during the evidence of the Management, was admittedly
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received by the Petitioner/Management, yet no action was taken thereon. It
was thus contended that the learned Labour Court rightly concluded that the
Respondent/workman had never voluntarily resigned from service and, in any
event, any such resignation stood withdrawn immediately.
18. Learned counsel further submitted that the plea raised by the
Petitioner/Management that AIIMS is not an “industry” and that the reference
was incompetent is wholly untenable. It was argued that the issue regarding
the competence of the appropriate Government had been specifically framed
and decided by the learned Labour Court after appreciating the evidence on
record. It was further submitted that the Petitioner/Management never
challenged the reference order independently and cannot be permitted to
question the validity of the reference for the first time after the culmination of
the adjudicatory proceedings. Reliance was placed upon AIIMS v. Raj Singh,
2007 SCC OnLine Del 1713, affirmed in 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1603 and
subsequently by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2017) 12 SCC 803, as well as
National Buildings Construction Corporation Ltd. v. M.K. Jain, 1980 SCC
OnLine Del 504 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mahavir Singh, 2002
SCC OnLine Del 251.
19. Learned counsel for the Respondent/workman further submitted that
the findings returned by the learned Labour Court are pure findings of fact
based upon oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties and do not
warrant interference in exercise of the limited jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance was placed upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan,
AIR 1964 SC 477, to contend that this Court ought not to reappreciate the
evidence while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction.
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20. Insofar as W.P.(C) No. 2447/2000 preferred by the
Respondent/workman is concerned, learned counsel submitted that having
held the termination of service to be illegal and having directed reinstatement
with continuity of service, the learned Labour Court committed a manifest
error in restricting the relief of back wages to only 40% without assigning any
reasons whatsoever. It was contended that the denial of the remaining back
wages is unsupported by any discussion in the impugned Award and is
therefore legally unsustainable.
21. Learned counsel for the Respondent/workman submitted that the
Respondent/workman had specifically pleaded in the Statement of Claim as
well as deposed in his affidavit that he remained unemployed throughout the
period during which he was kept out of service. It was argued that once such
a plea had been raised, the burden shifted upon the Petitioner/Management to
establish that the Respondent/workman was gainfully employed elsewhere,
which burden was never discharged. Reliance was placed upon Deepali
Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC
324, Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80, Surendra
Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1981 SC 422,
Manorama Verma v. State of Bihar, 1995 SCC (L&S) 193 and B.R. Rasaily
v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 1996 SCC OnLine Del 178, to contend
that reinstatement ordinarily carries with it the consequential relief of full
back wages unless exceptional circumstances are pleaded and proved by the
employer. It was submitted that no such exceptional circumstance was either
pleaded or established by the Petitioner/Management and, therefore, the
Respondent/workman is entitled to full back wages.
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DISCUSSION:
22. This court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
pleadings, impugned Award dated 10.12.1998 and other documents placed on
record.
23. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would be apposite to
identify the issues which arise for consideration in the present batch of writ
petitions. Since both petitions arise from the same Award but challenge
different parts thereof, the following questions fall for determination:
(I) Whether the impugned Award suffers from any jurisdictional
infirmity on account of (i) the alleged inapplicability of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to the Respondent/workman, and (ii) the learned
Labour Court having travelled beyond the terms of reference?
(II) Whether the finding recorded by the learned Labour Court that the
alleged resignation dated 15.10.1979 was not voluntary suffers from
perversity, patent illegality or any jurisdictional infirmity warranting
interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India?
(III) If Issue No. (II) is answered against the Petitioner/Management,
whether the learned Labour Court was justified in restricting the relief
of back wages to 40%, or whether the Respondent/workman is entitled
to full back wages with all consequential benefits?
24. Since Issue No. I concerns the preliminary objections raised by the
Petitioner/management regarding the jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court
and the maintainability of the industrial dispute, the same is required to be
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decided at the threshold. In the event the said objections do not merit
acceptance, this Court shall proceed to examine Issue No. II, namely, whether
the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court on the question of the
alleged resignation warrant interference in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. The issue concerning the quantum of
consequential relief shall be considered thereafter.
ISSUE NO. I
Whether the impugned Award suffers from any jurisdictional infirmity on
account of (i) the alleged inapplicability of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
to the Respondent/workman, and (ii) the learned Labour Court having
travelled beyond the terms of reference?
25. Learned counsel for the Petitioner/management contended that the
Respondent/workman, being employed as a Nursing Orderly (Hospital
Attendant Grade-III) in the Petitioner-institution, was holding a Group ‘D’
civil post governed by the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1965 and the applicable Recruitment Rules. It was, therefore,
submitted that the Respondent/workman was governed by a special statutory
service regime and consequently the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 were wholly inapplicable.
26. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The mere fact
that the Respondent/workman’s conditions of service and disciplinary
proceedings were governed by the CCS (CCA) Rules does not, ipso facto,
exclude the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The two operate
in distinct fields. While the CCS (CCA) Rules regulate the conditions of
service and disciplinary control over employees of the Petitioner, the
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Industrial Disputes Act provides a statutory forum for adjudication of
industrial disputes concerning a workman employed in an industry. The
applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act is to be determined on the
touchstone of the statutory requirements contained therein, namely, whether
the establishment answers the description of an “industry” and whether the
employee is a “workman” within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act.
27. In the present case, it is not the Petitioner/Management’s case that the
Respondent/workman was employed in a managerial, administrative or
supervisory capacity so as to fall outside the ambit of Section 2(s) of the
Industrial Disputes Act. Equally, the status of the Petitioner-Institute as an
“industry” has already attained finality. The Labour Court, therefore, cannot
be said to have lacked jurisdiction merely because the Respondent/workman
was also governed by the CCS (CCA) Rules. The existence of statutory
service rules regulating the conditions of service does not, in the absence of
an express statutory exclusion, divest the Labour Court of the jurisdiction
otherwise conferred upon it by the Industrial Disputes Act.
28. The reliance placed by the Petitioner/Management upon The Director
of Postal Services (South), Kerala Circle & Ors. v. K.R.B. Kaimal & Ors.
(supra) is misplaced. The said decision turned upon the statutory scheme
applicable in that case and cannot be read as laying down a general
proposition that every employee governed by the CCS (CCA) Rules is, for
that reason alone, excluded from the remedies available under the Industrial
Disputes Act. The first preliminary objection is, accordingly, rejected.
29. The next contention urged on behalf of the Petitioner/Management is
that the Labour Court travelled beyond the terms of reference made by the
Appropriate Government. It was submitted that the reference merely required
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the Labour Court to determine whether the services of the
Respondent/workman had been terminated illegally or unjustifiably.
However, according to the Petitioner/Management, the Labour Court
proceeded to frame and adjudicate an altogether different issue as to whether
the Respondent/workman had voluntarily tendered his resignation and
thereby enlarged the scope of the reference. The relevant issue framed by the
learned Labour Court reads as under:
“1. Whether the workman has himself voluntarily resigned
from his services as alleged by the management? If so, its
effect?”
30. This court finds that this contention of Petitioner/Management is
equally devoid of merit. The reference required the Labour Court to adjudicate
whether the cessation of the Respondent/workman’s employment was legal
and justified. The Petitioner/Management’s consistent defence before the
Labour Court was that there was no termination at its instance as the
Respondent/workman had voluntarily resigned from service. The
Respondent/workman, on the other hand, specifically disputed the alleged
resignation and asserted that his services had been illegally terminated.
31. In these circumstances, the question whether the Respondent/workman
had in fact voluntarily resigned constituted the very foundation of the dispute
and was intrinsically connected with the question referred for adjudication.
Unless the Labour Court first determined whether the cessation of service was
on account of a voluntary resignation or an act attributable to the employer, it
could not have effectively answered the reference concerning the legality of
the termination. The issue framed by the Labour Court was, therefore, merely
incidental and ancillary to the principal issue arising out of the reference and
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did not amount to travelling beyond the terms of reference. The Labour Court
neither enlarged the scope of the dispute nor adjudicated upon an independent
controversy dehors the reference. It merely examined the rival pleas raised by
the parties to determine the true nature of the cessation of employment.
32. In view of the foregoing discussion, neither of the preliminary
objections raised by the Petitioner/Management merits acceptance. The
learned Labour Court possessed the jurisdiction to adjudicate the industrial
dispute, and its examination of the voluntariness of the alleged resignation
was integral to the determination of the dispute referred to it. Issue No. I is
accordingly answered against the Petitioner/Management and in favour
of the Respondent/workman.
ISSUE 2
Whether the finding of the learned Labour Court that the resignation dated
15.10.1979 was not voluntary warrants interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India?
33. At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind the nature and scope of
jurisdiction exercised by this Court while examining an award passed by a
Labour Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is trite
that the High Court, while exercising powers of judicial review, does not sit
as a Court of appeal over the findings recorded by the Industrial Adjudicator.
The jurisdiction is supervisory and not appellate. Consequently, this Court is
not expected to reassess or reappreciate the entire evidence merely because
another view may also be possible. Interference is warranted only where the
findings recorded are shown to be wholly unsupported by evidence, are
perverse, suffer from manifest illegality or disclose a jurisdictional error
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apparent on the face of the record.
34. The contours of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 have been
authoritatively delineated by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477. The
Supreme Court observed:
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High
Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has
been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal
position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of
certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of
jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals :
these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts
or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as
a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can
similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction
conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or
properly, as for instance, it decides a question without
giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the
order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the
dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There
is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court
exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court.
This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact
reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the
appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or
questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is
apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a
writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear
to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown
that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had
erroneously refused to admit admissible and material
evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
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would be regarded as an error of law which can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this
category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind
that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be
challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the
ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced
before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to
sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency
of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be
drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be
agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that
the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article
226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately
exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad
Ishaque [(1955) 1 SCR 1104] Nagandra Nath Bora v.
Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam
[(1958) SCR 1240] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh
[AIR 1960 SC 1168]”
[Emphasis supplied ]
35. The same principle has repeatedly been reiterated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. In Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers’
Union, (2000) 4 SCC 245, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High
Court cannot substitute its own appreciation of evidence for that of the
Tribunal merely because another view appears to be possible. Unless the
conclusions reached by the Labour Court are shown to be irrational,
unsupported by evidence or such as no reasonable person could have arrived
at, interference under Article 226 would be wholly unwarranted.
36. The rationale underlying the aforesaid principle is not far to seek. The
Labour Court is the primary fact-finding authority constituted under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It has the advantage of recording oral evidence,
observing the demeanour of witnesses during examination and cross-
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examination and appreciating the evidence in its entirety. The writ Court, on
the other hand, examines the legality of the decision-making process and not
the correctness of every factual inference. Unless the appreciation of evidence
is shown to be demonstrably perverse or contrary to the settled principles of
law, the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court ordinarily deserve
deference.
37. It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid settled principles that the
correctness of the impugned Award is required to be examined. In order to
appreciate the challenge raised by the Petitioner/Management, it becomes
necessary to first examine the reasoning adopted by the learned Labour Court
while returning its finding that the alleged resignation dated 15.10.1979 was
not voluntary. The conclusion recorded in the impugned Award, which form
the foundation of the present controversy, deserve reproduction.
“So, I have come to the conclusion that infact, the
workman has never tendered the resignation and assuming
that he has tendered the resignation, he has withdrawn the
same by his letter dt.20.10.79.”
38. A careful reading of the impugned Award shows that the learned
Labour Court did not proceed on the premise that the resignation merely stood
proved or disproved by the oral testimony of either party. Rather, it
approached the controversy in two distinct stages. It first examined whether
the document dated 15.10.1979 could at all be regarded as a voluntary
resignation of the Respondent/workman. Secondly, and in the alternative, it
considered whether even assuming the document to be a resignation, the same
had already been withdrawn before its acceptance by the competent authority.
The learned Labour Court thus rested its conclusion on two independent
foundations.
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39. The principal submission advanced on behalf of the
Petitioner/Management is that the learned Labour Court misread the evidence
on record and returned findings contrary to the documentary material. It was
argued that the resignation had been voluntarily submitted by the
Respondent/workman owing to his personal and domestic difficulties and
stood duly accepted by the competent authority. According to the
Petitioner/Management, the Labour Court erroneously relied upon subsequent
representations made by the workman while overlooking the unequivocal
resignation submitted on 15.10.1979.
40. Elaborating the aforesaid submission, learned counsel contended that
the Labour Court appreciated the evidence in a selective and piecemeal
manner instead of considering the record as a whole. According to the
Petitioner/Management, the very foundation of the Respondent/workman’s
case was that he had withdrawn his resignation by means of a letter dated
20.10.1979 before its acceptance on 31.10.1979. However, it was urged that
in the subsequent letters addressed by the Respondent/workman dated
05.11.1979 and 12.11.1979, as also in the notice issued under Section 80 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, there was not even a whisper regarding the
alleged withdrawal dated 20.10.1979. It was submitted that had the
resignation in fact been withdrawn, the Respondent/workman would naturally
have referred to the same in the aforesaid communications. The omission to
do so, according to the Petitioner/Management, completely demolishes the
Respondent/workman’s case and demonstrates that the withdrawal letter was
subsequently introduced into the official records. Reliance was also placed
upon the testimony of MW-1, Shri Ajit Singh, to contend that the Labour
Court ignored material evidence while recording its findings.
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41. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention. At the outset,
the contention that the learned Labour Court appreciated the evidence on a
piecemeal basis is not borne out from the Award. A perusal of the impugned
Award reveals that the Labour Court did not confine itself to any isolated
document. On the contrary, it examined the pleadings of the parties, the oral
testimony of the workman as well as the management witnesses, the
contemporaneous correspondence exchanged between the parties and the
official records maintained by the Management before arriving at its
conclusion. The findings are, therefore, the result of a cumulative appreciation
of the evidence and not of a fragmented consideration of individual
documents.
42. The Labour Court first noticed the consistent stand of the
Respondent/workman that on 15.10.1979 he had reported back for duty after
attending to his ailing wife and had submitted an application seeking
permission to resume duties. According to the Respondent/workman, he was
thereafter directed to meet Shri Ajit Singh, who instructed Shri Ramesh
Chand Ahuja to prepare a document in English. Being an illiterate person
capable only of signing his name, the Respondent/workman asserted that he
signed the document believing it to be his joining report and not a resignation.
This version was reiterated by him both in the Statement of Claim as well as
in his affidavit by way of evidence.
43. The learned Labour Court thereafter examined whether the aforesaid
version found corroboration from the evidence led by the Management itself.
It was noticed that while the Management pleaded ignorance as to the
authorship of the resignation letter, MW-1, Shri Ajit Singh, admitted during
cross-examination that Shri Ramesh Chand Ahuja was working under him on
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the relevant date. Significantly, MW-1 also expressed inability to identify the
handwriting of Shri Ramesh Chand Ahuja despite having worked with him
for nearly two years. The Labour Court found this explanation to be unnatural
and inconsistent with the ordinary course of official functioning.
44. Equally significant was the testimony of MW-2, Shri Ramesh Chand
Ahuja. While the Management asserted that the Respondent/workman himself
had requested MW-2 to draft the resignation letter owing to his domestic
difficulties, the Labour Court juxtaposed this version with the
Respondent/workman’s plea that the document had been represented to him
as a joining report. Upon evaluating the surrounding circumstances, the
Labour Court found the latter version to be more probable. Such an exercise
plainly falls within the domain of appreciation of evidence entrusted to the
fact-finding authority.
45. The Labour Court, however, attached the greatest significance to the
contemporaneous conduct of the Respondent/workman immediately after
15.10.1979. It treated the representation dated 20.10.1979 (Ex. MW1/W-6),
produced from the Management’s own records, as the most crucial piece of
evidence. The Labour Court observed:
“This letter dated 20.10.79 Ex. MW1/W-6 exposes the
entire thing and supports the plea of the workman that he
never tendered the resignation. Had the workman been
aware of the fact that the letter dated 15.10.79 purported
to be a resignation is in fact resignation letter then
definitely he would have mentioned this fact in this letter
dated 20.10.79 rather he has stated that he may be
permitted to join the duty.”
46. The Petitioner/Management’s submission that the subsequent letters
dated 05.11.1979 and 12.11.1979 and the notice under Section 80 CPC do not
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expressly refer to the alleged withdrawal dated 20.10.1979 undoubtedly
constitutes a circumstance which the Management is entitled to rely upon.
However, the absence of such a reference is not, by itself, conclusive of the
issue. The evidentiary value of the omission must necessarily be assessed in
the backdrop of the entire factual matrix, including the admitted existence of
the contemporaneous representation dated 20.10.1979 forming part of the
Management’s own official records. The Labour Court was required to weigh
all these circumstances together and not in isolation.
47. More importantly, the Petitioner/Management’s submission essentially
invites this Court to reassess the relative weight to be assigned to different
pieces of evidence and to substitute its own inference for that drawn by the
Labour Court. Such an exercise is impermissible while exercising supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Once the findings recorded
by the Labour Court are supported by evidence and represent a plausible view
of the material on record, this Court would not interfere merely because
another inference may also be possible.
48. This Court is, therefore, unable to accept the contention that the
findings recorded by the Labour Court are the result of selective appreciation
of evidence. The Award reflects a comprehensive consideration of the oral
testimony, the contemporaneous documentary evidence and the official
records maintained by the Management. The criticism levelled by the
Petitioner/Management essentially relates to the weight assigned by the
Labour Court to different pieces of evidence, which lies within the exclusive
province of the fact-finding authority.
49. Having examined the reasoning adopted by the learned Labour Court,
this Court now proceeds to examine whether the said reasoning accords with
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the settled principles governing resignation from service. The controversy in
the present case is not merely whether a document styled as a resignation letter
bears the signature of the Respondent/workman. The real issue is whether the
said document represented a conscious, voluntary and unequivocal intention
on the part of the Respondent/workman to sever the jural relationship of
employer and employee. The law is well settled that resignation is not merely
a physical act of signing a document; it is a voluntary relinquishment of office
accompanied by a clear intention to abandon service.
50. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that the essence of a
valid resignation lies in the intention of the employee to relinquish the
employment voluntarily. In G.T. Lad v. Chemicals & Fibres India Ltd.,
(1979) 1 SCC 590, the Apex Court observed that:
“6. […]to constitute abandonment, there must be total or
complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention
not to resume the same. In Buckingham & Carnatic Co. v.
Venkatiah (1964) 4 SCR 265, it was observed by this Court
that under common law an inference that an employee has
abandoned or relinquished service is not easily drawn
unless from the length of absence and from other
surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can
be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the
employee intended to abandon service. Abandonment or
relinquishment of service is always a question of intention,
and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an
employee without adequate evidence in that behalf. Thus
whether there has been a voluntary abandonment of
service or not is a question of fact which has to be
determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances
of each case.”
51. The aforesaid principles assume considerable significance in the facts
of the present case. The learned Labour Court did not merely compare the
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competing oral versions of the parties. Rather, it examined whether the
contemporaneous conduct of the Respondent/workman was consistent with
the hypothesis that he had voluntarily abandoned service. It found that within
five days of the alleged resignation, the Respondent/workman addressed a
representation to the Director requesting that he be permitted to join duties.
Thereafter, he continued to submit representations dated 05.11.1979,
13.11.1979, 07.12.1979 and 20.12.1979 seeking reinstatement. Such conduct,
according to the learned Labour Court, was fundamentally inconsistent with
the conduct of an employee who had consciously decided to sever his
employment.
52. This Court finds considerable force in the aforesaid reasoning. Human
conduct often constitutes the best evidence of intention. Ordinarily, an
employee who has voluntarily resigned from service with a clear intention of
terminating the relationship of employment would not, within a matter of
days, repeatedly beseech the employer to permit him to resume duties. The
immediate and persistent representations made by the Respondent/workman,
particularly the representation dated 20.10.1979, constituted relevant
contemporaneous evidence from which the learned Labour Court was entitled
to infer that the Respondent/workman never intended to relinquish his
employment voluntarily.
53. Equally significant is the fact that the said representation dated
20.10.1979 was not a document subsequently manufactured for the purposes
of litigation. As noticed by the learned Labour Court, the said representation
formed part of the official records of the Petitioner/Management itself and
was duly proved through the Management witness as Ex. MW1/W-6.
54. Furthermore, the principle that resignation becomes effective only
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upon acceptance, has been consistently recognised in service jurisprudence.
In Raj Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1969 SC 180, while considering the
legal effect of resignation from service, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained
that where acceptance of resignation is contemplated under the service rules,
the jural relationship between the employer and employee ordinarily comes
to an end only upon such acceptance by the competent authority. Until then,
the employee continues in service and retains the right to withdraw the
resignation unless the governing rules provide otherwise. The Supreme Court
observed:
“5. […] When a public servant has invited by his letter of
resignation determination of his employment, his service
normally stands terminated from the date on which the
letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate
authority and in the absence of any law or rule governing
the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be
open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after
it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the
resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in
consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the
public servant concerned has locus poenitentiae but not
thereafter.”
55. The official notings maintained by the Petitioner/Management also
assume significance. The Labour Court noticed that even as on 30.10.1979,
the office note merely sought approval whether the resignation of the
Respondent/workman should be accepted. The relevant office noting,
extracted in the Award, reads as follows:
“It is submitted for consideration and orders if the
resignation tendered by Shri Mohammad Rafiq is accepted
w.e.f. 15.10.79 without insisting upon three months’ pay
and allowances in lieu of the notice period.”
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56. The Labour Court held that this noting itself demonstrated that no final
decision accepting the resignation had been taken till that stage. The Labour
Court further found that despite the assertion that the resignation had been
accepted on 31.10.1979, no contemporaneous order evidencing such
acceptance was produced. Instead, the file continued to reflect consideration
of the Respondent/workman’s repeated requests to be taken back in service.
57. The submission of the Petitioner/Management that another view of the
evidence was possible also does not advance its case. It is well settled that
where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence available on record,
the writ Court would not substitute its own view merely because it may have
arrived at a different conclusion had it been exercising appellate jurisdiction.
So long as the view adopted by the Labour Court is a plausible one founded
upon evidence, the same does not become vulnerable to interference under
Article 226 merely because another inference could also have been drawn.
58. Viewed in the aforesaid light, this Court is unable to hold that the
finding recorded by the learned Labour Court suffers from perversity or patent
illegality. The findings recorded by the learned Labour Court that the
Respondent/workman had not voluntarily resigned from service and that the
cessation of his employment was illegal are based upon a proper appreciation
of the oral and documentary evidence available on record. The conclusions
are neither perverse nor unsupported by evidence and do not suffer from any
patent illegality or jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
59. Consequently, this Court answers Issue No. II in the negative.
ISSUE NO. III
Whether the learned Labour Court was justified in restricting the relief to
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40% back wages or whether the Award calls for modification?
60. Having upheld the findings of the learned Labour Court on the illegality
of the cessation of service, this Court must now examine the rival challenge
to the relief granted by the learned Labour Court. While AIIMS contends that
no back wages ought to have been awarded, the legal representatives of the
deceased workman contend that the Labour Court committed an error in
restricting the award to only 40% back wages despite holding the termination
to be illegal. The controversy, therefore, shifts from the legality of the
termination to the nature and extent of the consequential relief.
61. The law relating to grant of back wages has witnessed a gradual
evolution. While earlier decisions often proceeded on the footing that
reinstatement ordinarily carried with it the consequence of full back wages,
subsequent judicial pronouncements have consistently held that the grant of
back wages is not an automatic or inevitable consequence of every order
declaring termination to be illegal. The relief has to be moulded upon
consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case so as to balance the
equities between the employer and the workman.
62. In Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that where termination is found to be illegal,
the normal rule is to restore the workman to the position which he would have
occupied but for the illegal action of the employer. The Court observed:
“9….Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has
been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back
wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed
during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any
other view would give a premium to the unwarranted
action of the employer.”
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63. The legal position was revisited in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P.
Agrawal, (2007) 2 SCC 433, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified
that payment of back wages is not a natural or automatic consequence of every
declaration of illegality. The Court emphasised that several relevant
considerations including the nature of misconduct, length of service, delay in
adjudication, conduct of the parties and other equitable circumstances must
inform the exercise of judicial discretion.
64. Subsequently, in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reconciled
the earlier authorities and observed that where termination is found to be
patently illegal, reinstatement ordinarily carries with it full back wages unless
the employer establishes circumstances disentitling the employee to such
relief. The Court, however, clarified that the rule is not absolute and that the
ultimate relief must always depend upon the facts of the individual case. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed:
“38.The propositions which can be culled out from the
judgments of this Court while deciding the issue of back
wages are:
(38.1) In cases of wrongful termination of service,
reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is
the normal rule.
(38.2) The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while
deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating
authority or the court may take into consideration the
length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of
misconduct, if any, found proved against the
employee/workman, the financial condition of the
employer and similar other factors.
(38.3) Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose
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services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back
wages is required to either plead or at least make a
statement before the adjudicating authority or the court of
first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or
was employed on lesser wages. If the employer seeks to
avoid payment of full back wages, it must specifically plead
and lead cogent evidence to prove that the
employee/workman was gainfully employed and was
getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior
to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled
law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular
fact lies on the person who makes a positive averment
about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive
fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the
employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on
the employer to specifically plead and prove that the
employee was gainfully employed and was getting the
same or substantially similar emoluments.”
65. Thus, the consistent thread running through the aforesaid decisions is
that while back wages are an important consequence flowing from an illegal
termination, the quantum thereof remains a matter of judicial discretion to be
exercised upon sound principles and supported by reasons. The discretion
cannot be exercised arbitrarily; equally, it cannot be fettered by any rigid
formula requiring grant either of full back wages or none at all.
66. Examining the impugned Award in the light of the aforesaid principles,
this Court finds that the learned Labour Court, after holding the termination
to be illegal, proceeded to award only 40% back wages. The entirety of the
reasoning on the aspect of relief is contained in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the
Award, wherein the learned Labour Court observed that the
Respondent/workman had remained absent on several occasions and,
therefore, “the interest of justice” would be served by awarding only 40%
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back wages till the date of superannuation.
67. The difficulty with the aforesaid reasoning is not the exercise of
discretion itself, but the absence of any discernible basis for the particular
quantum awarded. The learned Labour Court has not indicated why it
considered 40% to be the appropriate measure of compensation. While it has
noticed that the Respondent/workman was a habitual absentee, it has not
explained how that circumstance justified reducing the back wages by sixty
per cent. Equally, there is no finding that the Respondent/workman was
gainfully employed elsewhere during the interregnum, nor is there any
evidence on record to suggest that he had secured alternative employment so
as to mitigate the loss occasioned by the illegal termination. The restriction of
back wages to 40%, therefore, lacks an articulated rationale.
68. At the same time, this Court is equally unable to accept the submission
advanced on behalf of the legal representatives of the Respondent/workman
that the Award necessarily deserves to be modified by directing payment of
full back wages. Although the Respondent/workman pleaded that he remained
unemployed after the cessation of service, no independent evidence was led
to establish the extent of his unemployment during the entire period from 1979
till his superannuation in August, 1996. Equally, the Labour Court has
recorded a finding that the Respondent/workman had remained habitually
absent on several occasions prior to the dispute. While such conduct could not
justify an illegal termination or a forced resignation, it nevertheless remains a
relevant circumstance while moulding the consequential monetary relief.
69. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the relief of back wages is
essentially an equitable relief. The object is to compensate the workman for
the financial deprivation occasioned by the employer’s illegal action, while at
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the same time ensuring that the relief does not operate as a windfall divorced
from the facts of the case. The Court is, therefore, required to balance the
competing equities and mould the relief in a manner that achieves substantial
justice.
70. In the facts of the present case, certain circumstances assume
significance. Firstly, the Respondent/workman succeeded in establishing
before the learned Labour Court that he had not voluntarily resigned from
service and had been illegally kept out of employment. Secondly, the
Petitioner/Management did not lead any evidence whatsoever to establish that
the Respondent/workman had remained gainfully employed during the
relevant period. Thirdly, the litigation has remained pending for over four
decades and the Respondent/workman, who had been contesting the
proceedings since 1981, unfortunately passed away during the pendency of
the present writ petitions in the year 2013, without reaping the fruits of the
adjudication in his favour. Lastly, the Respondent/workman had already
attained the age of superannuation in August, 1996 and, therefore, what
survives today is only the monetary entitlement payable to his legal
representatives.
71. Having regard to the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the
considered opinion that while the Award insofar as it restricts the relief to
40% back wages cannot be sustained for want of adequate reasons, the facts
of the present case also do not justify grant of full back wages. Balancing the
equities between the parties, taking into consideration the absence of evidence
regarding gainful employment on the one hand and the findings recorded by
the learned Labour Court regarding the Respondent/workman’s service
conduct on the other, this Court is of the considered view that the ends of
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justice would be adequately met by enhancing the monetary relief to 50%
back wages from the date of the illegal cessation of service till the date of
superannuation.
72. The Award is, accordingly, modified to the limited extent that the
Respondent/workman shall be entitled to 50% back wages, together with
continuity of service for the limited purpose of computation of retiral and
terminal benefits up to the date of his superannuation in August, 1996. Since
the Respondent/workman has admittedly expired during the pendency of the
present proceedings, the aforesaid monetary and consequential benefits shall
be computed and released to his legal representatives in accordance with law.
CONCLUSION:
73. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no perversity,
patent illegality or jurisdictional infirmity in the findings recorded by the
learned Labour Court holding that the Respondent/workman had not
voluntarily resigned from service and that the cessation of his employment
was illegal. The said findings are based on a proper appreciation of the oral
and documentary evidence on record and do not warrant interference in
exercise of the limited jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
74. However, this Court finds that the restriction of back wages to 40% is
unsupported by adequate reasons. At the same time, the facts and
circumstances of the present case do not justify the grant of full back wages.
Having regard to the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court, the
absence of any evidence to establish gainful employment of the
Respondent/workman during the interregnum, the long pendency of the
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litigation spanning over four decades, and the fact that the
Respondent/workman attained the age of superannuation in August, 1996 and
expired during the pendency of the present proceedings, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the ends of justice would be adequately served by
enhancing the back wages from 40% to 50%, together with continuity of
service for the limited purpose of computation of consequential retiral and
terminal benefits up to the date of superannuation.
75. Accordingly, W.P.(C) No. 2551/1999 preferred by the All India
Institute of Medical Sciences is dismissed, whereas W.P.(C) No. 2447/2000
preferred by the legal representatives of late Shri Mohd. Rafiq is partly
allowed to the aforesaid extent.
76. The Petitioner/Management shall compute and release the
consequential monetary and retiral benefits to the legal representatives of the
deceased Respondent/workman within a period of twelve weeks from the date
of this judgment, failing which the outstanding amount shall carry simple
interest @ 6% per annum from the expiry of the aforesaid period till the date
of actual payment.
77. The writ petitions, along with all pending applications, stand disposed
of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs.
SHAIL JAIN
JUDGE
AUGUST 06, 2026
DG
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