Jharkhand High Court
Mahavir Gope @ Mahabir Gope Aged About 35 … vs The State Of Jharkhand Through Chief … on 20 July, 2026
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
2026:JHHC:21445-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(Cr.) (DB) No.812 of 2025
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Mahavir Gope @ Mahabir Gope aged about 35 years, son of
Logan Gope, resident of village-Bakashpur, P.O.-Lapa, P.S.-
Karra, District-Khuti. ... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary having it
office at Project Building, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S.
Jagannathpur, District-Ranchi.
2. The Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prison &
Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand, having
its office at Project Bhawan, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S.
Jagannathpur, District- Ranchi.
3. The District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner,
Khunti, P.O & P.S. Khuti, District- Khunti.
4. The Superintendent of Police Khunti, P.O & P.S.- Khunti,
District- Khunti.
5. The Sub Divisional Police Officer,Torpa, P.O. & P.S.-
Torpa, District- Khunti. ... ... Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
C.A.V. on 17.07.2026 Pronounced on 20/07/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
1. This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India for quashing the order dated
21.10.2025 (Annexure-1) passed by the District Magistrate-
cum-Deputy Commissioner, Khunti (respondent No. 3)
whereby and whereunder the petitioner was put under
preventive detention in terms of Section 12(2) of the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002.
Further prayer has been made for quashing of the
order dated 05.12.2025 (Annexure-3), passed by the
Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prison &
Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand
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(Respondent No.2), whereby and whereunder the order of
preventive detention passed under Section 12(2) of the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 has been confirmed
by the respondent no.2 on behalf of the State.
2. During the pendency of the instant writ petition,
fresh order was passed by the authority concerned on
09.01.2026 by which the detention of the writ petitioner has
been extended for further three months from 21.01.2026 to
20.04.2026 and consequent thereto petitioner sought leave
of this Court to amend the writ petition to challenge inter-
alia the extended detention period and the same was allowed
by this Court vide order 16.01.2026.
3. Again, during the pendency of the instant writ
petition, order of extension of detention order was passed on
10.04.2026, by which the detention of the petitioner has
been extended for further three months from 21.04.2026 to
20.07.2026, thereafter an interlocutory application being I.A.
No.6243 of 2026 was filed seeking amendment in the writ
petition, in the pleading and prayer portion thereof and the
said interlocutory application was allowed vide order dated
08.06.2026. Accordingly, the amended writ petition has also
been filed.
Factual Matrix
4. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made
in the writ petition, which are required to be enumerated,
read as under: –
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i. Proposal was made by the Superintendent of Police,
Khunti, vide letter No. 1086/DCB, dated 06.10.2025
addressed to the District Magistrate cum- Deputy
Commissioner, Khunti for taking action against the
petitioner U/S 12(2) of Jharkhand Control of Crime
Act, 2002 stating therein that since the petitioner is
an anti-social element and he may cause disruption
to peace and public order, as such, petitioner be
detained in the interest of maintaining public peace.
ii. District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner,
Khunti (respondent No.3) passed an order vide Memo
no. 1/V, dated 21.10.2025 on the basis of the
aforesaid recommendation and directed the
authorities to detain the petitioner Mahavir Gope
under Section 12 (2) of the Jharkhand by Control of
Crimes Act for a period of three months.
iii. The order passed by District Magistrate-cum-Deputy
Commissioner, Khunti (respondent No. 3) on
21.10.2025 against the petitioner under the
provision of u/s 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of
Crime Act, 2002 is approved by Additional Secretary,
Department of Home, Prison & Disaster
Management Government of Jharkhand (respondent
No.2) vide order dated 24.10.2025.
iv. The Additional Secretary, Department of Home,
Prison & Disaster Management Government of
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Jharkhand, (respondent No.2) No.
05/CCA/01/60/2025-417/CCA, order dated
05.12.2025 has confirmed the order of detention u/s
12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crime Act, 2002
passed by District Magistrate-cum-Deputy
Commissioner, Khunti (respondent No.3) vide order
dated 21.10.2025 and accordingly, petitioner has
been detained for a period of 3 months, i.e. from
21.10.2025 to 20.01.2026.
v. In course of pendency of the writ petition detention
of the petitioner was further extended vide letter No.
09/CCA, dated 09.01.2026 by the Additional
Secretary, Department of Home, Prison & Disaster
Management Government of Jharkhand,
(respondent No. 2) for further three months from
21.01.2026 to 20.04.2026.
vi. Petitioner was involved in four (4) criminal cases but
of out of four he has been acquitted in two cases, and
in rest of the cases he has been granted bail.
vii. The status of the criminal cases against the
petitioner is as follows: –
(I) In Karra P.S. Case No. 28/2012, petitioner has
been acquitted vide Judgment dated 30.08.2018
passed by the learned District & Additional
Sessions Judge-I, Khunti.
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(II) In Jariyagarh P.S. Case No. 09/2022,
petitioner has been acquitted vide Judgment
dated 17.09.2025, passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge-I, Khunti.
(III) In Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.01/2025, petitioner
has been granted bail by the Hon’ble High court
vide order dated 18.11.2025, Passed in B.A.
No.9931/2025.
(IV) In Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.02/2025, petitioner
has been granted bail by the Hon’ble High Court
vide order dated 01.07.2025 Passed in B.A. No.
5204/2025.
viii. It is the case of the Petitioner that he was produced
before the Advisory board on 17.11.2025 which is
after a lapse of almost 27 days from the date of
detention i.e. 21.10.2025 which again is violation of
the provision of law U/S 19 of the Jharkhand Control
of Crimes Act, 2002 which clearly mandates that the
exercise be done within a period of 21 days (3 weeks).
ix. During pendency of the writ petition, the detention
of the petitioner has been further extended by three
months i.e. from 21.04.2026 to 20.07.2026 vide
Letter 05/CCA/01/60/2025-108/CCA dated
10.4.2026 issued under the signature of the
Respondent No. 2.
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Submission of the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner:
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken the
following grounds in assailing the impugned decision:
i. The impugned detention order dated 21.10.2025
issued under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,
2002 by the respondent is illegal and in complete
violation of the provisions of the Act and is a clear
case of abuse of the process of law.
ii. The non-supply of information by the respondent
authorities regarding the representation preferred by
the petitioner is violative of provision of the
iii. Mere pendency of criminal cases cannot be a ground
for detention order under Section 12(3) of Jharkhand
Control of Crimes Act.
iv. Detaining authority did not record satisfaction in
the order of detention renders the impugned order
bad in law.
v. Detaining authority erred in issuing the detention
order dated 21.10.2025 merely because the
Petitioner has been made accused in four (4) criminal
cases.
vi. Respondent authorities cannot detain the
petitioner in the garb of maintaining ‘public order’
and can take away the petitioner’s Fundamental
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iota of evidence of any kind whatsoever or even
without establishing prima facie any imminent
threat to public order.
vii. Respondent authorities have acted arbitrarily, in
complete malafide and highhandedness in an
attempt to deprive the petitioner of his right to
freedom of life enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
viii. The name of the petitioner was recommended on the
ground that petitioner was involved in four criminal
cases and therefore he is habitual in crime and
petitioner is member of PLFI group and his main
profession to collect levy in the name of organization
to spread fear and terror in the society. But the same
cannot be a ground for detention under Section 12
(2) of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act as that can
be dealt with the ordinary Criminal law and on this
ground alone, detention order is illegal.
ix. When general provisions of law could suffice the
purpose then there is no need of invoking extra
ordinary statute, in other words the State could have
filed and approached the courts of law for
cancellation of bail, however without doing so the
State chose to impose the provisions of section 12 of
the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002
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curtailing the liberties of the petitioner and awarding
him with the extraordinary punishment of preventive
detention.
x. Petitioner was not informed about his right of
representation and the same is a mandate as
provided by the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,
2002.
xi. The petitioner was informed of his right of
representation by the relative of the petitioner after
due consultation with the lawyer and as such his
right of representation as well as his right of being
informed that he had a right of representation were
curtailed by the Jail Authorities.
xii. Petitioner when tried to send a representation to the
Detaining Authority the same was refused by the Jail
Authorities and it was communicated to him that the
same would not be forwarded. This clearly depicts
the malicious and biased attitude of the Jail
Authorities.
xiii. The detenu i.e. the petitioner in the instant case was
not supplied with the copies of the Letters or Memos
forwarded by the Superintendent of police, Khunti.
The petitioner was only handed over the copy of the
Order passed by the District Magistrate and the copy
of the order confirming the Preventive Detention
issued from the office of the Additional Secretary,
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Department of Home, Prisons and Disaster
Management, Government of Jharkhand.
6. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds,
has submitted that the order of detention, therefore, suffers
from error and hence not sustainable in the eye of law.
Submission made by the learned counsel for the State
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has
submitted that-
i. Petitioner is a notorious member of banned extremist
organization PLFI, having lots of criminal
antecedents of serious nature. He is having his
syndicate/gang/Arms extremists in Jharkhand as
well as in other neighbour state with help of which
he facilitated organized crimes of different nature
such as collecting levy from businessmen, traders
etc. and extorting money from people of the locality
by way of spreading fear and terror among the
society. The activities of the petitioner are
detrimental to maintaining Public Law and Order.
Therefore, the petitioner is kept under preventive
detention under the said exigent circumstances.
ii. Vide memo no 902/अनु०. Dated 26.09.2025 SDPO
Torpa, Khunti forwarded the details of petitioner for
preventive detention of petitioner in light of his
criminal antecedent as well as terror and havoc
created by the petitioner in the locality in the name
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of banned extremists organization PLFI, along with
entire details of case of petitioner.
iii. vide letter number 1086/DCB, dated 06.10.2025,
the Sub Divisional Police Officer, Torpa,
recommended and forwarded the proposal of
preventive detention of petitioner to Deputy
Commissioner, Khunti for taking needful action in
view of the report and proposal submitted by SDPO
Torpa/respondent number-05. Accordingly, the
impugned detention order to keep the petitioner
under detention was passed by the Deputy
Commissioner Khunti vide office memo no. 01, dated
21.10.2025.
iv. Detention order passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, Khunti has been confirmed by the
department of Home, Prison and Disaster
Management vide letter no. 374/CCA dated
24.10.2025 within the stipulated time.
v. The department of Home, Prison and Disaster
Management, Jharkhand, placed the matter of the
petitioner before the Advisory Board within the
stipulated time held on 17.11.2025 for consideration
of Advisory Board.
vi. Petitioner has five criminal antecedents of serious
nature, out of which in three cases he is in judicial
custody.
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vii. The Department of Home, Prison and Disaster
Management confirmed the detention order of the
petitioner vide letter no. 417 CCA/ Ranchi dated
05.12.2025 after the report and opinion submitted
by the Advisory Board.
viii. Proposal for extension of detention was sent to the
department of Home, Prison and Disaster
Management vide letter no. 10 dated 06.01.2026 and
accordingly the detention of the petitioner has been
extended vide letter no. 09 dated 09.01.2026 by the
Department of Home, Prison and Disaster
Management.
ix. On culmination of the period of detention as earlier
extended up to 20.04.2026, the matter was duly
examined by the Department of Home, Prison and
Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand
and considering the continued criminal antecedents
and conduct of the petitioner being prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order, the detention of the
petitioner has been further extended for a period of
three months i.e. from 21.04.2026 to 20.07.2026
vide Letter No. 05/CCA/01/60/2025-108/CCA
dated 10.04.2026 issued by the Respondent No.2
and the same is legal, just and proper and does not
call for any interference by the Hon’ble Court.
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8. Learned counsel appearing for the State, based upon
the aforesaid grounds, have submitted that it is, therefore,
not a case where the order of detention is said to suffer from
an error.
Analysis
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and
gone through the order of detention as also the pleadings
made on behalf of the petitioner and the State as available in
the writ petition and the counter affidavits.
10. The issues which require consideration herein are as
follows-
i. Whether representation of the petitioner was not
forwarded by the jail authorities to the Government, and
hence, the jail authorities acted mala fidely.
ii. Whether grant of bail to the petitioner in pending cases
and acquittal in some of the cases, is ground for his
release from the prevention detention passed under 12(2)
of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002?
iii. Whether the criminal activities of petitioner come under
the purview of definition of ”Anti-social Elements” as
defined under section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes Act, 2002?
iv. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present
case, can it be said that the authorities have got the
subjective satisfaction while passing the order of
detention?
Re: Issue No. (i)
11. The issue no.(i) i.e. whether representation of the
petitioner was not forwarded by the jail authorities to the
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Government, and hence, the jail authorities acted
malafidely?
12. In this regard learned counsel for the petitioner has
submitted that petitioner was not informed about his right
of representation, and when petitioner was informed of his
right of representation by the relative of the petitioner after
due consultation with the lawyer, then, petitioner tried to
send representation to the Detaining Authority, but, the
same was refused by the Jail Authorities and it was
communicated to him that the same would not be forwarded,
which, clearly depicts the malicious and biased attitude of
the Jail Authorities.
13. Since a controversy has been raised by the learned
counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the representation
submitted by the petitioner was not duly forwarded by the
jail authorities to the authority concerned therefore, it
becomes incumbent upon this Court to examine and
appreciate the aforesaid contention of the petitioner on the
basis of the material available on record; and in light of the
settled statutory provisions governing such matters.
14. At this juncture, Sections 17 of the Jharkhand
Control of Crimes, 2002 needs to be referred herein. Section
17 of the Act, 2002 inter alia provides that ground of orders
of detention to be disclosed and opportunity of making a
representation against the order of the State Government
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shall be given to the person affected by the order. Section 17
of the Act, 2002 reads as under-
17. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to
person affected by the order. – (1) When a person is detained
in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the
order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than
five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to
be recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the date of
detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order
has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of
making a representation against the order to the State
Government.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to
disclose facts which it considers to be against the public
interest to disclose.
15. Further, Article 22(5) of the Constitution mandates
that the authority making the order shall as soon as may be
communicate the grounds on which the order has been made
to the person detained and the detaining authority shall
afford to the person detained the earliest opportunity of
making a representation against the order.
16. Following the mandate of Article 22(5), provision has
been made under section 17 of Jharkhand Control of
Crimes,2002, wherein it has been provided that the
detaining authority shall communicate the grounds to the
detenue on which the detention order has been passed and
shall afford to the detenue an earliest opportunity of making
a representation against the order of the State Government.
17. In the present case, this Court finds that in the
counter Affidavit dated 20.01.2026, it is specifically
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mentioned that copy of detention order along with the
grounds of dentition was served upon the petitioner, as such
there is compliance of the Article 22(5) of the constitution.
18. Further, ongoing to the impugned detention order
which is annexed as Annexure-1 to this writ petition, this
court finds that annexure-1 contains two part and first part
is impugned detention order dated 21.10.2025 passed under
section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes,2002, by
the detaining authority i.e. Respondent No.3 and the second
part is grounds of detention and in the said document,
detaining authority had noted that copies of the said
documents shall be given to the detenue.
19. Hence, one of the constitutional requirements as
provided under Article 22(5) of Constitution of India and
Section 17 of the Act,2002, as to communicate the grounds
to the detenue on which the detention order has been passed
has been fulfilled by the State/Respondent, by providing the
petitioner, the ground of detention and detention order dated
21.10.2025(Annexure-1) passed by the respondent no.3
District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, District-
Khunti.
20. Now, the controversy raised by the petitioner in the
writ petition that his representation was not forwarded to the
detaining authorities, by the Jail Authorities and hence,
petitioner has alleged that jail authorities acted maliciously
and with biasness.
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21. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, this
Court has gone through the entire pleading of the writ
petition as well as exhibit annexed therein, wherefrom it is
apparent that in support of aforesaid statement the
petitioner has not placed any cogent evidence and he has
just stated that his right of representation has been curtailed
by the Jail authorities.
22. It is settled position of law that allegation without
evidence has no leg to stand and in the absence of cogent
evidence the same can only be treated as bald and empty
allegation. Further the initial onus to substantiate the
allegation of not forwarding the petitioner’s representation by
the jail authorities lies on the petitioner himself and the
petitioner has not been able to produce any evidence to
substantiate his allegation.
23. At this juncture it would be pertinent to see the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex court on the question of
burden of proving a case based on allegation of mala fide.
24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandra Prakash
Singh v. Purvanchal Gramin Bank, (2008) 12 SCC 292,
has held that it is a proposition of law that the burden of
proving mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges
it. Mere allegation is not enough. Party making such
allegations is under the legal obligation to place specific
materials before the court to substantiate the said
allegations. There has to be very strong and convincing
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evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides specifically
and definitely alleged in the petition as the same cannot
merely be presumed. The presumption under law is in favour
of the bona fides of the order unless contradicted by
acceptable material, for ready reference the paragraph-34 of
the aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein below-
“34. Thus, as a proposition of law, the burden of proving mala
fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Mere
allegation is not enough. Party making such allegations is
under the legal obligation to place specific materials before the
court to substantiate the said allegations. There has to be very
strong and convincing evidence to establish the allegations of
mala fides specifically and definitely alleged in the petition as
the same cannot merely be presumed. The presumption under
law is in favour of the bona fides of the order unless
contradicted by acceptable material.”
25. Further, in case of E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N.,
(1974) 4 SCC 3, while dealing the issue of mala fide, Hon’ble
Apex Court laid down that the Court would be slow to draw
dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by
a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and
they are made against the holder of an office which has a
high responsibility in the administration. Paragraph-92 of
the said judgment is being quoted herein below-
“92. Secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden
of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person
who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often
more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness
of such allegations demands proof of a high order of
credibility. Here the petitioner, who was himself once the
Chief Secretary, has flung a series of charges of oblique
conduct against the Chief Minister. That is in itself a17
2026:JHHC:21445-DBrather extraordinary and unusual occurrence and if these
charges are true, they are bound to shake the confidence
of the people in the political custodians of power in the
State, and therefore, the anxiety of the Court should be
all the greater to insist on a high degree of proof. In this
context it may be noted that top administrators are often
required to do acts which affect others adversely but
which are necessary in the execution of their duties.
These acts may lend themselves to misconstruction and
suspicion as to the bona fides of their author when the
full facts and surrounding circumstances are not known.
The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious
inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a
party, particularly when the imputations are grave and
they are made against the holder of an office which has
a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the
judicial perspective in evaluating charge of unworthy
conduct against ministers and other high authorities, not
because of any special status which they are supposed
to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life
or administrative set up–these considerations are
wholly irrelevant in judicial approach–but because
otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult
in a democracy. It is from this standpoint that we must
assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made
by the petitioner against the second respondent.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. On the basis of the discussion made hereinabove this
Court is of the considered view that the petitioner has failed
to prove mala fides against the jail authorities and has not
produced any clinching evidence and merely imputing
allegation against the jail authorities that jail authorities had
not forwarded his representation, is not fit to be accepted.
27. Accordingly, Issue No.(i) is answered against the
petitioner.
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Re: Issue No.(ii)
28. The issue no.2 is whether grant of bail to the
petitioner in pending cases and acquittal in some of the
cases, is ground for his release from the prevention detention
passed under 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,
2002?
29. In this regard petitioner has raised ground that
petitioner is already on bail or has been acquitted by the
Court of law, and the said cases were relied by the detaining
authority while passing the impugned order of detention
dated 21.10.2025 and hence, detention order cannot be
sustained.
30. This court from perusal of record finds that in the
proposal submitted by Superintendent of Police, Khunti, vide
Letter No. 1086/DCB dated 06.10.2025, , to the District
Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Khunti, there is
inter alia reference of four cases registered against the
petitioner- Karra P.S. Case No. 28/2012 dated 03.07.2012,
Jariyagarh P.S. Case No. 09/2022 dated 03.04.2022,
Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.01/2025 dated 01.01.2025 and
Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.02/2025 dated 02.01.2025.
31. In Karra P.S. Case No. 28/2012 and Jariyagarh P.S.
Case No. 09/2022, petitioner has been acquitted of by the
learned Trial Court by order dated 30.08.2018 and
17.09.2025 respectively.
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32. Further, in Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.01/2025 and
Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.02/2025, petitioner has been
enlarged on bail by the Hon’ble High Court by order dated
18.11.2025 and 01.07.2025 respectively.
33. Hence, out of the four cases registered against the
petitioner, petitioner has been acquitted in two cases and
has been enlarged on bail in two cases.
34. In the present case, from the ground of detention, it
is apparent that in the pending case Jaryagarh P.S. Case
No.01/2025, it is registered under section 308(4)/3(5) of
B.N.S. and 17 of CLA Act. Further, pending Jaryagarh P.S.
Case No.02/2025, is registered under 308/111/161(2)/3(5)
of BNS and 25(1-B) a/25(6)/26/35 of Arms Act and 17 of
35. Hence, so far as release of the petitioner on bail, in
the two pending cases i.e. Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.01/2025
and in Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.02/2025, which are
registered under the various sections of B.N.S. Act, Arms Act
and CLA Act, is concerned, this Court finds that it is the
subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority that in
spite of his continuous activities causing threat to
maintenance of public order and in such circumstances,
based on the relevant materials and satisfying itself, that it
would not be possible to control his habituality in continuing
the criminal activities by resorting the normal procedures,
the Detaining Authority had passed an impugned order
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detaining him under the Jharkhand Crime Control Act,
2002.
36. Further, the ground of bail cannot be said to affect
the decision of detention taken by the competent authority,
rather the accusation so made in the First Information
Report is to be seen for the purpose to have the subjective
satisfaction of the nature of accusation made in the said FIR.
37. Since the detention order is to be passed by the
competent authority anticipating the criminality of the
concerned and it would be evident from the accusation made
in the ground of detention dated 21.10.2025, (Annexure-1)
passed by the Respondent no. 3 District Magistrate-cum-
Deputy Commissioner, Khunti, wherein inter alia aforesaid
two pending criminal cases against the petitioner is
mentioned.
38. The consideration of coming from judicial custody by
virtue of order passed by the court to release on bail has been
taken into consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court in D.M
Nagaraja Versus Government of Karnataka and others
reported in (2011) 10 SCC 215 wherein detenue had
challenged his detention order. The Hon’ble Apex Court in
this case had noted in paragraph-17 that the even after
release on bail detenue again started indulging in the same
type of offences, particularly, threatening the public life,
damaging public property, etc. and hence, detenue appeal
was dismissed. Further in paragraph-20 of the aforesaid
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judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court had noted the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the
detention order against the detenue, for the ready reference
Paragraph-17 and 20 of D.M. Nagaraja(supra) case is
quoted herein below –
“17. All the abovementioned details which have been correctly
stated in the detention order clearly show that the appellant
is not amenable to ordinary course of law. It also shows that
even after his release on bail from the prison on various
occasions, he again started indulging in the same type of
offences, particularly, threatening the public life, damaging
public property, etc. All these aspects have been meticulously
considered by the detaining authority and after finding that
in order to maintain public order, since his activities are
prejudicial to the public, causing harm and danger, the
detaining authority detained him as “goonda” under
Karnataka Act 12 of 1985 for a period of 12 months and the
same was rightly approved by the Advisory Board and the
State Government. Inasmuch as the detaining authority has
taken note of all the relevant materials and strictly followed
all the safeguards as provided in the Act ensuring the liberty
of the detenue, we are in entire agreement with the decision
of the detaining authority as well as the impugned order of
the High Court affirming the same.”
xxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
20. In the case on hand, we have already extracted
criminality, criminal activities starting from the age of 30 and
details relating to eleven cases mentioned in the grounds of
detention. It is not in dispute that in one case he has been
convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for a term of nine years. He had been acquitted in two cases
and four cases are pending against him wherein he was
granted bail by the courts. It is the subjective satisfaction of
the detaining authority that in spite of his continuous
activities causing threat to maintenance of public order, he
was getting bail one after another and indulging in the same
activities. In such circumstances, based on the relevant
22
2026:JHHC:21445-DB
materials and satisfying itself, namely, that it would not be
possible to control his habituality in continuing the criminal
activities by resorting to normal procedure, the detaining
authority passed an order detaining him under Act 12 of
1985.”
39. Thus, from the impugned detention order dated
21.10.2025 (Annexure-1), it is evident that the petitioner is
habitually involved in offences relating to extortion,
organised crime, Arms Act, CLA Act etc. and further on the
basis of subjective satisfaction the detaining authority has
arrived to conclusion that the well-organized manner in
which such pre-judicial activities have been carried on and
nexus between dates of incidents and passing of the
detention order and the said observation is according to the
ratio led down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of D.M
Nagaraja Versus Government of Karnataka and
others(supra) therefore, the said observation of the
detaining authority cannot be said to be suffer from an error.
40. Accordingly, Issue No.(ii), has been answered herein.
Issue No.(iii) and Issue No.(iv)
41. Since both these issues, whether the petitioner falls
within the purview of the definition of “Anti-social Elements”;
and whether the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority was duly recorded while passing the detention
order, are interlinked and inseparably connected, this Court
deems it appropriate to take them up together for
consideration, both on the basis of the material available on
23
2026:JHHC:21445-DB
record and in light of the settled principles of law governing
preventive detention.
42. But before considering these issues, the statutory
provisions as contained under the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes, 2002 needs to be referred.
43. The relevant provisions which require consideration
are Sections 2(d) and section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes, 2002, which are necessary to be referred herein.
44. “Anti-social Element” has been defined in section 2(d)
of the Act,2002, which reads hereunder as: –
2(d) “Anti-social element” means a person who-
(i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang
habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the
commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or
Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code;or
(ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences
under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls
Act, 1956; or
(iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to
promote, on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or
community or any other grounds whatsoever, feelings of
enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or language
groups or castes or communities; or
(iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to, or
teasing women or girls; or
(v)who has been convicted of an offence under sections 25,26,
27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959
45. From perusal of Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Crime
Control Act, 2002, it is evident that “anti-social element” is a
person who habitually commits or abets offenses listed in
Chapters XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code, or certain
24
2026:JHHC:21445-DB
other specific crimes. It needs to refer herein that this
definition requires a pattern of behaviour, not isolated
incidents, and aims to identify individuals whose acts cause
alarm or terror among the public, warranting preventive
detention to maintain public order.
46. It needs to refer herein that the Act of 2002 was
meant to make special provisions for the control and
suppression of anti-social elements with a view to
maintenance of public order. It also needs to refer herein that
the “Law and Order” problems typically affect only
individuals or small groups, whereas “public order”
disruptions affect the community’s normal functioning on a
broader scale often generating fear or anxiety among the
general public.
47. It is pertinent to mention herein that the primary
element with respect to Section 2(d)(i) of the Act of 2002
seems to be the word “habitual”. It would thus mean that a
person who is frequently engaged in committing or
attempting or abating commission of an offence in terms of
Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code would
be an antisocial element. In this context, we may refer to the
case of Vijay Narayan Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in
(1984) 3 SCC 14 wherein the word “habitually” has been
sought to be enumerated in the following manner:
“31. It is seen from Section 12 of the Act that it makes provision
for the detention of an anti-social element. If a person is not an25
2026:JHHC:21445-DBantisocial element, he cannot be detained under the Act. The
detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the
person against whom an order is made under Section 12 of
the Act is an anti-social element as defined in Section 2(d) of
the Act. Sub-clauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d) of the Act
which are not quite relevant for the purposes of this case may
be omitted from consideration for the present. The two other
sub-clauses which need to be examined closely are sub
clauses (i) and (iv) of Section 2(d). Under sub-clause (i) of
Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or as a
member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts
to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable
under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting the human
body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property,
of the Penal Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social
element. Under subclause (iv) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a
person who has been habitually passing indecent remarks to,
or teasing women or girls, is an anti-social element. In both
these sub clauses, the word “habitually” is used. The
expression “habitually” means “repeatedly” or “persistently”. It
implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar
repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not
isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to
justify an inference of habit. It connotes frequent commission
of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the
said sub clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions.
This appears to be clear from the use of the word “habitually”
separately in subclause (i), sub-clause (ii) and sub- clause (iv)
of Section 2(d) and not in sub clauses (iii) and (v) of Section
2(d). If the State Legislature had intended that a commission
of two or more acts or omissions referred to in any of the sub-
clauses (i) to (v) of Section 2(d) was sufficient to make a person
an “anti-social element”, the definition would have run as
“Anti-social element” means “a person who habitually is. ..”.
As Section 2(d) of the Act now stands, whereas under sub-
clause (iii) or sub-clause (v) of Section 2(d) a single act or
omission referred to in them may be enough to treat the person
concerned as an ‘antisocial element’, in the case of sub-clause
(i), sub-clause (ii) or subclause (iv), there should be a repetition
of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in sub-clause
26
2026:JHHC:21445-DB
(i), subclause (ii) or in sub-clause (iv) by the person concerned
to treat him as an “anti-social element”. Commission of an act
or omission referred to in one of the sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv)
and of another act or omission referred to in any other of the
said sub-clauses would not be sufficient to treat a person as
an “anti-social element”. A single act or omission falling under
subclause (i) and a single act or omission falling under
subclause (iv) of Section 2(d) cannot, therefore, be
characterized as a habitual act or omission referred to in either
of them. Because the idea of “habit” involves an element of
persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of
the same class or kind, if the acts or omissions in question are
not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when
they are committed with a long interval of time between them
they cannot be treated as habitual ones.”
48. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if a person
is not an antisocial element, he cannot be detained under
the Act of 2002. The detaining authority should, therefore,
be satisfied that the person against whom an order is made
under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social element as
defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Under sub-clause (i) of
Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or as
a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or
attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences
punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences
affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing with
offences against property, of the Penal Code, 1860 is
considered to be an anti-social element. Further the
expression “habitually” means “repeatedly” or “persistently”.
It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar
repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not
27
2026:JHHC:21445-DB
isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to
justify an inference of habit.
49. Further, Section 12 of the Act,2002 empowers the
State Government to detain a person, which reads as under-
12. Power to make order detaining certain persons. –
The State Government may- (1) if satisfied with respect to any
person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and
there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements
cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest
of such person, make an order directing that such anti-social
element be detained.
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to
prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of
a District Magistrate, the State Government is satisfied that it
is necessary so to do, it may by an order in writing direct, that
during such period as may be specified in the order, such
District Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-
section (1) exercise the powers conferred upon by the said sub-
section:
Provided that the period specified in an order made by
the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the
first instance exceed three months, but the State Government
may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do,
amend such order to extend such period from time to time by
any period not exceeding three months at any one time.
(3) When any order is made by District Magistrate, he shall
forthwith report, the fact to the State Government together with
the grounds on which the order has been made and such other
particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter,
and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days
after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been
approved by the State Government:
Provided that where under Section 17 the grounds of
detention are communicated by the officer making the order
after five days but not later than ten days from the date of
detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the28
2026:JHHC:21445-DBmodification that, for the words “twelve days”, the words
“fifteen days” shall be substituted.
50. Hence, power to make orders detaining certain
persons are provided in Section 12 of the Jharkhand Control
of Crimes Act, 2002.
Section 12(1) provides that if State Government is
satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to
preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that
the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented
otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person,
make an order directing that such anti-social element be
detained.
51. So, section 12(1) empowers the State Government to
detain anti-social element if there is reason to fear that the
activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented
otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person. The
anti-social element has been defined in Section 2(d) of the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and section 2(d)(i) of
the Act provides that “Anti-social element” means a person
who either by himself or as a member of or leader of gang
habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the
commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or
Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code.
29
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52. In the backdrop of the aforesaid statutory provisions,
the factual aspect of the present case is to be considered in
order to consider these issue as formulated herein above.
53. Re-adverting to the factual aspect of the present case,
the petitioner has challenged the order of preventive
detention dated 21.10.2025 (Annexure-1) passed under
section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crime Act,2002 by
the respondent no.3 District Magistrate-cum-Deputy
Commissioner, Khunti, and also the order of confirmation of
detention dated 05.12.2025 and subsequent orders of
extension of detention of the petitioner latest one 10.04.2026
by which detention of petitioner has been extended from
21.04.2026 to 20.07.2026 extending the period of detention.
54. On going through the detention order dated
21.10.2025 (Annexure-1), this Court finds this detention
order was passed by the respondent no.3 District Magistrate-
cum-Deputy Commissioner, Khunti, on the
recommendations made by the Superintendent of Police,
Khunti, vide Letter No. 1086/DCB dated 06.10.2025.
55. This Court finds from the ground of communication
that two cases are pending against the petitioner i.e.
Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.01/2025 registered under section
308(4)/3(5) of B.N.S. and 17 of CLA Act and Jaryagarh P.S.
Case No.02/2025 registered under Sections
308/111/161(2)/3(5) of BNS and 25(1-B) a/25(6)/26/35 of
30
2026:JHHC:21445-DB
Arms Act and 17 of CLA Act under the various sections of
B.N.S. Act, Arms Act and CLA Act.
56. Hence, from the FIRs and charge sheet mentioned in
the ground of detention dated 21.10.2025 (Annexure-1), it
indicates that crime committed by the petitioner ranges to
extortion, organised crime, Arms Act, CLA Act etc.
57. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that petitioner
habitually commits offences punishable under section
Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code/BNS
and hence comes under the purview of anti-social element
as defined in section 2(d)(i) of the Act 2002.
58. Further the question of subjective satisfaction of the
authority concerned while passing the order of detention is
questioned herein and has submitted by the learned counsel
for the petitioner that there is absence of material linking
habitual criminality of the petitioner, therefore in absence of
subjective satisfaction, the order of preventive detention is
bad in law.
59. Before, proceeding further, it would be pertinent to
mention the case of Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana,
(2023) 9 SCC 587, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court has laid
down certain principles to be observed by the Constitutional
Court while examining the legality of orders of preventive
detention. Paragraph-28 of this judgment is quoted herein
below-
“28. In the circumstances of a given case, a constitutional court
31
2026:JHHC:21445-DBwhen called upon to test the legality of orders of preventive
detention would be entitled to examine whether:
“28.1. The order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit
subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such
satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon
which validity of the exercise of the power is predicated, would
be the sine qua non for the exercise of the power not being
satisfied;
28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining
authority has applied its mind to all relevant circumstances
and the same is not based on material extraneous to the scope
and purpose of the statute;
28.3. Power has been exercised for achieving the purpose for
which it has been conferred, or exercised for an improper
purpose, not authorised by the statute, and is therefore ultra
vires;
28.4. The detaining authority has acted independently or
under the dictation of another body;
28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of self-created rules
of policy or in any other manner not authorised by the
governing statute, has disabled itself from applying its mind
to the facts of each individual case; 28.6. The satisfaction of
the detaining authority rests on materials which are of
rationally probative value, and the detaining authority has
given due regard to the matters as per the statutory mandate;
28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind
existence of a live and proximate link between the past
conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him or
is based on material which is stale;
28.8. The ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction
is/are such which an individual, with some degree of
rationality and prudence, would consider as connected with
the fact and relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry in
respect whereof the satisfaction is to be reached;
28.9. The grounds on which the order of preventive detention
rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant
which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the
satisfaction for the detention, giving him the opportunity to
make a suitable representation; and
28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law, have been32
2026:JHHC:21445-DBstrictly adhered to.”
60. Hence, Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Ameena
Begum v. State of Telangana (supra), on the issue of
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority has laid
down that the order based on the requisite satisfaction,
albeit subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence
of such satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or
law, upon which validity of the exercise of the power is
predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of the
power not being satisfied. Hon’ble Apex Court further laid
down that the Court may examine that the satisfaction has
been arrived at bearing in mind existence of a live and
proximate link between the past conduct of a person and the
imperative need to detain or is based on material which is
stale.
61. In the present case, ongoing to the impugned
detention order, passed by the detaining authority
Respondent No. 3 dated 21.10.2025(Anneure-1), it is evident
that the sequence of criminal cases registered against the
detenue.
62. This Court has gone through the impugned order
dated 21.10.2025 wherefrom it is evident that authority
concerned has taken note of the fact that petitioner has been
an active member of PLFI extremist group whose main
profession has been extortion of money in the name of the
organization by spreading terror and fear in the society.
33
2026:JHHC:21445-DB
Mahavir Gope (petitioner herein) has been habitually
engaged in criminal activities which ranges from criminal
conspiracy, extortion and the cases under arms act which
are prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order. The
catena of criminal cases against the said Mahavir Gope as
contained in the letter No. 902/Anuo dated 26.09.2025 of
Sub-Divisional Police Officer Torpa and substantiated by
Jariyagarh PS case No. 02/2025 on 02.01.2025 under
section 308/111/61(2)/3(5) of BNS and under section 25(1-
B)a/25(6) /26/35 of Arms Act and 17 CLA act and
Jariyagarh PS case No. 01/25 dated 01.01.2025 under
section 308(4)/3(5) of BNS and 17 CLA Act, shows that the
continued criminal activities as evidenced by the multiple
criminal cases pending against petitioner demonstrate a
proclivity to disturb the public peace and order.
63. It is further evident from the sub paragraph of the
said order of detention that the detaining authority has
expressly noted his satisfaction based upon the material
available on record and has mentioned that he is satisfied
subjectively and objectively with the material and report
placed before him that the activities of petitioner are not
merely a matter of ‘Law and Order’ but constitute a grave
threat to “Public Order” thereby making it necessary to
detain him (Mahavir Gope) in order to prevent him from
acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of Public
Order.
34
2026:JHHC:21445-DB
64. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that authority
concerned has expressed its subjective satisfaction based
upon the material available against the petitioner. Further it
is apparent that the detaining authority respondent no.3
while passing the detention order 21.10.2025 (Annexure-1),
was satisfied that petitioner if released from jail will act in
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
65. In the present case, the factual aspect as has been
dealt with hereinabove while deciding the issue, this Court
is of view that the detaining authority has taken into
consideration the fact in entirety which shows the subjective
satisfaction based upon the document as found to be
available with the recommending authority which has been
accepted by the detaining authority. Further, the,
satisfaction has been arrived by the detaining authority
bearing in mind existence of live and proximate link between
the past conduct of a petitioner and material which is not
stale and is in consonance of the judgment rendered by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ameena Begum v. State
of Telangana and others(supra).
66. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid factual
aspect is of the view that respondent authorities after being
satisfied from the material available on record has
considered that the petitioner comes under purview of ”Anti-
social Elements” as defined under section 2(d)(i) of the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and detention of
35
2026:JHHC:21445-DB
petitioner is required to maintain public order and while
arriving the said satisfaction, the authority concerned has
followed all the constitutional mandate therefore, order of
detention requires no inference by this Court.
67. Accordingly, Issue No.(iii) and Issue No.(iv) are hereby
answered.
68. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the orders of
detention need no interference.
69. Accordingly, the detention order dated 21.10.2025
(Annexure-1) passed by the Respondent No.3 and order
dated 05.12.2025 (Annexure-3), passed by the Respondent
No.2 confirming the detention order and the subsequent
orders 09.01.2026 (Annexure-3/1) and 10.04.2026
extending the period of detention, passed by the respondent
no. 2 requires no interference.
70. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands
dismissed.
71. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands
dispose of.
I agree. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.)
Date : 20/07/2026
Birendra / A.F.R.
Uploaded On: - 21/07/2026
36
