Himachal Pradesh High Court
Ram Lal vs State Of H.P. & Another on 20 July, 2026
( 2016:HHC:11065
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 112 of 2016
Reserved on: 06.07.2026
.
Date of Decision: 20.07.2026
Ram Lal ...Petitioner
Versus
of
State of H.P. & another ....Respondents
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the petitioner : Ms Sheetal Vyas, Advocate.
For the Respondents/ : Mr Jitender K. Sharma,
State Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the
judgment dated 22.04.2016, passed by Learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned
Appellate Court), vide which the Judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 08.01.2016, passed by learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were
1
. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
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upheld ( The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
manner as they were arrayed before learned Trial Court for
convenience).
.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the Superintendent, Open Air Jail, Bilaspur,
H.P., filed a complaint against the accused Ram Lal for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 9 of H. P.
of
Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968 (in
short Prisoners Act). It was asserted that the accused Ram Lal
rt
was convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P., in Session Trial No. 78/7
of 2005 for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 396, 395, 460, 457, and 120-B of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC) on 30.12.2009. The accused applied for 40 days’
parole on 03.04.2012, which was sanctioned, and the accused
was released on parole on 21.07.2012. His parole was extended
for fourteen days, and he was to surrender on 15.09.2012;
however, he failed to do so. A wireless message was sent to
the police to arrest the accused. A telephonic message was
received from the Crime Branch, Chandigarh, on 15.11.2013
that the accused was arrested by Chandigarh Police in F.I.R.
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No. 367 dated 15.11.2013 for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act. The custody of the
.
accused was handed over to the Superintendent of Jail for
serving the sentence. The respondent had overstayed by 1 year
and 2 months on the date of his arrest. Hence, a complaint
was made for taking action against the accused as per the law.
of
3. The Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
rt
accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 9 of the Prisoners Act, to which he
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 6 witnesses to prove its
case. Bhanu Prakash (CW-1) is the complainant. Vikas Katoch
(CW-2) proved that the custody of the accused was
transferred from the Chandigarh Police. HC Jagdish (CW-3)
brought the accused from Chandigarh to Bilaspur. SI Suheel
Kumar (CW-4) arrested the accused with 220 Grams of
Charas. Sohan Lal (PW-5) proved the record. ASI Jagpal (CW-
6) proved the entries in the daily diary.
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5. The accused, in his statement recorded under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedures (CrPC),
admitted that he was convicted and sentenced by the Learned
.
Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin. He admitted that he
had applied for 42 days’ parole, which was extended by 14
days. He admitted that he was supposed to surrender on
15.09.2012. He claimed that his mother was unwell. He
of
admitted that he was arrested in F.I.R. No. 367 of 2013, dated
15.11.2012, and thereafter he was lodged in the Open-Air Jail,
rt
Bilaspur. He stated that the complaint was filed against him
because he was late in surrendering. He claimed that he was
busy with the treatment of his ailing mother. He did not
produce any evidence in his defence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution’s
case was duly proved on record that the accused had
overstayed his period of parole. The entry in the Daily Diary
(Ext.CW6/C) showed that the accused had left the village and
never contacted his parents after 14.09.2012, as per the
parents of the accused. The accused was arrested in another
case and could be brought to serve the sentence thereafter.
Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the
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commission of an offence punishable under Section 9 of the
Prisoners Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 1 year, pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of
.
payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for
1 month.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and sentence
imposed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an
of
appeal which was decided by the Learned Additional Session
Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate
rt
Court). The Appellate Court concurred with the findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused had
overstayed his parole by 1 year and 2 months. The statement
made by the accused under Section 313 of the CrPC
corroborated the prosecution’s case. The plea taken by the
accused that his mother was ill was not proved by any
material on record. He was apprehended with Charas, which
falsified the claim made by the accused that he had to look
after his mother. The learned Trial Court had imposed an
adequate sentence, which did not require any interference
from the Appellate Court; hence, the appeal was dismissed.
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8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed
by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present
revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in
.
appreciating the material placed before them. The behaviour
of the accused was good inside the jail. No constable had gone
to take the accused in custody. The accused had himself
informed the Chandigarh Police about his imprisonment in
of
Bilaspur jail. He could not surrender to the authorities due to
the illness of his mother. He was acquitted by this Court in his
rt
appeal. The benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was not
extended. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision
be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Courts
below be set aside.
9. I have heard Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
10. Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating
the material on record. The accused has been acquitted by this
Court in an appeal preferred by him. The plea taken by the
accused that his mother was ill was highly probable, and the
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accused had no intention of absconding. The learned Trial
Court had imposed a severe sentence. Hence, she prayed that
the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order
.
passed by the learned Courts below be set aside, or in the
alternative, the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court
be reduced. She relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of Haryana: 2025 INSC
of
475 in support of her submissions.
11. Mr
rt Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that
the petitioner/accused had not surrendered within the time
granted to him. He was arrested by Chandigarh Police with
Charas, which falsified the plea taken by him that his mother
was ill and he was getting her treated. There is no infirmity in
the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below.
This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings
of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed
that the present revision be dismissed.
12. I have given a considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the
records carefully.
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13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a
.
revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only
rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It
was observed at page 207-
“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions,
of
at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are
concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two
courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and
evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal
rt
revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise
the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scopeof interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section
397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC“)
vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the
regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court.
The object of the provision is to set right a patentdefect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be
a well-founded error that is to be determined on themerits of individual cases. It is also well settled that
while considering the same, the Revisional Court does
not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of thecase to reverse those findings.
14 This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court
under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the::: Downloaded on – 20/07/2026 20:36:00 :::CIS
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power to call for and examine records of an inferior
court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the
legality and regularities of any proceeding or order
made in a case. The object of this provision is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or.
the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v.
Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ)687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397
has been considered and succinctly explained as under:
(SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
of
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of
an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying
itself as to the legality and regularity of any
rt proceedings or order made in a case. The object
of this provision is to set right a patent defect oran error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a
well-founded error, and it may not be
appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders,
which, upon the face of it, bear a token of carefulconsideration and appear to be in accordance
with law. If one looks into the various judgments
of this Court, it emerges that the revisionaljurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions
under challenge are grossly erroneous, there isno compliance with the provisions of law, the
finding recorded is based on no evidence,
material evidence is ignored, or judicialdiscretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely.
These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely
indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a
very limited one and cannot be exercised in a
routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is
that it should not be against an interim or
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interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in
mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where
the Court is dealing with the question as to
whether the charge has been framed properly
.
and in accordance with law in a given case, it
may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction unless the case
substantially falls within the categories
aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a
much-advanced stage in the proceedings under
CrPC.”
of
15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8
SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC
rt
OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the
absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope
of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for
exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court.
In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath JathavedanNamboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while
considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction ofthe High Court, this Court has laid down the following:
(SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)
5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court
can call for and examine the record of any
proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But
the said revisional power cannot be equated with
the power of an appellate court, nor can it be::: Downloaded on – 20/07/2026 20:36:00 :::CIS
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treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate
for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence
and come to its conclusion on the same when the
evidence has already been appreciated by the
.
Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in
appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to
the notice of the High Court which would
otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of
justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment
of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint,
we have no hesitation in concluding that the
of
High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in
interfering with the conviction of the respondent
by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to
rt
and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this
Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray
Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19].
This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the
order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely
on the ground that another view is possible. The
following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)
“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate
is perverse or the view taken by the court is
wholly unreasonable or there is non-
consideration of any relevant material or there is
palpable misreading of records, the Revisional
Court is not justified in setting aside the order,
merely because another view is possible. The
Revisional Court is not meant to act as an
appellate court. The whole purpose of the
revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in
the court to do justice in accordance with the
principles of criminal jurisprudence. The
revisional power of the court under Sections 397
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to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an
appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose
decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be
perverse or untenable in law or is grossly
erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where
.
the decision is based on no material or where the
material facts are wholly ignored or where the
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously, the courts may not interfere with
the decision in exercise of their revisional
jurisdiction.”
16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
of
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC
(Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at
rt
page 205:
“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in theabsence of perversity, upset concurrent factual
findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse
and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.
Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC457, it is a well-established principle of law that the
Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order
is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absenceof a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first
question is, therefore, in the negative.”
17. The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
18. Bhanu Prakash (CW-1) stated that the accused had
applied for parole for 42 days vide application (Ext.CW1/A).
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The application was allowed vide letter (Ext.CW-1/C). The
personal bond of the accused (Ext.CW-1/D) was received. A
temporary release order was prepared, and he was released on
.
parole with effect from 21.07.2012 till 31.08.2012. He was to
surrender on 01.09.2012, but his parole was extended by 14
days. The accused was to surrender on 15.09.2012, but he
failed to surrender. An intimation (Ext.CW1/G) was given to
of
Station House Officer (SHO), Ghumarwin, District Bilapsur,
H.P. A telephone call was received from Crime Branch
rt
Chandigarh on 15.03.2013, that the accused was arrested by
Chandigarh Police in FIR No. 367 of 2013. The custody of the
accused was handed over to the jail. The accused had
overstayed his parole by 1 year and 2 months. He stated in his
cross-examination that the conduct of the accused was good.
He had earlier gone on parole but had surrendered on time.
The accused had himself told the Chandigarh Police about his
incarceration. He could not say that the accused had gone to
Chandigarh for the treatment of his mother.
19. The cross-examination of this witness shows that
the accused has not disputed his sentence, his release on
parole, his failure to surrender after the parole and his arrest
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by Chandigarh police in an NDPS case. The accused also
admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the
CrPC. that he had applied for parole. Parole was sanctioned to
.
him for 42 days, which was extended by 14 days, and he had
not surrendered on time. He also admitted that he was
arrested by the police in FIR No. 367 of 2013, and thereafter,
he was lodged in the Open Air Jail, Bilaspur, H.P. He also
of
claimed that the complaint was filed against him because he
had overstayed his parole. Learned Appellate Court had rightly
rt
held that the statement made by the accused under Section
313 of CrPC can be used to lend assurance to the prosecution’s
case. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State
of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC
(Cri) 705: 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon
the statement of the accused recorded under section 313 of the
Cr.P.C. It was observed at page 742:
“51. That brings us to the question of whether such a
statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can
constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is
administered to the accused, the statements made by
the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is
why sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not
render himself liable to punishment if he gives false
answers. Then comes sub-section (4), which reads:
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“313. (4) The answers given by the accused may
be taken into consideration in such inquiry or
trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any
other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence
which such answers may tend to show he has.
committed.”
Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to
his examination under Section 313 can be taken into
consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is
clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section.
Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section
(4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in
of
the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B.
Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri LJ
95. This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v.
State of M.B. 1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC
rt
468, held that an answer given by an accused under
Section 313 examination can be used for proving his
guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution
witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR
678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730, this Court held that if the
accused confesses to the commission of the offence
with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon
that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the
exact language in which the three-Judge bench
answered the question, it would be advantageous to
reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685:
“Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it
is material, the Court may at any stage of theenquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the
prosecution have been examined and before the
accused is called upon for his defence shall put
questions to the accused person for the purpose
of enabling him to explain any circumstance
appearing in the evidence against him.
Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be
directed to those matters on which evidence has
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the accused his version or explanation, if any, of
the incident which forms the subject-matter of
the charge and his defence. By sub-section (3),
the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken
into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. If.
the accused person in his examination under Section
342 confesses to the commission of the offence
charged against him the court may, relying upon
that confession, proceed to convict him, but if hedoes not confess and in explaining circumstance
appearing in the evidence against him sets up his
own version and seeks to explain his conductof
pleading that he has committed no offence, the
statement of the accused can only be taken into
consideration in its entirety.” (emphasis
rt supplied)
Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-
section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that itnow stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso
added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where
the presence of the accused is dispensed with, his
examination under clause (b) may also be dispensedwith. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old
sub-section (4), asd the present sub-section (3)
corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the
change necessitated on account of the abolition of thejury system. The present sub-section (4) with which
we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the oldsub-section (3). Therefore, the aforestated
observations apply with equal force.”
20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri)
1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the
accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence
to the evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement
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cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at
page 244:
27. The statement made in defence by the accused
.
under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to
lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution,
but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the
sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is
almost settled that the statement under Section 313
CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or
of
in part. It may also be possible to rely on the
inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory
part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led
by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar
rt
(1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp. 357-58,
para 23)
“23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the
statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently
improbable but is contradicted by the other
evidence. According to this statement, the injury
that the appellant received was caused by the
appellant’s attempt to catch hold of the hand of
Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the
victim. This was contradicted by the statement of
the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to
the effect that he had received the injury in a
scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his
body when he was examined by the doctor on 13-
10-1961, negatives of both these versions.
Neither of these versions accounts for the profuse
bleeding which led to his washing his clothes and
having a bath in River Patro, the amount of
bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains
being so considerable as to attract the attention
of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him
about the cause thereof. The bleeding was not a
simple one as his clothes all got stained with
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blood, as also his books, his exercise book, his
belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife
which was discovered on his person was found to
have been stained with blood according to the
report of the Chemical Examiner. According to
.
the post-mortem report, this knife could have
been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In
circumstances like these, there being enough
evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the
statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High
Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory
part and piercing the same with the other evidence
of
to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the
person responsible for the crime.” (emphasis
supplied)
21. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of
rt
Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC
OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under
Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the prosecution’s
case, can be used against him for recording a conviction. It
was observed at page 275: –
“52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation
to put material evidence to the accused under Section
313 CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of
recording a statement under this provision of the CrPCis to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the
circumstances appearing against him as well as to put
forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once
he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences
in law must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of
this opportunity, then his statement made under
Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the
prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a::: Downloaded on – 20/07/2026 20:36:00 :::CIS
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conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the
consequences in law.”
22. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v.
State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014
.
SCC OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the
accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used
to lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution
witnesses. It was held at page 761: –
of
24. We are of the view that, under Section 313
statement, if the accused admits that, from the
rt
evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained
severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and
his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court in State
of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700:
1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held that since no oath is
administered to the accused, the statement made bythe accused under Section 313 CrPC will not be
evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of course,
shall not render himself liable to punishment merelyon the basis of answers given while he was being
examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section(4) says that the answers given by the accused in
response to his examination under Section 313 CrPC
can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry ortrial. This Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of
Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953
Cri LJ 1933 held that the answers given by the accused
under Section 313 examination can be used for
proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the
prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab
(1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678, this Court held
that when the accused confesses to the commission of::: Downloaded on – 20/07/2026 20:36:00 :::CIS
20( 2016:HHC:11065
the offence with which he is charged, the court may
rely upon the confession and proceed to convict him.
25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10
SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244,
para 27)
.
“27. The statement made in defence by the
accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly
be taken aid of to lend credence to theevidence led by the prosecution, but only a
part of such statement under Section 313 CrPC
cannot be made the sole basis of his
conviction.”
of
In this connection, reference may also be made to the
judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v.
Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri)
rt
1185 and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11
SCC 467: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766. The abovementioned
decisions would indicate that the statement of the
accused under Section 313 CrPC for the admission of
his guilt or confession as such cannot be made the sole
basis for finding the accused guilty, the reason being
he is not making the statement on oath, but all the
same the confession or admission of guilt can be taken
as a piece of evidence since the same lends credence to
the evidence led by the prosecution.
26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given
by the accused while examining him under Section 313,
fully corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and
hence the offences levelled against the appellant stand
proved, and the trial court and the High Court have
rightly found him guilty for the offences under
Sections 326, 436 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.”
23. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the findings
recorded by the learned Courts below that the accused had
overstayed his parole by I year and two months.
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( 2016:HHC:11065
24. It was submitted that no constable had visited the
house of the accused to arrest him. This submission is only
stated to be rejected. This Court held in State of H.P. v. Ram Lal
.
2006 Cri LJ 3070 that the prisoner is supposed to surrender
himself to the Superintendent of jail from which he was
released after the expiry of the parole, and in case of failure to
surrender within 10 days without any sufficient cause, he is
of
liable to be punished. It was observed:
“7. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it
rt
clear that the prisoner, on expiry of the period for
which he is released under the Act, shall surrenderhimself to the Superintendent of the jail from which he
was released. In case he does not surrender within 10
days from the due date, he can be arrested by a police
officer without a warrant. In case the prisonersurrenders within a period of 10 days after the due date
and satisfies the Superintendent of the concerned Jail
that he was prevented by sufficient cause fromsurrendering on the due date, no action is to be taken
against him. In case he fails to satisfy theSuperintendent that he was prevented by any sufficient
cause, he will be liable to be awarded specified
penalties by the Superintendent. In case surrender wasnot within 10 days, the prisoner will further be liable to
be punished under S. 9 of the Act. In view of the scheme
of the aforesaid sections, I am of the view that the
accused will be liable to be punished under S. 9 read
with S. 8(2) of the Act only if he has failed to surrender
on the due date without any sufficient cause preventing
him from surrendering himself. However, in case the
prisoner is prevented by a sufficient cause from::: Downloaded on – 20/07/2026 20:36:00 :::CIS
22( 2016:HHC:11065
surrendering himself on the due date, he cannot be
convicted and punished under S. 9 of the Act.
25 Thus, the plea taken on behalf of the accused that
the police had failed to visit his native place to take him to jail
.
is contrary to the provisions of the Prisoners Act and will not
help him.
26. The accused claimed that his mother was ill and he
of
could not surrender because of his mother’s illness. He did
not produce any evidence to support this plea. He did not file
rt
any medical evidence to show the illness of his mother. He did
not examine his mother to prove this fact. The accused had
not himself surrendered but was arrested by the Chandigarh
Police with Charas. All these circumstances falsified the plea
taken by the accused that his mother was ill and he had
sufficient cause for overstaying.
27. Sohan Lal (CW-5) stated in his cross-examination
that the accused was granted parole due to the illness of his
mother, and this fact was verified by the police. Subsequently,
it was found that the accused was getting his mother’s
treatment, because of which he could not surrender to jail. A
heavy reliance was placed upon the part of this statement to
submit that the accused had a sufficient cause for not
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23
( 2016:HHC:11065
surrendering on time. However, this submission is not
acceptable. The statement made by this witness is hearsay
and inadmissible in evidence. If the hearsay evidence is to be
.
admitted, the entry made in the daily diary (Ext.W6/E) and
the statement of the mother of the accused (Ext.CW6/F)
cannot be ignored, in which it was stated that the accused had
only visited the house for one day on 07.06.2015 and not
of
thereafter. However, both these pieces of evidence are
inadmissible and will not help any party.
rt
28. The burden to prove the sufficient cause was upon
the accused. He could have discharged it by bringing on record
the prescription slips or the treatment record, but he failed to
do so, and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the
accused had overstayed his parole without any sufficient
cause.
29. In Karan Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that the amendment made by the legislature in the
Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners Temporary Release
Amendment Act, 2012, was not retrospective. It is difficult to
see how this judgment will help the accused. There is no
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24
( 2016:HHC:11065
amendment in the present case, and the cited judgment does
not apply to the facts of the present case.
30. Parole is a privilege granted to the accused on the
.
assurance that he will return after availing the period of
parole. It helps the accused to maintain social ties with
society. Any deviation in adhering to the parole conditions
can have a cascading effect because other prisoners released
of
on parole are likely to violate the conditions of their parole, if
any violation is treated with leniency. This would bring the
rt
whole penal system to its knees and would prevent the
extension of benefits to the deserving candidates when the
prisoners fail to surrender within the time granted to them.
Therefore, no leniency can be shown in case of the violation of
the parole conditions. In the present case, the accused was
arrested for possession of charas during parole, and he had
not surrendered even after the overstay. The accused had
overstayed his parole by one year and two months. All these
circumstances show that the petitioner did not deserve any
sympathy, and the sentence imposed by the learned Trial
Court of one year is on the lesser side, which does not require
any interference.
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25
( 2016:HHC:11065
31. No other point was urged.
32. In view of the above, the present revision petition
fails, and it is dismissed. All the pending applications(s), if
.
any, also stand disposed of.
33. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the
learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith
of
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
20th July, 2026.rt
(ravinder)
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