Chattisgarh High Court
Mansingh Nishad vs The State Of Chhattisgarh on 6 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
Digitally signed by
MOHAMMED
AADIL KHAN
Date: 2026.07.14
18:59:27 +0530
CGHC010056522023 2026:CGHC:27635-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 397 of 2023
1 - Mansingh Nishad S/o Baldau Nishad, Aged About 19 Years, R/o
Village Padmi, Police Chouki Devarbeeja, Police Station and District
Bemetara (C.G.)
...Appellant
versus
1 - The State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police
Station Bemetara, District Bemetara (C.G.)
... Respondent
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant : Ms. Madhunisha Singh, Advocate.
For State : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Addl. Advocate General.
For Objector : Mr. Dheerendra Pandey, Advocate.
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
06-07-2026
1. The present criminal appeal has been filed under Section 374(2)
of the Cr.P.C. against the the impugned judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 28-01-2023 passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge, F.T.S.C. (POCSO Act) Bemetara, District Bemetara
(C.G.), in Sessions Case No. 47/2022 whereby the appellant has been
convicted and sentenced in the following manner with a direction to run
all the jail sentences concurrently:-
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Conviction Sentence
U/s 341 of the IPC Fine of Rs.500/- in default of payment of
fine amount S.I. for 1 month,
U/s 323 of the IPC Fine of Rs.500/- in default of payment of
fine amount S.I. for 1 month,
U/s 506 Part II of the IPC R.I. for 2 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in
default of payment of fine amount further
R.I. for 2 months,
U/s 6 of POCSO Act R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-,
in default of payment of fine amount
further R.I. for 2 months,
U/s 376(2)(j)(n) of the IPC No separate sentence has been
awarded.
U/s 376(3) of the IPC No separate sentence has been
awarded.
2. The prosecution case, in brief is that, PW-1 father of the victim
lodged a written report Ex.-P/1 to the Police Station Bemetara, Police
Outpost, Devarbija, District Bemetara (C.G.) with the allegation that his
minor daughter had gone to the school and at about 12:00 in the noon
when she returned she disclosed that while going to school on the way
the appellant stopped her and asked to go with him and when she
refused, he abused and assaulted her. Two months back also the
appellant kidnapped his minor daughter and when he came to know
about his act, he scolded him and asked not to repeat the incident in
future. His daughter has also informed that on 09.02.2022 the appellant
committed rape upon her by giving allurement of marriage and since
then he continued his physical relation with her. Based on the written
complaint the FIR Ex.-P/2 was lodged and the police registered the
offence against the appellant under Section 341, 294, 506, 323, 376,
3
376(2)(n) of the IPC and Section 4,5(l) and 6 of the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short ‘POCSO Act‘). The
victim was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital
Bemetara where she was medically examined by PW-10 Doctor Sabida
who gave her report Ex.-P/35. While medically examining the victim the
doctor has noticed her hymen was ruptured, however, no external injury
was found and no sigh of forceful intercourse was present. Two slides of
her vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed over to police for
its chemical examination. Spot map Ex.-P/3 was prepared by police and
Ex.-P/4 was prepared by Patwari. With respect to the age and date of
birth of the victim, the police has seized the school register vide seizure
memo Ex.-P/14 and after retaining attested true copy of the school
register the original school register was returned back to the school and
the attested true copy of the school register is Ex.-P/15(C). The police
has also seized mark sheet of Class 5th of the victim in which her date of
birth is recorded as 19-07-2008, which has been seized vide seizure
memo Ex.-P/6. The appellant was arrested on 26-07-2022 and he too
was sent for his medical examination to Primary Health Center
Devarbija where he was medically examined by PW-7 Doctor Aditya
Dipak who gave his report Ex.-P/19 While medically examining the
appellant the doctor has found the the patient is eligible for sexual
intercourse. The underwear of the appellant was also seized and it was
sent for its query report to the doctor who gave his query report
Ex.-P/20 and referred the same fo its chemical examination The
underwear of the victim, her vaginal slides and underwear of the
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appellant were sent for its chemical examination to State FSL Raipur
from where report Ex.-P/32 was received in which no semen and
sperms were found on the sent articles.
3. The statement of the witnesses under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.
has also been recorded and after completion of usual investigation
charge sheet was filed against the appellant before the learned trial
Court for the offence under Section 341, 294, 506, 323, 376, 376(2)(n),
354 and 354D of the IPC and Section 4, 5(l), 6 and 8 of POCSO Act.
The learned trial Court has framed charge against the appellant for the
for the offence under Section 341, 294, 323, 376(2)(j)(n), 376(3) and
506 Part II of the IPC and Section 5(l)/6 of POCSO Act. The appellant
denied the charge and claimed trial.
4. To prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has
examined as many as 10 witnesses. The statement of appellant under
Section 313 CrPC has also been recorded in which he denied the
circumstances that appears against him, pleaded innocence and has
submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence in question.
5. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by
the prosecution, the learned trial Court has acquitted the appellant from
the offence under Section 294 of the IPC and has convicted and
sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence
this appeal.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of the
5
prosecution witnesses and the evidence are not sufficient to hold the
appellant guilty for the offence in question. The victim and the appellant
had love affair and there was consensual relationship between them.
Only on the pressure made by her parents the victim has made
allegations against the appellant. She would further submit that for the
alleged commission of offence dated 09-02-2022 the FIR was lodged on
25-07-2022 and in between that period the victim did not disclose the
incident to anyone and she repeatedly engaged in making consensual
physical relation upto 16-07-2022 which itself demonstrates that she
was a consenting party in making physical relation with the appellant. It
is also submitted that no injury or any mark of struggle was found on the
body of the victim and the FSL report also does not corroborate the
case of prosecution. She would further submit that age of the victim has
also not been proved by producing sufficient and cogent evidence and
there are material discrepancies in the evidence with respect to the age
of the victim. Therefore, in absence of any cogent and clinching
evidence, the appellant cannot be convicted and he is entitled for
acquittal.
7. On the other hand, the counsel for the State opposes the
submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and has
submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt. But for minor omissions and contradictions the evidence of the
victim as well as other prosecution witnesses are reliable and sufficient
to hold the appellant guilty for the alleged offence. He would further
submit that absence of injury alone is not sufficient to disbelieve the
6
evidence of the victim who has duly supported the prosecution case.
The age of the victim has also been proved by leading cogent evidence
and documents obtained from the school of the victim which has been
duly proved by the prosecution. As per the school record, the victim is
found to be minor and less than 16 years of age. There are sufficient
and overwhelming evidence against the appellant that he committed the
alleged offence with the victim and the learned trial Court has rightly
convicted and sentenced him and his appeal is liable to be dismissed.
8. We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the
records of the case.
9. The first and foremost question arose by learned counsel for the
appellant is regarding the age of the victim.
10. The prosecution sought to prove the age of the victim by relying
upon the school register Ex.-P/15(C) and Class 5 th mark sheet of the
victim Article A which was sought to be proved by PW-3, her school’s
Head Master. PW-3 has stated in his evidence that the police has
seized school register with respect to age and date of birth of the victim
vide seizure memo Ex.-P/14 and after retaining the attested true copy of
the school register Ex.-P/15(C) the original school register was returned
back to the school which he brought today with him. In the school
register the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 19-07-2008 and
she admitted in the school in Class 1. In cross-examination he admitted
that at the time of admission of the victim in the school her parents have
not brought her birth certificate. He voluntarily stated that at the time of
7
her admission in the school he was not the Head Master of the school,
therefore, he did not know the same. He also admitted that in the school
register Ex.-P/15 there is over writing in the date of admission of the
victim in the school, but who made the over writing he did not know.
From the evidence of this witness it is clear that he is not the author of
the school register and there is no document on the basis of which the
date of birth of the victim is recorded in the the school register.
11. Admissibility and the evidentiary value of the school register has
been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alamelu
and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, reported
in 2011 (2) SCC 385, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as
under in paragraphs 40, and 48 that :
“40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl’s date
of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid
certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16
days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer
certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly
signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence
under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of
such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of
the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was
recorded.
48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian
Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same
standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be
appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of
Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 584] held as follows:-
“The age of a person as recorded in the school register or
otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for
8obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting
election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under
the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a
civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by
a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff
being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or
any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A
court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a party to
the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the
Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different
standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of
abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the
prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if
on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the
school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would
be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the
Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be
convicted.”
12. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under :
“33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid
catena of judgments is as follows:
33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the
provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would
have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as
to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age
of the person as nearly as may be.
XXXX XXXX XXX
33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the
person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial
burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii),
and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-
9
section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima
facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid
documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.
33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age
of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by
the opposite side.
33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing
as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ
Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal
court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion
but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of
section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence.
Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true
age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an
inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the
determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made
on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of
such acceptance.
33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract
formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of
the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the
parties in each case.
33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should
not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in
support of the plea that he was a juvenile.
33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should
lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline
cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is
made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time,
the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by
persons to escape punishment after having committed serious
offences.
33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence
such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be
10
considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as
any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official
duty would have greater credibility than private documents.
33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents,
such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the
JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as
per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other
provisions.
33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age
determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person
cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by
radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence
but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of
documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.”
13. Further, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by
Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :
“14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth
certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the
concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of
which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority
or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such
documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or
“any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders
of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the
present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of
birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered.
Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the
victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced
not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e.,
CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it
alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon
a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the
concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that
the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were
11
missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of
documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer
certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was
below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.
15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors. [2022 (8) SCC 602] this court outlined the procedure to
be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was
dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in
pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:
“20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to
be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person
in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis
of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an
inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ
Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the
matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the
absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the
school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the
absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a
corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the
absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion
could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to
declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided
that while determination was being made, benefit could be
given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower
side within the margin of one year.”
16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the
various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev
Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors [2019] 9 SCR 735]
that:
“Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate
from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate
from the concerned examination board in the same category
(namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides
for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal
authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii)
that age determination by means of medical analysis is
12provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over
the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the
Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)
(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given
precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not
being available that the date of birth certificate from the school
first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the
date of birth certificate from the school as well as the
matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same
category.
17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal
[(2012) 9 SCR 224], this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the
burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed
age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court
indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of
preference.”
14. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the victim PW-2 has
stated that her date birth is 19-07-2008. In cross-examination para 9
she stated that she did not know the date of birth of her brother and
sisters. She admitted that she disclosed her date of birth based on the
school record.
15. PW-1 is the father of the victim. He has not disclosed any date of
birth of the victim, but has stated that she born in the year 2008. In the
cross-examination he admitted that he could not tell about the date of
birth of his other children. The date of birth of the victim has not
recorded in the kotwari register and since the police personnel have not
enquired about the kotwari register he did not tell them about the same.
He himself has not admitted her in the school but his mother has got
13
admitted her in the school and she informed her date of birth in the
school.
16. PW-5 is the mother of the victim, she also did not state about the
date of birth, but she disclosed the year of her birth as 2008. In cross-
examination she admitted that her mother-in-law has got admitted the
victim in the school. She also admitted that they have not got prepared
the birth certificate of the victim and since her mother-in-law was
illiterate lady, she got the date of birth of the victim recorded in the
school on assumption.
17. The evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to the age
of the victim does not inspire confidence of this Court that the
prosecution has produced sufficient and cogent evidence to prove that
the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of
incident. In view of the above facts and evidence available on record
and also in view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to
prove that the victim was minor on the date of incident and less than 16
years of age, yet the learned trial Court has held her minor.
18. So far the offence of rape is concerned, we again carefully
examine the evidence of the victim PW-2. She has stated in her
evidence that on 16 February the appellant came to her house when
she was alone and after removing his and her clothes committed rape
upon her. When she tried to stop her and shouted he threatened her
with dire consequence. Thereafter the appellant committed the same
14
act for about 6 times. Three months back when she was going to
school, the appellant asked her to go with her and when she refused he
abused and threatened her. After returning from the school she
informed the incident to her grand-mother and parents and also
informed about the earlier incident of rape and then her father has
lodged the report to police. In cross-examination she stated that her
grand-mother was used to reside in her house. Her house is adjacent to
the houses of others where the neighbours are residing and if she
shouted it will be heard to her neighbours. She admitted that in her 164
Cr.P.C. statement she has not disclosed that she raised alarm at the
time of commission of rape upon her. She also admitted that she has
not disclosed any incident to her friends or any person in the school.
19. In the present case, the victim alleged the incident of rape on
dated 16 February, whereas the report has been lodged by her father on
25-07-2022 and in the FIR it has been mentioned that the appellant
engaged in repeated act of rape up to 16-07-2022, which the victim has
also stated in para 3 of her evidence. There is no any evidence that at
any point of time she informed about the act of the appellant to either
her friends or to any of the persons. Even she has not stated that she
raised alarm at the time of commission of rape. Though she simply
stated that she opposed the act of the appellant. Though the victim
raised allegation of rape upon the appellant, but she could not depose
the evidence with that quality which is required for conviction of the
appellant for the offence of rape without corroboration. In the present
15
case, the victim cannot put to the platform of sterling witness as has
been required for the same.
20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Santosh Prasad @
Santosh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar, 2020 (3) SSC 443, in which it was
observed as under:
“5.4.2 In the case of Rai Sandeep alias Deepu [Rai Sandeep alias
Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21], this Court had an
occasion to consider who can be said to be a “sterling witness”. In
paragraph 22, it is observed and held as under:
“22 In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of
a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore,
be unassailable. The court considering the version of such
witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value
without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the
status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be
relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a
witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency
of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely,
at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and
ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent
with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should
not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The
witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-
examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be
and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to
the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the
sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each
and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries
made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the
scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version
should consistently match with the version of every other witness.
It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in
the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be
16any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused
guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of
such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such
similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can
be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted
by the court without any corroboration and based on which the
guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the
said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain
intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral,
documentary and material objects should match the said version
in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the
offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting
materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”
21. PW-1 is the father of the victim and he has stated about the
incident whatever disclosed by his daughter/victim to him. However, in
cross-examination he also admitted that before the incident he did not
see the appellant coming to his house or the appellant and the victim
together. He is having no cordial relation with the appellant.
22. PW-5, mother of the victim has also stated about the same that
she deposed on the basis of the disclosure made by the victim about
the incident.
23. PW-10 Doctor Sabida who medically examined the victim does
not find any external or internal injury on her body and gave her report
Ex.-P/35, in the report she did not find any forceful sexual intercourse
upon the body of the victim. Further, in the FSL report Ex.-P/32 no
semen or sperms are found on the vaginal slide or underwear of the
victim. Therefore, there is no corroboration to the evidence of the victim
17
with respect to the allegation leveled against the appellant that he
committed rape upon her.
24. Since this court finds that the evidence of the victim does not
inspire confidence of the Court with respect to the alleged incident, the
allegation against the appellant for wrongful restraint the victim and
criminal intimidation with threat to dire consequences are also not found
proved in absence of cogent and clinching evidence and the appellant is
entitled for benefit of doubt for that also. Therefore, as the cumulative
effect of the evidence available on record, there are lack of
corroboration and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses suffer from
inherited contradictions and inconsistency for which the appellant is
entitled for benefit of doubt and his conviction under Section 341 and
506 Part II of the IPC also cannot be sustained. Further, since no
injuries has been found on the body of the victim and therefore, the
offence under Section 323 of the IPC for voluntarily causing simple hurt
to the victim is also found doubtful.
25. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. He is
acquitted from all the alleged offences and the impugned judgment of
conviction and sentence is set aside. The appellant is reported to be in
jail since 26-07-2022. He shall be released forthwith if not required in
any other case.
26. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant- Mansingh Nishad is
directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one
18
surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be
effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the
event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or
for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof,
shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
27. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent
back to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Aadil
