Telangana High Court
A. Shailaja vs Yogita Rana on 29 June, 2026
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR THE STATE OF
TELANGANA
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
CONTEMPT CASE No. 2110 OF 2025
29.06.2026
Between:
A.Shailaja & others
..... Petitioners
And
Yogita Rana,
Principal Secretary,
School Education Department & others
..... Respondents
O R D E R:
The image of justice in the popular imagination is
that of a woman who is blind-folded with a weighing scale in her
hand. The blindfold represents the idea of impartiality i.e. the
belief that the judge has to be completely neutral and decide the
matter before her without being influenced by any consideration
other than the merits of the case.
By Saurabh Kirpal (Chapter 11 – The Telecom
Counter-Revolution from FIFTEEN JUDGMENTS CASES THAT
SHAPED INDIA’S FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE)
Respondent authorities appear to be on the
erroneous assumption that symbolism of the blindfold denotes
2
inability of the justice delivery system to perceive or take
cognizance of manifest illegality. The contemporary conception
of Justice, as reflected in the recently unveiled Nyay Devatha by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, depicts Lady Justice with open
eyes, signifying that the law is neither oblivious nor indifferent,
but remains vigilant and sees every citizen equally while
administering justice without fear or favour. Further significant
is the replacement of the traditional sword with the Constitution
of India, symbolizing that the constitutional values, the rule of
law, and the protection of fundamental rights constitute the
true foundation of the justice delivery system, and not the
punitive legacy of colonial jurisprudence.
*****
Aggrieved by the action of Respondents in willfully
and deliberately disobeying the final order dated 21.03.2025 in
Writ Petition No. 1434 of 2020, petitioners are before this Court.
It is their case, this Court, after considering the entire
controversy relating to recruitment to the post of Secondary
Grade Teacher under Notification No.53 of 2017 dated
21.10.2017, had categorically directed Respondents to select
and appoint them as per their merit against the unfilled and
unclaimed vacancies by removing the names of candidates who
could have relinquished their candidature. According to
3
Petitioners, despite the order attaining finality, Respondents
failed to implement the directions issued by this Court and
instead, proceeded to issue a rejection order dated 16.06.2025
declining to extend the benefit of appointment to them. It is
therefore, alleged that the conduct of Respondents constitutes
willful and deliberate disobedience of a binding judicial order,
warranting initiation of contempt proceedings under the
2. Petitioners are candidates who participated in the
recruitment process initiated pursuant to Notification No.53 of
2017 dated 21.10.2017 issued by the Telangana State Public
Service Commission for recruitment to the posts of Secondary
Grade Teachers under the Teacher Recruitment Test conducted
for the School Education Department of the State of Telangana.
Petitioners, along with several similarly situated candidates,
filed Writ Petition challenging the action of the Telangana State
Public Service Commission in publishing the impugned
selection notifications dated 11.10.2019 pertaining to Telugu
Medium candidates and 02.11.2019 pertaining to English
Medium candidates for appointment to the post of Secondary
Grade Teacher under Notification No.53 of 2017 dated
21.10.2017. According to Petitioners, Respondents failed to
adhere to the procedure contained in Rule 6-A; despite the
4
existence of vacancies caused by non-joining and
relinquishment, Respondents failed to extend consideration to
eligible candidates standing next in order of merit and had
consequently deprived the Petitioners of their valuable right to
be considered for appointment.
2.1. Petitioners had specifically contended in the writ
proceedings that the Telangana State Public Service
Commission undertook appointments contrary to the procedure
prescribed under Rule 6-A and also contrary to the directions
issued by this Court in Writ Appeal No.419 of 2019 and batch
dated 30.08.2019. It was their consistent case that several
vacancies remained unfilled notwithstanding the availability of
eligible candidates and that the action of Respondents in not
filling such vacancies by considering candidates next in the
order of merit was arbitrary, illegal, discriminatory and violative
of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
2.2. It is asserted that the vacancies left unfilled were
not vacancies arising out of any subsequent recruitment
process but were vacancies directly relatable to Notification
No.53 of 2017 itself; once candidates selected under the
notification either failed to join duty or relinquished their claim
to appointment, Respondents were legally-obligated to treat
such vacancies as available vacancies under the same
5
recruitment notification and to fill them by considering
candidates next in the merit list. Respondents could not permit
such vacancies to remain unfilled nor could they divert the
same to any future recruitment process. This Court had initially
considered the issue and disposed of the writ petition along with
a batch of similar matters by order dated 24.06.2021 directing
Respondents to fill up all unfilled vacancies by strictly adhering
to Rule 6-A. According to petitioners, the said order clearly
recognised the obligation cast upon the Commission to fill
vacancies arising out of relinquishment and non-joining by
considering the next eligible candidates in order of merit.
2.3. Respondents, being aggrieved by the said order,
preferred Writ Appeal No.533 of 2021 and batch. The Division
Bench, while disposing of the Appeals on 26.10.2021, remanded
the matters for fresh consideration directing that each writ
petition be independently examined and appropriate findings be
rendered regarding the applicability and compliance of Rule 6-A.
Petitioners contend that the remand order did not dilute the
substantive rights asserted by them but merely required a
detailed examination of the facts pertaining to each individual
writ petition. Upon remand, the writ petition was heard at
considerable length. Petitioners contend that all relevant
records, vacancy particulars, details relating to relinquishment,
6
information concerning non-joining candidates and the legal
effect of Rule 6-A were examined by this Court before the final
judgment came to be rendered. According to Petitioners, the
entire controversy stood conclusively adjudicated by this Court
after a detailed consideration of the rival submissions advanced
by the parties.
2.4. It is stated, after examining the factual and legal
position, this Court allowed Writ Petition No. 1434 of 2020 by
the order under contempt; the operative portion is unequivocal
and leaves no room for ambiguity. This Court directed the
Telangana State Public Service Commission to select and
appoint Petitioners as per their merit and eligibility by removing
all candidates who had not responded to the web notification
and by treating such candidates as deemed to have relinquished
their candidature to the post of Secondary Grade Teacher under
Notification No.53 of 2017 dated 21.10.2017. Petitioners place
considerable emphasis on the language employed by this Court
in the operative portion of the order. According to them, the
direction issued by this Court was neither advisory nor
recommendatory in nature. On the contrary, it was a positive
and mandatory direction requiring implementation by the
Respondents; the order did not leave any discretion with the
Commission to re-examine their entitlement or to once again
7
adjudicate upon issues which had already attained finality
before this Court.
2.5. Petitioners further contend that the order under
contempt attained finality inasmuch as no writ appeal, review
petition or any other proceedings were initiated by the
Respondents; once the order attained finality, absolute
obedience to the directions contained therein became
mandatory and binding upon all authorities concerned.
Respondents, being instrumentalities entrusted with the
implementation of the order, were duty-bound to act strictly in
accordance with the directions contained therein. Instead of
implementing the same, Respondents proceeded to issue
rejection proceedings dated 16.06.2025 declining appointment
to petitioners. Rejection proceedings amount to a direct negation
of the order passed by this Court and effectively nullify the relief
granted to them in the writ proceedings.
2.6. Petitioners specifically contend that the rejection
order is founded upon grounds which were either expressly
considered and rejected by this Court while deciding the writ
petition or which ought to have been urged before this Court
during the pendency of the writ proceedings. Once the writ
petition stood allowed and directions were issued, Respondents
were not entitled to reopen the controversy by inventing fresh
8
reasons or by reasserting contentions which had already stood
concluded by the judgment. It is further stated, in support of
their case regarding the availability of vacancies, Petitioners
sought information under the Right to Information Act, 2005
from the educational authorities concerned; the information
furnished disclosed existence of several non-joining and unfilled
vacancies under TRT-2017; copies of the information so
furnished were placed before this Court and formed part of the
material considered while rendering the judgment dated
21.03.2025.
2.7. Petitioners further contend that the principal
justification now sought to be advanced by Respondents is that
the vacancies which remained unfilled pursuant to Notification
No.53 of 2017 were subsequently carried forward and notified
under DSC-2024 and that appointments were made against
those vacancies in the subsequent recruitment process. Such a
justification is wholly untenable and contrary to the law
declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Telangana State
Level Police Recruitment Board v. Narimetla Vamshi1.
Petitioners contend that the issue regarding carry forward of
vacancies had already been considered by this Court while
1
(2017) 14 SCC 797
9
deciding the writ petition and therefore could not be resurrected
as a ground to deny implementation of the judgment.
2.8. Petitioners contend that Respondents are effectively
attempting to sit in appeal over the judgment rendered by this
Court. According to them, instead of faithfully implementing the
directions contained in the judgment, they have undertaken a
fresh exercise of adjudication and have substituted their own
conclusions in place of the conclusions reached by this Court.
Such conduct, according to Petitioners, strikes at the very
foundation of the rule of law and undermines the authority of
judicial pronouncements. Reliance is placed upon the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Baranagore Jute Factory
PLC Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) v. Baranagore Jute Factory PLC 2.
It is contended that the Supreme Court has categorically held
that courts possess ample authority to ensure effective
implementation of their orders and to take restitutive measures
wherever necessary for undoing the consequences flowing from
non-compliance. Petitioners state that the said principle
squarely applies to the facts of the present case.
2.9. According to Petitioners, the conduct of
Respondents is not merely a case of delayed compliance or
mistaken interpretation; the rejection proceedings were
2
(2017) 5 SCC 506
10
consciously issued despite full knowledge of the judgment and
despite the fact that the judgment had attained finality; such
conduct clearly demonstrates deliberate, intentional and wilful
disobedience of the orders of this Court. It is therefore,
contended that all ingredients necessary for constituting civil
contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 stand fully established.
3. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of
respondents stating that the recruitment process was
undertaken strictly in accordance with the notifications
conditions, applicable service rules and reservation roster
requirements governing appointments to the post of Secondary
Grade Teacher. Writ Petition No. 1434 of 2020 was originally
filed challenging the action of the Commission in publishing the
provisional selection notifications dated 11.10.2019 relating to
Telugu Medium candidates and 02.11.2019 relating to English
Medium candidates. It is stated that the Petitioners had sought
a declaration that the appointments undertaken by the
Commission were contrary to Rule 6-A and contrary to the
directions issued by this Court in Writ Appeal No. 419 of 2019
and batch. Respondent, however, maintains that the
Commission had acted strictly in accordance with the
11
recruitment rules and had duly filled vacancies in the manner
contemplated under the applicable legal framework.
3.1. Respondents state that the post of Secondary Grade
Teacher is a district cadre post and that appointments thereto
are governed not merely by merit but also by various reservation
requirements, including district reservation, local reservation,
reservation for women and category-wise reservation prescribed
under the State and Subordinate Service Rules. According to
them, any consideration of vacancies and appointments must
necessarily be undertaken in the context of these reservation
requirements and cannot be determined solely on the basis of
merit position. As per the indent received from the School
Education Department, the total number of vacancies notified
under the Notification for the post of Secondary Grade Teacher
(Telugu Medium) were 3,786, out of which 3,642 were filled and
119 vacancies remained unfilled. Similarly, in respect of
Secondary Grade Teacher (English Medium), 909 vacancies were
notified, 892 were filled and 11 vacancies remained unfilled.
Existence of unfilled vacancies by itself does not automatically
entitle petitioners to appointment and that the nature and
category of such vacancies must be examined with reference to
reservation requirements and availability of eligible candidates.
12
3.2. Respondents further contend that pursuant to the
directions issued by this Court in the Writ Appeal, the
Commission had already undertaken the exercise of seeking
relinquishment from candidates who had been provisionally
selected; in respect of SGT (English Medium), forty-six
candidates relinquished their claim to appointment during the
period from 09.09.2019 to 16.09.2019. Immediately upon
receipt of such relinquishments, the Commission proceeded to
select the next meritorious candidates in accordance with the
applicable rules and filled all such vacancies. In respect of SGT
(Telugu Medium), eighty-one candidates relinquished their
claims to appointment; the vacancies arising out of such
relinquishments were also filled by considering candidates next
in order of merit and by strictly adhering to the recruitment
procedure. It is therefore contended that the Commission had
already complied with the mandate contained in Rule 6-A and
that no vacancy arising out of relinquishment remained
unattended.
3.3. Respondents further submit that district-wise
vacancy particulars clearly demonstrate that vacancies which
remained unfilled were not vacancies capable of being filled by
the Petitioners. According to Respondents, the remaining
vacancies pertained to specific reserved categories for which
13
eligible candidates were not available and therefore such
vacancies could not be filled by candidates belonging to different
categories or districts. Petitioners have incorrectly assumed that
every unfilled vacancy necessarily translates into an enforceable
right to appointment.
3.4. Insofar as Petitioners belonging to the English
Medium stream are concerned, it is stated, in the erstwhile
Ranga Reddy District, 238 vacancies were notified, 237
vacancies were filled and one vacancy remained unfilled. It is
specifically contended that the said vacancy was not available
for appointment since it was kept withheld on account of
judicial proceedings in Writ Petition No. 23005 of 2018.
Likewise, in the erstwhile Medak District, out of 137 notified
vacancies, 133 were filled and two vacancies remained unfilled.
According to these Respondents, these vacancies were also
withheld owing to pendency of Writ Petition No.15671 of 2018
and therefore could not have been utilised for appointing
Petitioners.
3.5. With regard to Telugu Medium stream, Respondents
state that in the erstwhile Ranga Reddy District, out of 588
notified vacancies, 576 vacancies were filled and nine vacancies
remained unfilled. Those vacancies belonged to specific reserved
categories such as BC-C (General), BC-C (Women), VH (Women)
14
and HH (Women). Some of these vacancies were additionally
withheld due to pending court proceedings including Writ
Petition No. 22527 of 2018 and Writ Petition No. 43591 of 2017.
Therefore, according to Respondents, such vacancies could not
have been utilised for accommodating petitioners.
3.6. In the erstwhile Medak District, out of 585 notified
vacancies, 573 vacancies were filled and ten vacancies remained
unfilled. According to Respondents, these vacancies pertained to
categories such as VH (General), VH (Women), HH (General), HH
(Women) and OH (Women); such vacancies remained unfilled
only because eligible candidates belonging to the concerned
reserved categories were not available and not because the
Commission failed to undertake the recruitment process in
accordance with law; vacancies which remained unfilled due to
non-availability of eligible candidates in reserved categories are
governed by the provisions relating to carry forward of
vacancies. According to them, such vacancies cannot
automatically be diverted to candidates belonging to other
categories merely because those candidates had participated in
the same recruitment process.
3.7. Respondents further state that after completion of
the recruitment process under Notification No.53 of 2017, the
backlog and non-joining vacancies were carried forward in
15
accordance with the applicable Government Orders and service
rules. According to Respondents, such vacancies were
subsequently included in DSC-2024 and were notified afresh for
recruitment. It is contended that eligible candidates were
selected and appointed against such vacancies in the
subsequent recruitment process and therefore no vacancy
presently exists against which petitioners could be
accommodated. While examining the claims of Petitioners
pursuant to the order dated 21.03.2025, the Commission
undertook a detailed verification of vacancy position, reservation
roster, category-wise eligibility and district-wise availability of
posts. Such examination revealed that Petitioners could not be
fitted against any available vacancy under the relevant
notification.
3.8. Respondents therefore, issued proceedings dated
16.06.2025 communicating the outcome of such examination. It
is contended that the issuance of the said proceedings was not
intended to disregard the judgment of this Court but was merely
an administrative exercise undertaken for determining the
feasibility of implementation of the judgment in accordance with
the applicable recruitment rules. Contempt jurisdiction cannot
be invoked for the purpose of adjudicating disputed questions
relating to vacancies, reservation roster, eligibility or entitlement
16
to appointment. According to Respondents, if Petitioners are
aggrieved by the conclusions recorded in the proceedings dated
16.06.2025, their remedy lies elsewhere in accordance with law
and not in proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
3.9. Respondents contend that contempt jurisdiction is
attracted only where there is clear and deliberate disobedience
of a judicial order. In the present case, according to
Respondents, the Commission has acted bona fide, examined
the claims of Petitioners and arrived at a conclusion based upon
the recruitment records. It is therefore, contended that no
element of willfulness can be attributed to the actions of the
Respondent.
4. Petitioners filed a reply contending that the entire
stand now sought to be projected by Respondent Commission is
nothing but an attempt to reopen issues which already stood
concluded by the order dated 21.03.2025 in Writ Petition
No.1434 of 2020. Every contention relating to vacancies,
reservation requirements, relinquishment, non-joining
candidates and applicability of Rule 6-A formed part of the
original writ proceedings and was considered by this Court
before the final judgment came to be rendered. According to
them, once this Court had adjudicated the controversy and
issued specific directions, Respondents were bound to faithfully
17
implement the same and could not be permitted to revisit the
merits of the dispute under the guise of implementation.
4.1. The contention of Respondents that vacancies had
already been filled by considering candidates who relinquished
their claims is wholly irrelevant to the issue arising in the
present Contempt Case. The very foundation of the writ petition
was existence of vacancies which continued to remain unfilled
despite the operation of Rule 6-A; existence of such vacancies
was accepted and recognized by this Court while rendering the
order under contempt. Therefore, Respondents cannot now seek
to contend that there were no vacancies available for
accommodating Petitioners. It is also stated, the plea raised by
Respondents regarding reservation requirements and category-
wise vacancy distribution is equally untenable; if such a plea
was available to Respondents, the same ought to have been
effectively established during the writ proceedings. Having failed
to persuade this Court to accept such a contention at the stage
of adjudication, Respondents cannot now rely upon the very
same grounds to avoid compliance with the final judgment.
According to petitioners, the contempt proceedings are
concerned not with the correctness of the original judgment but
with obedience thereto, therefore, Respondents cannot be
18
permitted to indirectly challenge the findings already recorded
by this Court.
4.2. Petitioners specifically deny the contention that the
vacancies in question were unavailable on account of pending
writ petitions or judicial orders. Even assuming that certain
vacancies were withheld owing to pending litigation, the
Respondents have failed to establish how such withheld
vacancies completely extinguished the rights recognised in
favour of the Petitioners by the order under contempt.
Petitioners state that Respondents are selectively relying upon
isolated vacancy particulars while completely ignoring the
findings and conclusions reached by this Court after examining
the recruitment process as a whole.
4.3. Petitioners further contend that Respondents have
deliberately attempted to shift the focus of the controversy by
relying upon district-wise vacancy particulars and reservation
rosters. According to them, the issue before this Court is not
whether the Commission presently believes that vacancies are
available, but whether the Commission has complied with the
specific direction issued by this Court; once this Court directed
selection and appointment of the Petitioners as per their merit
and eligibility, the Commission was under an obligation to give
effect to that direction and not to embark upon a fresh exercise
19
of determining whether Petitioners should or should not be
appointed.
4.4. Petitioners emphatically contend that reliance
placed by Respondent upon DSC-2024 exposes the deliberate
nature of the disobedience committed by the Respondent
authorities. The rights flowing from Notification No.53 of 2017
cannot be extinguished by carrying forward vacancies into a
subsequent recruitment process; permitting such a course of
action would result in the complete frustration of the judgment
rendered by this Court and would allow Respondents to defeat
judicial orders by resorting to subsequent administrative
measures. It is stated, the contention regarding inclusion of
vacancies in DSC-2024 was specifically considered by this
Court while deciding the writ petition. According to Petitioners,
Respondents are therefore seeking to re-agitate an issue which
already stands concluded. Law does not permit a party to
achieve indirectly, through administrative action, what it could
not achieve directly through judicial proceedings.
4.5. Petitioners place strong reliance upon the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Telangana State Level Police
Recruitment Board v. Narimetla Vamshi. According to them,
the principles laid down therein clearly establish that vacancies
arising within the recruitment process cannot be arbitrarily
20
denied to candidates who are otherwise entitled to
consideration. Respondents have ignored the legal position
recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and reaffirmed by this
Court while deciding the writ petition.
4.6. Petitioners further contend that rejection
proceedings dated 16.06.2025 constitute a direct affront to the
authority of this Court. Respondents were never granted liberty
to reconsider their claims or to arrive at independent
conclusions regarding their entitlement. By issuing the rejection
proceedings, Respondents have effectively substituted their own
decision in place of the judgment rendered by this Court.
Petitioners state that the defence of bona fides set up by the
Respondent is wholly unsustainable; bona fides cannot be
pleaded where a public authority consciously chooses a course
of action which has the effect of nullifying a judicial direction.
Petitioners contend that the rejection proceedings were issued
after Respondents had full knowledge of the judgment and after
the judgment had attained finality. Such conduct, according to
Petitioners, excludes any possibility of an innocent or
inadvertent mistake.
4.7. Petitioners further state that Respondent
Commission has attempted to portray the rejection proceedings
as a measure undertaken for implementing the judgment. The
21
very contents of the rejection proceedings demonstrate the
contrary. Instead of implementing the directions issued by this
Court, Respondents have recorded reasons for denying
appointment. It is contended, an order denying the relief
granted by this Court can never be treated as compliance with
the judgment. The law relating to contempt is well settled.
Where an authority is confronted with a clear and unambiguous
judicial direction, the authority is not permitted to reinterpret
the order in a manner that defeats its purpose. According to
Petitioners, Respondents were required to obey the order as it
stood and not as they wished it to be. The conduct of
Respondents amounts to a conscious attempt to circumvent the
judgment and therefore attracts the provisions of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971.
4.8. Petitioners further place reliance upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Baranagore Jute
Factory PLC Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) (supra), wherein it was
held that courts possess ample powers to ensure that their
judgments are effectively implemented and that appropriate
restitutive measures can be directed wherever a party attempts
to frustrate the implementation of judicial orders. According to
petitioners, the said principle squarely applies to the facts of the
present case.
22
4.9. Petitioners state that all ingredients necessary for
establishing civil contempt stand satisfied in the present case.
The order under contempt is clear and unequivocal; the
Respondents had complete knowledge of the said judgment; the
Respondents had sufficient opportunity to comply with the
directions issued therein, and despite such knowledge and
opportunity, the Respondents deliberately chose to issue
proceedings denying the very relief granted by this Court.
5. Heard Sri J. Sudheer, learned counsel for
petitioners, Sri P.S. Rajasekhar, learned Standing Counsel for
Commission and Sri S. Satyanarayana, learned Government
Pleader for School Education.
6. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would
be appropriate to briefly recapitulate the scope and ambit of
contempt jurisdiction. It is well-settled that a contempt court is
not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the judgment
alleged to have been violated. Equally, a contempt court cannot
sit in appeal over the judgment and re-examine issues which
have already attained finality. The limited question which falls
for consideration in contempt proceedings is whether the order
passed by the Court is clear and unambiguous, whether the
alleged contemnor had knowledge of the order, whether
compliance with the order was possible and whether there has
23
been wilful and deliberate disobedience of the directions
contained therein.
7. It is equally well-settled that once a competent
court issues a direction and the said direction attains finality,
the parties bound thereby are under a legal obligation to
faithfully implement the same. An authority cannot avoid
compliance by assigning reasons which have the effect of
nullifying the judgment itself. Nor can an authority substitute
its own interpretation in place of the mandate contained in the
judicial order. If such a course is permitted, every
administrative authority would become a judge of the
correctness of judicial pronouncements, thereby striking at the
very foundation of the rule of law.
8. In the light of the aforesaid principles, the first
question which requires consideration is whether the order
dated 21.03.2025 is clear and unambiguous. Upon a careful
reading of the order, this Court finds that the operative portion
thereof leaves no room whatsoever for doubt or ambiguity. After
considering the controversy relating to vacancies arising out of
non-joining and relinquishment and after examining the
applicability of Rule 6-A, this Court specifically directed the
Telangana State Public Service Commission to select and
appoint the Petitioners as per their merit and eligibility by
24
removing all candidates who had not responded to the web
notification and treating such candidates as deemed to have
relinquished their candidature to the post of Secondary Grade
Teacher under Notification No.53 of 2017 dated 21.10.2017.
9. The language employed in the operative portion of
the judgment is mandatory in nature. The direction is neither
advisory nor recommendatory. The Court did not merely direct
consideration of the cases of the Petitioners. The Court did not
direct the Respondents to undertake a fresh exercise of
determining whether vacancies existed. The Court did not
reserve any liberty to the Commission to independently decide
whether the Petitioners were entitled to appointment. On the
contrary, the Court issued a positive direction requiring the
Respondents to select and appoint the Petitioners in the manner
indicated therein.
10. The second aspect which requires consideration is
whether Respondents had knowledge of the order. There is
absolutely no dispute on this aspect. Respondents actively
contested the writ petition and they are fully aware of the order.
Indeed, Respondents itself acknowledge the existence of the
order and seek to justify its subsequent actions by referring to
its understanding of the directions contained therein.
25
Consequently, the requirement of knowledge stands fully
established.
11. The next issue which falls for consideration is
whether the order under contempt attained finality. The record
discloses that no writ appeal was preferred against the said
order and no review petition was filed; no modification was
sought and no stay of operation of the order was obtained from
any superior forum. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that
the order attained finality and became binding upon the parties.
Once the order attained finality, absolute obedience thereto
became mandatory.
12. The principal defence put forth by Respondents is
that the Commission examined the vacancy position after the
order and arrived at a conclusion that petitioners could not be
accommodated against any available vacancies. According to
Respondents, vacancies which remained unfilled either
pertained to reserved categories for which eligible candidates
were unavailable or had been carried forward to DSC-2024.
Respondents therefore contend that issuance of proceedings
dated 16.06.2025 cannot be treated as wilful disobedience. This
Court is unable to accept the said contention. The defence
proceeds on a fundamentally erroneous premise. Respondents
appear to have assumed that even after the order, it retained
26
the authority to independently adjudicate the entitlement of the
Petitioners. Such an assumption is wholly misconceived. Once
the writ petition was allowed and specific directions were
issued, the Commission ceased to have the authority to reopen
the controversy. The Commission was required to implement the
judgment and not to sit in judgment over it.
13. A careful reading of the proceedings dated
16.06.2025 demonstrates that instead of implementing the
judgment, the Respondent embarked upon a fresh examination
of issues which already stood concluded by the judgment. The
proceedings contain elaborate reasons as to why Petitioners are
allegedly not entitled to appointment. Such an exercise, in the
opinion of this Court, is wholly impermissible. Respondents
could not have substituted its own conclusions for the
conclusions reached by this Court.
14. The submission that vacancies were subsequently
included in DSC-2024 also does not advance the case of
Respondent. The rights recognised by this Court in favour of
Petitioners arose out of Notification No.53 of 2017. Once this
Court adjudicated the rights of the parties and issued
consequential directions, those rights could not be defeated by
resorting to a subsequent recruitment process. Administrative
27
action undertaken after the judgment cannot be used as a
shield to avoid compliance with the judgment itself.
15. Acceptance of Respondent’s contention would lead
to startling consequence; it would imply that an authority can
avoid compliance with a judicial order merely by carrying
forward vacancies to a future recruitment process and
thereafter contend that no vacancies remain available. Such a
proposition is wholly inconsistent with the constitutional
obligation of public authorities to obey judicial orders and
cannot be countenanced by this Court.
16. Equally untenable is the contention that vacancies
pertained to reserved categories or were otherwise unavailable.
The correctness or otherwise of such contentions is no longer
open for examination in contempt proceedings. These were
matters which either formed part of the original adjudication or
ought to have been urged during the writ proceedings. Once the
order attained finality, Respondent was bound by the
conclusions reached therein and could not seek to reopen those
issues indirectly through administrative proceedings.
17. This Court also finds considerable force in the
submission of petitioners that rejection proceedings dated
16.06.2025 do not constitute compliance in any sense of the
term. Compliance implies giving effect to the directions
28
contained in the judgment. The proceedings dated 16.06.2025
do not seek to implement the judgment. On the contrary, they
deny the very relief which was granted by this Court. An order
refusing appointment to petitioners cannot be characterised as
compliance with a judgment directing their appointment.
18. The distinction between implementation and
avoidance is of crucial significance. If Respondents had
undertaken steps to give effect to the directions issued by this
Court and some incidental difficulty had arisen in the process,
the matter may have stood on a different footing. However,
where the authority chooses a course which has the direct
consequence of nullifying the relief granted by the Court, such
conduct cannot be protected under the guise of implementation.
19. This Court is also unable to accept the plea of bona
fides advanced by the Respondent. Bona fides cannot be
inferred merely because an authority has assigned reasons for
its action. The true test is whether the action taken advances
compliance with the judicial order or defeats it. In the present
case, the inevitable consequence of the proceedings dated
16.06.2025 is the denial of the benefit granted to Petitioners
under the judgment dated 21.03.2025. Such conduct is wholly
inconsistent with a bona fide attempt at compliance.
29
20. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Baranagore Jute Factory PLC Mazdoor Sangh (BMS)’s case
assumes significance, in this context. The Supreme Court
emphasised that courts are not powerless when their judgments
are sought to be frustrated and that appropriate restitutive and
consequential directions can always be issued to ensure
meaningful compliance. The principles enunciated therein fully
support the proposition that a party cannot be permitted to
defeat the effect of a judicial order through subsequent actions.
This Court is therefore, satisfied that Respondents had complete
knowledge of the order dated 21.03.2025; they are fully aware
of the obligations cast upon by the said order. Respondent
possessed the ability to comply with the directions contained
therein. Nevertheless, instead of implementing the judgment,
the Respondent consciously chose to issue proceedings which
had the effect of denying the very relief granted by this Court.
21. The conduct of Respondents cannot be
characterised as a mere error of interpretation, nor can it be
treated as an inadvertent lapse. The rejection proceedings reveal
a conscious decision to revisit issues which had already
attained finality. Such conduct clearly demonstrates deliberate
and intentional disregard of the directions issued by this Court.
30
This Court is therefore, left with no manner of doubt that the
ingredients necessary for constituting civil contempt within the
meaning of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
stand fully established. The order dated 21.03.2025 is clear and
unambiguous. Respondents had full knowledge thereof; they
are bound to comply with the same, however, deliberately they
acted in a manner which defeated and frustrated the
implementation of the judgment.
22. Consequently, this Court holds that Respondent
has committed wilful, deliberate and intentional disobedience of
the order under contempt and is therefore guilty of civil
contempt under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971.
23. Having arrived at the conclusion that Respondents
have committed willful and deliberate disobedience of the order
dated 21.03.2025, the next question which arises for
consideration relates to the nature of the consequential orders
that are required to be passed in the facts and circumstances of
the present case. The law relating to contempt has evolved not
merely as a mechanism for punishing disobedience of judicial
orders but also as a means of preserving the majesty of law and
maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice.
Courts exercise contempt jurisdiction not for vindicating the
31
personal dignity of individual judges but for ensuring that
judicial pronouncements are obeyed and that the rule of law
remains meaningful and effective. If orders passed by
constitutional courts are permitted to be ignored, circumvented
or defeated by administrative authorities, the very foundation of
the justice delivery system would stand seriously undermined.
24. In the present case, this Court cannot lose sight of
the fact that petitioners have been litigating in relation to the
recruitment process initiated under Notification No.53 of 2017
for a considerable period of time. The record discloses that the
controversy initially arose in relation to vacancies which
remained unfilled despite the operation of Rule 6-A and despite
the existence of eligible candidates. Petitioners approached this
Court seeking enforcement of their legal rights. The matter
thereafter travelled through various stages of litigation,
including appellate proceedings and remand. Ultimately, after a
detailed consideration of the issues involved, this Court
rendered its judgment dated 21.03.2025 granting relief in favour
of Petitioners.
25. Once such a judgment came to be rendered and
attained finality Petitioners became entitled to expect faithful
compliance from the Respondent authorities. The
administration of justice does not end with the pronouncement
32
of a judgment. The effectiveness of the judicial process
ultimately depends upon the willingness of public authorities to
implement judicial decisions in their true letter and spirit. A
successful litigant cannot be compelled to repeatedly approach
the Court merely to secure implementation of a relief which has
already been granted.
26. The conduct of Respondent in the present case
assumes significance because instead of implementing the
order, Respondents chose to issue proceedings dated
16.06.2025 refusing the very relief granted by this Court. The
said proceedings are not ancillary or consequential proceedings
intended to facilitate implementation. On the contrary, they
constitute an independent exercise resulting in the denial of the
relief granted by this Court. In effect, the Respondent sought to
replace the judgment of this Court with its own conclusions.
Such a course is wholly impermissible in law.
27. This Court is conscious of the fact that contempt
jurisdiction must be exercised with circumspection and
restraint. Courts ordinarily lean in favour of securing
compliance rather than imposing punishment. At the same
time, where the conduct of a party demonstrates conscious
disregard of judicial authority, the Court cannot remain a silent
spectator. Judicial orders are not mere suggestions. They are
33
commands issued under authority of law and are required to be
obeyed unless modified, stayed or set aside by a competent
forum.
28. In the present case, Respondents had adequate
opportunity to challenge the order dated 21.03.2025 if they were
aggrieved by the findings recorded therein. No such challenge
was made. The judgment therefore attained finality. Having
allowed the judgment to become final, they could not thereafter
assume unto itself the role of an appellate authority and
undertake a fresh examination of the entitlement of the
Petitioners. Such conduct, in the considered opinion of this
Court, strikes at the very root of judicial discipline.
29. This Court is therefore, of the view that rejection
proceedings dated 16.06.2025 cannot be permitted to stand.
The said proceedings are in direct conflict with the operative
directions contained in the order under contempt. Continuance
of the said proceedings would amount to permitting
Respondents to derive advantage from an act of disobedience.
Such a result would be wholly contrary to the principles
governing contempt jurisdiction.
34
30. This Court is also placing reliance upon the law
laid down in Celir LLP v. Mr. Sumathi Prasad Bafna 3,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that once a court passes
an order, the said order is required to be complied with in letter
and spirit, and that a party cannot be permitted to sit in
judgment over the order of the court and decide for itself
whether to comply with it or not. The Hon’ble Apex Court
further held that when a court passes a clear and unequivocal
direction, the authority or party bound by such direction is
under an absolute obligation to comply with the same, and that
any attempt to wriggle out of the said obligation by raising
technical pleas or by advancing justifications that were either
already considered or ought to have been raised before the court
that passed the order, would amount to willful disobedience
constituting contempt. The Hon’ble Apex Court also made it
clear that where a party has chosen not to challenge the order
by preferring an appeal and has allowed the same to attain
finality, such a party cannot be heard to raise objections to
compliance at the stage of contempt proceedings, as the
correctness of the order is no longer open for examination at
that stage. The operative portion of the judgment is extracted
hereunder:
3
2024 INSC 978
35” 182.In order to decide whether the appellants are guilty of
civil contempt, it would be apposite to refer to Section 2(b) of the Act,
1971, which reads as under:
“2. Definitions.-
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
xxx xxx xxx
(b) “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgment,
decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach
of an undertaking given to a court;”
183. The Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, at page 1599,
defines “willful” as hereunder: –
“Proceeding from a conscious motion of the will; voluntary; knowingly;
deliberate. Intending the result which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional;
purposeful; not accidental or involuntary. Premeditated; malicious; done with evil intent, or
with a bad motive or purpose, or with indifference to the natural consequences; unlawful;
without legal justification. An act or omission is “willfully” done, if done voluntarily and
intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific
intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose
either to disobey or to disregard the law. It is a word of many meanings, with its
construction often influenced by its context. In civil actions, the word (willfully) often denotes
an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But
when used in a criminal context it generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without
justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely.”
184. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha and
Ors. reported in (2003) 11 SCC 1, the expression ‘wilful disobedience’ in
the context of Section 2(b) of the Act, 1971 was read to mean an act or
omission done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do
something, which the law forbids or with the specific intention to fail to
do something which the law requires to be done. Wilfulness signifies
deliberate action done with evil intent and bad motive and purpose. It
should not be an act, which requires and is dependent upon, either
wholly or partly, any act or omission by a third party for compliance.
185. Hence, the expression or word “wilful” means act or
omission which is done voluntarily or intentionally and with the specific
intent to do something which the law forbids or with the specific intent
to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say with
bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. It signifies a
deliberate action done with evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose.
36
186. Article 129 of the Constitution declares this Court as a “a
court of record” and states that it shall have all the powers of such a
court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The
provisions of the Act, 1971 and the Rules framed thereunder form a part
of a special statutory jurisdiction that is vested in courts to punish an
offending party for its contemptuous conduct. It needs no emphasis that
the power of contempt ought to be exercised sparingly with great care
and caution. The contemptuous act complained of must be such that
would result in obstruction of justice, adversely affect the majesty of law
and impact the dignity of the courts of law.
187. It must also be understood that contempt proceedings are
sui generis inasmuch as the Law of Evidence and the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 are not to be strictly applied. At the same time, the
procedure adopted during the contempt proceedings must be fair and
just that is to say the principles governing the Rule of law must be
extended to the party against whom contempt proceedings have been
initiated. The party must have every opportunity to place its position
before the Court. Such a party must not be left unheard under any
circumstances.
188. In Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj & Ors. reported in (2014)
16 SCC 204 it was held that the contempt jurisdiction conferred on to
the law courts power to punish an offender not only for his wilful
disobedience but also for contumacious conduct or obstruction to the
majesty of law. It further observed that such power has been conferred
for the simple reason that the respect and authority commanded by the
courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen that his
rights shall be protected and the entire democratic fabric of the society
will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is undermined. The
relevant observations read as under: –
“11. The contempt jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts power to punish
an offender for his wilful disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty
of law, for the reason that respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the
greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen that his rights shall be protected and the entire
democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is
undermined. Undoubtedly, the contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of
the courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless, thus,
otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the
law courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi-criminal in
37nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all
reasonable doubt. It would rather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the
authorities in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities. […]”
(Emphasis supplied)
189. In Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia & Anr. reported in
(2000) 2 SCC 367 this Court held that the purpose of contempt
jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law
since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be
led to be distorted, as any indulgence which can even remotely be
termed to affect the majesty of law would result in the society losing its
confidence and faith in the judiciary and the law courts forfeiting the
trust and confidence of the people in general. The relevant observations
read as under: –
“9 […] The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity
of the courts of law since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be
led to be distorted. The respect and authority commanded by courts of law are the greatest
guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble
down if the respect for the judiciary is undermined. It is true that the judiciary will be judged
by the people for what the judiciary does, but in the event of any indulgence which can even
remotely be termed to affect the majesty of law, the society is bound to lose confidence and
faith in the judiciary and the law courts thus, would forfeit the trust and confidence of the
people in general.”
(Emphasis supplied)
190. In Pushpaben & Anr. v. Narandas Badiani & Anr.
reported in (1979) 2 SCC 394, it was held that contempt of court is a
special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and with caution whenever
an act adversely affects the administration of justice or which tends to
impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial
institutions. It further held that this jurisdiction is to be exercised not
for the protection of the dignity of an individual judge but to protect the
administration of justice from being maligned and ensure that the
authority of the courts is neither imperilled nor is the administration of
justice by it interfered with in any manner. The relevant observations
read as under: –
” 42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly
and with caution whenever an act adversely affects the administration of justice or which
tends to impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions.
This jurisdiction may also be exercised when the act complained of adversely affects the
majesty of law or dignity of the courts. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the
majesty and dignity of the courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction combining “the
38jury, the judge and the hangman” and it is so because the court is not adjudicating upon any
claim between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an
individual judge but to protect the administration of justice from being maligned. In the
general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of courts should not be
imperilled and there should be no unjustifiable interference in the administration of justice. It
is a matter between the court and the contemner and third parties cannot intervene. It is
exercised in a summary manner in aid of the administration of justice, the majesty of law
and the dignity of the courts. No such act can be permitted which may have the tendency to
shake the public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of justice.
(Emphasis supplied)
191. In Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian
Express Newspapers, Bombay Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (1988) 4
SCC 592 it was observed that the process of due course of
administration of justice must remain unimpaired. Public interest
demands that there should be no interference with judicial process and
the effect of the judicial decision should not be pre-empted or
circumvented. The relevant observations read as under: –
” 35. The question of contempt must be judged in a particular situation. The
process of due course of administration of justice must remain unimpaired. Public interest
demands that there should be no interference with judicial process and the effect of the
judicial decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented by public agitation or
publications. It has to be remembered that even at turbulent times through which the
developing countries are passing, contempt of court means interference with the due
administration of justice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
192. In Rita Markandey v. Surjit Singh Arora reported in
(1996) 6 SCC 14, it was observed that even if parties have not filed an
undertaking before the court but if the court was induced to sanction a
particular course of action or inaction on the representation made by a
party and the court ultimately finds that the party never intended to act
on the said representation or such representation was false, the party
would be guilty of committing contempt. The relevant observations read
as under: –
” 12. Law is well settled that if any party gives an undertaking to the court to
vacate the premises from which he is liable to be evicted under the orders of the court and
there is a clear and deliberate breach thereof it amounts to civil contempt but since, in the
present case, the respondent did not file any undertaking as envisaged in the order of this
Court the question of his being punished for breach thereof does not arise. However, in our
considered view even in a case where no such undertaking is given, a party to a litigation
may be held liable for such contempt if the court is induced to sanction a particular course of
action or inaction on the basis of the representation of such a party and the court ultimately
39finds that the party never intended to act on such representation or such representation was
false. In other words, if on the representation of the respondent herein the Court was
persuaded to pass the order dated 5-10-1995 extending the time for vacation of the suit
premises, he may be held guilty of contempt of court, notwithstanding non-furnishing of the
undertaking, if it is found that the representation was false and the respondent never
intended to act upon it. […]”
(Emphasis supplied)
193. The Borrower and the Subsequent Transferee / the alleged
contemnors herein placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Patel
Rajnikant (supra) have contended that in the absence of any
disobedience or wilful breach of a prohibitory order no contempt could
be said to have been committed. It has been further canvased that this
Court in the Main Appeals never issued any specific direction either to
the Borrower or the Subsequent Transferee, & therefore no contempt
could be said to have been committed.
194. In Patel Rajnikant (supra), this Court upon examining
Section 2(b) of the Act, 1971 held that to hold a person guilty of having
committed contempt, there must be a judgment, order, direction etc. by
a court, there must be disobedience of such judgment, order, direction
etc and that such disobedience must be willful.
” 58. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 have also
been invoked. Section 2 of the Act is a definition clause. Clause (a) enacts that contempt of
court means “civil contempt or criminal contempt”. Clause (b) defines “civil contempt”
thus:
” 2. (b) ‘civil contempt’ means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree,
direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to
a court;”
Reading of the above clause makes it clear that the following conditions
must be satisfied before a person can be held to have committed a civil contempt:
(i) there must be a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process
of a court (or an undertaking given to a court);
(ii) there must be disobedience to such judgment, decree, direction, order,
writ or other process of a court (or breach of undertaking given to a court); and
(iii) such disobedience of judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other
process of a court (or breach of undertaking) must be wilful.”
195. However, the subsequent observations made by this Court
in Patel Rajnikant (supra) are significant. It observed that the court
should not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt, it is for
the proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with
40
the orders passed by it in order to uphold and maintain the dignity of
courts and majesty of law. The relevant observations read as under: –
” 70. From the above decisions, it is clear that punishing a person for contempt
of court is indeed a drastic step and normally such action should not be taken. At the same
time, however, it is not only the power but the duty of the court to uphold and maintain the
dignity of courts and majesty of law which may call for such extreme step. If for proper
administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by a court, it
is required to take strict view under the Act, it should not hesitate in wielding the potent
weapon of contempt.
(Emphasis supplied)
196. What can be discerned from the above exposition of law is
that any act of disobedience, defiance, or any attempt to malign the
authority of the court would amount to contempt because they
undermine the respect and trust that the public reposes in judicial
institutions. The judicial process relies on the confidence of society, and
any act that disrupts or disrespects this process threatens to erode the
foundation of justice and order.
197. Contempt jurisdiction exists to preserve the majesty and
sanctity of the law. Courts are the guardians of justice, and their
decisions must command respect and compliance to ensure the proper
functioning of society. When individuals or entities challenge the
authority of courts through wilful disobedience or obstructive behaviour,
they undermine the rule of law and create the risk of anarchy. Contempt
serves as a mechanism to protect the integrity of the courts, ensuring
that they remain a symbol of fairness, impartiality, and accountability.
198. When judicial orders are openly flouted or court proceedings
are disrespected, it sends a signal that the rule of law is ineffective,
leading to a loss of trust in the system. Judicial decisions must remain
unimpaired, free from external pressures, manipulation, or
circumvention. Acts that attempt to mislead the court, obstruct its
functioning or frustrate its decisions distort the process of justice and
would amount to contempt.
199. The contempt jurisdiction of this court cannot be construed
by any formulaic or rigid approach. Merely because there is no
prohibitory order or no specific direction issued the same would not
mean that the parties cannot be held guilty of contempt. The Contempt
jurisdiction of the court extends beyond the mere direct disobedience of
explicit orders or prohibitory directions issued by the court. Even in the
41
absence of such specific mandates, the deliberate conduct of parties
aimed at frustrating court proceedings or circumventing its eventual
decision may amount to contempt. This is because such actions strike
at the heart of the judicial process, undermining its authority and
obstructing its ability to deliver justice effectively. The authority of
courts must be respected not only in the letter of their orders but also in
the broader spirit of the proceedings before them.
200. Any contumacious conduct of the parties to bypass or
nullify the decision of the court or render it ineffective, or to frustrate
the proceedings of the court, or to ensure any undue advantage
therefrom would amount to contempt. Attempts to sidestep the court’s
jurisdiction or manipulate the course of litigation through dishonest or
obstructive conduct or malign or distort the decision of the courts would
inevitably tantamount to contempt sans any prohibitory order or
direction to such effect.
201. Thus, the mere conduct of parties aimed at frustrating the
court proceedings or circumventing its decisions, even without an
explicit prohibitory order, constitutes contempt. Such actions interfere
with the administration of justice, undermine the respect and authority
of the judiciary, and threaten the rule of law.
202. However, at the same time, the power of contempt ought to
be exercised sparingly and with caution and care. It operates with a
string of caution and unless otherwise satisfied beyond doubt, it would
neither be fair nor reasonable for the courts to resort to such powers.
The standard of proof required before a person is held guilty of
committing contempt of court must be beyond all reasonable doubt.
203. The courts while exercising its contempt jurisdiction must
remain circumspect, more particularly, where there exists a possibility
of the order being amenable to more than one interpretation. In
Jhareshwar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly reported in (2002) 5
SCC 352 it was held that if an order does not contain any specific
direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions
issued therein then it would be appropriate to direct the parties to
approach the court which disposed of the matter for necessary
clarification of the order instead of the court exercising its contempt
jurisdiction thereby taking upon itself the power to decide the original
42
proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the
judgment or order. The relevant observations read as under:
“The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been
any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is
alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt
jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided
in the judgment or order… The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or
order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have
contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt
jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party,
which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the
judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding
a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to
direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the
order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to
decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment
or order.”
(Emphasis supplied)”
31. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court,
mentioned supra in Celir LLP, squarely applicable to the
present case. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of
the case, this Court is of the opinion that the ends of justice
would be adequately served by directing immediate
implementation of the judgment while simultaneously recording
a finding of guilt against Respondents for willful disobedience of
the order of this Court. The Court is also of the view that a final
opportunity deserves to be granted to the Respondents to purge
the contempt by complying with the directions contained in the
judgment.
32. Interestingly, an argument was sought to be put
forth contending that the direction in the Writ Petition was to
43the TGPSC, therefore, there cannot be any contempt against the
State. In this connection, it is to be noted that Writ Petition was
filed against the State of Telangana (represented through
Principal Secretary, Roads & Buildings Department), and
Telangana State Public Service Commission, which is the
agency of the State. TGPSC being a recruiting agency of the
State Public Services, and acting for and on behalf of the State;
its role is to scrupulously follow the guidelines applicable for
conducting examinations, selection of candidates and
forwarding the select list to the State Government for issuance
of necessary appointment orders. Therefore, a direction to
TGPSC is invariably a direction to the State. Merely because the
direction specified the TGPSC, that does not absolve the State of
its responsibility to act and implement the order. Therefore,
both the TGPSC as well as the State are duty-bound to take
action to implement the order under contempt.
33. Therefore, the grounds sought to be urged by
TGPSC that State has filled up / appointed the candidates
subsequently and that there are no vacancies, or the grounds
sought to be urged by the State that the direction is for TGPSC
are apparently a blame-game.
34. In that view of the matter, the Contempt Case is
allowed. The State of Telangana and TGPSC (respondents in the
44Writ Petition) are directed to forthwith appoint petitioners as per
their merit and eligibility by removing all the candidates who
have not responded to the web notification treating them as
deemed to have relinquished their candidature to the post of
SGT under Notification No. 53 of 2017 dated 21.10.2017 and if
necessary by creating supernumerary posts within a period of
eight weeks from today.
34.1. Respondents shall also be liable for punishment
under Sections 10 to 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
the quantum of which shall be determined upon the
Respondent’s compliance or non-compliance with this direction
being brought to the notice of this Court.
35. Consequently, the miscellaneous Applications, if
any shall stand closed.
——– —————————–
NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J
29th June 2026
ksld
