Allahabad High Court
Chunnu Lal vs State Of U.P. on 15 July, 2026
Author: Santosh Rai
Bench: Santosh Rai
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Reserved on 14.05.2026 Delivered on 15.07.2026 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 1649 of 1984 Chunnu Lal ..Appellant(s) Versus State of U.P. ..Respondent(s) Counsel for Appellant(s) : Brij Gopal Yadav, Virendra Singh Parmar Counsel for Respondent(s) : A.G.A. Court No. - 93 HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.
1. Heard Sri Virendra Singh Parmar, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Purushottam Maurya, learned A.G.A. for the State-respondent.
2. This appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. is directed against the judgment and order dated 7.6.1984 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Fatehpur, in S.T. No. 247/83 (State v. Chunnu Lal), whereby the appellant Chunnu Lal has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 307 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years, in connection with Case Crime relating to P.S. Jahanabad, District Fatehpur.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that a marriage party (barat) of Sheo Charan Sachan had gone to village Khairabad, P.S. Jahanabad, District Fatehpur, at the house of one Dhani Ram Sachan, and had put up at a school building where refreshments were being served on behalf of the bride’s side. It is alleged that while the appellant was serving refreshments and drinks to the Baratis, he mischievously poured drinks upon the clothes of some of the Baratis, and thereafter, while serving the complainant Satish Chandra Sachan, repeated the same act. On the complainant protesting against this conduct, the appellant is alleged to have got infuriated and, after threatening the complainant, moved away. It is further alleged that later, when the marriage party was proceeding towards the house of the bride and paused near the house of Gaya Prasad, Jagdamba Prasad, Saddu and others so that the young men in the party could perform a dance, the appellant came from behind the complainant and fired at him with a country-made pistol, causing a firearm injury on his back. On the alarm raised by the complainant, persons in the vicinity rushed towards the appellant, but he could not be apprehended and fled the spot while threatening the onlookers with the pistol.
4. The written report (Ext. Ka.1) was lodged at the police station on 30.5.1982 at 6.30 a.m., on the basis of which a case under Section 307 I.P.C. was registered. The investigation was conducted by S.I. Jagjitan Singh (P.W.5), who prepared the site plan (Ext. Ka.4), recorded statements of the complainant and other witnesses, and, after completing the investigation, submitted the chargesheet (Ext. Ka.5) on 21.7.1982. The learned Sessions Judge, upon trial, framed a charge under Section 307 I.P.C., which the appellant denied, claiming trial.
5. The prosecution examined five witnesses. P.W.1 Satish Chandra, the informant and injured, is the sole witness to the actual firing; he deposed that the appellant fired at him from behind with a country-made pistol, that there was sufficient light of gas lamps/petromax at the spot, and that his bush-shirt, burnt by the gunshot, was handed over to and sealed by the police (Ext. Ka.2). P.W.2 Ram Nath, a companion in the marriage party, corroborated the earlier altercation over the pouring of drinks and the threat extended by the appellant, and deposed to the accused having fired upon the complainant with a country-made pistol causing injuries, with sufficient light from a petromax being carried by the party. P.W.3 Jagpal Singh, examined as an eye-witness, admitted the altercation between the complainant and the appellant over the serving of drinks but stated that he could not recognize the person who had actually fired the shot; he was accordingly declared hostile. P.W.4 Dr. S. C. Tandon, Medical Officer, Government Dispensary, Kora, Jahanabad, examined the complainant on 30.5.1982 at 10.45 a.m. and found a single gunshot injury on the upper part of the left back, measuring about 10 cm 4 cm, without tattooing or blackening, which, in his opinion, was six to twelve hours old and consistent with the time of the alleged occurrence (Ext. Ka.3). P.W.5 S.I. Jagjitan Singh proved the site plan (Ext. Ka.4), the chargesheet (Ext. Ka.5) and the chik report (Ext. Ka.6). The genuineness of the copy of the General Diary (Ext. Ka.7) recording registration of the case was admitted by the defence under Section 294 Cr.P.C.
6. The appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution case in its entirety and set up a plea of false implication, asserting that the son of Dhani Ram, at whose house the marriage party had put up, happened to be his school-mate, and that on account of pre-existing enmity with the said family he had been falsely roped in.
7. The learned Sessions Judge, on an appraisal of the ocular testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.2, read with the medical evidence of P.W.4 and the investigation carried out by P.W.5, held the prosecution case to be established beyond reasonable doubt and convicted the appellant under Section 307 I.P.C.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant does not seriously assail the finding of guilt returned by the trial court, but confines his challenge to the correctness of the conviction under Section 307 I.P.C. It is urged that: (i) only a single gunshot injury was caused, and that too on a non-vital part of the body, namely the back, without any tattooing or blackening; (ii) P.W.4, the Medical Officer, has nowhere opined that the injury was, in the ordinary course of nature, sufficient to cause death or was otherwise dangerous to life; (iii) the occurrence took place in the course of a sudden quarrel arising out of a trivial altercation during the festivities of a marriage, without premeditation and without any prior enmity between the appellant and the complainant, the enmity, if any, being with the family of Dhani Ram (iv) the appellant has no other criminal antecedent, and the present appeal itself has remained pending since the year 1984 and (v) in these circumstances, the conviction ought to be altered from Section 307 I.P.C. to Section 324 I.P.C., and the appellant, being a first offender, be extended the benefit of release on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
9. Learned Additional Government Advocate, per contra, supports the judgment of the trial court and submits that the use of a firearm, a young life placed at risk, and the deliberate act of firing from behind at close range are all factors which justify a conviction under Section 307 I.P.C., irrespective of the site of the injury or its ultimate severity.
10. The following points arise for determination in this appeal: (i) whether the finding of guilt recorded by the trial court, on the basis of the evidence on record, calls for interference; and (ii) if not, whether the conviction recorded under Section 307 I.P.C. is sustainable on the facts and circumstances of the case, or whether it requires to be altered to one under Section 324 I.P.C.
11. On a careful re-appreciation of the evidence on record, this Court finds no infirmity in the concurrent and corroborated testimony of P.W.1 (the injured informant) and P.W.2 (an independent witness of the marriage party), both of whom have consistently deposed to the prior altercation between the appellant and the complainant over the mischievous pouring of drinks, the threat extended by the appellant on that occasion, and the subsequent firing upon the complainant with a country-made pistol from behind while the party had paused for the boys to dance. Their testimony stands duly corroborated by the medical evidence of P.W.4, who found a fresh gunshot injury on the person of the complainant, consistent in point of time and character with the prosecution version as also by the recovery and sealing of the complainant’s bush-shirt burnt by the gunshot (Ext. Ka.2). The presence of sufficient light at the spot, spoken to by both P.W.1 and P.W.2, lends further assurance to the identification of the appellant as the assailant. The circumstance that P.W.3 did not identify the assailant does not, by itself, dislodge the otherwise cogent and corroborated testimony of the injured witness and the other witness of fact, more particularly when the plea of false implication set up by the appellant is founded on alleged enmity with a third family and not with the complainant. This Court accordingly finds no reason to disturb the finding of guilt recorded by the learned trial court, and the same is affirmed. In the judgment of Sivamani v. State Represented by the Inspector of Police (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1581), the Hon. Supreme Court clarified the requirements for a conviction under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which pertains to “Attempt to Murder.” The question that remains is whether the offence, on the facts found, is one under Section 307 I.P.C. or Section 324 I.P.C.
It is well settled that to sustain a conviction under Section 307 I.P.C., it is not essential that the injury inflicted should be one that is, in the ordinary course of nature, sufficient to cause death; the Court is required to examine whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge, and under the circumstances, mentioned in that Section. It is equally well settled that an injury need not necessarily be on a vital part of the body for Section 307 I.P.C. to apply, if the requisite intention or knowledge is otherwise established . At the same time, the intention to cause death cannot be presumed as a matter of course; it has to be gathered from the totality of circumstances, the nature of the weapon used, the part of the body chosen for assault, the number and severity of the blows or shots, the conduct of the accused before and after the incident, and the background in which the incident took place. Where the assault arises out of a sudden quarrel, onl10 cmy a single injury is caused, that too on a non-vital part, without repeated or aimed blows, and the medical evidence does not indicate the injury to be dangerous to life, courts have consistently held that the offence falls short of Section 307 I.P.C. and is more appropriately one under Section 324 I.P.C. The intention of the accused must be gathered from the totality of the circumstances. This includes the nature of the weapon used, the circumstances of the attack, and the conduct of the accused. While the absence of a life-threatening injury does not automatically negate a Section 307 charge, the nature of the injury is a vital factor in determining whether the accused actually intended to cause death. If the injuries are only “simple” in nature and there is no evidence of repeated or severe blows, it may suggest that the necessary intent for murder was absent. In this specific case, the Court observed that: there were no allegations of repeated or severe blows. The injuries sustained by the victims were minor/simple in nature. Consequently, the conviction under Section 307 IPC was found to be unsustainable, and the charge was modified to the lesser offences of Sections 323 (voluntarily causing hurt) and 324 (voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons) of the IPC. And this principle is applicable in this case at hand ,even to firearm injury on back of injured, where the wound, though caused by a country-made pistol, was single, superficial in the sense of not endangering life, and inflicted in the course of a sudden altercation rather than a premeditated design to kill.
12. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is significant that only a single gunshot injury was caused, measuring 10 cm 4 cm on the upper part of the left back admittedly a non-vital part of the body P.W.4, the examining doctor, has nowhere deposed, either in his evidence or in the injury report, that the injury was, in the ordinary course of nature, sufficient to cause death or was otherwise dangerous to life, nor has any such suggestion been put to him by the prosecution. There was no tattooing or blackening, suggesting that the shot was not fired from point-blank range. The occurrence was not preceded by any premeditation or prior enmity between the appellant and the complainant, but arose out of a sudden and trivial altercation in the course of the festivities of the marriage party of Sheo Charan Sachan, when the appellant, while serving refreshments, mischievously poured drinks on the clothes of the Baratis and, upon being remonstrated with by the complainant, reacted in a fit of anger. The appellant fled the spot the moment an alarm was raised and made no further attempt to pursue or renew the assault upon the complainant or upon the witnesses who gave chase, which is inconsistent with a settled intention to kill. Having regard to these circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that while the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the appellant fired at the complainant causing him a gunshot injury, it has failed to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the intention or knowledge requisite to sustain a conviction under Section 307 I.P.C. The act of the appellant, in the facts of this case, is more appropriately punishable under Section 324 I.P.C., namely voluntarily causing hurt by means of an instrument which, if used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, the country-made pistol admittedly being such an instrument. The conviction of the appellant is accordingly altered from Section 307 I.P.C. to Section 324 I.P.C.
13. On the question of sentence, learned counsel for the appellant submits, and it is not disputed by the State, that the appellant has no previous conviction, is not shown to have any criminal antecedent apart from the present case, and that the present appeal has remained pending before this Court since the year 1984. The incident itself arose out of a sudden and heated exchange in the course of the celebration of a marriage and not out of any deep-rooted or long-standing enmity between the appellant and the injured. These are all relevant factors which a court exercising the reformative jurisdiction under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is required to keep in view. Section 324 I.P.C. does not carry a sentence of death or imprisonment for life, and there is nothing in the nature of the offence, so re-appraised, or in the record of the appellant, which would render it inexpedient to extend to him the benefit of probation.
14. Sections 4 and 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 are reproduced below for ready reference:
4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct. (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is Ramexpedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.
2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
3) When an order under sub-section (1) is made, the court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender.
(4) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender.
(5) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned.
5. Power of court to require released offenders to pay compensation and costs.(1) The court directing the release of an offender under section 3 or section 4, may, if it thinks fit, make at the same time a further order directing him to pay
(a) such compensation as the court thinks reasonable for loss or injury caused to any person by the commission of the offence; and
(b) such costs of the proceedings as the court thinks reasonable.
(2) The amount ordered to be paid under sub-section (1) may be recovered as a fine in accordance with the provisions of sections 386 and 387 of the Code.
(3) A civil court trying any suit, arising out of the same matter for which the offender is prosecuted, shall take into account any amount paid or recovered as compensation under sub-section (1) in awarding damages.
15. In Sitaram Paswan and Another vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 13 SCC 110, the Apex Court has held as under:
For exercising the power which is discretionary, the court has to consider the circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. While considering the nature of the offence, the court must take a realistic view of the gravity of the offence, the impact which the offence had on the victim. The benefit available to the accused under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act is subject to the limitation embodied in the provisions and the word “may” clearly indicates that the discretion vests with the court whether to release the offender in exercise of the powers under Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, having regard to the nature of the offence and the character of the offender and overall circumstances of the case. The powers under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act vest with the court when any person is found guilty of the offence committed, not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. This power can be exercised by the courts while finding the person guilty and if the court thinks that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, benefit should be extended to the accused, the power can be exercised by the court even at the appellate or revisional stage and also by this Court while hearing the appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
16. In Lakhanlal alias Lakhan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 100, the Apex Court held as under:
10. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab AIR 1965 SC 444 while examining the provisions of the 1958 Act held that in case the offenders are below 21 years, an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act but in respect of offenders who were above age of 21 years, the Court has absolute discretion to release such offenders either after admonition or on probation of good conduct. The Court held as under:
“4. The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years, absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.”
11. This Court in Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar (1972) 2 SCC 633 explained the rationale of the provision as to prevent the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals as a result of their association with hardened criminals of mature age in case the youthful offenders are sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. The Court held as under:
“6. The Probation of Offenders Act was enacted in 1958 with a view to provide for the release of offenders of certain categories on probation or after due admonition and for matters connected therewith. The object of the Act is to prevent the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals as a result of their association with hardened criminals of mature age in case the youthful offenders are sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. The above object is in consonance with the present trend in the field of penology, according to which effort should be made to bring about correction and reformation of the individual offenders and not to resort to retributive justice. Modern criminal jurisprudence recognises that no one is a born criminal and that a good many crimes are the product of socio-economic milieu. Although not much can be done for hardened criminals, considerable stress has been laid on bringing about reform of young offenders not guilty of very serious offences and of preventing their association with hardened criminals. The Act gives statutory recognition to the above objective. It is, therefore, provided that youthful offenders should not be sent to jail, except in certain circumstances. Before, however, the benefit of the Act can be invoked, it has to be shown that the convicted person even though less than 21 years of age, is not guilty of an offenec punishable with imprisonment for life. This is clear from the language of Section 6 of the Act.”
17. In Mohd. Hashim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2017) 2 SCC 198, the Apex reiterated the exercise of discretionary power of the court under Probation of Offenders Act as under:
21. In this regard, it is also seemly to refer to other authorities to highlight how the discretion vested in a court under the PO Act is to be exercised. In Ram Parkash v. State of H.P.9, while dealing with Section 4 of the PO Act in the context of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Court opined that the word “may” used in Section 4 of the PO Act does not mean “must”. On the contrary, as has been held in the said authority, it has been made clear in categorical terms that the provisions of the PO Act distinguish offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age and offenders who are guilty of committing an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. Thereafter, the Court has proceeded to observe:
“7…. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years. absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. (Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab and Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar.)”
Be it noted, in the said case, keeping in view the offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Court declined to confer the benefit under Section 4 of the PO Act.
22. We have referred to the aforesaid authority to stress the point that the court before exercising the power under Section 4 of the PO Act has to keep in view the nature of offence and the conditions incorporated under Section 4 of the PO Act. Be it stated in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana it has been held that Parliament has made it clear that only if the Court forms the opinion that it is expedient to release the convict on probation for the good conduct regard being had to the circumstances of the case and one of the circumstances which cannot be sidelined in forming the said opinion is “the nature of the offence”. The Court has further opined that though the discretion has been vested in the court to decide when and how the court should form such opinion, yet the provision itself provides sufficient indication that releasing the convicted person on probation of good conduct must appear to the Court to be expedient. Explaining the word “expedient”, the Court held thus:
9. The word “expedient” had been thoughtfully employed by Parliament in the section so as to mean it as “apt and suitable to the end in view”. In Black’s Law Dictionary the word “expedient” is defined as “suitable and appropriate for accomplishment of a specified object” besides the other meaning referred to earlier. In State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabril a two-Judge Bench of this Court has considered the word “expedient”. The learned Judges have observed in para 21 thus:
21…. Again, the word “expedient” used in this provision, has several shades of meaning. In one dictionary sense, “expedient” (adj.) means “apt and suitable to the end in view”, “practical and efficient”: “politic”; “profitable”; “advisable”, “fit, proper and suitable to the circumstances of the case”. In another shade, it means a device “characterised by mere utility rather than principle, conducive to special advantage rather than to what is universally right” (see Webster’s New International Dictionary)’.
10. It was then held that the court must construe the said word in keeping with the context and object of the provision in its widest amplitude. Here the word “expedient” is used in Section 4 of the PO Act in the context of casting a duty on the court to take into account “the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence…”. This means Section 4 can be resorted to when the court considers the circumstances of the case, particularly the nature of the offence, and the court forms its opinion that it is suitable and appropriate for accomplishing a specified object that the offender can be released on probation of good conduct.”
18. In Chellammal and Another vs. State represented by the Inspector of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 461, where the Sessions Judge has acquitted the appellants (mother-in-law and husband) of the charge under Section 304-B IPC but convicted them under Section 498-A, the Apex Court held as under:
Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration release of the offender on probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfillment of the stated circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon considering the report of the probation officer impose such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to record the reasons therefor.
19. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, the singular and non-vital nature of the injury, the absence of any premeditation or pre-existing enmity with the complainant, the sudden and trivial origin of the quarrel, the absence of any previous conviction against the appellant, and the fact that the appellant has already remained under the shadow of this prosecution and the present appeal for over four decades, this Court is satisfied that it would meet the ends of justice, without unduly compromising the interest of the victim, to release the appellant on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, in lieu of sentencing him to imprisonment, subject to his executing a bond, with sureties to the satisfaction of the trial court, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during the period of the bond and, in the meantime, to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, and to remain under the supervision of the Probation Officer for a period of one year.
20. In view of the above, the appeal is partly allowed with modification in conviction and sentence. The conviction of the appellant Chunnu Lal, under Section 307 is modified and convicted him under Section 324 I.P.C.. Thus, conviction awarded by the trial court is modified accordingly.
21. However, the sentence awarded in this case is hereby set aside and in modification thereof, it is directed that the appellant, Chunnu Lal, be released on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, subject to the following conditions:-
(i) The accused-appellant shall execute a fresh personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned for a period of one year with an undertaking that he shall maintain peace and good behaviour and will not involve in any criminal activity.
(ii) Invoking Section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, the appellant shall pay compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) to the injured/complainant Satish Chandra Sachan as compensation, within a period of one month from today. In case of death of injured/victim(s), the appellant shall pay the same to his legal heirs.
(iii) The appellant shall deposit above compensation amount before the trial court concerned within stipulated period and the trial court, after notice and verification, shall give the amount to the victim(s)/his legal heirs through bank accounts.
(iv) In the event of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions, the accused-appellant shall be liable to undergo the maximum sentence as provided under Section 324 I.P.C.
22. Trial court shall ensure compliance and seek report from the Probation Officer for supervision.
23. In view of the modification of sentence and release of the appellant on probation, the bail bonds and sureties furnished earlier during trial/appeal shall stand discharged.
24. The appellant is directed to appear before the trial court within two weeks from today to furnish the requisite bonds. In case of default, the trial court shall be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law, including issuance of coercive process.
25. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted forthwith to the trial court concerned along with trial court record for compliance.
26. The Registrar (Compliance) is also directed to serve a copy of this order within one week by FAX/e-mail to the concerned court through District & Sessions Judge, Fatehpur for compliance.
(Santosh Rai,J.)
July 15, 2026
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