Chattisgarh High Court
Pradip Kumar Sahu vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 15 July, 2026
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CGHC010022072023 2026:CGHC:29955
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 27 of 2023
(Order Reserved on 09/07/2026)
(Final Order Delivered on 15/07/2026)
(Final Order Uploaded on 15/07/2026)
Pradip Kumar Sahu S/o - Shri D. P. Sahu Aged About 40 Years Presently
Posted As - Additional Collector, District Korba, Chhattisgarh, R/o - Ward
No.10, Sakti, District : Sakti, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Revenue and Disaster
Management, Mantralay Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, District
- Raipur, Chhattisgarh (C.G.)
2 - Mrigendar Singh Deo S/o Late Samar Bahadur Singh Deo Aged About 55
Years R/o - Deviganj Road, Ambikapur, District : Surguja, Chhattisgarh
... Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate along
with Mr. Waquar Naiyyar, Advocate
For State : Mr. Vivek Verma, GA
For Respondent No.2 Mr. Kishore Narayan, Advocate
(Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru)
CAV Order
ASHUTOSH
MISHRA
Digitally signed by
ASHUTOSH MISHRA
Date: 2026.07.15
17:50:36 +0530
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1. The petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India calling in question the
legality, validity and propriety of the award dated 14.12.2022 passed
by the Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under the Legal Services
Authorities Act, 1987 (for short “the Act of 1987”), in case
No.351/2022 (Mrigendar Singh Deo v Pradip Kumar Sahu & Anr).
2. (a) The brief facts of the case, as projected by the petitioner (non-
applicant No.1 before the Permanent Lok Adalat), are that the dispute
relates to a parcel of land which, according to respondent No.2
(applicant before the Permanent Lok Adalat), was originally allotted
on lease in favour of Maharaja Chandikeshwar Singhdeo. It is pleaded
by respondent No.2 that the allotment was duly published in the
Gazette on 22.12.1967 and the subsequent transfer in favour of the
predecessor-in-interest of respondent No.2 was effected through a
registered sale deed dated 02.05.1965. Consequent mutation entries
were also recorded in the revenue records and the respondent claims to
have remained in lawful possession.
(b) The petitioner, however, questioned the legality of the claim of
respondent No.2 and asserted that the land continued to be
Government land and that respondent No.2 had no lawful title. The
dispute ultimately culminated in proceedings before the Permanent
Lok Adalat. The Permanent Lok Adalat issued notices to the parties
and thereafter proceeded to decide the matter by passing the impugned
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award in favour of respondent No.2. The award also directed payment
of compensation in favour of respondent No.2. Feeling aggrieved, the
petitioner has filed the present writ petition.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that:
(a) the impugned award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat
is wholly without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside, as
the same has been rendered by a forum which was not
constituted in accordance with the mandatory provisions of
the Act, 1987. He would next submit that Section 22B(2) of
the Act of 1987 mandates that every Permanent Lok Adalat
shall consist of a Chairman, who is or has been a District
Judge or Additional District Judge, and two other Members
possessing adequate experience in public utility service. The
Legislature has consciously employed the expression “shall
consist of”, thereby making the composition prescribed
under the statute mandatory and not directory. Since the
jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat is entirely
statutory, it can exercise adjudicatory powers only when it is
duly constituted in the manner contemplated under the Act,
1987.
(b) Learned counsel would further submit that on the date
the impugned award was passed, the Permanent Lok Adalat
was not functioning with its complete statutory composition,
4as one of the Members was not available and the award
came to be rendered by an incomplete quorum.
Consequently, the adjudicatory body lacked the competence
to adjudicate the dispute and the award rendered by such an
incompletely constituted forum is a nullity in the eyes of
law.
(c) He would next submit that the statutory composition of
the Permanent Lok Adalat is mandatory and an award passed
by an incompletely constituted Permanent Lok Adalat is
without jurisdiction and deserves to be set aside.
(d) Placing reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Dilip Mehta v. Rakesh Gupta & Others,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2737, learned counsel submits that
although the scope of judicial review against an award of the
Permanent Lok Adalat is limited, interference under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution is permissible where the
award suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity. According to
the petitioner, the defect in the present case goes to the very
root of the matter, inasmuch as the adjudicating forum itself
was not constituted in accordance with the statute. Without
prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel also
submits that the proceedings before the Permanent Lok
Adalat were conducted in violation of the principles of
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natural justice inasmuch as the petitioner was not afforded
an adequate and effective opportunity of hearing before
passing the impugned award.
(e) Learned counsel would further submit that the
application filed before the Permanent Lok Adalat by the
respondent No.2 itself was not maintainable in view of
Section 22C(1) of the Act of 1987. It is submitted that prior
to invoking the jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat,
respondent No.2 had already initiated proceedings before the
Sub-Divisional Officer relating to diversion of the land.
Once the dispute had already been taken before the
competent authority, the application before the Permanent
Lok Adalat was not maintainable. Learned counsel would
also submit that the dispute arose out of proceedings
governed by the Chhattisgarh Lok Sewa Guarantee Act,
2011, which provides a complete statutory mechanism
including an appellate remedy before the Collector. Since
respondent No.2 admittedly did not avail the statutory
appellate remedy, the application before the Permanent Lok
Adalat was premature and not maintainable.
(f) On the aforesaid grounds, it is prayed that the
impugned award be quashed and the matter be remitted to a
duly constituted Permanent Lok Adalat, constituted in
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accordance with Section 22B(2) of the Act, 1987, for fresh
adjudication in accordance with law after granting due
opportunity of hearing to all the parties.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2, while supporting the
impugned award, submits that:
(i) every allegation made in the writ petition is
misconceived. It is argued that the petitioner deliberately
choose not to participate effectively before the Permanent
Lok Adalat despite repeated opportunities. The respondent
has relied upon the Gazette publication, lease documents,
registered sale deed dated 02.05.1965, mutation entries and
subsequent revenue records to contend that the title and
possession of respondent No.2 stood established. It is further
submitted that the Permanent Lok Adalat first made sincere
efforts for conciliation as required by Section 22C of the Act
of 1987 and only after failure of conciliation proceeded to
adjudicate the dispute.
(ii) With regard to the allegation of violation of natural
justice learned counsel would next submit that notices were
repeatedly issued and opportunities were granted but were
not availed by the petitioner. Learned counsel has further
argued that the Permanent Lok Adalat has awarded only
compensation and not penalty and, therefore, the objection
7regarding lack of jurisdiction to impose penalty is wholly
misconceived.
(iii) Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh,
(2008) 2 SCC 660, Bhargavi Constructions v. Kothakapu
Muthyam Reddy, (2018) 13 SCC 480 and particularly Dilip
Mehta (supra), to contend that the award of a Permanent
Lok Adalat can be interfered with only on extremely limited
grounds such as fraud, jurisdictional error or violation of
natural justice.
5. Learned State counsel adopts the submissions advanced on behalf of
respondent No.2 and submits that the award is reasoned and does not
warrant interference.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record.
7. The principal question which arises for consideration is –
“Whether the impugned Award passed by the Permanent Lok
Adalat can be sustained when admittedly it was not
functioning with the composition prescribed under the Act,
1987.”
8. In order to consider the plea raised at the bar, it would be appropriate to
consider the provisions contained in the Act of 1987 as also the nature and
scope of the said Act.
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9. The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 was enacted to constitute legal
services authorities to provide for free and competent legal service to the
weaker sections of the society to ensure that opportunities for securing
justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other
disabilities, and to organise Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of the
legal system promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity. The Act of
1987 is divided in seven chapters. Section 2(d) defines, “Lok Adalat”
means a Lok Adalat organised under Chapter VI. Clause (a) of Section
22A defines, “Permanent Lok Adalat” means a Permanent Lok Adalat
established under sub-section (1) of Section 22B, only with respect to
“public utility service” as envisaged under clause (b) of Section 22A and
such Permanent Lok Adalats have to be established under Section 22B.
Section 22B which relates to Establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats
states as under: –
“22B. Establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats.–(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in section 19, the Central
Authority or, as the case may be, every State Authority shall, by
notification, establish Permanent Lok Adalats at such places and
for exercising such jurisdiction in respect of one or more public
utility services and for such areas as may be specified in the
notification.
(2) Every Permanent Lok Adalat established for an area notified
under sub-section (1) shall consist of–
(a) a person who is, or has been, a district judge or
additional district judge or has held judicial office higher in
rank than that of a district judge, shall be the Chairman of
the Permanent Lok Adalat; and
(b) two other persons having adequate experience in public
utility service to be nominated by the Central Government
9or, as the case may be, the State Government on the
recommendation of the Central Authority or, as the case
may be, the State Authority,appointed by the Central Authority or, as the case may be, the State
Authority, establishing such Permanent Lok Adalat and the other terms
and conditions of the appointment of the Chairman and other persons
referred to in clause (b) shall be such as may be prescribed by the
Central Government.
10. In Bar Council of India v. Union of India (2012) 8 SCC 243, their
Lordships of the Supreme Court while highlighting the object of having
non-judicial members in a tribunal like Permanent Lok Adalat, have held
as under: –
“36. It is not unusual to have the tribunals comprising of
judicial as well as non-judicial members. The whole idea
of having non-judicial members in a tribunal like
Permanent Lok Adalat is to make sure that the legal
technicalities do not get paramountcy in conciliation or
adjudicatory proceedings. The fact that a Permanent Lok
Adalat established under Section 22-B comprises of one
judicial officer and two other persons having adequate
experience in public utility service does not show any
abhorrence to the rule of law nor such composition
becomes violative of principles of fairness and justice or is
contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.”
Their Lordships further held that Permanent Lok Adalat under the Act of
1987 has to be by majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok
Adalat, and observed as under: –
“37. It is true that the award made by the Permanent Lok
Adalat under the 1987 Act has to be by majority of the
persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. In a given
case, it may be that the two non-judicial members disagree
with the judicial member but that does not mean that such
majority decision lacks in fairness or sense of justice.”
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11. In the matter of Karnal Improvement Trust, Karnal v. Parkash Wanti
(Smt) (Dead) and another (1995) 5 SCC 159 their Lordships of the
Supreme Court while considering a matter rendered by a Tribunal
constituted under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, while
examining the Act of 1922 found that under Section 2(5), the Tribunal
constituted under Section 60(1) shall consist of a President and two
assessors. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, their Lordships held as under: –
“6. A conspectus of the above provisions would given us
unerring indication of the legislative animation that the
Tribunal shall consist of three members, namely, the
President and two assessors and each is co-existent with the
others. The Tribunal is a civil court and the President is the
Presiding Judge of the court. Being a judicial member,
undoubtedly, he has been conferred with power to preside
over the Tribunal, summon the witnesses, secure the
evidence and decide on questions of law and title and
procedure. …”
Their Lordships further held in paragraphs 7 & 12 as under: –
“7. The award of the Tribunal has been designated to be
the award of the court and the Tribunal is the court and each
member is entitled to his own opinion in determination of the
compensation or measurements of the land. The
Chairperson as a Civil Judge is empowered to sign the
award on behalf of the Tribunal. In case of difference of
opinion, the majority opinion of the members shall be the
decree of the Tribunal. The mandatory quorum, therefore, is
three members and the award of the Tribunal is a decree of a
civil court. … When the Tribunal consists of three members,
the opinion has to be of the composite body, and not of the
sole President. … In case of difference of opinion, the
majority view would be the executable decree. In other
words, it indicates that it is a three-member statutory body
and does not consist of the Presiding Judge only. He is left
with no option but has to associate the other members in
determining the compensation of the acquired land for the
11trust or its nature or extent. Any other interpretation would
be inconsistent with and derogatory to the scheme, purpose
and intendment of the Act. The presence and participation
of each member in the adjudication of the compensation or
measurement or quality of land is of necessity, mandatory.
… It would, therefore, be clear that all the three members
should be present and should participate at the time of
enquiry unless unavoidable, hear the matter on merits and
the decision of the Tribunal, if not unanimous and if there be
difference of opinion, be as per the majority.
12. The question thus arises whether the function by the
Tribunal as a body is mandatory or directory? The discharge of
the duties under the Act are quasi-judicial. The power to
determine compensation and other questions involves
adjudication. The discharge of the functions by the Tribunal being
quasi-judicial cannot be regarded as ministerial. When the statute
directs the Tribunal consisting of three members to determine
compensation etc. and designates the award as judgment and
decree of a civil court, it cannot be held that the quasi-judicial
functions of the Tribunal would be considered as directory,
defeating the very purpose of the Act. Though inconvenience and
delay may occasion in some cases by holding the provisions to be
mandatory, but that is an inescapable consequence. In the light of
the aforesaid discussion, it must be held that the adjudication by
the three-member Tribunal is imperative and mandatory.
Determination of the compensation in disregard thereof renders
the adjudication void, invalid and inoperative.”
12. The principle of law laid down in Karnal Improvement Trust (supra)
applies with full vigour to the facts of the present case, as in the instant
case also by virtue of Section 22(3) of the Act of 1987, all proceedings
before a Permanent Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings
within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code
and every Permanent Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a civil court for
the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The function of Permanent Lok Adalat is not ministerial
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and therefore the composition of the Permanent Lok Adalat has to be
strictly in accordance with Section 22B(2) of the Act of 1987 (one judicial
member as Chairman and other two members being non-judicial
members), and decision of the Permanent Lok Adalat has to be unanimous
and as per the scheme of the Act of 1987 and in case of difference of
opinion, it should be as per majority. Quorum of the Permanent Lok
Adalat i.e. one judicial member being Chairman and two non-judicial
members being Members, is mandatory quorum which is necessary for
constituting competent Permanent Lok Adalat to adjudicate the dispute by
way of conciliation or on merits.
13. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Karnal Improvement Trust
(supra) further repelled the argument that the parties to the dispute have
participated in the proceedings of the Tribunal without any demur or
protest and therefore setting aside of the award would put them at great
hardship. Their Lordships repelling the argument held that acquiescence
does not confer jurisdiction and erroneous interpretation equally should
not be permitted to perpetuate defeating legislative animation. It has been
observed as under: –
“22. It is next contended that since the matter is long
pending and the appellant has acquiesced to the jurisdiction
of the single member award, it is not a fit case warranting
interference under Article 136. Acquiescence does not
confer jurisdiction and erroneous interpretation equally
should not be permitted to perpetuate and perpetrate
defeating of legislative animation. …”
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14. As such, in absence of mandatory quorum of one judicial member being
Chairman and two non-judicial members being Members in light of the
decision of the Supreme Court in Karnal Improvement Trust (supra),
the impugned award of the Permanent Lok Adalat would be void, invalid
and inoperative.
15. Before adverting to the factual aspect, it would be apposite to examine the
statutory scheme contained in Chapter VI-A of the Act, 1987.
16. Section 22A defines “Permanent Lok Adalat” for the purposes of
Sections 22 and 22B and also defines “public utility service”. The
adjudicatory jurisdiction exercised by a Permanent Lok Adalat is, thus,
entirely a creation of statute and can be exercised only in the manner
contemplated by the Act.
17. The provisions contained in Sections 22A to 22E constitute an
integrated statutory scheme and, therefore, each provision must be
construed harmoniously rather than in isolation. Section 22B deals
with the establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats. Sub-section (2),
which is material for the present controversy, provides that every
Permanent Lok Adalat shall consist of a Chairman, who is or has been
a District Judge or an Additional District Judge or has held judicial
office higher in rank than that of a District Judge, and two other
persons having adequate experience in public utility service. The
Legislature has consciously employed the expression “shall consist
of”, thereby making the composition of the Permanent Lok Adalat
mandatory. The statute neither contemplates nor permits adjudication
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by the Chairman sitting singly or by an incomplete Bench. The
jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat, therefore, is conditioned
upon its constitution strictly in accordance with Section 22B(2) of the
Act.
18. The distinction between mandatory and directory provisions is well
settled. A statutory requirement is mandatory where compliance is
indispensable to the validity of the act and where the provision relates
to the competence or jurisdiction of the authority itself. On the other
hand, a directory provision regulates the manner in which the power is
to be exercised and substantial compliance may suffice. The
requirement contained in Section 22B(2) falls in the former category.
The Legislature has not merely prescribed the procedure to be
followed by the Permanent Lok Adalat; it has prescribed the very
composition of the adjudicatory forum. A body constituted contrary to
the mandate of Section 22B(2) is not the Permanent Lok Adalat
contemplated by the statute.
19. The procedure to be followed by the Permanent Lok Adalat has been
prescribed under Section 22C. Under sub-sections (4) to (7), the
Permanent Lok Adalat is required to make efforts to bring about an
amicable settlement between the parties. It is only upon failure of
conciliation that, by virtue of sub-section (8), the Permanent Lok
Adalat acquires jurisdiction to decide the dispute on merits. The right
to adjudicate under Section 22C(8) is not an independent source of
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jurisdiction; it is merely the stage at which the jurisdiction already
vested in a duly constituted Permanent Lok Adalat becomes
exercisable. The provision cannot be read in isolation so as to enable
an incompletely constituted forum to exercise adjudicatory powers.
20. Further, Section 22D provides that while conducting conciliation
proceedings or deciding the dispute, the Permanent Lok Adalat shall
be guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play,
equity and other principles of justice, though it is not bound by the
Code of Civil Procedure or the Indian Evidence Act. Relaxation of
procedural law under Section 22D does not dispense with compliance
of the mandatory statutory requirement regarding the constitution of
the Permanent Lok Adalat itself.
21. The relaxation contemplated under Section 22D is confined to
procedural law. It enables the Permanent Lok Adalat to evolve a
flexible procedure by dispensing with the strict application of the Code
of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act. However, such
procedural flexibility cannot be construed as dispensing with the
substantive statutory conditions governing the very constitution of the
adjudicatory forum. Procedure regulates the exercise of jurisdiction; it
does not create jurisdiction where the statute withholds it.
22. Section 22E declares every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat to be
final and binding on all the parties and further provides that such
award shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court. The finality
16
attached to an award under Section 22E, however, presupposes that the
award has been rendered by a forum lawfully constituted and acting
within the bounds of its jurisdiction. A decision rendered by an
authority lacking jurisdiction cannot derive legitimacy merely because
the statute accords finality to its award.
23. It is a settled principle that jurisdiction is conferred by statute and must
be exercised strictly in the manner prescribed therein. Where the
statute creates a special tribunal and simultaneously prescribes the
composition in which it shall function, such composition becomes a
condition precedent to the valid exercise of adjudicatory power. Any
adjudication by a body not constituted in accordance with the statute is
rendered without jurisdiction and is void ab initio.
24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dilip Mehta (supra) while examining
the scope of judicial review against an award of the Permanent Lok
Adalat, has held that although interference under Articles 226 and 227
is limited, judicial review is nevertheless available where the award
suffers from fraud, lack of jurisdiction or violation of the principles of
natural justice. Thus, absence of jurisdiction continues to remain a
recognised ground for exercise of the writ jurisdiction.
25. From the above discussion, it is quite vivid that the composition
prescribed under Section 22B(2) of the Act, 1987 is mandatory and
that an award rendered by an incompletely constituted Permanent Lok
Adalat cannot be sustained in law.
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26. Once the Court reaches the conclusion that the adjudicatory forum
itself lacked jurisdiction, the submissions advanced by the respondents
regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the documents relied upon, the
conciliation proceedings or the correctness of the findings on merits
cease to assume significance. Jurisdiction is anterior to adjudication on
merits, and a decision rendered without jurisdiction cannot be
sustained irrespective of the correctness of its conclusions.
27. Coming to the facts of the present case, the record unmistakably
reveals that on the date the impugned Award was rendered, the
Permanent Lok Adalat was not functioning with the complete statutory
composition contemplated under Section 22B(2) of the Act. One of the
Members was not part of the quoram and the matter came to be
adjudicated by an incomplete Bench. Such an adjudication is plainly
contrary to the statutory mandate. An order passed by an authority
lacking inherent jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be sustained in the
eye of law.
28. The defect in the present case is not a mere procedural irregularity
capable of being cured by consent, waiver or acquiescence. It strikes at
the root of the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory forum itself.
29. Since this Court has already held that the impugned award is liable to
be set aside on the ground that the Permanent Lok Adalat itself lacked
inherent jurisdiction owing to incomplete quoram, it is unnecessary to
examine the remaining contentions urged by the petitioner relating to
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the maintainability of the proceedings under Section 22C of the Act of
1987, the effect of the proceedings pending before the Sub-Divisional
Officer, or the applicability of the Chhattisgarh Lok Sewa Guarantee
Act, 2011. All such questions are expressly left open to be considered
by the duly constituted Permanent Lok Adalat, in accordance with law.
30. Consequently, the impugned Award dated 14.12.2022 passed by the
Permanent Lok Adalat in case No.351/2022 deserves to be and is
hereby set aside. The matter is remitted to the concerned Permanent
Lok Adalat for fresh consideration by a duly constituted Bench in strict
conformity with Section 22B(2) of the Act, 1987.
31. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the rival claims and all questions including the
maintainability are left open to be decided afresh by the Permanent
Lok Adalat in accordance with law after affording due opportunity of
hearing to all concerned. The date of hearing be given to the parties
well in advance.
32. The writ petition is accordingly allowed to the above extent. No order
as to costs.
SD/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
JUDGE
ashu
