Calcutta High Court
Ifb Industries Limited vs National Insurance Company Limited on 14 July, 2026
Author: Ravi Krishan Kapur
Bench: Ravi Krishan Kapur
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
ORIGINAL SIDE
(Commercial Division)
BEFORE:
The Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur
C.S. (COM) No. 601 of 2024
I.A./G.A. (COM) No. 3 of 2025
In
IFB Industries Limited
Vs.
National Insurance Company Limited
For the petitioner/plaintiff : Mr. Ratnanko Banerjee, Senior Advocate
Mr. Shatanshu Panda, Advocate.
Mr. Anunoy Basu, Advocate.
Mr. Sayuj Banerjee, Advocate.
Mr. Sohom Sarkar, Advocate.
For the respondent/defendant : Mr. Ishaan Saha, Advocate.
Ms. Sananda Ganguly, Advocate.
Heard on : 17.06.2026
Judgment on : 14.07.2026
Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.:
1. This is an application for judgment upon admission. The suit arises out of a
claim for insurance. The plaintiff seeks a money decree and consequentially
challenges the repudiation of its claim.
2. Briefly, the plaintiff is engaged in the business of manufacturing and
importing consumer durables. The goods manufactured and imported by the
plaintiff are sold to dealers on a principal to principal basis across the
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country. For such distribution network, the plaintiff operates a “Hub and
Spoke” model, wherein a central location (the hub) serves as a point of
connection for several surrounding locations (the spokes). The plaintiff has
four hub godowns located at Gurgaon, Chennai, Nagpur and Goa respectively
and seventy-five branch godowns throughout the country.
3. The distribution chain of the plaintiff involves the following transits: (i)
manufacturing locations outside India to the import warehouse in India; (ii)
import warehouse in India to the hub godown; (iii) manufacturing location in
India to the hub godown; (iv) hub godown to the branch godown and (v)
branch godown to the dealer’s godown or warehouse. During such
distribution and transportation, the plaintiff’s goods are temporarily stored at
the warehouse at the importing location i.e. the hub godown and the branch
godown.
4. In the ordinary course of business, the plaintiff had insured its goods against
various perils under multiple contracts of insurance with the defendant. The
two policies which are relevant for the present suit are: (a) the Multi Transit
Marine Insurance (Marine policy) which covered transit of all the goods
bearing policy No. 104400211910000001 dated 1st April, 2019, for the period
1 April, 2019 to 31 March, 2020, for a sum insured of Rs. 10,29,05,00,000/
and (b) the Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy bearing policy No.
104400111810000245 dated 24 December, 2018, for the period 24
December, 2018 to 23 December, 2019, for a sum insured of Rs.
45,00,00,000/ covering the plaintiff’s hub godown at Gurgaon (the Avvashya
godown) for the goods stored therein. It is also alleged by the plaintiff that the
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claim under the Marine Policy was for goods which were stored in the hub
godown as an intermediate storage point with a cover of 8 weeks i.e. 56 days.
5. In November, 2019, the plaintiff decided to shift its Gurgaon hub godown
from the Avvashya godown to a new location at Village Babra Bakipur,
Gurgaon (the Babra godown). By an email dated 20 November, 2019, the
plaintiff informed the defendant that it was exiting from the Avvashya godown
and shifting to the Babra godown. Hence, the request to the defendant to
incorporate the new address of the Babra godown in the existing Standard
Fire and Special Perils Policy instead of the Avvashya Godown. Subsequently,
by a further e-mail dated 22 November, 2019, the defendant duly responded
by accepting the request and substituting the insured premises under the
Fire Policy as Babra godown with effect from 1 December, 2019.
6. On 2 December 2019, a fire broke out at the plaintiff’s Avvashya godown and
the entire goods stored were destroyed. The incident was immediately
reported to the defendant by an email dated 3 December, 2019.
Subsequently, the defendant appointed Mack Insurance Surveyors and Loss
Assessor Private Limited to assess the loss. The plaintiff submitted necessary
documents and co-operated in the survey process.
7. By a Final Survey & Loss Adjustment Report dated 23 March, 2021, the
surveyor assessed the gross loss suffered by the plaintiff at Rs. 7,67,74,919/-
and after adjusting certain deductibles, concluded the final loss amount as
Rs. 6,43,98,111/- under the Marine Policy. For the purposes of this
application, the plaintiff has restricted its claim to Rs. 6,43,98,111/-, which is
the amount assessed by the surveyor under the Marine policy. However, the
surveyor was of the view that the loss was not payable on the ground that
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there was an alleged endorsement dated 5 April, 2019 by which the
intermediate storage clause from the Marine Policy had been deleted.
Subsequently, upon such disputes being raised by the plaintiff against the
existence and validity of this alleged endorsement, the surveyor, by an
Addendum Report dated 25 June, 2021, also clarified that the loss was
neither payable under the Marine Policy or the Fire Policy.
8. By a letter dated 8 September, 2021, the defendant repudiated the plaintiff’s
claim on the ground that the same was not payable in terms of the
recommendations of the surveyor. The plaintiff contested such repudiation
and diverse correspondence was exchanged between the parties. Ultimately,
by an email dated 2 May, 2023, the defendant confirmed that the claim of the
plaintiff had been justifiably repudiated and did not merit any
reconsideration. Hence, this suit. Upon filing of the suit, the defendant has
filed its Written statement.
9. On behalf of the plaintiff it is contended that the defendant has admitted the
entire distribution chain followed by the plaintiff in the Written statement
namely, from the manufacturing/importing location to the hub godown, from
the hub godown to the branch godown and from the branch godown to the
dealer’s godown. Such admission unequivocally establishes that the hub
godown is an intermediate point in the transit chain and not the final
destination. Thus the sequence of transportation of goods is admitted. It is
also admitted by the defendant that on a reading of the terms of the Marine
Policy read with clause 8 of the Institute Cargo Clauses (A) and clause 5 of the
Inland Transit Clause-A it is clear that the insurance cover terminates at the
time of unloading of the plaintiff’s goods at the branch godown of the plaintiff.
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The defendant has also admitted that intermediate storage means storage at
the intermediate point prior to unloading of the goods at the final warehouse
or place of storage. The Marine Policy cover remained in force at the hub
godown being the stage prior to the branch godown. Thus, on the basis of the
averments made in the written statement it is admitted that the goods were
still in transit from the hub godown to the branch godown whereupon they
were transported to the plaintiff’s dealers or purchasers. The intermediate
storage cover of 8 weeks is admitted. The Marine policy continued during the
course of transit and terminated at the time of unloading at the branch. The
quantum of liability in the report of surveyor assessed such loss at Rs.
6,43,98,111/- and the plaintiff has restricted its claim for judgment upon
admission to this amount for the purposes of this application and reserves its
right to claim the remaining amount at trial In support of such contentions,
the plaintiff relies on the decision in Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United
Bank of India (2000) 7 SCC 120.
10. On behalf of the defendant, it is contended that the application is
misconceived and meritless. There is no admission either in respect of breach
or quantum of liability which warrants any decree being passed. The terms of
the Marine Policy read with clause 8 of the Institute Cargo Clauses (A) and
Clause 5 of the Inland Transit Clause-A establish that the cover terminated
upon unloading at the final warehouse or place of storage which the
defendant maintains is the branch godown. The piecemeal reading of the
written statement does not constitute any admission far less an unconditional
or unqualified admission. The defendant made an endorsement No.
104400211982100002 dated 5 April, 2019 in the Marine Policy pursuant to
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the Regulation dated 22nd March, 2019 issued by the General Insurance
Corporation of India which clarified the extant position and is binding on the
plaintiff.
11. By an email dated 20 November, 2019, the plaintiff informed the defendant
that it was exiting the Avvashya godown and requested that the Babra
godown be substituted in the Fire Policy. The defendant accepted the request
by an email dated 22 November, 2019 and incorporated the insured premises
with effect from 1 December, 2019. In such circumstances, since the fire
occurred on 2 December 2019 at the Avvashya godown, which was no longer
the insured premises, the plaintiff’s claim under the Fire Policy was
inadmissible and such claim was justifiably rejected under both policies. In
support of such contentions, the defendant relies on Rajiv Ghosh vs. Satya
Naryan Jaiswal. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 751, Rajesh Mitra & Ors. vs. Karnani
Properties Ltd. (2024) SCC OnLine SC 2607, Jeevan Diesels and Electricals Ltd.
vs. Jasbir Singh Chadha (2010) 6 SCC 601, Pushpa & Ors. vs. Dayawati & Ors
2026 SCC OnLine SC 1013, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Pradeep Kumar
(2009) 7 SCC 787 and Dudh Nath Pandey v. Suresh Chandra Bhattasali,
(1986) 3 SCC 360.
12. Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 provides as follows:
6. Judgment on admissions.–(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in
the pleading or otherwise; whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the
suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the
determination of any other question–between the parties, make such order or give such
judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in
accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment
was pronounced.
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13. The object of Order XII Rule 6 is to enable a party to obtain a speedy
judgment at least to the extent of the admissions of the defendant which
entitle the plaintiff to relief. The Rule enables either party, at any stage of the
suit, to obtain judgment or an appropriate order on the admissions made by
the other party. In other words, either party may by availing of this Rule can
get rid as much of the suit about which there is no controversy. The Rule
confers a very wide discretion on Court. The Court may at any stage of the
suit either on an application of any party or on its own motion and without
determination of any other question between the parties make such order or
make such judgment as it thinks fit on the basis of an admission made in the
pleadings or otherwise, whether orally or in writing.
14. For any exercise of discretion under the above Rule, the admission must be
clear, unambiguous, unconditional and unequivocal. In construing the
pleadings filed by a party it is impermissible to dissect the same and the
pleadings should be read as a whole. In Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal,
(Supra), it has been held as follows:
28. The provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and permissive. They are not
mandatory, obligatory or peremptory. This is also clear from the use of the word ‘may’ in
the Rule.
29. The powers conferred on Court by this Rule are untrammeled and cannot be
crystallized into any rigid Rule of universal application. They can be exercised keeping in
view and having regard to the facts and varying circumstances of each case.
30. If the Court is of the opinion that it is not safe to pass a judgment on admission, or
that a case involves questions which cannot be appropriately dealt with and decided on
the basis of admission, it may, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to pass a judgement
and may insist upon clear proof of even admitted facts.
31. To make order or to pronounce judgment on admission is at the discretion of the court.
First, the word “may” is used in Rule 6 and not the word “shall” which prima facie shows
that the provision is an enabling one. Rule 6 of Order 12 must be read with Rule 5 of
Order 8 which is identical to the Proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act. Reading all the
relevant provisions together, it is manifest that the court is not bound to grant relief to the
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Plaintiff only on the basis of admission of the Defendant. (See: Sher Bahadur v. Mohd.
Amin MANU/LA/0103/1929 : AIR 1929 Lah 569).
15. In Jeevan Diesels and Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha (Supra), after
reviewing the authorities, it was held as follows:
13. Whether or not there is a clear, unambiguous admission by one party of the case of
the other party is essentially a question of fact and the decision of this question depends
on the facts of the case. This question, namely, whether there is a clear admission or not
cannot be decided on the basis of a judicial precedent. Therefore, even though the
principles in Karam Kapahi (supra) may be unexceptionable they cannot be applied in the
instant case in view of totally different fact situation.
14. In Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India and Ors. reported in
MANU/SC/0485/2000 : (2000) 7 SCC 120 the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 came up for
consideration before this Court. This Court on a detailed consideration of the provisions of
Order 12 Rule 6 made it clear ‘wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of
which it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed’ the principle will
apply. In the instant case it cannot be said that there is a clear admission of the case of
the defendants-plaintiffs about termination of tenancy by the appellant in its written
statement or in its reply to the petition of the defendants-plaintiffs under Order 12 Rule 6.
15. In another old decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hughes vs. London,
Edinburgh, and Glasgow Assurance Company reported in (1891) 8 The Times Law
Reports 81, similar principles were laid down. Lord Justice Lopes held that judgment
upon admission under Order 32 Rule 6 should not be entered unless the admission is
clear and unequivocal. Lord Justice Esher concurred with the said formulation.
16. In yet another decision of the Court of Appeal in Landergan vs. Feast reported in The
Law Times Reports 1886-87 Volume 55 at page 42, in an appeal from Chancery Division,
Lord Justice Lindley and Lord Justice Lopes held that party is not entitled to apply under
the aforesaid rule unless there is a clear admission that the money is due and recoverable
in the action in which the admission is made.
17. In the case of J.C. Galstaun v. E.D. Sassoon & Co., Ltd. reported in 27 CWN (1922-23)
783, a Bench of Calcutta High Court presided over by Hon’ble Justice Sir Asutosh
Mookerjee sitting with Justice Rankin while construing the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6
of the Code followed the aforesaid decision in Hughes (supra) and also the view of Lord
Justice Lopes in Landergan (supra) and held that these provisions are attracted ‘where
the other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed. This rule
applies where there is a clear admission of the facts on the face of which it is impossible
for the party making it to succeed’. In saying so His Lordship quoted the observation of
Justice Sargent in Ellis v. Allen (1914) 1 Ch. D. 904 {See page 787}.
16. It is true that in paragraph 3(g) of the Written statement, the defendant has
alleged that the cover terminated at the time of unloading of the plaintiff’s
goods at the branch godown and that intermediate storage means storage at
the intermediate point prior to unloading of the goods at the final warehouse
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or place of storage. Nevertheless, the defendant’s express denials in the
subsequent paragraphs i.e. 3(ii), 3(jj), 3(kk), and paragraph 5 of the written
statement cannot be ignored. In paragraph 5 of the written statement, it has
been categorically denied that under the Marine Policy, the plaintiff’s goods
remained insured for a further period of 56 days after they had arrived and
were unloaded at the plaintiff’s branch godown, which is the final warehouse
or place of storage under the Marine policy.
17. On a complete reading of the written statement, the defendant has not made
any admission that the goods at the hub godown were covered under the
Marine Policy at the time of the fire. On the contrary, the defendant has
specifically denied that the hub godown was covered as an intermediate
storage point. The defendant has also denied that the 56 day intermediate
storage clause was a negotiated term under any of the above two policies. The
defendant has also denied that the premium was calculated based on such
clause. The defendant has denied that the cover continued for any period
after the goods were unloaded at the hub godown.
18. In view of the above, the plaintiff’s attempt to selectively read the written
statement is precisely the kind of piecemeal reading which is impermissible
while dealing with such applications. In this context, in Pushpa & Ors. v.
Dayawati & Ors. (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
39. While examining the question as to whether the aforesaid statement constitutes an
admission within the meaning of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, it becomes necessary to
read the written statement as a whole. We have, therefore, carefully examined the
entirety of the written statement filed by defendant No. 3. In our considered opinion, the
approach adopted by the High Court in isolating a single portion of the written statement
and construing the same as an unequivocal admission of liability is legally unsustainable,
as it is well settled that pleadings cannot be read in a piecemeal manner and must be
construed holistically.
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19. In such circumstances, the averments in paragraph 3 of the written
statement cannot be treated as admissions of fact which per se entitles the
plaintiff to a decree. On a full and complete reading of the written statement
the question of whether the hub godown was a transit waypoint or a pre-
determined destination under the policy is a mixed question of law and fact
requiring fuller examination at trial and is insufficient to constitute an
admission warranting passing of a decree. Even assuming that the
defendant’s statements in paragraph 3(g) were to be construed as an
admission of the terms of the policy, the defendant has in paragraph 5(xvi)
categorically denied liability and alleged that it is not estopped from relying on
the true terms and conditions of the policy including the validity, authenticity
and evidentiary value of the endorsement dated 5 April 2019. Similarly, there
is also a factual dispute about whether the receipt of the goods within the
period is covered under the policy or not. This cannot constitute an admission
far less a clear, categorical or unequivocal admission. [Dudh Nath Pandey v.
Suresh Chandra Bhattasali, (Supra) and Himani Alloys Ltd. vs. Tata Steel Ltd.
(2011) 15 SCC 271].
20. In this connection, the plaintiff’s email addressed to the defendant dated 20
November, 2019 is also relevant in examining the existence of disputed
questions of fact. By such email, the plaintiff informed the defendant that it
was exiting from the Avvashya godown and moving to a new location and
requested the defendant to incorporate the new Babra godown in the existing
Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy in place of its Avvashya Godown. By
its response dated 22 November 2019, the defendant accepted the request
and replaced the insured premises under the Fire Policy to the Babra godown
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with effect from 1 December, 2019. No contemporaneous objection was raised
by the plaintiff. Prima facie, this shows that the plaintiff itself treated the
Avvashya godown as a location from which it was exiting and not as a location
which should continue to be remain covered. The plaintiff’s subsequent
assertion that it only requested an ‘addition’ and not a ‘deletion’ requires
further examination and cannot be adjudicated upon in this summary
jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the pleadings when read as a whole
reveal several disputed questions of fact and law which require further
adjudication. The alleged admission is qualified and textual. The plaintiff’s
attempt to selectively rely on a solitary paragraph in the written statement
while ignoring the remaining denials is precisely the kind of reading which is
prohibited.
21. The report of the surveyor even insofar as assessment of quantum is
concerned cannot be the basis for any decree without any further
examination. In any event, the report of the surveyor is per se not the last and
final word moreso when the claim of the plaintiff has been ultimately rejected.
The report also requires to be read as a whole. The defendant has also
disputed the surveyor’s assessment of liability in rejecting the claim. The
plaintiff cannot pick and choose the surveyor’s figure insofar as quantum is
concerned and disregard the portion of the report where liability has been
rejected. The report must be read in its entirety. A surveyor’s report is neither
sacrosanct nor conclusive. It is neither binding upon the insurer nor the
insured and cannot be the sole basis of a judgment on admission. This is also
statutorily recognized under section 64 UM(4) of the Insurance Act 1938. In
any event, the challenge by the plaintiff to the Addendum Report on the
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ground that it was commissioned without notice to the plaintiff is a triable
issue. In this background, any reliance on the surveyor’s assessment as an
admission of fact is erroneous and misplaced. In New India Assurance Co.
Ltd. v. Pradeep Kumar, (Supra), it has been held as follows:
22. In other words although the assessment of loss by the approved surveyoris a
prerequisite for payment or settlement of claim of twenty thousand rupees or more by
insurer, but surveyor’s report is not the last and final word. It is not that sacrosanct that it
cannot be departed from; it is not conclusive. The approved surveyor’s report may be the
basis or foundation for settlement of a claim by the insurer in respect of the loss suffered
by the insured but surely such report is neither binding upon the insurer nor insured.
22. In view of the contested factual and legal disputes raised in this application
there are several issues which necessarily require further adjudication and
cannot be determined without trial. Such questions inter alia involve (a)
whether the incident of fire occurred within the period of cover envisaged
under the Marine policy or not, (b) whether the alleged endorsement dated 5th
April, 2019 deleting the intermediate storage clause from the Marine Policy is
valid and binding or not; (b) whether the premium was calculated based on
the intermediate storage clause or whether the clause was a standard
provision; (c) whether the hub godown was the final warehouse or place of
storage or an intermediate point under the Marine Policy; (d) whether the
plaintiff’s goods were covered from the time of manufacture or import until
the time of delivery to the dealer; (e) whether the Avvashya godown was still
covered under the Fire Policy at the time of the fire or whether the defendant
was justified in replacing the insured premises with the Babra godown
effective 1 December, 2019; (f) whether the surveyor’s assessment of Rs.
6,43,98,111/- is final, conclusive and binding on the defendant and (g)
whether the intermediate storage clause covered intentional storage of goods
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post completion of transit by unloading goods at the destination warehouse
pending onward sale to the distributors.
23. To reiterate, this is not a case where there is any conscious or deliberate
admission which is clear and positive entitling the plaintiff to any decree.
There are no admissions either of liability or quantification which would lead
to the conclusion of non-suiting the defendant or shutting out the defendant
from establishing its case at the trial. There can be no decree for judgment
upon admission based on surmises, conjectures and inferences. In view of the
above, there is no merit in this application and the same is dismissed GA 3 of
2025 stands disposed of. The suit should proceed to trial on all issues. The
parties are directed to take expeditious steps for hearing of the suit.
(Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.)
