Punjab-Haryana High Court
Parshotam Lal vs Union Of India And Ors on 7 July, 2026
CWP-20191-201
2019 (O&M)
(1)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-20191-2019 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 07.07.2026
Parshotam Lal ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & others ...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present: Mr. Fateh Singh Dhillon, Advocate,
for the petitioner.
Mr. N.P.S.Hira, DAG, Punjab.
Mr. D.K.Prajapati, Advocate, for
Ms. Sonia Madan, Advocate, for respondent No.5.
NAMIT KUMAR,
KUMAR J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court by
filing the instant petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India
seeking the following reliefs:
(i) To issue a writ in the nature of certiorari forr quashing of
the advertisement dated 05.07.2019 (Annexure P
P-3)
3)
issued by respondents No.3 & 4 i.e. District Red Cross
Society, Pathankot, whereby they have advertised the
post of Secretary on contractual basis in a totally
arbitrary and illegal manner
manner, more so when the petitioner
is already working
ing on contractual basis since the year
2013 and is now being sought to be replaced by another
contractual employee by similar arrangement
arrangement, and
furthermore for quashing the order dated 17.07.2019
(Annexure P-4),, wherein the services of the petitioner
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have been discontinued in a totally arbitrary, illegal and
punitive manner by an act of punishment de hors the
principles of natural justice and without calling for any
explanation or inquiry and de hors the provisi
provisions
ons of the
Service Rules which specifically provide for granting of
an opportunity of personal hearing and seeking written
explanation before passing of any order of punishment
against the employee; &
(ii) For issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the
respondents to permit the petitioner to continue on the
post of Secretary and not to replace him with another and
similar set of contractual employee and also to pay him
the minimum of the pay scale alongwith annual
increments as admissible to the said pos
postt to regular
incumbents.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that respondent No.3 –
District Red Cross Society, Pathankot issued an advertisement in the year
2013 inviting applications for appointment to the post of Secretary
(Executive Secretary) on contractual basis. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner
was appointed vide appointment letter dated 11.12.2013 (Annexure P-1) for
a period of six months on contract basis on a consolidated salary of
Rs.10,000/- per month.
month It is the case of the petitioner that his contractual
appointment was extended from time to time and lastly vide letter dated
09.03.2019 (Annexure P-2),
P his contractual tenure was extended from
29.01.2019 to 28.07.2019. However, before expiry of the said contractual
period, the services of the petitioner were terminated, vide order dated
17.07.2019 (Annexure P-4).
P Aggrieved against the said order, the petitioner
has filed the present petition.
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3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order dated
17.07.2019
.2019 (Annexure P-4),
P vide which the services of the petitioner have
been terminated, is stigmatic in nature. He further submits that before
passing the said order,
order neither any show cause notice was issued to the
petitioner nor any departmental inquiry wa
was conducted. Furthermore, no
opportunity of personal hearing was afforded to the petitioner before
terminating his services.
services
4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents
respondents, while referring
to the averments made in the written statement
statement, submits that the writ petition
is not maintainable in view of the alternative remedy available to the
petitioner. It is submitted that the termination order dated 17.07.2019
(Annexure P-4)
P is an appealable order in terms of Para 24(ii) of the ‘Indian
Indian
Red Cross Society,
Society, District Red Cross Branches, District St. John
Ambulance Association, District Red Cross Hospital Welfare Section Rules,
2015’, wherein an appeal lies before the ‘Commissioner of the respective
division’. He further submits that the petitioner had been repeatedly
cautioned with regard to his work and conduct
conduct, vide letters dated
08.05.2017, 14.06.2017 & 07.09.2017 (Annexures R
R-2/T to R-4/T i.e.),,
whereby the petitioner was advised to improve his work.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have
perused the record.
6. Firstly, while dealing with the preliminary objection raised by
the respondents with regard to availability of the alternative remedy of
appeal, it may be stated that the order
order of termination dated 17.07.2019
(Annexure P–4)
4) has been passed by the respondents in violation of principles
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of natural justice without conducting any inquiry and without affording the
petitioner any opportunity of hearing.
hearing. Therefore, existence of an alternative
remedy does not operate as an absolute bar for entertaining the writ petition
in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India.. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court
urt reported as Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks, Mumbai & others, 1998 (8) SCC 1.
7. So far as letters dated 08.05.2017, 14.06.2017 & 07.09.2017
annexed as Annexures R-2/T
R to R-4/T issued to the petitioner are concerned,
the same have been issued by the respondents in the year 2017
2017.. Even
thereafter, respondents continued to extend the appointment/contract
contract of the
petitioner from time to time and lastly his contract was extended vide letter
dated 09.03.2019 (Annexure P-2)
P 2) from 29.01.2019 to 28.07.2019. Thus,
having done so, the respondents cannot rely upon the said letters to justify
the termination order passed during the subsistence of the extended
contractual period.
8. Coming to the question that arises for consideration is ass to
whether the termination order dated 17.07.2019 (Annexure P
P-4)
4) is stigmatic
or not.. Since the nature of the order has to be gathered from its contents, the
relevant portion from the termination order reads as under:
“17. As it is made clear in the above Paras, the work-conduct
conduct
and service of this employee is not satisfactory. This employee
has not shown any act at his level from which it is observed that
he raised funds for the District Red Cross Society, Pathankot by
way of an extra effort or has shown iinterest
nterest in Society
Welfare/extending help to the unprivileged persons. No
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concrete contribution has been extended by this employee in
raising funds for the District Red Cross Society, Pathankot till
today from the date of his appointment i.e. 11.12.2013. Funds
during that period were raised by the then Officers through
their reputation and recognition in the society and income to
this Society has been generated through fairs/Magic Shows on
voluntarily basis.
18. Red Cross School for Blinds was opened by the District
Administration through this Society for the blind children at
Model Town,, Pathankot, but it is unpleasant to submit that no
self contribution has been made by this employee towards
extending help to these unprivileged children. The under
signatory himself have checked the overall efficiency/capability
of this employee, but it is felt that this employee is not giving
the output matching to his monthly salary being disbursed by
the District Red Cross Society, Pathankot. Staightforwardly, it
can be stated that an employee like this is like a burden
burden..
Therefore, it is not in the public interest to keep the services of
this employee in continuation. Hence, it has been decided that
the extension in the appointment on ad hoc basis of this
employee as Secretary (Adjective Secretary) shall not be given
to this employee post dated 28.07.2019.
28.07.2019.”
9. A perusal of the above reveals that it attributes unsatisfactory
work and conduct of the petitioner.
petitioner. The order, therefore, cannot be
construed as a simplicitor
simplicitor order of termination, but is clearly stigmatic in
nature having the effect of adversely impacting petitioner’s future
employment prospects.
10. This Court in Tamanna Vs. State of Haryana, 2026 (1) SLJ
361,, while considering the similar issued has held as under:
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“17. The core issue that arises before this court for
determination in the present matter is:
Whether the termination of a contractual employee,
founded on allegations of negligence, without any
enquiry or determination of causation, and wi
without
thout
affording an opportunity of hearing, can be sustained in
law as a termination simpliciter under the contract?
Nature of the Impugned Termination
18. It is now a settled principle of law that the form of an
order is not decisive, it is the substance, foundation, and
attendant circumstances which determine its true character.
Even in the case of contractual or ad hoc employees, the
employer cannot camouflage a punitive action as termination
simpliciter merely by invoking a clause in the contract.
19. In
n the present case, the impugned order dated 17.05.2023
(Annexure P-13)
13) expressly attributes negligence, non
non–
adherence to Standard Operating Procedures, and links the
termination directly to a fatal outcome following vaccination.
Such averments are not neutral
tral or administrative in nature but
strike at the professional integrity and competence of the
petitioner. An order which imputes fault, blame, or dereliction
is ex facie stigmatic and punitive in character.
20. The law on this aspect is too well
well-settled to admit of any
ambiguity. However, though the employer has a wider latitude
while dealing with a probationer as compared to a regular
employee, such discretion is not absolute and cannot be
exercised arbitrarily or punitively under the cloak of a
termination simpliciter. Termination orders founded on
allegations of misconduct or negligence cannot be sustained
without adherence to due process. The distinction between a
termination founded on unsuitability and one founded on
misconduct
onduct is no longer res integra.
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21. The Supreme Court in “Jai Singh v. Union of India
2006 (4) SCT 66″ while discussing that in what situation the
allegation of misconduct will be the motive and in what cases
they will be foundation has to be adjudged in the factual
background of each case, while observing that,
” The issue has been examined in several decisions
including several Constitution Bench judgments and a
judgment of 7-judges.
judges. An elaborate analysis of the
various decisions was made by this Court in Radhey
Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd.
and Anr., (1999(2) SCC 21). The matter was examined
elaborately by 7-Judges
Judges in Samsher Singh v. State of
Punjab and Anr., (1974(2) SCC 831). In the said case it
was noted in paragraphs 79 and 80 as follows:
“79. The Enquiry Officer nominated by the Director of
Vigilance recorded the statements of the witnesses behind
the back of the appellant. The enquiry was to ascertain
the truth of allegations of misconduct. Neither the report
port
nor the statements recorded by the Enquiry Officer
reached the appellant. The Enquiry Officer gave his
findings on allegations of misconduct. The High Court
accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and wrote to
the Government on June 25, 1969 that in the light of the
report the appellant was not a suitable person to be
retained in service. The order of termination was because
of the recommendations in the report.
80. The order of termination of the services of Ishwar
Chand Agarwal is clearly by way of punishment in the
facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court not
only denied Ishwar Chand Agarwal the protection under
Article 311 but also denied itself the dignified control
over the subordinate judiciary. The form of the order is
not decisivee as to whether the order is by way of
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punishment. Even an innocuously worded order
terminating the service may in the facts and
circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into
allegations of serious and grave character of misconduct
involving stigma
gma has been made in infraction of the
provision of Article 311.. In such a case the simplicity of
the form of the order will not give any sanctity. That is
exactly what has happened in the case of Ishwar Chand
Agarwal. The order of termination is illegal aand
nd must be
set aside.”
10. In Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. and Ors. v. Gujarat
Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and Ors. (1980(2) SCC
593) it was observed as follows :
“53 : Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play
hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain
and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by
terminological cover-ups
ups or by appeal to psychic
processes but must be grounded on the substantive
reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed.
The Court will find out from other procee
proceedings
dings or
documents connected with the formal order of
termination what the true ground for the termination is.
If, thus, scrutinized, the order has a punitive flavour in
cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of
this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put it
slightly differently, a termination effected because the
master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the
consequent desirability of terminating the service of the
delinquent servant, is a dismissal, even if he had the right
in law to terminate with an innocent order under the
standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the
grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the
formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the
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fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master
abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given
an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and
the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal,
even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given
and non-injurious
urious terminology is used.
54. On the contrary, even if these is suspicion of
misconduct the master may say that he does not wish to
bother about it and may not go into his guilt but may feel
like not keeping a man he is not happy with. He may not
like to
o investigate nor take the risk of continuing a
dubious servant. Then it is not dismissal but termination
simpliciter, if no injurious record of reasons or punitive
pecuniary cut-back
back on his full terminal benefits is found.
For, in fact, misconduct is not then the moving factor in
the discharge. We need not chase other hypothetical
situations here.”
22. This principle was reiterated in ”
“Dipti
Dipti Prakash Banerjee
v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre (1999) 3 SCC 60″,,
wherein the Supreme Court held that if the termination is based
on allegations which cast a stigma or are likely to prejudice the
future prospects of the employee, the order cannot be treated as
innocuous. Relevant extract of the same is as under:
In the matter of ‘stigma’, this Court has held that the
effect which an order of termination may have on a
person’s future prospects of employment is a matter of
relevant consideration. In the seven Judge case in
Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, 1974(2) SCC 831,
Ray, CJ observed that if a simple order of termination
was passed, that would enable the officer to “make good
in other walks of life without a stigma”. It was also stated
in Bishan Lal Gupta v. State of Haryana, 1978(1) SCC
202 that if the order contained a stigma, the termination
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would be bad for “the individual concerned must suffer a
substantial loss of reputation which may affect his future
prospects.”
24. There is, however, considerable difficulty in finding
out whether in a given case where the order of
termination is not a simple order ooff termination, the
words used in the order can be said to contain a ‘stigma’.
The other issue in the case before us is whether – even if
the words used in the order of termination are innocuous,
– the court can go into the words used or language
employed inn other orders or proceedings referred to by
the employer in the order of termination ?
25. As to what amounts to stigma has been considered
in Kamal Kishore Lakshman v. Pan American World
Airways, 1987(1) SCC 146. This Court explained the
meaning of ‘stigma’ as follows (p. 150) :
“According to Webster’s New World Dictionary, it
(stigma) is something that detracts from the character or
reputation of a person, a mark, sign etc., indicating that
something is not considered normal or standard. The
Legal Thesuras by Burton gives the meaning of the word
to be blemish, defect, disgrace, disrepute, imputation,
mark of disgrace or shame. The Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary gives the meaning as a mark or
label indicating a deviation from a norm. Ac
According
cording to
yet another dictionary ‘stigma’ is a matter for moral
reproach.”
23. Similarly, in “Jayesh
Jayesh Pravin Chandra Modi v. State of
2019″,, the
Gujarat R/special Civil Application No. 7166 of 2019”
Apex Court reiterated that once misconduct forms the basis of
termination, a full-scale enquiry becomes indispensable, while
holding that:
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“5.3 What is evident from reading the contents of the
decision is that if initiation of action is based on an
unsatisfactory work, gross negligence or indiscipline, it
tantamounts to being stigmatic and unless and until a full
scale departmental inquiry is held, irrespective of
whether the employee is a regular employee or a
contractual employee, the result has to be the same.”
Contractual Power and Constitutional Discipline
24. The submission of the respondents that the petitioner’s
services could be terminated at any time under the contract
does not carry the matter any further. It is trite that contractual
freedom of the State is not unfettered. The State and its
instrumentalities are bound by constitutional discipline even
while acting in the contractual domain.
25. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
arbitrariness is antithetical to equality. Where the State chooses
to terminate a contract not for admin
administrative
istrative convenience but
on allegations casting stigma, it must conform to the minimum
standards of fairness, reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness.
26. A termination clause cannot be used as a cloak for
punitive action. What cannot be done directly by im
imposing
posing
punishment without enquiry cannot be achieved indirectly by
invoking contractual terms.”
11. To the similar effect is the judgment of this Court in Pawan
Kumar Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd.
Ltd., 2024 NCPHHC
104807,, wherein also it has been held that even a contractual employee is
entitled for protection and if his order of termination is stigmatic, the same
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. In the said judgment, it has been held
as under:
“8. The law in this regard is well settle
settled
d as to whether for a
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contractual employee when there is a stigma attached in the
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order of termination, then whether any opportunity of hearing
and regular enquiry has to be conducted or not and whether the
principles of natural justice are to be followed or not.
9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in A. P. State Fed. of Coop.
Spinning Mills Ltd. versus P.V. Swaminathan’ s case (supra)
observed as under:-
“3. The legal position is fairly well settled that an
order of termination of a temporary employee or
probationer or even a tenure employee, simplicitor
without casting any stigma may not be interfered with by
court. But the court is not debarred from looking to the
attendant circumstances, namely, the circumstances prior
to the issuance of order of termination to find
d out
whether the alleged inefficiency really was the motive for
the order of termination or formed the foundation for the
same order. If the court comes to a conclusion that the
order was, in fact, the motive, then obviously the order
would not be interfered
red with, but if the court comes to a
conclusion that the so called inefficiency was the real
foundation for passing of order of termination, then
obviously such an order would be held to be penal in
nature and must be interfered with since the appropriate
procedure has not been followed. The decision of this
Court relied upon by Mr. K. Ram Kumar also stipulates
that if an allegation of arbitrariness is made in assailing
an order of termination, it will be open for the employer
to indicate how and what was the motive of passing the
order of termination, and it is in that sense in the
counter-affidavit.
affidavit. It can be indicated that the
unsuitability of the person was the reason for which the
employer acted in accordance with the terms of
employment and it never w
wanted
anted to punish the employee.
But on examining the assertions made in paragraphs 13
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and 14 of the counter- affidavit, in the present case it
would be difficult for us to hold that in the case in hand,
the employer appellant really terminated the services iin
n
accordance with the terms of the employment and not by
way of imposing the penalty in question.”
10. A Division Bench of this Court in Union Territory of
Chandigarh and others versus Central Administrative
Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench and others case (Supra)
observed as under:-
“10. A perusal of the aforesaid para would show that
even in a case of contract of service if the termination is
founded on a misconduct then it has to be regarded as a
punishment because it is manifest in the order itself. The
aforesaid judgement holds the field even today which is
evident from the perusal of judgements of Hon’ble the
Supreme Court in the cases of State of U.P. v. Kaushal
Kishore Shukla 1991(1) SCC 691 and P.
V.Swaminathan’s case (supra). However, in the aforesaid
id
judgements it has been observed that a temporary
government servant has no right to hold the post and
whenever the competent authority is satisfied that work
and conduct of a temporary government servant is not
satisfactory or that his continuation in sservice
ervice is not in
public interest on account of his inability, mis
mis-conduct
conduct or
inefficiency it may either terminate the service in
accordance with the terms and conditions of service or
the relevant rules or it may decide punitive action against
the government
nt servant. The observations made in para 7
of the judgement in the case of Kaushal Kishore Shukla’s
case (supra) reads thus:
“7. A temporary Govt. servant has no right to hold the
post, his services are liable to be terminated by giving
him one month’s notice without assigning any reason
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either under the terms of the contract providing for such
termination or under the relevant statutory rules
regulating the terms and conditions of temporary Govt.
servants. Since, a temporary Govt. servant is also entitled
ed
to the protection of Article 311(2) in the same manner as
a permanent Govt. servant, very often, the question arises
whether an order of termination is in accordance with
the contract of service and relevant rules regulating the
temporary employment or it ‘is by way of punishment. It
is now well settled that the form of the order is not
conclusive and it is open to the Court to determine the
true nature of the order. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra v.
Union of India AIR 1958 SC 36 a Constitution Bench of
this Court
ourt held that the mere use of expressions like
‘terminate’ or ‘discharge’ is not conclusive and in spite of
the use of such expressions, the Court may determine the
true nature of the order to ascertain whether the action
taken against the Govt. servant iis punitive in nature. The
Court further held that in determining the true nature of
the order the Court should apply two tests namely: (1)
whether the temporary Govt. servant had a right to the
post or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with
evil consequences; and if either of the tests is satisfied, it
must be held that the order of termination of a temporary
Govt. servant is by way of punishment. It must be borne
in mind that a temporary Govt. servant has no right to
hold the post and termination of such a Govt. servant
does not visit him with any evil consequences. The evil
consequences as held in Parshotam Lal Dhingra‘s case
(supra) do not include the termination of services of a
temporary Govt. servant in accordance with the terms
and conditions of service. The view taken by the
Constitution Bench in Dhingra‘s case has been reiterated
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and affirmed by the Constitution Bench decisions of this
Court in The State of Orissa and Anr. v. Ram Narayan
Das AIR 1961 SC 177; R.C. Lacy v. The State of Bihar
and Ors. C.A. No. 590/62 decided on 23.10.1963;
Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India
AIR1964 SC 1854; Jagdish Miner v. The Union of
India AIR1964 SC 449; A.G. Benjamin v. Union of
India C.A. No.1341/66 decided on 13.12.1966 and
Shamsher Singh and
d Anr. v. State of Punjab (1974)2
SCC 831. These decisions have been discussed and
followed by a three Judge Bench in State of Punjab and
Anr. v. Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur AIR 1968 SC 1089
1089.”
11. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Pramod Kumar
Sharma V. State of Haryana and others, 2017 (1) SCT 79
observed as under:-
12. This Court would have no hesitation in recording
that the decision of the respondent Corporation not to
grant extension to the petitioner as regards his
contractual assignment is founded on charges of grave
misconduct. Since the matter had been enquired into and
a report dated 30.09.2014 (Annexure R
R-3)
3) had been
furnished by the Financial Controller of Municipal
Corporation, Faridabad and against the petitioner, the
misconduct cannot be seen merely as a motive but would
have to be construed as the foundation of the decision not
to continue with the services of the petitioner. The
decision of the respondent Corporation was thus clearly
punitive.
13. During the course of arguments, it has ggone
one
uncontroverted that prior to the decision contained in
Annexure R-3
3 to dispense with the services of the
petitioner, no opportunity of hearing was granted to him
and even a show cause notice had not been served.
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14. It is by now well settled that even in the case of
tenure appointees/contractual employees, if the order of
dispensing of the services is founded on misconduct then
it is imperative upon the employer to conduct an inquiry
and in which such employee has to be associated. In the
facts of the present case, the decision of the respondent
Corporation to dispense with the service of the petitioner
cannot sustain as the same is in clear negation of the
principles of natural justice.
12. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present
case, a perusal of the fact finding enquiry would show that the
element of negligence has been attributable to the petitioner as
well which is similar to the aforesaid other two persons. A
perusal of Annexure P-9
P 9 would also show that the services of
the petitioner have been dispensed with on the basis of
allegation of negligence. Therefore, it is clear that a stigma was
attached to the petitioner at the time when his services were
terminated vide Annexure P-9.
9. Apart from the above, even
otherwise also, had the petitioner
tioner been subjected to regular
enquiry, then after holding of the regular enquiry, a similar
kind of punishment may have been inflicted upon him as that of
the aforesaid Dalbir because the aforesaid Dalbir whose role
was similar to that of the present pe
petitioner, a punishment of
stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect has been
inflicted upon him and therefore by non
non-adhering
adhering to the
principles of natural justice namely audi alteram partem and by
not even issuing any notice what to talk of a regularr enquiry,
miscarriage of justice has been done. Once an order of
dispensing with the services of a contractual employee is
passed and is purely stigmatic in nature, then the principles of
natural justice were required to be followed.”
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.07.14 14:05
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
CWP-20191-201
2019 (O&M)
(17)
12. To the same effect are the judgments in Babandeep Singh Vs.
others, 2024 NCPHHC 158934 and Narender Verma Vs.
State of Punjab & others,
State of Haryana & others,
others 2024 NCPHHC 92709
92709.
13. Therefore, once the termination order is found to be stigmatic in
nature, the respondents were under a legal obligation to adhere to the
principles of natural justice before dispensing with the petitioner’s service.
Admittedly, neither any show cause notice was issued tto
o the petitioner nor
was any inquiry conducted nor an opportunity of personal hearing was
afforded to the petitioner before passing the impugned order. Therefore, the
impugned order, being stigmatic and having been passed in violation of the
principles of natural justice, is liable to be set aside.
14. In view of the aforesaid facts & circumstances, the present writ
petition is allowed. The impugned order of termination dated 17.07.2019
(Annexure P-4)
P is hereby set aside and quashed
quashed. The respondents are
directed to take the petitioner back into service. The petitioner shall not be
entitled to any back-wages,
back but he will
ill be entitled to other consequential
benefits. If the petitioner is taken back on duty in pursuance to this order,
then the respondents
responden shall be att liberty to proceed against him in accordance
with law by initiating any other proceedings for the purpose of regular
enquiry, if they so desire.
07.07.2026 (NAMIT KUMAR)
Vimal JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No
VIMAL KUMAR
2026.07.14 14:05
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
