Himachal Pradesh High Court
M/S Energy Clones Mercantile Pvt Ltd. & … vs M/S Fujiyama Power System Private Ltd on 14 July, 2026
2026:HHC:28403
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 836 of 2025
Reserved on: 25.06.2026
.
Date of Decision: 14.07.2026.
M/s Energy Clones Mercantile Pvt Ltd. & another ...Petitioners
Versus
of
M/s Fujiyama Power System Private Ltd. ...Respondents
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioners : Mr Sumeet Raj Sharma,
Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr J.S. Bagga, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition for
setting aside the order dated 17.12.2021, passed by learned Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Kasauli, District Solan, H.P. (learned Trial
Court), vide which the learned Trial Court ordered the issuance of
summons against the petitioners (accused before the learned Trial
Court) for the commission of an offence punishable under Section
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). (The parties shall
hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed
.
before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an
of
offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was asserted
that the complainant is engaged in the business of manufacturing
rt
inverters, solar power generating systems, batteries, etc. Accused
Nos. 1 and 2 have business relations with the complainant.
Accused No. 1 is in full control and responsible for the day-to-day
business, administrative and financial affairs of Accused No.1.
Accused Nos. 1 and No.2 ordered a solar power generating system
and allied items from the complainant. An amount of ₹8,18,204/-
was payable by them. The accused Nos. 1 and 2 issued a cheque of
₹8,18,204/- in favour of the complainant. The complainant
presented the cheque at his bank, but it was dishonoured with an
endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The complainant served a legal
notice upon the accused, asking them to pay the amount within 15
days from the date of receipt of the notice. The notice was served
upon the accused, but they failed to pay the money. Hence, the
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complaint was filed before the Learned Trial Court for taking
action as per the law.
.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused and ordered the issuance of a summons to
the accused vide order dated 17.12.2021.
4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
of
Trial Court, the accused have filed the present petition asserting
that the learned Trial Court erred in taking cognisance. Notice was
rt
not served upon the accused, and the service of notice was a
condition precedent for maintaining the complaint. The
complainant failed to disclose that the accused No.2 was in charge
of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business
at the time of commission of the offence. The averments made in
the complaint do not satisfy the requirements of Section 141 of the
NI Act. The allegations are inherently improbable, and no
reasonable person would have reached a conclusion drawn by the
learned Trial Court. The complaint was filed with an ulterior
purpose to compel the complainant to settle the dispute. The
cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘payment stopped
by the drawer’ and not with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’.
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Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and
the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
.
5. I have heard Mr Sumeet Raj Sharma, learned counsel
for the petitioners/accused, and Mr J.S. Bagga, learned counsel,
for the respondent/complainant.
6. Mr Sumeet Raj Sharma, learned counsel for the
of
petitioners/accused, submitted that the documents annexed to
the complaint do not show that the accused owed a liability of
rt
₹8,18,204. Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the documents
on record. The complaint was filed to compel the accused to settle
the matter with the complainant, which is impermissible.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
order passed by the Learned Court be set aside. He relied upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ankul Singh vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and another AIR 2025 SC4567 in support of his
submission.
7. Mr J.S. Bagga, learned counsel for the
respondent/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court
had gone through the preliminary evidence and found sufficient
reasons to summon the accused. The averments in the complaint,
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prima facie, make out a case for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. A cheque carries with
.
it a presumption that it was issued for consideration to discharge
the debt/liability, and the Court should not scuttle the proceedings
at the threshold without allowing the accused to lead the evidence
to rebut the presumption. Therefore, he prayed that the present
of
petition be dismissed. He relied upon the following judgments in
support of his submissions: –
rt
➢ Shiv Kumar alias Jawahar Saraf vs. Ramavtar
Agarwal, 2020 SCC 617; and➢ K. Ranganayakulu vs. State of Telangana & Ors.
2026 INSC 555.
8. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary.
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
of
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should
be exercised.
rt (1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of
a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
.
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings,
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
of
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
rt proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would
be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR
or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such
a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
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proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
.
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, mayissue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutoryof
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of
this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly.
The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
rt
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where
intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines
that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal
proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting theProsecution from building its case before the Trial Court.
The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the
following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has beenfiled with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the
legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv)the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains
vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are
willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (Stateof Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)
11. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12. It was asserted in the complaint that Accused Nos 1 and
No.2 had business relations with the complainant, and they issued
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a cheque of ₹8,18,204/- in favour of the complainant to discharge
their liability. The averments in the complaint, prima facie, show
.
that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the
liability.
13. It was submitted that the cheque was not dishonoured
with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’, but with an
of
endorsement ‘payment stopped by the drawer’. This submission
will not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
rt
Court in Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 13 SCC 375: (2012)
4 SCC (Cri) 283: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 970 that the dishonour of a
cheque on the ground that the drawer had stopped the payment
will also attract the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act. It was
observed at page 388:
12. In Modi Cements Ltd. [(1998) 3 SCC 249: 1999 SCC (Cri)
252], a similar question had arisen for the consideration ofthis Court. The question was whether dishonour of a cheque
on the ground that the drawer had stopped payment was a
dishonour punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Relyingupon two earlier decisions of this Court in Electronics Trade
& Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Indian
Technologists and Engineers (Electronics) (P) Ltd. [(1996) 2
SCC 739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] and K.K. Sidharthan v. T.P.
Praveena Chandran [(1996) 6 SCC 369: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1340], it
was contended by the drawer of the cheque that if the
payment was stopped by the drawer, the dishonour of the
cheque could not constitute an offence under Section 138 of
the Act. That contention was specifically rejected by this::: Downloaded on – 14/07/2026 20:33:52 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:28403Court. Not only that, the decision in Electronics Trade &
Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. [(1996) 2 SCC 739: 1996
SCC (Cri) 454] to the extent that the same held that
dishonour of the cheque by the bank after the drawer had.
issued a notice to the holder not to present the same would
not constitute an offence, was overruled. This Court
observed: (Modi Cements Ltd. case [(1998) 3 SCC 249: 1999
SCC (Cri) 252], SCC pp. 257-58, paras 18 & 20)
“18. The aforesaid propositions in both these reported
judgments, in our considered view, with great respect,
are contrary to the spirit and object of Sections 138 and
of
139 of the Act. If we are to accept this proposition, it will
make Section 138 a dead letter, for, by giving
instructions to the bank to stop payment immediately
after issuing a cheque against a debt or liability, the
rt
drawer can easily get rid of the penal consequences,
notwithstanding the fact that a deemed offence was
committed. Further, the following observations in para 6
in Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn.
Ltd. [(1996) 2 SCC 739: 1996 SCC (Cri) 454] (SCC p. 742)
Section 138 is intended to prevent dishonesty on the
part of the drawer of a negotiable instrument to draw
a cheque without sufficient funds in his account
maintained by him in a bank and induce the payee or
holder in due course to act upon it. Section 138 draws
the presumption that one commits the offence if one
issues the cheque dishonestly.
In our opinion, do not also lay down the law correctly.
***
20. On a careful reading of Section 138 of the Act, we are
unable to subscribe to the view that Section 138 of the
Act draws a presumption of dishonesty against the
drawer of the cheque if he, without sufficient funds to
his credit in his bank account to honour the cheque,
issues the same and, therefore, this amounts to an
offence under Section 138 of the Act. For the reasons
stated hereinabove, we are unable to share the views
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expressed by this Court in the above two cases, and we
respectfully differ with the same regarding the
interpretation of Section 138 of the Act to the limited
extent as indicated above.” (emphasis in original)
.
13. We may also, at this stage, refer to the decisions of this
Court in M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P)
Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 234: 2002 SCC (Cri) 121], where to this
Court considering an analogous question held that even in
cases where the dishonour was on account of “stop-
payment” instructions of the drawer, a presumption
regarding the cheque being for consideration would arise
of
under Section 139 of the Act. The Court observed: (SCC p.
240, para 19)
“19. Just such a contention has been negatived by this
Court in Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi [(1998)
rt
3 SCC 249: 1999 SCC (Cri) 252]. It has been held that even
though the cheque is dishonoured by reason of a ‘stop-
payment’ instruction, an offence under Section 138
could still be made out. It is held that the presumption
under Section 139 is also attracted in such a case. The
authority shows that even when the cheque is
dishonoured by reason of ‘stop-payment’ instructions
by virtue of Section 139, the court has to presume that
the cheque was received by the holder for the discharge,
in whole or in part, of any debt or liability. Of course, this
is a rebuttable presumption. The accused can thus show
that the ‘stop-payment’ instructions were not issued
because of insufficiency or paucity of funds. If the
accused shows that in his account there were sufficient
funds to clear the amount of the cheque at the time of
presentation of the cheque for encashment at the drawer
bank and that the stop-payment notice had been issued
because of other valid reasons, including that there was
no existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of
a cheque for encashment, then offence under Section 138
would not be made out. The important thing is that the
burden of so proving would be on the accused. Thus, a
court cannot quash a complaint on this ground.”
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14. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in
Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D’Souza [(2003) 3 SCC 232:
2003 SCC (Cri) 603: 2003 Cri LJ 1723] where this Court held
that “stop-payment instructions” and consequent.
dishonour of a post-dated cheque attract the provision of
Section 138. This Court observed: (SCC pp. 232g-233c)
“Chapter XVII, containing Sections 138 to 142, was
introduced in the Act by Act 66 of 1988 with the object ofinculcating faith in the efficacy of banking operations
and giving credibility to negotiable instruments in
business transactions. The said provisions wereof
intended to discourage people from not honouring their
commitments by way of payment through cheques. The
court should lean in favour of an interpretation that
serves the object of the statute. A post-dated cheque will
rt
lose its credibility and acceptability if its payment can be
stopped routinely. The purpose of a post-dated cheque is toprovide some accommodation to the drawer of the cheque.
Therefore, it is all the more necessary that the drawer of the
cheque should not be allowed to abuse the accommodation
given to him by a creditor by way of acceptance of a post-
dated cheque.
In view of Section 139, it has to be presumed that a
cheque is issued in the discharge of any debt or otherliability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing
evidence, and the burden of proof is on the person whowants to rebut the presumption. This presumption,
coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act, leads to
the conclusion that by countermanding payment of a post-
dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get away
from the penal provision of Section 138 of the Act. A contrary
view would render Section 138 a dead letter and will provide
a handle to persons trying to avoid payment under legal
obligations undertaken by them through their own acts,
which, in other words, can be said to be taking
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14. Therefore, the accused would be, prima facie, liable for
the commission of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the
.
N I Act, even if the cheque has been dishonoured with an
endorsement ‘payment stopped by the drawer’.
15. It was submitted that the accused did not have any
liability to pay the amount. This submission will not help the
of
petitioners. The complainant had specifically asserted in the
complaint that the cheque was issued by the accused and was duly
rt
signed by them. These averments have to be, prima facie, accepted
as correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 513 that the cheque carries with it a presumption of
consideration which is to be rebutted by leading evidence, and any
factual dispute is to be resolved by weighing evidence. It was
observed:
“10. It is also relevant to bear in mind that the burden of
proving that there is no existing debt or liability is to be
discharged in the trial. For a two-judge Bench in M.M.T.C.
Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC
234, Justice S.N. Variava made the following pertinent
observation on this aspect: —
“17. There is, therefore, no requirement that the
complainant must specifically allege in the complaint
that there was a subsisting liability. The burden of::: Downloaded on – 14/07/2026 20:33:52 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:28403proving that there was no existing debt or liability was
on the respondents. This they have to discharge in the
trial. At this stage, merely on the basis of averments in
the petitions filed by them, the High Court could not.
have concluded that there was no existing debt or
liability.”
11. The legal presumption of the cheque having been issued
in the discharge of liability must also receive due
weightage. In a situation where the accused moves the
Court for quashing even before the trial has commenced,
the Court’s approach should be careful enough not to
of
prematurely extinguish the case by disregarding the legal
presumption which supports the complaint. The opinion of
Justice K.G. Balakrishnan for a three-judge Bench in
Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 would, at this
rt
stage, deserve our attention: —
“26. … we are in agreement with the respondent
claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139
of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability. As noted in the citations,
this is, of course, in the nature of a rebuttablepresumption, and it is open to the accused to raise a
defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability can be contested. However, there can beno doubt that there is an initial presumption which
favours the complainant.”
12. At any rate, whenever facts are disputed, the truth
should be allowed to emerge by weighing the evidence. On
this aspect, we may benefit by referring to the ratio in
Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2020) 3 SCC
794, where the following pertinent opinion was given by
Justice R. Banumathi: —
22. ………….. When disputed questions of fact are
involved, which need to be adjudicated after the parties
adduce evidence, the complaint under Section 138 of the
NI Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court
by taking recourse to Section 482 CrPC. Though the
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Court has the power to quash the criminal complaint
filed under Section 138 of the NI Act on legal issues like
limitation, etc., the criminal complaint filed under
Section 138 of the NI Act against Yogeshbhai ought not
.
to have been quashed merely on the ground that there
are inter se disputes between Appellant 3 and
Respondent 2. Without keeping in view the statutory
presumption raised under Section 139 of the NI Act, the
High Court, in our view, committed a serious error in
quashing the criminal complaint in CC No. 367 of 2016
filed under Section 138 of the NI Act.”
of
13. Bearing in mind the principles for the exercise of
jurisdiction in a proceeding for quashing, let us now turn to
the materials in this case. On careful reading of the
complaint and the order passed by the Magistrate, what is
rt
discernible is that a possible view is taken that the cheques
drawn were, in the discharge of a debt for the purchase of
shares. In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it
would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a
detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first
permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the
parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself the
burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts
are contested. To say it differently, the quashing
proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits
of a factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either
the complainant or the defence.”
16. It was further held that the Courts should be slow in
scuttling the complaint at a pre-trial stage. It was observed:
“14. The parameters for invoking the inherent jurisdiction
of the Court to quash the criminal proceedings under S.482
CrPC, have been spelt out by Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian for
the two judges’ bench in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335: AIR 1992 SC 604, and the suggested
precautionary principles serve as good law even today, for
invocation of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
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“103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that
the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should
be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection
and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court.
will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as
to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that
the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer anarbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to
its whim or caprice.”
15. In the impugned judgment, the learned Judge had
of
rightly relied upon the opinion of Justice J.S. Khehar for a
Division Bench in Rajiv Thapar (supra), which succinctly
expresses the following relevant parameters to be
rt
considered by the quashing Court, at the stage of issuing
process, committal, or framing of charges,
“28. The High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful
choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the
truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled
by the prosecution/complainant against the accused.
Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how
weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused
are. Even if the accused is successful in showing some
suspicion or doubt in the allegations levelled by the
prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible
to discharge the accused before trial. This is so
because it would result in giving finality to the
accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant,
without allowing the prosecution or the complainant
to adduce evidence to substantiate the same.”
16. The proposition of law as set out above makes it
abundantly clear that the Court should be slow to grant the
relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-trial stage, when the
factual controversy is in the realm of possibility,
particularly because of the legal presumption, as in this
matter. What is also of note is that the factual defence,
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without having to adduce any evidence, needs to be of an
unimpeachable quality to altogether disprove the
allegations made in the complaint.
.
17. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a
pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing
proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality
without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce
evidence, and the consequence then is that the proper
forum, i.e., the trial Court, is ousted from weighing the
material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be
given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also,
of
because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the
signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of
convenience at this stage is in favour of the
rt
complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due
opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to
rebut the presumption.
18. Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage
of the summoning order, when the factual controversy is
yet to be canvassed and considered by the trial court, will
not, in our opinion, be judicious. Based upon a prima facie
impression, an element of criminality cannot entirely be
ruled out here, subject to the determination by the trial
Court. Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent
stage, the scuttling of the criminal process is not merited.”
17. Therefore, the Court cannot hold that the cheque was
issued without any legal liability and quash the complaint without
allowing the complainant to prove his case before the learned Trial
Court.
18. It was submitted that the statement of account filed by
the complainant is suspicious because it contains the same invoice
number. This submission will not help the petitioner. The
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statement of account (Ext. CW-1/H1) shows that it is running into
multiple pages and is in continuation. This is apparent from the
.
fact that the balance that has been carried forward has been
mentioned on the second page onwards. It shows an amount of
₹11,51,331/-, which is more than the cheque amount.
19. It was submitted that there is a discrepancy in the copy
of
of the ledger and the tax invoice filed by the complainant, which
makes the complainant’s case suspect. This submission will not
rt
help the petitioners. The entry dated 24.04.2021, shows that an
amount of ₹11,51,331/- was due from the accused. This is precisely
the amount mentioned in the tax invoice. Thus, there is no
discrepancy in the tax invoice and the statement of account.
20. It was submitted that the notice was not received by
the accused, and the essential condition for invoking the
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 138 of the N I Act is
missing. This submission will not help the petitioners. The
complainant had specifically asserted in para-6 of the complaint
that the complainant had served a legal notice dated 20.09.2021
upon the accused Nos. 1 and 2, through registered post and which
was served upon the correct address of the accused. This is duly
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2026:HHC:28403
corroborated by the copy of the postal receipts (Ext.CW-1/ and Ext.
CW1/F2), which show that the letters were sent to the accused at
.
the addresses mentioned in the complaint. There is a presumption
under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, read with Section 114
of the Indian Evidence Act, that a letter sent to the correct address
is deemed to be served, and it would be open for the
of
petitioner/accused to rebut the presumption before the learned
Trial Court by leading the evidence. However, the complaint
rt
cannot be quashed by holding that the notice was not served upon
the accused.
21. It was submitted that the accused No. 2 is stated to be
in full control and responsible for the day-to-day affairs, day-to-
day business, administrative and financial affairs, which does not
satisfy the requirement of Section 141 of the NI Act. This
submission will not help the petitioners. The cheque is shown to
be signed by accused No.2, and he is liable by virtue of his position
as an authorised signatory. It was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court
K.Ranganayakulu (supra) that an authorised signatory is liable by
virtue of his position as a signatory. Therefore, the accused No. 2
would be liable to the complainant by virtue of his being a
signatory, and even if something is lacking in the complaint, the
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same is not sufficient to quash the complaint and the summoning
order.
.
22. In Anukul Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
was concerned with an FIR lodged for the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 506 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC), and it was held that a civil dispute cannot
of
be converted into a criminal case.
23. In the present case, the cheque has been issued, which
rt
is punishable under Section 138 of the NIA, and no civil dispute is
being converted into a criminal matter. Thus, the cited judgment
does not apply to the facts of the present case.
24. In the present case, the order was passed in the year
2021, and the present petition was filed in the year 2025. Thus, it
is apparent that the petitioners have approached the Court to
assail the order of cognisance after an inordinate delay. It was laid
down by the Delhi High Court in Sanyam Bhushan v. State (NCT of
Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4545, that a person cannot approach
the Court for quashing the criminal proceedings after an
inordinate delay. It was observed:
“43. At the outset, I find merit in the submission made by
the learned counsel for the Complainant that the present::: Downloaded on – 14/07/2026 20:33:52 :::CIS
21
2026:HHC:28403set of petitions is liable to be dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches, as also for the failure of the petitioners to
avail of their alternate efficacious remedy in the form of
Revision Petitions under Section 397 of the Cr. P.C..
44. It need not be emphasised that powers under Section
482 of the Cr. PCs are discretionary in nature, and though
there may not be a total ban on the exercise of such power
where the situation so warrants, at the same time, there arelimitations of self-restraint that are recognised and
followed by the Courts in exercising this jurisdiction. One
such limitation is where the petitioner had an alternateof
efficacious remedy; however, they did not avail of the same
within the period of limitation and thereafter filed the
petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. to overcome the
objection of limitation. Similarly, the Courts have refused to
rt
entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., where
it is filed with unexplained delay and laches, and in themeantime, the trial has proceeded.
45. In Prabhu Chawla (Supra), the Supreme Court quoted
with approval its earlier judgment in Madhu Limaye
(Supra), wherein it had been held that though theavailability of an alternate efficacious remedy of a Revision
under Section 397 of the Cr. P.C. does not affect the
amplitude of the inherent power under Section 482 of theCr. P.C. that the High Court possesses, at the same time,
easy resort to inherent power is not to be allowed exceptunder compelling circumstances; it should not invade areas
set apart for specific power under the Cr. P.C. itself. It was
held that while it is true that Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. ispervasive; it should not subvert legal interdicts written into
the same Code, such as, for instance, in Section 397(2) of
the Cr. P.C.
46. This Court in Vipin Kumar Gupta (Supra), placing
reliance on its earlier judgment in Rajesh Chetwal v. State
Neutral Citation no. 2011: DHC: 4313, held that though there
is no period of limitation prescribed for filing of a petition
under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., the principles of
inordinate delay and laches shall be applicable, and where::: Downloaded on – 14/07/2026 20:33:52 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:28403such petitions are filed with an inordinate delay and laches,
this itself shall be a ground to dismiss the same.”
25. In the present case, no exceptional circumstances are
.
shown to set aside the order of cognisance.
26. No other point was urged.
27. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is
dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
of
rt (Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
14th , June 2026.
(Ravinder)
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