Madhya Pradesh High Court
State Bank Of India vs Shrimati Rinshi Mittal W/O Shri Harsh on 10 July, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AMIT SETH
ON THE 10th OF JULY, 2026
MISC. PETITION No. 337 of 2026
STATE BANK OF INDIA
Versus
SHRIMATI RINSHI MITTAL W/O SHRI HARSH MITTAL AND
OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Harshavardhan Topre - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Santosh Agrawal - Advocate for respondents No.1 and 2.
None for respondents No.3 to 5 though served.
Shri Yogesh Parashar - Government Advocate for respondent
No.6/State.
ORDER
1. The present miscellaneous petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 challenges the order dated 22.12.2025 (Annexure
P/1) passed by the Sixth Additional Judge to the First Civil Judge, Junior
Division, Morena (learned trial Court), Madhya Pradesh, in RCSA/107/2025,
whereby the application preferred by respondents No.1 and 2/plaintiffs under
Section 94 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in
short “CPC“) has been allowed, and the petitioner has been restrained from
alienating the suit property. The suit has been fixed for filing of the written
statement and reply to the application preferred by the petitioner under Order
39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC.
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2. It has been argued by the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner that the petitioner/Bank had advanced financial assistance to M/S
K L Oil Industries LLP, for which, the suit property had been mortgaged in
favour of the petitioner by the respondents No.3, 4 and 5. Since the
respondent No.3, 4 and 5 defaulted in payment of loan amount therefore,
loan account was declared NPA by the petitioner, and proceedings were
initiated under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets ad
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as
“SARFAESI Act, 2002). Respondents No. 3 to 5 were served notice under
Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 on 05.05.2025 and 02.05.2025
(Annexure P/3), calling upon them to repay the amount of Rs.13,98,23,308/-.
The respondents No.3, 4 and 5 had mortgaged the disputed property, being
the sole owner and possessors thereof. However, the plaintiffs (respondents
No.1 and 2), being the daughters of Ramprakash Agrawal, colluded and,
with a view to evade the recovery process initiated by the bank, instituted a
suit against respondents No.3, 4 and 5 seeking a decree of declaration of
ownership and possession of a 1/4 – 1/4 portion of the suit property on the
ground that the same being, joint Hindu property, belonged to the
coparceners and that they had their share in the same and the same was
mortgaged by the respondents No.3, 4 and 5 in favour of the petitioner/Bank
without their consent, they are in ownership and possession. A further prayer
for permanent injunction qua their share in the suit property was also prayed
for.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/Bank further argued
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that initially, without impleading the petitioner/Bank as defendant,
respondent No.1 and 2 moved an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2
CPC, which was collusively allowed vide order dated 06.05.2025 (Annexure
P/5) but when, the petitioner/Bank continued with the proceedings, the
petitioner/Bank was impleaded as party defendant in the suit on 18.08.2025.
The Bank took symbolic possession of the suit property in terms of Section
13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 on 01.12.2025. Yet, in order to frustrate
and avoid the proceedings being undertaken by the petitioner under the
SARFAESI Act, 2002, an application under Section 94 of CPC came to be
filed by the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 seeking interim directions against the
present petitioner which has been allowed by the learned trial Court vide
order dated 22.12.2025 impugned in the present petition.
4. It is argued by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that
the civil suit filed by the respondents No.1 and 2 is itself not maintainable.
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 specifically excludes the jurisdiction
of civil court from entertaining any suit or proceedings in respect of any
matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal (in short “DRT”) or the Appellate
Tribunal is empowered under this Act to determine and no injunction is to be
granted by any court or any authority in respect of any action taken or to be
taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.
5. It is, therefore, argued on behalf of the petitioner that once, the
jurisdiction of the civil court to grant an injunction in respect of the
proceedings instituted by the secure creditor (bank) is itself barred by statute,
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the supplemental proceedings under Section 94 of CPC could not have been
permitted to be invoked by respondents No.1 and 2, and the learned trial
Court could not have passed the impugned order in derogation of the
provisions contained in Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
6. It is also argued by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
that since symbolic possession of the suit property in terms of Section 13 (4)
of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 has already been taken by the petitioner/Bank,
even the relief pertaining to restoration of possession of the mortgaged
property, the respondents No.1 and 2 are required to approach the DRT in
terms of Section 17 (3) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, which, now pursuant to
the amendment incorporated with effect from 01.09.2016, provides that the
relief of restoration of possession is available to the borrower or any other
persons aggrieved.
7. In support of his contentions, reliance is placed by the petitioner’s
counsel upon an order dated 01.08.2023 passed by this Court in Second
Appeal No.2295/2022 (Sabana vs. Vikash Shrivastava and Others) wherein,
the dismissal of a similar suit on an application filed under Order 7 Rule 1
(D) of of CPC was affirmed. Reliance is also placed upon an order passed
by the Coordinate Bench of this Court at Jabalpur in M.P.No.5406/2024
(M.P.Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and Others vs. Prakash Nagpal and Others)
decided on 25.10.2025, to contend that once the suit itself is not
maintainable, then invocation of supplemental proceedings under Section 94
of CPC is also not maintainable. Reliance is further placed upon an order
dated 08.03.2022 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in
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M.P.No.4804/2021 (Dr. Anandchandra Bansal vs. Punjab National Bank and
Others), whereby, in similar circumstances, the trial Court ‘s refusal to grant
temporary injunction was affirmed.
8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No.1 and
2, by referring of I.A.No.3250/2026, i.e, an application for dismissal of
petition, submits that since the order under challenge has been passed under
Section 94 of CPC, which is, in sum and substance, the power prescribed
under the Code for grant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and
2 CPC, therefore, invocation of present miscellaneous petition under Article
227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable, as the petitioner has the
statutory remedy of filing an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) CPC. It is
further argued by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the
issue of maintainability of the civil suit in view of the bar contained under
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 has been considered by the Apex
Court in the case of Central Bank of India and Another vs. Smt. Prabha Jain
and Others, 2025 (4) SCC 38, wherein it has been held that the relief of
declaration of title, partition in respect of the property cannot be decided by
the DRT and for the said relief, the jurisdiction in respect thereof vests with
the civil Court. He submits that in the pending civil suit, the respondent Nos.
1 and 2 are seeking protection of their title and interest qua their share in the
property jointly owned and possessed by them alongwith respondents No.3, 4
and 5. The said relief cannot be granted by the DRT and therefore, the civil
suit filed by them is maintainable. It is also pointed out by the learned
counsel appearing for the respondents that prior to passing of the order dated
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22.12.2025, impugned in the present petition, the learned trial Court, vide
order dated 08.12.2025, has rejected the application preferred by the
petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the
very same grounds as are argued and raised in the present petition. The
petitioner though had filed the present petition on 15.01.2026, but the factum
of rejection of their application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC raising same
grounds has been conveniently suppressed by the petitioner. There is no
disclosure whatsoever as regards the rejection of the application under Order
7 Rule 11 CPC by the petitioner. He submits that once, the trial Court,
rightly or wrongly, has decided the issue of jurisdiction and declined to
reject the plaint by rejecting the application seeking dismissal filed by the
petitioner, the said judicial order, though interlocutory, binds the parties till it
is set aside by any higher forum. As per the knowledge of respondents No.1
and 2, the petitioners have not challenged the order dated 08.12.2025 passed
by the trial Court and therefore, cannot be permitted to argue the grounds
afresh without challenging the order dated 08.12.2025.
9. At this stage, in rejoinder arguments, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner submits that the order of rejection of their application under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC by the learned trial Court vide order dated 08.12.2025
is challenged and pending before this Court in Civil Revision
(C.R.)No.264/2026. However, in the present case, the issue arising for
consideration is whether, the injunction could have been granted by the trial
Court or not. He is unable to dispute the fact that there is absolutely no
disclosure of rejection of the petitioner’s application filed before the learned
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trial Court under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC vide order dated 08.12.2025 in the
present petition.
10. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the
record.
1 1 . Admittedly, the proceedings under Section 94 of CPC are
supplemental in nature. The perusal of the order dated 22.12.2025 indicates
that the application filed under Section 94 of CPC by respondents No.1 and 2
was opposed by the petitioner primarily on the ground of alleged bar of the
jurisdiction of the civil court to grant the final relief in terms of Section 34 of
the SARFAESI Act, 2002. However, the learned trial Court, placing reliance
upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Prabha Jain (supra) ,
rejected the said grounds and finding that in case, the suit property is
alienated during the pendency of the suit, which has raised legal issues for
adjudication, the same would incur in multiplicity of proceedings and cause
irreparable injury to the plaintiffs thereby, restrained the petitioners from
alienating the suit property till disposal of an application under Order 39
Rule 1 and 2 CPC.
12. It is noteworthy that the petitioner before this Court in the present
petition is a nationalized bank falling within the ambit of “State” as defined
under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it was all the more
incumbent upon the petitioners as well as the Officer In Charge (“OIC”) of
the case that they ought to have disclosed all material facts in the present
petition. However, the petitioners very conveniently suppressed the material
facts that they had moved an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC seeking
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rejection of the suit filed by the respondents No.1 and 2 on the very same
grounds and that the learned trial Court, v i d e order dated 08.12.2025,
rejected the said application, thereby holding the civil suit to be
maintainable.
13. It is the duty of litigants to disclose all material facts required for
the decision-making process of the Court, and the failure to do so disentitles
them from the grant of relief. This aspect has also been impressed upon by
the Apex Court in the case of Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav and Others vs.
Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society and Others, 2013 (11) SCC
531 wherein it has been observed that:
“44. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material
for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the
obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case
and leave the decision-making to the court. True, there
is a mention of the order dated 2-5-2003 in the order
dated 24-7-2006 passed by the JCC, but that is not
enough disclosure. The petitioners have not clearly
disclosed the facts and circumstances in which the order
dated 2-5-2003 was passed or that it has attained
finality.
xxx-xxx-xxx-xxx
46. More recently, in Ramjas Foundation v. Union of
India [(2010) 14 SCC 38 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 889] the
case law on the subject was discussed. It was held that if
a litigant does not come to the court with clean hands,
he is not entitled to be heard and indeed, such a person
is not entitled to any relief from any judicial forum. It
was said: (SCC p. 51, para 21)
“21. The principle that a person who does not
come to the court with clean hands is not entitled
to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in
any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is
applicable not only to the petitions filed under
Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but
also to the cases instituted in others courts and
judicial forums. The object underlying theSignature Not Verified
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principle is that every court is not only entitled but
is duty-bound to protect itself from unscrupulous
litigants who do not have any respect for truth and
who try to pollute the stream of justice by
resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement
or by suppressing facts which have a bearing on
adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
14. In the considered opinion of this Court, since the aforesaid order
dated 08.12.2025 was passed by the trial Court prior to the impugned order
dated 22.12.2025, and the order impugned in the present petition is sought to
be challenged on similar grounds of maintainability of the suit itself, then, it
was incumbent upon the petitioners to have placed on record the order dated
08.12.2025 passed by the learned trial Court but, the same has been
suppressed, all the more, the factum of rejection of the application under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC has been suppressed in the present petition, therefore,
this Court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioner had not approached
this Court with clean hands. Thus, on this ground alone, the petitioner is not
entitled to any equitable relief before this Court.
15. Further, as has been admitted by the learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner during the course of arguments, the order dated 08.12.2025
passed by the learned trial Court rejecting the application under Order 7 Rule
11 CPC has been challenged by the petitioner/Bank in Civil Revision (C.R.)
No.264/2026. The issue as regards the maintainability of the suit filed by the
respondents No.1 and 2 is, therefore, required to be considered and decided
in the pending Civil Revision arising out of the main proceedings, and the
petitioners cannot be permitted to seek adjudication of the said issue in the
present petition arising out of supplemental proceedings.
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16. The judgments relied upon by the petitioners’ counsel on the
question of maintainability of the suit are, therefore, not required to be
adverted to at this stage. It is open for the petitioner to make his submission
in the said regard in the pending Civil Revision (C.R.) No.264/2026.
17. Be that as it may. In Preetpal Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P and
Ors., 1988 JLJ 549, it was held that Section 94 of CPC deals with
supplementary proceedings and does not press the merits of the case and as
such, the trial court has the jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 94
without deciding the merits of the case. The Court before which a question of
jurisdiction is raised has power to issue interim injunctions without first
finally deciding the question of jurisdiction. Therefore, on this count also, the
present petition does not have any merit. Relevant para of Preetpal Singh and
Ors. (supra) is reproduced here under:
“5. After hearing the counsel, I am satisfied that this
appeal deserves to be allowed with a direction to the
lower Court to reconsider the matter afresh on the
question of prima facie case leaving aside the question
of jurisdiction involved. My reasons for the same are as
under:-
While hearing the matter pertaining to the grant of
temporary injunction, the Court cannot be regarded
to deal with the suit on merits. The proceedings
pertaining to the grant of temporary injunction are
supplemental proceedings, which so not press
merits of the Case. This is clear from Sec. 94 C. P.
C. which deals with supplemental proceedings and
clause (c) whereof, deals with the power of the
Court to grant temporary injunction. A Court,
before which a question of jurisdiction has been
raised, has power to issue an interim injunction
without first finally deciding the question of
jurisdiction. Since prima facie until such question
is decided in the negative, a Court has jurisdictionSignature Not Verified
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to do all acts and take any action that may be
sanctioned by law in connection with the Case.
This is what has been held by Tapp, J. in Allah
Baksh Fazal Din v. Koran Chard
MANU/LA/0435/1931 : AIR 1931 Lah 690. Such
a situation arose first before this Court in the case
of M, P. S. v. R. T, C, v. Amarsingh (Civil
Revision No. 879/81) decided on 27-4-82 by late
Hon, Shri Justice H. G. Mishra, who held that
when such a question is referred, the plaintiff has
to satisfy the Court that he has fair question as to
the existence of a legal right, claimed by him in
the suit, is well recognised in India as well as in
England. Again the Division Bench of this Court
in the case of Naresh Kumar (Supra) held that
when a question of jurisdiction of Civil Court is
raised and the Court is considering the case of
grant or refusal of temporary injunction, the Court
has no jurisdiction to decide the suit on the basis
of the reply filed under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 C.P.C.,
to say that the Court has no jurisdiction and suit is
barred under the provisions of the M. P.
Cooperative societies Act. The Division Bench
further observed in that case that can only be done
after the written statement is filed and a
preliminary issue is raised and is decided.
Thereafter again this matter came before this Court
in Laxminarayan v. State of M. P. 1988 MPWN
(1) 117 wherein this Court held that the question
relating to the maintainability and jurisdiction of
the Court can-not be decided after the written
statement is filed and the issue is raised. This is
not the stage, while considering an application
under O. 39 Rr. 1 and 2 C. P. C. Even assuming
that the Court has no jurisdiction, the Court has
power to grant temporary injunction. Hence, this is
well settled that while considering the application
for grant of temporary injunction, the Court has to
apply its mind to see whether on the plaint
allegations or on facts, a prima facie case has been
made out or not. In my opinion, the trial Court
committed an illegality while rejecting the
application of the plaintiffs’ on the ground that the
Civil Court’s jurisdiction was barred. Though the
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trial Court held that there is an irreparable injury
and the balance of convenience is in favour of the
plaintiff. But the trial Court, in my opinion, has
not applied its mind to the facts whether the facts
pleaded and the documents produced, a prima
facie case, a fair question to be tried has been
made out or not. In such circumstances, it is not
possible for this Court in the appellate jurisdiction
to grant temporary injunction at this stage and it is
proper to direct the trial Court to pass a suitable
order after considering whether the plaintiffs have
made out a prima facie case or not.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
18. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in view of
the considerations made hereinabove, no case for interference in the present
proceedings in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India having limited scope of interference is made out. Accordingly,
interference is declined, and the present miscellaneous petition is dismissed.
(AMIT SETH)
JUDGE
AK/-
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