Chattisgarh High Court
Sevan Kumar vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 3 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:27386-DB
INDRAJEET by
Digitally signed
INDRAJEET NAFR
SAHU
SAHU
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Date: 2026.07.08
19:09:22 +0530
CRMP No. 3014 of 2025
1 - Sevan Kumar S/o Lochan Sidar Aged About 29 Years R/o Village
Girhulpali, P.O. Lodhiya P.S. Baramkela, Tahsil Sariya District- Sarangarh
Bilaigarh (C.G.)
2 - Nilambar @ Lilambar Nayak S/o Late Thakur Ram Nayak Aged About 64
Years R/o Village Jhabar Tahsil And P.S. Baramkela District - Sarangarh -
Bilaigarh (C.G.)
3 - Surendra Nayak S/o Nilambar @ Lilambar Nayak Aged About 37 Years
R/o Village Jhabar Tahsil And P.S. Baramkela District - Sarangarh - Bilaigarh
(C.G.)
4 - Khemsagar Yadav S/o Chaitram Yadav Aged About 26 Years R/o Village
Jhabar Tahsil And P.S. Baramkela District - Sarangarh - Bilaigarh (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Baramkela, District-
Sarangarh Bilaigarh (C.G.)
2 - Ajambar Singh Sidar S/o Late Bihari Prasad Aged About 27 Years Village
Sangitarai Jutemill, District- Raigarh (C.G.) (Complainant)
... Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioners : Shri Atul Kumar Kesharwani, Advocate.
For State : Shri Sumeet Singh, Dy. Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2 : Shri CJK Rao , Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
Order on Board
03.07.2026
2
Per, Ramesh Sinha, CJ.
1 The petitioners have filed this petition seeking following reliefs:
“1) That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the
instant petition filed under section 528 of B.N.S.S. 2023 filed by
the petitioners, in the interest of justice.
2) This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the
impugned First Information Report dt. 14.06.2025 bearing crime
no. 69/2025 lodged u/ss 294, 186, 353, 323, 341, 427, 34 I.P.C.
against the petitioners at police station Baramkela, District
Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.).
3) This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the entire
Final Report No. 79/2025 dt. 09.08.2025 of P.S. Baramkela,
District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) submitted before Special
Court (Atrocities Act) Raigarh (C.G.) u/ss 294, 186, 353, 323,
341, 427, 34 I.P.C. & S. 3(2)(V)(a) & S. 3(1)(r)(s) of Schedule
Caste & Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1988.
(Annexure P-1)
4) This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the entire
criminal proceedings pending in Special Criminal Case (Atrocities
Act) No. 24/2025 titled as State of Chhattisgarh vs Khemsagar
Yadav & 03 others against the petitioners for offences.
5) This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash/set-aside
impugned order dt. 12.08.2025 of taking cognizance of impugned
final report by Ld. Special Judge (Atrocities Act) Raigarh (C.G.)
passed in Criminal Case No. 24/2025. (Annexure P-2)
6) Any other relief/reliefs which the Hon’ble may deem fit under
the facts and circumstances of the case.”
2 Brief facts of the case are that, the complainant Ajambar Singh Sidar is
the brother of Sanjay Sidar (Petitioner in CrMP No.1634 of 2026).
Sanjay Sidar was posted as Peon in Tehsil office. Sidharth Anant
(Petitioner in CrMP No.1634 of 2026) was Tehsildar under whom
Sanjay Sidar was posted. The complainant herein made a written
complaint on 15.12.2022 at Police Station, Baramkela, stating that
while his brother Sanjay Sidar was performing his official duty at Tehsil
Office, the petitioners herein came there seeking some revenue
records. On the said issue some hot talk in the name of caste took
place between them resulting into scuffling. Annoyed with the said
incident, when his brother was going to lodge police complaint along
3
with Tehsildar Sidharth Anant, in front of Computer shop of the
petitioners herein, they again started Marpeet on account of which
main road was blocked for a couple of hours and therefore they could
not lodge FIR on the same day. Later on, on 14.06.2025 and FIR was
lodged under Sections 294,186,353,323,341,427,34 IPC in Crime
No.69 of 2025 and charge sheet has been filed on 09.08.2025 under
Sections 294,186,353,323,341,427,34 IPC and Sections 3(1)(v)(a) and
3(1)(r)(s) of The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989.
3 Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that false and
fabricated belated FIR has been lodged by the brother of one of the
accused in Crime No.397 of 2022 as a counter blast. Firstly, the
petitioners herein lodged the FIR in Crime No.397 of 2022 on the same
day against Sanjay Sidar, Sidharth Anant and three others under
Sections 452,307,34 IPC alleging that they assaulted Nilamber Nayak,
the father of Surendra Nayak in their Computer Shop. On that day the
complainant herein only made a written complaint to the police on
15.12.2022, however, FIR has been lodged on 14.06.2025 with a delay
of 2 and ½ years. Therefore, FIR No.69 of 2025 for the aforesaid
offences lodged at the behest of Sidharth Anand, Tehsildar, being false
and malicious, is a sheer abuse of process of law and power. Thus,
consequential Charge sheet No.79 of 2025 dated 09.08.2025 and
cognizance order dated 12.08.2025 in Special Case (Atrocities Act)
No.24 of 2025 deserves to be quashed. Further, the FIR does not
disclose any ingredients of the offence under the Atrocities Act. The
said provisions were added at a later stage to harass the petitioners.
4
Further, the coordinate Bench of this court in MCrCA No.234 of 2023
while granting anticipatory bail to accused Sidharth Anant in FIR
No.397 of 2022 on 05.04.2023 had directed to examine the written
complaint made by the complainant herein (Ajambar Singh Sidar i.e.
Brother of Sanjay Sidar) which clearly shows that present FIR has
been lodged only as a consequence of the said order dated
05.04.2023.
4 We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material
annexed with the petition.
5 It is not in dispute that the incident is alleged to have occurred on
15.12.2022. It is also not disputed that on the very same day the
petitioners had lodged Crime No.397 of 2022 against Sanjay Sidar,
Tehsildar Sidharth Anant and others alleging commission of serious
offences including under Section 307 IPC. It is equally undisputed that
the present complainant had only submitted a written complaint on the
same date and no FIR was registered thereon. The FIR in the present
case came to be registered only on 14.06.2025, after an unexplained
delay of about two and a half years. The explanation offered in the FIR
that the complainant could not lodge the report because the road
remained blocked for a few hours on the date of occurrence cannot, by
any stretch of imagination, explain the extraordinary delay of more than
two and half years. Such inordinate delay assumes significance
particularly when the complainant admittedly had already approached
the police by submitting a written complaint on the date of occurrence
itself.
5
6 The sequence of events further assumes importance. The Coordinate
Bench of this Court while considering the anticipatory bail application of
accused Sidharth Anant in Crime No.397 of 2022 passed an order on
05.04.2023 directing examination of the written complaint submitted by
the present complainant-Ajambar Singh Sidar. The FIR in question was
thereafter registered on 14.06.2025. The chronology supports the
contention of the petitioners that the impugned prosecution is a sequel
to the earlier criminal case and has been initiated as a counterblast.
7 This Court also finds substance in the submission of the petitioners
regarding invocation of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Except a bald
allegation that some altercation took place in the name of caste, the
FIR and the charge-sheet do not disclose the foundational facts
necessary to attract the offences under the Atrocities Act. There is no
specific allegation indicating intentional insult or intimidation with intent
to humiliate the victim on the ground of caste in a place within public
view. Likewise, the ingredients necessary for attracting Section 3(2)(v)
(a) are also absent.
8 What also cannot be lost sight of is the fact that, since CrMP No.3014
of 2025 and CrMP No.1634 were clubbed together as both the cases
were arising out same incident and considering the fact that a
compromise have already been taken place between the parties in
Crime No.397 of 2022 (in CrMP No.1634 of 2026, Annexure A/4), this
Court is of the opinion that once when the complainant and the
accused have settled their matter and buried the dispute and
differences, it would be an important consideration for the High Court
6
while exercising the powers under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 to
compound the offence. The opinion of this Court stands fortified from
the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh v. State
of Punjab & Another [2012 (10) SCC 303] and also in the case of
Narinder Singh & Others v. State of Punjab & Another [2014 (6)
SCC 466].
9 The Supreme Court in Gian Singh (Supra) has observed in para 49,
52, 53 and 57 as under:
“49. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the
inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a
superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
It begins with the words, ‘nothing in this Code which means that the
provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of
doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the
inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in
Section 482 itself i.e., to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated
that Section 482 confers no new powers on High Court; it merely
safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by High Court
necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure
the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be
resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of
the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very
sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of
law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.
52. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High
Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a
straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under
Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided.
53. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of
settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as
compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable.
Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a
court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is
circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court
is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the
formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence
or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material
on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise
of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or
dismissal of indictment.
57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a
7criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a
criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of
the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii)
to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases
power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may
be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their
dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to
the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s
family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences
are not private in nature and have serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in
relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of
corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while
working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the
criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil
flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing,
particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial,
mercantile, civil, partnership or such 5 like transactions or the
offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the
family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal
in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In
this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between
the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and
bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and
complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other
words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair
or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal
proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to
secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is
put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in
affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to
quash the criminal proceeding”
10 Accordingly, since the present petition was clubbed with CrMP No.1634
of 2026 and in that case compromise have already been taken place
between the parties (Annexure A/4 in CrMP No.1634 of 2026), the
8
present petition also deserves to be and is hereby allowed. FIR No.69
of 2025 registered against the petitioners at Police Station Baramkela
for offences under Sections 294, 186, 353, 323, 341, 427 and 34 IPC
and Sections 3(2)(v)(a) and 3(1)(r)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the
consequential Charge-sheet No.79 of 2025 dated 09.08.2025, the
order dated 12.08.2025 taking cognizance and all consequential
proceedings arising therefrom in Special Case (Atrocities Act) No.24 of
2025, pending before the Special Judge (Atrocities Act), Raigarh, are
hereby quashed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
inder
