Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Dunga Kumari vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others on 8 July, 2026
Date of reserved for orders : 03.07.2026
Date of pronouncement : 08.07.2026
Date of uploading : 08.07.2026
APHC010460382025 [3562]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
WRIT PETITION NO: 23639 of 2025
Dunga Kumari ...Petitioner
Vs.
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...Respondent(s)
**********
Advocate for Petitioner: D PURNACHANDRA REDDY
Advocate for Respondent: THE ADVOCATE GENERAL
CORAM : SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
DATE :
JUDGMENT:
(per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)
Heard Sri D. Purnachandra Reddy, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri Kirthi Teja, learned Government Pleader, attached to
the Office of the Additional Advocate General, appearing for the
respondents.
2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
has been filed for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by the petitioner for direction
to the respondents to release the petitioner’s husband, namely, Dunga
Manikyam (in short ‘the detenu’) pursuant to the Order of his detention.
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WP. No.23639 of 2025
3. The 2nd respondent – the Principal Secretary to Government
(FAC), Revenue (Excise-II) Department, State of Andhra Pradesh, vide
G.O.Rt.No.711, dated 09.07.2025 passed an Order of Detention under
Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (in short ‘PIT NDPS Act, 1988‘) on
the ground that the detenu was involved in ‘illicit traffic’ within the
meaning of Section 2 (e) (iii) of the PIT NDPS Act, 1988 and his activities
were prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and to prevent him
from further indulging in such type of activities, it was necessary to pass
the Order of Detention. The case of the detenu was placed before the
Advisory Board which reviewed and submitted its reports/opinions dated
07.08.2025 stating that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the
detenu and accordingly, the State Government issued G.O.Rt.No.931,
dated 26.08.2025 under Section 3 (1) read with Section 11 of the PIT
NDPS Act, 1988, confirming the order of detention for a period of 12
months from the date of detention.
4. The Order of Detention was passed basing on six different
criminal cases, registered against the detenu. Those cases are as under:
Sl.No. Details of Case/Crime Property Seized
1. Cr.No.128/2017 of Nakkapalli 40 kgs Ganja and Auto
P.S. for the offences under
Sections 25, 8C, 20 (b) of PIT
NDPS Act
3 RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.23639 of 2025
2. Cr.No.11/2018 of Rolugunta PS 30 kgs Ganja and Car &
for the offences under Sections Auto
8C, 20 (b) (ii) (c) and 25 of PIT
NDPS Act
3. Cr.No.28/2018 of Rolugunta PS 60 kgs Ganja, two Cars &
for the offences under Sections Pulsar Bike
8C, 20 (b) (ii) (c) and 25 of PIT
NDPS Act
4. Cr.No.66/2018 of Pithapuram PS 29 kgs Ganja and Auto
for the offences under Sections
8C and 20 (b) (ii) (c) of PIT NDPS
Act
5. Cr.No.344/2019 of 175 kgs of Ganja and Auto
Payakaraopeta PS for the
offences under Sections 8C, 20
(b) (i), 20 (b) (ii) (c) and 25 of PIT
NDPS Act
6. Cr.No.42/2025 of Payakaraopeta 600 kgs of Ganja and
PS for the offences under Bolero vehicle
Sections 20 (b) (ii) (c) and 25 r/w.
8 (c) of PIT NDPS Act
5. Challenging the aforesaid Orders, the present writ petition has
been filed.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised the only submission
that the Order of Detention is unsustainable and erroneous in law. He
submitted that out of 6 cases, the detenu was granted bail in 5 cases. In
one other case, out of 6 cases, i.e., Cr.No.42 of 2025 (i.e., 6th case) supra
of Payakaraopeta Police Station, on the date of passing of the Order of
Detention i.e., 09.07.2025, the detenu was in judicial custody. The said
case was also taken into consideration, but the 2nd respondent did not
4 RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.23639 of 2025
record its satisfaction about the necessity to pass the order of detention
once the detenu was already in judicial custody, or about the imminent
possibility of his release on bail in that case. He submitted that the Order
of Detention, cannot be sustained on that ground and so the order of
confirmation.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in the following
cases in support of his contentions:
8. Sri Kirthi Teja, learned Government Pleader, for the respondents
submitted that the aforesaid Cr.No.42 of 2025, as referred to above, was
taken into consideration in the detention order. In the said case, the
detenu was in the judicial custody. In the order of detention any
satisfaction as regards the possibility or the likelihood of the detenu being
1
2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 515
2
(2015) 16 SCC 253
3
2020 SCC OnLine AP 565
4
WP.No.1803 of 2021, Decided on
27.04.2021 (APHC, Amaravati)
5
WP.No.7335 of 2023 & Batch,
Decided on 03.07.2023 (APHC, Amaravati)
6
WP.No.932 of 2025, Decided on
26.09.2025 (APHC, Amaravati)
5 RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.23639 of 2025
released on bail was not recorded. However, he submitted further that
even if the contention of the petitioner’s counsel be correct on that
ground, the order of detention would still not be vitiated. The order of
detention can stand in view of the other grounds with respect to the other
criminal cases i.e., in Ground Nos.1 to 5.
9. Learned Government Pleader referred to the provisions of
Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act 1988 to contend that the Order of Detention
shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of the grounds, it
has been passed and shall not be invalid or inoperative merely because
on Ground No.6 the detention order would be invalid.
10. We have considered the aforesaid submissions of the learned
counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.
11. The Order of Detention has been passed by the Principal
Secretary to Government on Ground Nos.1 to 6. The challenge is with
respect to Ground No.6, i.e., Cr.No.42 of 2025. The detenu was in
judicial custody in that case and the Principal Secretary to Government
has not recorded its satisfaction that there was no need to pass the Order
of Detention or on the point that there was likelihood of the detenu being
released on bail.
12. In Champion R. Sangma (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has
held that even if the detenu is in jail in connection with some criminal
cases, there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order. However,
6 RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.23639 of 2025
there are certain aspects which have to be borne in mind by the detaining
authority and satisfaction on those aspects is to be arrived while passing
the detention order. Referring to the case in Kamarunnissa v. Union of
India7 those three factors were re-stated; (1) If the authority passing the
order is aware of the fact that the detenu is actually in custody; (2) If he
has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him
(a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that
on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial
activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him from so doing. The
Hon’ble Apex Court held that if the authority passes an order after
recording his satisfaction on these aspects, such an order cannot be
struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to
oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to
question it before a higher Court.
13. Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of Champion R. Sangma (supra) are
reproduced as under:
“9. Coming to the ground on which we intend to allow this appeal, we may
point out that even if the appellant is in jail in connection with some criminal
case(s) there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order. Law on this
aspect is well settled and stands crystallised by a plethora of judgments of this
Court. However, a reading of those very judgments also clarifies that there are
certain aspects which have to be borne in mind by the detaining authority and
satisfaction on those aspects is to be arrived at while passing the detention
order.
7
(1991) 1 SCC 128
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WP. No.23639 of 2025
10. There are three such factors which were restated
in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India [Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1
SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 88] : (SCC pp. 140-41, para 13)
“13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that
even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed
(1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in
custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed
before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and
(b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial
activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing.
If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf,
such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for
the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such
opposition, to question it before a higher court. What this Court stated
in Ramesh Yadav [Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4 SCC
232 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 514] was that ordinarily a detention order should not be
passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which
are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law.
It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the
facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of
preventive detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed
above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our
attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it
difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was
no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention
because the detenus were in custody.”
11. The aforesaid dicta is reiterated in subsequent judgments as well. Some
of which are as under:
(i) T.V. Sravanan v. State [T.V. Sravanan v. State, (2006) 2 SCC 664 :
(2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 593] ,
(ii) K.K. Saravana Babu v. State of T.N. [K.K. Saravana Babu v. State of
T.N., (2008) 9 SCC 89 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 679] ,
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WP. No.23639 of 2025
(iii) Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur [Huidrom Konungjao
Singh v. State of Manipur, (2012) 7 SCC 181 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 956] .”
14. In Champion R. Sangma (supra), it was recorded that the
appellant therein (detenu) was under incarceration as he was implicated
in as many as 8 cases and he was in jail and he was not yet granted bail.
It was held that it was for the respondents therein (the detaining authority)
to satisfy the Court as to whether the triple requirements as postulated
stood satisfied. Those requirements were not satisfied. There, though
the detention order and even the grounds of detention recorded the
factum of the detenu being in custody, no satisfaction was recorded by
the detaining authority that there was reliable material before the authority
on the basis of which the detaining authority had reasons to believe that
there was real possibility of release on bail of the detenu. The detention
order was silent on that aspect of possibility of indulging in activity if the
detenu was granted bail. So, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the
detention order suffered from material illegality which vitiated the order of
detention.
15. The other cited judgments of Syed Mohiyuddin (supra),
Cheemparthi Parvin (supra) and V. Adi Lakshmi (supra) as in para-7
(supra) also hold the same relying upon the Hon’ble Apex Court judgment
in Champion R. Sangma (supra). But, the question is whether the Order
of Detention would be vitiated on the aforesaid submissions and grounds
and the detenu entitled to be set free.
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WP. No.23639 of 2025
16. The aforesaid law is by now well settled. When tested on the
triple tests as in Champion R. Sangma (supra) the Order of Detention
satisfied only the first test, i.e., the detaining authority was aware that the
detenu was in custody in Cr.No.42 of 2025 (Ground No.6). However, the
other two tests are not satisfied. While considering the Ground No.6, the
Principal Secretary to Government has not recorded its satisfaction; (1)
that the authority had reason to believe on the basis of reliable material
placed before him, (a) that there was a real possibility of the detenu being
released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all
probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (2) if it was felt essential to
prevent him from so doing, with respect to the aforesaid case. So, the
Order of Detention cannot stand on Ground No.6.
17. Champion R. Sangma (supra) was on Meghalaya Preventive
Detention Act, 1995. The other judgments on which reliance was placed
are under Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders and Land-Grabbers Act, 1986. Those are not under
Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1988.
18. We are not saying that the detaining authority while passing the
Order of Detention under PIT NDPS Act has not to record its satisfaction
on the aspects as laid down in Champion R. Sangma (supra) if the
10 RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.23639 of 2025
detenu is, in custody. But what we say is that the effect of non-
compliance with the above requirements with respect to one ground out
of six grounds (as is the present case) would not invalidate the order of
detention and the detenu would not be entitled to release. We say so
because of Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act.
19. Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act provides as under:
“6. Grounds of detention severable.-Where a person has been detained in
pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of section 3 which has
been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to
have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly-
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely
because one or some of the grounds is or are-
(i) vague,
(ii) non-existent,
(iii) not relevant,
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not therefore
possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have
been satisfied as provided in sub-section (I) of section 3 with reference to the
remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention;
(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be
deemed to have made the order of detention under the said sub-section (I) after
being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with reference to the remaining
ground or grounds.”
20. A bare perusal of Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act shows that where
a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under
sub-section (1) of Section 3 which has been made on two or more
grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been passed
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WP. No.23639 of 2025
separately on each of such grounds, and accordingly, (a) such order shall
not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some
of the grounds is or are; (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not relevant, (iv)
not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or (v)
invalid for any other reasons whatsoever, and it is not therefore possible
to hold that the Government or Officer making such order would have
been satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 3 with reference
to the remaining ground or grounds and make the order of detention.
Clause (b) makes it more clear that the Government or Officer making the
order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention
under the sub-section (1) of Section 3 after being satisfied as provided in
that sub-section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds.
21. In Mortuza Hussain Choudhary v. State of Nagaland8 the
Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held that Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act,
1988 provides that grounds of detention are severable and an order of
detention shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because
one or some of the grounds are either found to be vague, nonexistent,
irrelevant or not connected with such persons or is invalid for any other
reason. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that Section 6
specifically records that where a person has been detained pursuant to
an order of detention under Section 3 (1), which has been made on two or
more grounds, such order shall be deemed to have been made
8
2025 SCC OnLine SC 502
12 RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.23639 of 2025
separately on each ground. Paragraph-7 of Mortuza Hussain
Choudhary (supra) reads as under:
“7. It would be apposite at this stage to take note of the statutory regime of
the Act of 1988. Section 3(1) thereof empowers the authorized officers, either
of the Central Government or of a State Government, to detain any person with
a view to prevent him/her from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances. Section 3(2) requires a State Government that passes
such a detention order to forward a report of the same to the Central
Government within ten days. Section 3(3) mandates communication of the
grounds on which the detention order has been made to the detenu as soon as
may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days and in
exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later
than fifteen days from the date of detention. The sub-section records that this
requirement is for the purposes of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, which
mandates such communication as soon as may be. Section 6 of the Act of 1988
provides that the grounds of detention are severable and an order of detention
shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of
the grounds is either found to be vague, non- existent, irrelevant or not
connected with such persons or is invalid for any other reason. Section
6 specifically records that where a person has been detained pursuant to an
order of detention under Section 3(1), which has been made on two or more
grounds, such order shall be deemed to have been made separately on each
ground. This indicates that the order of detention must be accompanied by the
„grounds of detention‟ made by the detaining authority itself. Section 11 of the
Act of 1988 speaks of the maximum period of detention and states that the same
may be extended up to 2 (two) years from the date of detention.”
22. In Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and Secretary.
Government of Kerala9 where under consideration was Section 5-A of
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling
9
1985 SCC OnLine SC 316
13 RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.23639 of 2025
Activities Act (COFEPOSA Act) which is on the same lines as Section 6
of PIT NDPS Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that Section 5-A stipulates
that when the detention order has been made on two or more grounds,
such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately
on each of such grounds and accordingly if one irrelevant or one
inadmissible ground had been taken into consideration that would not
make the detention order bad.
23. Paragraphs 70 & 71 of Prakash Chandra Mehta (supra) read
as under:
“70. Section 5-A of the said Act which was introduced by amendment in
1975 reads as follows:
“5-A. Grounds of detention severable.–Where a person has been detained
in pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of Section 3 which
has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be
deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and
accordingly–
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely
because one or some of the grounds is or are–
(i) vague,
(ii) non-existent,
(iii) not relevant,
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever,
and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer
making such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of
Section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order
of detention;
14 RNT, J & SS, J
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(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be
deemed to have made the order of detention under the said sub-section (1) after
being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with reference to the remaining
ground or grounds.”
71. Section 5-A stipulates that when the detention order has been made on
two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been
made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly that if one irrelevant
or one inadmissible ground had been taken into consideration that would not
make the detention order bad.”
24. In Vashisht Narain Karwaria v. State of U.P10 the same
principle has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in view of the
specific provision even a single ground for detention if found to be
material may be the basis of the detention order. Paragraph-11 of
Vashisht Narain Karwaria (supra) reads as under:
“11. …………. What Section 5-A provides is that where there are two or
more grounds covering various activities of the detenu, each activity is a
separate ground by itself and if one of the ground is vague, non-existent, not
relevant, not connected or not proximately connected with such person or
invalid for any other reason whatsoever, then that will not vitiate the order of
detention.”
25. In view of the statutory provision of Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act,
the Order of Detention passed under Section 3 (1) of PIT NDPS Act 1988
when passed on two or more grounds, such Order of Detention shall be
deemed to have been passed separately on each of such grounds. In the
present case, the impugned Order of Detention has been passed on six
10
(2990) 2 SCC 629
15 RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.23639 of 2025
grounds i.e., two or more grounds. Such Order of Detention shall be
deemed to have been passed separately on each of such grounds from
Ground Nos.1 to 6. So, even if it be taken that the Order cannot be
sustained on Ground No.6, for non-consideration of three requirements
with respect to the detenu being in judicial custody, it cannot be held that
the detaining authority had not satisfied on the other grounds, only
because of no satisfaction recorded relating to Ground No.6. It shall be
deemed that the State Government or the detaining authority had made
the Order of Detention after being satisfied on the remaining grounds.
26. Order of Detention shall not be deemed to be invalid for the
remaining grounds and it shall be deemed that the Order of Detention has
been made under Section 3 (1) of PIT NDPS Act 1988 after being
satisfied with reference to the remaining 5 grounds. Simply because the
Order of Detention cannot be sustained on Ground No.6, it cannot be said
that the Order of Detention cannot be sustained on Ground Nos.1 to 5. It
cannot be that the Order of Detention has to go. Notwithstanding that the
Order of Detention cannot stand on Ground No.6, it is still a valid Order
on Ground Nos.1 to 5. As already mentioned (supra), the only ground of
challenge raised before us was to the Ground No.6.
27. In the judgment cited, the Preventive Detention Act as involved
did not contain any provision like Section 6 of the PIT NDPS Act 1988.
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WP. No.23639 of 2025
28. The Order of Detention is sustained on the Ground Nos.1 to 5,
though not on Ground No.6. In view of Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act 1988,
the Order of Detention would not be illegal and the detenu would not be
entitled for release.
29. The Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in
consequence.
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
______________________
SUBHENDU SAMANTA, J
Date: 08.07.2026
Dsr
Whether the order is :
Reasoned ‘Yes’
Reportable ‘Yes’
