Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench
Adan Bashir Bangroo vs U. T. Of J&K Th. Police Station on 3 July, 2026
Author: Rajnesh Oswal
Bench: Rajnesh Oswal
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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
Reserved on 04.06.2026
Pronounced on 03.07.2026
Uploaded on 03.07.2026
CrlA(D) No. 64/2025
c/w
CrlA(D) No. 70/2025
Adan Bashir Bangroo .....Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s)
Mohd. Manan Dar
Through: Mr. Shariq Jan Reyaz, Adv
in Crl(D) No. 64/2025
Mr. Danish Majid Dar, Adv.
Q
in CrlA(D) No. 70/2025
Vs
U. T. of J&K th. Police Station ..... Respondent(s)
Shaheed Gunj, Srinagar
Through: Mr. Mohsin Qadiri, Sr. AAG with
Ms. Maha Majeed, Adv.
Coram: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Per Oswal J
1. The appellants, through the medium of the instant appeals, i.e., CrlA(D)
No. 64/2025 and CrlA(D) No. 70/2025, have assailed the order dated
12.07.2025 passed by the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge
(Designated Special Court under the NIA Act), Srinagar (hereinafter
referred to as “the trial court”), whereby charges came to be framed
against them. Since both the appeals arise out of the same impugned order
and involve common questions of fact and law, they are being disposed of
by this common judgment.
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2. Appellant-Adnan Bashir Bangroo in CrlA(D) No. 64/2025 stands charged
for commission of offences under Sections 13, 18, and 39 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short “the Act”) and Section 506 of
the IPC. On the other hand, appellant- Mohd. Manan Dar in CrlA(D) No.
70/2025 stands charged for commission of offences under Sections 13, 18,
39, and 40(2) of the Act and Section 506 of the IPC.
3. In these twin appeals, the appellants challenge the impugned order dated
12.07.2025 on the ground that the elements of offenses under Sections 13
and 39 of the Act are not made out against them. It is contended that the
learned trial court solely relied upon alleged confessions made by the
appellants before an Executive Magistrate to frame the charges, which is
impermissible in law, particularly in the absence of any corroborative
evidence to validate the alleged confessions or disclosures.
4. Mr. Shariq Jan Reyaz, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in
CrlA(D) No. 64/2025 has restricted his challenge to the impugned order
dated 12.07.2025 solely to the framing of charge under Sections 18 and 39
of the Act. It is contended that, barring the alleged confessional statement
of the appellant Adnan Bashir Bangroo, the record is completely devoid of
evidence connecting the appellant in CrlA(D) No. 64/2025 to any offence
under Sections 18 and 39. He strenuously argued that the disclosure
statement relied upon by both the prosecution and the learned trial court is
legally not permissible, as no recovery was ever effected or discovered
pursuant to it. Consequently, he submitted that the appellant is entitled to
be discharged from the alleged offences
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5. Mr. Danish Majid Dar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in
CrlA(D) No. 70/2025, while adopting the arguments advanced by Mr.
Reyaz, learned counsel for the appellant in the connected appeal, urged
that the appellant, Mohammad Manan Dar, was falsely implicated in the
FIR and the resulting charge sheet. To substantiate this, he submitted that
the appellant was taken into custody by the Special Operation Group on
16.03.2024 at about 10:00 PM, prompting the filing of a Habeas Corpus
petition (HCP No. 70/2024) on 19.03.2024. It is contended that these prior
proceedings clearly demonstrate the appellant’s innocence and the falsity
of the allegations. He has placed on record copies of the said writ petition,
the objections/reply filed by the respondents, and the order dated
20.03.2024 passed by the learned Writ Court.
6. Heard and perused the record, including the order impugned passed by the
learned trial court.
ALLEGATIONS:
7. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by the appellants as to
whether the learned trial court has rightly passed the impugned order
framing charges against them, it would be apt to take a glance at the
allegations levelled against the appellants.
8. A perusal of the charge sheet depicts that on 18.03.2024, the Police
Station, Shaheed Gunj received an information from a reliable source to
the effect that the Terrorist Organization, the Resistance Front (TRF) has
posted a threat message on a social media group “Fight Kashmir”
regarding the upcoming Parliamentary Elections. The contents of the post
are as under:
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“a list of Booth Level Officials (Srinagar) for upcoming so-
called elections. We are watching. It is but a small list that
has been uploaded. We have got all the input/info. Input
when and how to take action #Kashmir Fight.”
9. Based on this information, FIR No. 11/2024 for commission of offences
under sections 506 IPC and 13 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
was registered and SHO Police Station, Shaheed Gung was designated as
the Investigating Officer of the case. On the following day, March 19,
2024, at approximately 11:00 AM, routine vehicle checking and frisking
was being conducted at a police checkpoint (Naka) established at Jehangir
Chowk. During the checking of a motorcycle bearing registration No.
JK01AE-5442, which was being ridden by two persons (the appellants
herein), 14 posters were found hidden under the shirt of the appellant-
Mohd. Manan Dar, who was also found in possession of Indian currency
notes totalling ₹1,00,000 in the denomination of ₹500. On the other hand,
the appellant-Adnan Bashir Bangroo was found in possession of 25
posters containing an alleged message issued by the Telegram channel ‘
Kashmir Fights’, along with a bottle of glue hidden under his shirt.
Accordingly, both the appellants were arrested on 19.03.2024 in presence
of two independent witnesses.
10. An income certificate procured from the office of the EMIC, South,
indicated that the appellants had no known or verifiable sources of income
to account for the recovery of Indian currency totalling ₹1,00,000 from the
appellant-Mohd. Manan Dar. As per the income certificates issued by the
EMIC South vide order dated 15.05.2024, the monthly income of Mohd.
Manan Dar is ₹12,000/- and that of appellant Adnan Bashir Bangroo is
₹15,000/-.
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11. During sustained questioning and interrogation, on 25.03.2024, the
appellant Mohd. Manan Dar stated before the Executive Magistrate that he
was in touch with a Pakistan based Handler, who used to call him through
various virtual numbers. During his conversations with the Pakistan based
Handler, the latter convinced him to work for the banned organization
TRF as associates. During one such conversation, the Pakistan based
Handler told Mohd. Manan Dar-appellant to go near Hoor Makeover
Barthana, Qamarwari on 14.03.2024 at around 12.30 PM where someone
would hand over some cash and posters to the appellant, to be pasted at
various locations in the District Srinagar so as to dissuade the people from
participating in general elections. He discussed the whole plan with Adnan
Bashir Bangroo, who agreed to join him. On 14.03.2024, at around 1230
hours, both the appellants went to Qamar Wari, Srinagar to receive posters
and cash from an unknown person on the instructions of their Pak
Handler. The unknown person handed them over a polythene bag
containing some posters, cash and a bottle of glue. The unknown person
told the appellants to handover the polythene bag containing ₹1.00 lac to
the then active terrorist Momin Gulzar, who would meet Mohd. Manan
Dar on 19.03.2024 near Ahl-e-Hadis Masjid, Gowkadal during Zuhar
Prayers. He further stated that the photograph of the then active terrorist
Momin Gulzar was present in his i-Phone. After collecting cash and
posters, the appellants returned to the house of Mohd. Manan Dar where
they counted the cash and the number of posters. Upon counting, the
contents of the polythene bag were found to consist of 200 currency notes
of ₹500 denomination, totalling ₹1,00,000, while the aggregate
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number of posters was 39. The appellant Mohd. Manan Dar kept the cash
of ₹1.00 lac and 14 posters with himself and gave away rest of the posters
and the bottle of glue to appellant-Adnan Bashir Bangroo. As directed, on
19.03.2024, while they were on their way to Ahl-e-Hadis Masjid,
Gowkadal on the bike bearing registration No. JK01AE-5442, they were
intercepted by a naka party at Jehangir Chowk. On their frisking, the
Police Party recovered the cash of ₹1.00 lac and 14 TRF posters from him
whereas, 25 posters and the bottle of glue were recovered from Adnan
Bashir Bangroo.
12. The appellant-Adnan Bashir Bangroo made a similar statement before the
Executive Magistrate, admitting that he and Mohd. Manan Dar were in
contact with a Pakistan-based handler to further terrorist activities in the
Kashmir Valley. He further stated that they had been directed by the said
handler to paste posters at various locations across Srinagar District, with
the objective of intimidating or preventing the general public from
participating in the elections.
13. The Investigating Officer re-seized the amount of ₹1.00 lac under section
25(5) of the Act on 25.03.2024 and submitted to the Divisional
Commissioner, Kashmir for further necessary orders. Accordingly, on
25.06.2024, a confirmation order of the seized cash of ₹1.00 lac was
received from the Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir. During financial
investigation, it was found that neither the appellant-Mohd. Manan Dar
nor Adnan Bashir Bangroo had withdrawn any cash from their respective
accounts. On the basis of IPDR and GPRS data of mobile numbers
6005963665 used by appellant-Adnan Bashir Bangroo and 9103070297
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used by appellant-Mohd. Manan Dar from 14.3.2024, the technical
evidence revealed that both appellants were present at the same location in
Qamarwari, Srinagar, as their respective mobile numbers were found to be
active simultaneously between 12:30 hours and 13:00 hours on
14.03.2024. This location data prima facie corroborates the disclosure
statements made by the appellants. Mobiles of both the appellants were
handed over by their parents to the then Investigating Officer of the case,
who seized the mobile phones and the same were sent to FSL for data
retrieval. Thereafter, the same were analysed by the FSL. In the data, the
photograph of an active terrorist (now dead) Momin Gulzar was retrieved
from the mobile phone of appellant-Mohd Manan Dar. The meta data of
the phone FSL extraction reveals that the said photograph was clicked by
Mohd. Manan Dar on 16.03.2024 by his Cell Phone. The expert opinion in
this regard has been obtained from FSL Srinagar. It has further been
established that the photograph in question was not available on the
internet or any social media platform, thereby ruling out the possibility of
it being downloaded from a public domain. This clearly demonstrates that
the appellant Mohd. Manan Dar was in contact with Momin Gulzar,
terrorist of TRF Outfit, who was subsequently killed by the Forces.
Besides the FSL extraction of the mobile phone of the appellant-Mohd.
Manan Dar, revealed that he was in contact with various virtual numbers
like 017017141151, 15304879776, 15306600849, 17147073350,
128520684 and 19318882415, which further corroborated the disclosure
statements made by the appellants. A forensic analysis of the data
extracted by the FSL from the mobile phone of appellant Adnan Bashir
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Bangroo established that the appellants were in frequent contact, having
exchanged over 100 WhatsApp calls. Interestingly, the standard Call
Detail Records (CDR) revealed a complete absence of conventional
cellular voice calls between the two appellants, indicating they
communicated exclusively through internet-based platforms. Investigation
into the mobile number linked to the registration of the Telegram channel
https://t.me.kfpublic was conducted by the Cyber Police Station, Srinagar.
Upon requisitioning details from the Telegram administration, it was
established that the account in question was registered through a virtual
cellular number 19419091984 and the FSL extraction of the mobile phone
of appellant Mohd. Manan Dar revealed that he was in continuous contact
with Pakistan based Handler through various numbers and the admin of
the Telegram Channel https://t.me.kfpublic and was acting pursuant to his
directions.
14. To substantiate the charge of conspiracy, the respondent has placed on
record tabulated details of the mobile phone numbers alongside the
forensic data extracted by the FSL. Based on this material, the respondent
asserts that the appellants were operating in tandem with a Pakistan-based
handler and certain unidentified individuals, from whom they received the
incriminating posters and cash. Accordingly, after the completion of the
investigation, the Investigating Officer filed the charge sheet against the
appellant Mohd. Manan Dar for commission of offences under sections
13, 18, 39, 40(2) UA(P) Act & 506 IPC and under sections 13,18, 39 of
the UA(P) Act & 506 IPC against appellant Adnan Bashir Bangroo.
Momin Gulzar, a terrorist belonging to the TRF outfit, was named as
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Accused No. 1 in the charge sheet; however, on account of his death, it
was stated that the proceedings had abated against the said accused.
APPRECIATION:
15. In “State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Golconda Linga Swamy“, (2004) 6
SCC 522, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India has held that at the stage of
framing of charge, evidence cannot be gone into meticulously. It was held
that it is immaterial whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial
evidence and a charge can be framed if there are materials showing
possibility about commission of the offence by the accused as against
certainty.
16. Further, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in “Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI“,
(2010) 9 SCC 368, was pleased to lay down the following principles
governing discharge and framing of charges:
“17 On consideration of the authorities about the scope of section 227
and 228 of CrPC, the following principles emerge:-
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges
under section 227 of the CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and
weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or
not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The
test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of
each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave
suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained,
the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding
with the trial.
(iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of
the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the
case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced
before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at this stage,
there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter
and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an
opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame
the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the
offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the
material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge
the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on
record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the
accused was possible.
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(vi) At the stage of sections 227 and 228 the Court is required to
evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find
out if the facts emerging there from taken at their face value discloses
the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence.
For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected
even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as
gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad
probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion
only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be
empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see
whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”
17. Thus, as mandated by Sections 227 and 228 of the Cr.P.C. (sections
250(2) and 251 of BNSS), while considering the issue of framing of
charge or discharge of the accused, the court must form an opinion based
on the material placed on record by the Investigating Officer to ascertain
whether sufficient grounds exist for presuming that the accused has
committed the offence. At this stage, the court cannot indulge in a
meticulous or critical evaluation of the evidence, which is a domain
reserved strictly for the final appreciation of evidence upon the conclusion
of the trial. While a charge may be framed even on the basis of grave
suspicion, the trial court is simultaneously not expected to act merely as a
post office and frame charges mechanically simply because a charge sheet
has been filed. The trial court may sift the prosecution’s evidence to
ascertain whether the unrebutted material satisfies the essential ingredients
of the alleged offence; however, it cannot conduct a „mini-trial‟ to
determine whether the final matrix would warrant a conviction. If the
foundational ingredients of the offence are conspicuously lacking, the
court has no option but to discharge the accused.
18. We now proceed to adjudicate upon the merits of the challenge directed
against the assailed order framing charges on the touch stone of law laid
down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court and discussed as above.
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19. The appellants have confined their challenge to the charges framed under
Sections 18, 39, and 40(2) of the Act, effectively leaving the charge under
Section 13 un-assailed. This focus stems from the fact that the strict
limitations on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Act are triggered by the
more serious offenses under Sections 18, 39, and 40(2) of the Act.
Accordingly, the thrust of their submissions is directed entirely toward
establishing that these specific charges are legally unsustainable.
20. Be that as it may, at this stage of the proceedings, the contents of the
posters running across the record are, in our estimation, amply sufficient
for charging the appellants with the commission of an offence under
Section 13 of the Act. The reliance placed by the appellants on the
judgment titled U.T. of J&K vs. Ghulam Mohd. Lone [CrlA(D) No.
45/2024] is entirely misplaced and cannot come to their rescue at this
threshold. In the text of these posters, a deliberate attempt has been made
to alienate the local residents of Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of
India, which is sufficient to spread disaffection against the nation.
21. It was urged that no offences under sections 18 and 39 of the Act are made
out against the appellants. Section 18 of the Act is extracted as under:
“18. Punishment for conspiracy, etc.–Whoever conspires
or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or
[incites, directly or knowingly facilitates] the commission of,
a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a
terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than five years but which may extend
to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
22. Section 15 of the Act, that defines „terrorist act‟ is extracted as under:
[15. Terrorist act.–4 [(1)] Whoever does any act with intent
to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security 5
[economic security,] or sovereignty of India or with intent to
strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any
section of the people in India or in any foreign country,–
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(a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances
or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal
weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or
by any other substances (whether biological radioactive,
nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other
means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause–
(i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or
(ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or
(iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life
of the community in India or in any foreign country; or[(iiia) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of
production or smuggling or circulation of high quality
counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other
material; or]
(iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a
foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of
India or in connection with any other purposes of the
Government of India, any State Government or any of their
agencies; or
(b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of
criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any
public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public
functionary; or
(c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to
kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to
compel the Government of India, any State Government or
the Government of a foreign country or [an international or
inter-governmental organisation or any other person to do or
abstain from doing any act; or] commits a terrorist act.
[Explanation.–For the purpose of this sub-section-
(a) “public functionary” means the constitutional
authorities or any other functionary notified in the Official
Gazette by the Central Government as public functionary;
(b) “high quality counterfeit Indian currency” means the
counterfeit currency as may be declared after examination by
an authorised or notified forensic authority that such currency
imitates or compromises with the key security features as
specified in the Third Schedule.]
[(2) The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an
offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the
treaties specified in the Second Schedule.]
23. The case against the appellants extends beyond the mere possession of
incriminating posters and currency notes. They are further alleged to have
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been in contact with a Pakistan-based handler and an active terrorist,
Momin Gulzar, who was later neutralized in an encounter. Notably, a
photograph of the deceased terrorist was found on the mobile phone of
appellant Mohammad Manan Dar. Since this photograph was entirely
unavailable on the open internet or any social media platform, it rules out
the possibility of it being downloaded or retrieved from the public domain.
The record indicates that the Telegram channel of the banned terrorist
organization TRF was operated by a Pakistan-based handler. The
recovered posters and the sum of ₹1,00,000/- were intended for delivery to
a terrorist, Momin Gulzar, who was later killed in an encounter. The
physical transportation of these posters alongside unaccounted-for cash
demonstrates that the appellants and ‘Momin Gulzar ‘ were part of a wider
conspiracy to strike terror among the public, specifically targeting polling
personnel on electoral duty, and to challenge the sovereignty of India.
Therefore, at this threshold stage, the contention that there is no evidence
to connect the appellants with the offense under Section 18 of the Act is
legally unsustainable.
24. Insofar as the offense under Section 39 of the Act is concerned, there is
incriminating material on record to demonstrate that the appellants were
actively working as associates of the proscribed TRF outfit. This link is
substantiated by the recovery of propaganda posters, cash, and adhesive
material (glue) from their conscious possession. Furthermore, a digital
nexus is established by the fact that the contents of the posters recovered
from the appellants on 19.03.2024 were previously published online on
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14.03.2024 by the ‘Kashmir Fights’ Telegram channel at the URL:
https://t.me/kfpublic.
25. At this stage, nothing on record indicates that the Telegram Channel did
not belong to the Outfit. The disputed questions of fact raised by the
appellants cannot be evaluated now, but must be determined during the
trial. Furthermore, we find no error in charging the appellant under
Section 40(2) of the Act, especially since the prosecution has established
that the appellant-Mohd. Mannan Dar failed to justify possessing ₹1.00
lakh and had no corresponding bank withdrawals.
26. It was vehemently argued by the learned counsel appearing for appellant-
Mohd. Manan Dar that he was falsely implicated because the HCP was
filed by him on 19.03.2024, wherein it was categorically mentioned that
the appellant was arrested on 16.03.2024 at around 1200 hours by the
Special Operation Group.
27. Habeas Corpus Petition (HCP) No. 70/2024 was filed only on 19.03.2024,
as verified by the learned Writ Court‟s order dated 20.03.2024. The bald
averments in the petition concerning the appellant‟s alleged detention do
not constitute evidence, let alone evidence of ‘sterling quality’ capable of
proving false implication. To invoke the extraordinary power of quashing
an FIR or charge sheet, the record must disclose unimpeachable evidence
of sterling quality that requires no further proof; self-serving pleadings do
not meet this threshold. At best, the appellant‟s contention constitutes a
matter of defense to be established at trial, rather than a ground to quash
the order framing charges. Notably, this ground was not raised in the
memo of appeal. However, since the learned counsel for the appellant
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placed on record copies of the writ petition, the respondents’ reply, and the
order passed in HCP No. 70/2025, we have evaluated this submission
strictly on the merits of the oral arguments advanced by the learned
counsel for the appellant. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the
Hon‟ble Apex Court in “State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005)
1 SCC 568″, where in the Hon‟ble Apex Court has held as under:
18. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The reliance on
Articles 14 and 21 is misplaced. The scheme of the Code and object
with which Section 227 was incorporated and Sections 207 and 207-A
omitted have already been noticed. Further, at the stage of framing of
charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible. If the contention of
the accused is accepted, there would be a mini-trial at the stage of
framing of charge. That would defeat the object of the Code. It is well
settled that at the stage of framing of charge the defence of the
accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of
the learned counsel for the accused would mean permitting the
accused to adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge
and for examination thereof at that stage which is against the
criminal jurisprudence. By way of illustration, it may be noted
that the plea of alibi taken by the accused may have to be
examined at the stage of framing of charge if the contention of the
accused is accepted despite the well-settled proposition that it is
for the accused to lead evidence at the trial to sustain such a plea.
The accused would be entitled to produce materials and
documents in proof of such a plea at the stage of framing of the
charge, in case we accept the contention put forth on behalf of the
accused. That has never been the intention of the law well settled
for over one hundred years now. It is in this light that the
provision about hearing the submissions of the accused as
postulated by Section 227 is to be understood. It only means
hearing the submissions of the accused on the record of the case as
filed by the prosecution and documents submitted therewith and
nothing more. The expression “hearing the submissions of the
accused” cannot mean opportunity to file material to be granted to
the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At the stage of
framing of charge hearing the submissions of the accused has to be
confined to the material produced by the police.
(emphasis added)
28. Upon reviewing the record, we find no error in the impugned order. At the
stage of framing charges, the learned trial court was neither required nor
positioned to conclusively determine the adequacy of the evidence; it was
only tasked with ascertaining whether a prima facie presumption of guilt
exists against the appellants.
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29. For the reasons recorded above, we find no error or infirmity in the trial
court’s order framing charges against the appellants. The instant appeals,
being devoid of merit and misconceived, are accordingly dismissed.
However, it is made clear that any observation made by this Court while
determining the validity of the impugned order is tentative in nature and
shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case
during the trial. The learned trial court shall remain uninfluenced by any
such observations, if made and shall be free to arrive at its own
independent conclusion upon the culmination of the trial with regard to
the allegations levelled against the appellants.
(SANJAY PARIHAR) (RAJNESH OSWAL)
JUDGE JUDGE
Jammu
03.07.2026
Rakesh PS
Whether the order is speaking: Yes
Whether the order is reportable: Yes
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