Call Detail Records are Not Admissible Without S.65B Evidence Act Certificate

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     It was further contended that the call detail

    records were proved by the nodal officers of the

    SPONSORED

    service providers, i.e. Vibhor Rastogi (PW.23) and

    Saurabh Kumar (PW.24) and hence, non-production

    of the certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence

    Act [Section 63 of the BSA] pales into insignificance.

    Mere non-production of the certificate under Section

    65-B of the Evidence Act [Section 63 of the BSA] in

    this case cannot be treated to be fatal to the

    prosecution’s case, particularly, when the call detail

    records have been duly proved by examining the

    employees of the service providers i.e., Vodafone and

    Bharati Hexacom Ltd./Bharati Heckjakom Ltd.{Para 22}

    18. The Evidence Act does not contemplate

    or permit the proof of an electronic record by

    oral evidence if requirements under Section

    65-B of the Evidence Act are not complied

    with, as the law now stands in India.”

    (Emphasis Supplied)

    52. Admittedly, in the present case, the certificate

    under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act [Section 63 of

    the BSA] was not proved by the prosecution. In the

    absence of the certificate, mandatorily required

    under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act [Section 63 of

    the BSA], the call detail records become inadmissible

    in evidence and cannot be relied upon to support the

    prosecution’s case.

    REPORTABLE

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

    (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No (s). 1977 of 2026)

    POORANMAL Vs  THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR. 

    Author: Mehta, J.

    Citation: 2026 INSC 217.

    Dated: MARCH 10, 2026.

    1. Heard.

    2. Leave granted.

    3. The appellant, Pooranmal1, along with one Ladu

    Lal faced trial in Sessions Case No. 33 of 2010 before

    the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, (Women

    Atrocities Cases), Bhilwara, Rajasthan2. Both the

    accused were convicted by the trial Court vide

    judgment and order dated 8th February, 2012, for the

    offence punishable under Sections 302/34 of the

    1 Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant-Pooranmal”.

    2 Hereinafter, referred to as “trial Court”.

    Indian Penal Code, 18603 [Sections 103 (1)/3(5) of the

    Bhartatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 20234] and were

    sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and fine of

    Rs. 5,000/- with default stipulation. Both the

    accused were also convicted for the offence

    punishable under Section 201 of the IPC [Section 238

    of the BNS] and sentenced to undergo seven years

    rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/- with

    default stipulation. Both the sentences were ordered

    to run concurrently.

    4. The common appeal being DB Criminal Appeal

    No. 238 of 2012 preferred by the accused persons

    against their conviction stands rejected by the High

    Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur5 vide

    judgment and order dated 16th March, 2018. It may

    be mentioned here that Ladu Lal assailed the said

    judgment of the High Court by preferring Special

    Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1071 of 2022, which has

    been dismissed by this Court in limine vide order

    dated 7th February, 2022.

    3 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘IPC’.

    4 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘BNS’.

    5 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘High Court’.

    5. The appellant-Pooranmal who was unable to

    prefer an appeal owing to poverty and lack of access

    to legal assistance, has now filed the present appeal

    through legal aid.

    6. Vide order dated 28th January, 2026, we took

    note of the distinguishing features inter se between

    the case of the appellant-Pooranmal and that of the

    co-convict Ladu Lal and issued notice in the present

    appeal. The case of the prosecution as against the coconvict

    Ladu Lal was based on recoveries as well as

    the reverse burden of proof as provided under Section

    106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 18726 (Section 109 of

    the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 20237). In

    contrast, insofar as the appellant-Pooranmal is

    concerned, the prosecution’s case rests purely on

    recoveries and call detail records. It was in these

    circumstances and remaining conscious of the

    dismissal of the special leave petition preferred by the

    co-convict Ladu Lal, that we deemed it appropriate to

    entertain the special leave petition filed on behalf of

    the appellant-Pooranmal through legal aid,

    6 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Evidence Act’.

    7 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘BSA’.

    4

    notwithstanding the significant delay of 2749 days,

    which stands condoned by the aforesaid order.

    BRIEF FACTS

    7. Succinctly stated, the facts relevant and

    essential for disposal of this appeal are noted

    hereinbelow.

    8. The case as set up by the prosecution is that the

    appellant-Pooranmal along with the co-convict Ladu

    Lal, committed murder of Aruna, wife of Ladu Lal, in

    the latter’s house on the night intervening 2nd March,

    2010 and 3rd March, 2010.

    9. The written report of the incident (Ex. P-40) was

    lodged by none other than Ladu Lal before the Station

    House Officer, Police Station Bijolia alleging inter alia

    that he was sleeping in the drawing room of his house

    with his son Devender. His wife, Smt. Aruna, was

    sleeping in the adjacent room. At about 1:30 am, he

    got up to attend the call of nature and found that his

    room was bolted from outside. He tried calling Smt.

    Aruna on her mobile number, but she did not

    respond. On this, he called his brother,

    Satyanarayan (PW.2), and upon receiving no

    response, he called his acquaintance Shankar Singh

    Rathore, posted as constable at the Police Station

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    Bijolia. Thereafter, some people gathered at the spot

    and opened his room from outside. Upon proceeding

    to the adjoining room, they found Smt. Aruna lying

    on the bed with visible injuries, including a wound on

    her left temple, along with signs of struggle. On

    checking closely, they realised that Smt. Aruna was

    dead. The almirah situated near the dead body was

    lying open, and a sum of approximately Rs. 4 lakh

    was missing therefrom. Ladu Lal alleged in the report

    that some unknown persons had murdered his wife

    by inflicting injuries on her head and requested the

    police to take action. On the basis of said report, FIR

    No. 28 of 2010 came to be registered at the Police

    Station Bijolia under Section 460 of the IPC (Section

    331(8) of the BNS). The usual investigation was

    undertaken. The dead body was subjected to inquest

    proceedings and subsequently forwarded to the

    Medical Jurist for postmortem examination.

    10. During the course of investigation, Ladu Lal was

    interrogated and looking to his evasive response, the

    needle of suspicion turned towards him and he was

    accordingly arrested. Ladu Lal made a

    confession/disclosure statement (Ex. P-42) and

    based thereupon, the appellant-Pooranmal was also

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    apprehended in the present case. The Investigating

    Officer, Dalpat Singh (PW.22)8, thereafter effected

    recoveries of a blood-stained shirt and a sum of

    Rs.46,000/-, in furtherance of the disclosure

    statements made by the appellant-Pooranmal.

    11. The Investigating Officer (PW.22) collected the

    call details of mobile Nos. 978****222 and 977****299

    belonging to the accused persons, which led to the

    conclusion that the appellant-Pooranmal and Ladu

    Lal were continuously in contact with each other,

    proximate to the probable time of the incident.

    12. Upon conclusion of investigation, chargesheet

    came to filed against two accused persons i.e. the

    appellant-Pooranmal and Ladu Lal for the offences

    punishable under Sections 302/34 and 201 of the

    IPC [Sections 103 (1)/3(5) and 238 of the BNS]. Since

    the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC

    [103 (1) of the BNS] was exclusively triable by the

    Court of Sessions, the case was committed and made

    over to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge,

    (Women Atrocities Cases), Bhilwara, Rajasthan for

    trial. The trial Court framed charges against both the

    8 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Investigating Officer (PW.22)’.

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    accused who pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The

    prosecution examined twenty-four witnesses (PW.1

    to PW.24) and exhibited fifty-five documents (Ex. P-1

    to P-55) along with seven articles (Ex. A-1 to A-7) to

    prove its case.

    13. The accused, upon being questioned under

    Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

    [Section 351 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

    Sanhita, 2023] denied the prosecution allegations

    and claimed to be innocent. Three witnesses (DW.1

    to DW.3), and eight documents (Ex. D-1 to D-8) were

    exhibited in defence.

    14. As stated above, the trial Court vide judgment

    and order dated 8th February, 2012 convicted and

    sentenced the appellant-Pooranmal and the coaccused

    for the offences mentioned above.9

    15. The appeal preferred by the appellant-

    Pooranmal against his conviction has been rejected

    by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 16th

    March, 2018 and hence, this appeal by special leave.

    9 Supra para 3.

    8

    SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

    16. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-

    Pooranmal, vehemently and fervently contended that

    the conviction of the appellant-Pooranmal recorded

    by the trial Court, and affirmed by the High Court, is

    based purely on conjectures and surmises. It was

    submitted that the prosecution’s case rests entirely

    on circumstantial evidence and that there is no

    credible or reliable evidence on record of the case so

    as to connect the appellant-Pooranmal with the

    alleged crime.

    17. The learned counsel urged that the recovery of

    the blood-stained shirt allegedly made at the instance

    of the appellant-Pooranmal does not inspire

    confidence. The call detail records cannot be

    admitted in evidence because the mandatory

    certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act

    [Section 63 of the BSA] was never proved.

    18. The learned counsel further contended that the

    recovery of the currency notes cannot be treated to

    be incriminating because there is no credible

    evidence to show that these currency notes had, as a

    matter of fact, been given to the appellant-Pooranmal

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    by the co-convict Ladu Lal for committing the murder

    of Smt. Aruna.

    SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

    19. Per contra, learned counsel representing the

    State opposed the submissions advanced by the

    appellant’s counsel. It was submitted that the special

    leave petition filed by the co-convict against the selfsame

    impugned judgment, having been rejected by

    this Court, there is no reason for this Court to take a

    different view in the case of the appellant-Pooranmal.

    20. It was further submitted that the Investigating

    Officer (PW.22) has given unimpeachable evidence

    proving the grave incriminating recoveries of the

    blood-stained shirt and the currency notes made at

    the instance of the appellant-Pooranmal. The shirt

    upon being examined at the serological department

    of the Forensic Science Laboratory10 tested positive

    (FSL Report Ex. P-49) for the presence of the same

    blood group (O) as that of the deceased-Aruna. The

    appellant-Pooranmal failed to offer any explanation

    as to how the shirt worn by him at the time of the

    incident was bearing stains of the same blood group

    10 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘FSL’.

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    as that of the deceased-Aruna. The failure of the

    appellant-Pooranmal to offer any explanation to this

    gravely incriminating circumstance requires drawing

    of adverse inference.

    21. It was further submitted that the call detail

    records are gravely incriminating. The appellant-

    Pooranmal failed to offer any explanation for the

    extensive contact with the main accused Ladu Lal

    proximate to the time of the occurrence. Thus, these

    incriminating call detail records were rightly relied

    upon by the trial Court and the High Court for

    drawing the inference of guilt against the appellant-

    Pooranmal.

    22. It was further contended that the call detail

    records were proved by the nodal officers of the

    service providers, i.e. Vibhor Rastogi (PW.23) and

    Saurabh Kumar (PW.24) and hence, non-production

    of the certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence

    Act [Section 63 of the BSA] pales into insignificance.

    Mere non-production of the certificate under Section

    65-B of the Evidence Act [Section 63 of the BSA] in

    this case cannot be treated to be fatal to the

    prosecution’s case, particularly, when the call detail

    records have been duly proved by examining the

    employees of the service providers i.e., Vodafone and

    Bharati Hexacom Ltd./Bharati Heckjakom Ltd.

    23. The learned counsel also urged that the

    appellant-Pooranmal hails from a poor family and as

    such, his being in possession of such a large sum of

    money soon after the incident is a gravely

    incriminating circumstance for which the appellant-

    Pooranmal could not offer any explanation. Thus, by

    virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act [Section 109

    of the BSA], the burden shifted on to the appellant-

    Pooranmal to explain as to how he came into

    possession of the huge sum of money recovered from

    his house pursuant to the disclosure made by him

    under Section 27 of the Evidence Act [Proviso to

    Section 23 of the BSA].

    24. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel

    submitted that the concurrent and well-reasoned

    findings recorded against the accused by the trial

    Court and affirmed by the High Court, i.e. convicting

    the appellant-Pooranmal and upholding his

    conviction do not warrant interference. He thus

    implored the Court to dismiss the appeal.

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    ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

    25. We have heard and considered the submissions

    advanced by learned counsel for the appellant-

    Pooranmal and learned standing counsel appearing

    for the State. We have also carefully perused the

    impugned judgments and sifted the evidence

    available on record.

    26. Suffice it to say that, as emerging from the

    impugned judgments of the trial Court and the High

    Court, the case of the prosecution pertaining to the

    murder of Smt. Aruna is based purely on

    circumstantial evidence. Insofar as the appellant-

    Pooranmal is concerned, the prosecution’s case rests

    upon following three incriminating circumstances: –

    i. Call detail records indicating continuous and

    frequent conversation between the

    appellant-Pooranmal and co-convict Ladu

    Lal corresponding to the time of the incident.

    ii. The recovery of blood-stained shirt, having

    same blood group as that of Smt. Aruna, in

    furtherance of the disclosure made by the

    appellant-Pooranmal under Section 27 of the

    Evidence Act [Proviso to Section 23 of the

    BSA].

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    iii. The recovery of currency notes totalling

    Rs.46,000/-, purportedly paid by co-convict

    Ladu Lal to the appellant-Pooranmal for

    committing murder of Smt. Aruna.

    27. The law governing cases resting on

    circumstantial evidence is no longer res integra. It

    would, therefore, be apposite to advert to the salient

    principles enunciated by this Court in Sharad

    Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra11,

    wherein the parameters for appreciation of

    circumstantial evidence have been authoritatively

    and succinctly laid down:-

    “153. A close analysis of this decision would show

    that the following conditions must be fulfilled before

    a case against an accused can be said to be fully

    established:

    (1) the circumstances from which the

    conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be

    fully established.

    It may be noted here that this Court indicated

    that the circumstances concerned “must or

    should” and not “may be” established. There

    is not only a grammatical but a legal

    distinction between “may be proved” and

    “must be or should be proved” as was held by

    this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State

    of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793] where the

    observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807]

    “Certainly, it is a primary principle that

    the accused must be and not merely may

    11 (1984) 4 SCC 116.

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    be guilty before a court can convict and

    the mental distance between ‘may be’ and

    ‘must be’ is long and divides vague

    conjectures from sure conclusions.”

    (2) the facts so established should be

    consistent only with the hypothesis of the

    guilt of the accused, that is to say, they

    should not be explainable on any other

    hypothesis except that the accused is

    guilty,

    (3) the circumstances should be of a

    conclusive nature and tendency,

    (4) they should exclude every possible

    hypothesis except the one to be proved,

    and

    (5) there must be a chain of evidence so

    complete as not to leave any reasonable

    ground for the conclusion consistent with

    the innocence of the accused and must

    show that in all human probability the act

    must have been done by the accused.”

    (Emphasis Supplied)

    28. Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, we

    shall now proceed to examine and analyse the

    evidence led by the prosecution to prove the

    circumstances relied upon by it for bringing home the

    guilt of the appellant-Pooranmal.

    I. RECOVERY OF CURRENCY NOTES

    29. At the outset, we may take note of the fact that

    there is a grave discrepancy regarding the exact

    amount of currency notes recovered by the

    Investigating Officer (PW.22) purportedly in

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    furtherance of the disclosure statement made by the

    appellant-Pooranmal.

    30. Whilst in the examination-in-chief, the

    Investigating Officer (PW.22) deposed that the

    appellant-Pooranmal furnished an information under

    Section 27 of the Evidence Act [Proviso to Section 23

    of the BSA] regarding receipt of the amount of

    Rs.46,000/- (Ex. P-44) from Ladu Lal pursuant to a

    plan to commit the murder of Smt. Aruna.

    31. The Investigating Officer (PW.22) further stated

    that in consequence of the said disclosure, as also

    another disclosure pertaining to the shirt allegedly

    worn at the time of the incident, the appellant-

    Pooranmal led the police party to his residence and

    got recovered a shirt (suspected to be blood-stained)

    kept in an iron box. The said recovery was reduced

    into writing vide memo (Ex. P-9), and the shirt was

    sealed at the spot. Further as per the information

    given by the appellant-Pooranmal, a sum of

    Rs.46,000/- was recovered from his house and was

    seized vide memo (Ex. P-13). The said amount was

    also sealed at the spot.

    32. In cross-examination, the Investigating Officer

    (PW.22) admitted that though on the chit of material

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    exhibit (Ex. P-52), the currency notes were mentioned

    as Rs.46,000/-, but when the notes were counted in

    Court, it was noticed that the amount was

    Rs.46,145/-. The Investigating Officer (PW.22)

    admitted that there was no mention of these extra

    Rs.145 on the packet marked as (Ex. P-52).

    33. Thus, the very factum of recovery of the

    currency notes comes under a grave cloud of doubt.

    That apart, mere recovery of currency notes, in the

    absence of any cogent evidence establishing a clear

    nexus between the said amount and the crime, would

    not by itself constitute an incriminating

    circumstance against the appellant-Pooranmal.

    Thus, the said circumstance was wrongly treated to

    be incriminating by the trial Court as the recovery

    itself is doubtful and additionally, the mere recovery

    of currency notes cannot constitute incriminating

    evidence in absence of corroborative evidence.

    II. RECOVERY OF BLOOD-STAINED SHIRT

    34. The second incriminating article recovered at

    the instance of the appellant-Pooranmal was the

    blood-stained shirt which upon being analysed at the

    FSL purportedly gave a positive test for the presence

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    of the same blood group (O) as that of the deceased-

    Aruna. From the evidence of the Investigating Officer

    (PW.22), it transpires that the recovery of the shirt

    was effected in furtherance of the disclosure

    statement of the appellant-Pooranmal (Ex. P-43). The

    recovery memo of the shirt was proved as (Ex. P-9).

    35. We may observe that the appellant-Pooranmal

    herein was a free bird since the day of incident i.e.

    from intervening night of 2nd and 3rd March, 2010

    until 4th March, 2010, when he came to be formally

    arrested in connection with the present case, after

    being implicated by the co-convict Ladu Lal. The

    recovery memo (Ex. P-9) indicates that the appellant-

    Pooranmal had meticulously concealed the shirt in

    an iron box and when the same was recovered, it was

    bearing blood stains. To our mind, it is highly

    improbable and unnatural that the appellant-

    Pooranmal, who was a free bird, would have taken

    such great pains to conceal the shirt so meticulously

    rather than simply destroying it by burning.

    Furthermore, even if the appellant-Pooranmal was

    desirous of preserving the shirt, all that was required

    to obliterate the blood stains was to wash the same.

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    Hence, we are of the firm view that the recovery of the

    shirt is totally unreliable.

    36. The recovery of the shirt was held to be

    incriminating based on the FSL report (Ex. P-49) as

    per which the blood stains on the shirt tested positive

    for the presence of O blood group being the same as

    that of the deceased-Aruna. For treating the FSL

    report (Ex. P-49) to be admissible, the prosecution

    would have to prove the complete chain of custody

    establishing the sanctity of the sealed articles right

    from the time of the seizure till the time they reached

    the FSL. In this regard, we would like to refer to the

    evidence of the following witnesses:-

    a. Mathura Singh (P.W.19)

    37. Mathura Singh (PW.19), the Head Constable incharge

    of the malkhana at Police Station Bijolia,

    stated that on 6th March, 2010 the Investigating

    Officer (PW.22) deposited blood-stained tissues and

    shirt in a sealed cloth bag. An entry to this effect was

    made in the malkhana register at Serial No. 227. On

    7th March, 2010, the Investigating Officer (PW.22)

    deposited a sealed bag containing 46 notes of

    Rs.1,000/- each, totalling Rs. 46,000/-. The witness

    19

    (PW.19) stated that these articles, which also

    included the articles/samples recovered from the

    crime scene and the t-shirt recovered at the instance

    of the co-convict Ladu Lal, bearing marks A, B, C, L,

    M (totalling five), were forwarded with constable

    Surender Singh (PW.16) to SP office Bhilwara on 15th

    March, 2010 for being deposited at the FSL

    accompanied by requisite documents. However,

    because the FSL forwarding letter was not yet

    prepared, the said articles were returned and handed

    back to said witness (PW.19) who redeposited the

    same in the malkhana with an endorsement made in

    the malkhana register (Ex. P-37).

    38. These very articles were again taken out from

    the malkhana on 18th March, 2010 and handed over

    to Surender Singh (PW.16) for delivery to FSL.

    Surender Singh (PW.16) proceeded to Udaipur and

    deposited the samples at the FSL on 19th March,

    2010. He thereafter returned on 20th March, 2010

    along with the receipt evidencing such deposit.

    39. The witness (PW.19) was confronted with the

    malkhana entry in his cross-examination and stated

    as below: –

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    “It is wrong to say that I had given the material

    to Surendra Singh on 12.3.10 for taking to F.S.L.

    and that due to some shortage in it, the material

    were returned on 15.3.l0. Ex.D.3 The copy of the

    Malkhana which was attached with the challan

    in the file, in the C-D part of which it is written

    that the material were sent on 12.3.10 is wrong.”

    b. Surendra Singh (P.W.16)

    40. The Carrier Constable, Surender Singh (PW.16),

    emphatically stated that he carried the malkhana

    articles to the FSL on 18th March, 2010, deposited

    them at the FSL, Udaipur on 19th March, 2010 and

    brought back the receipt. In his cross-examination,

    the witness (PW.16) stated that he did not recollect

    taking the same articles to the S.P. office on 12th

    March, 2010. He was confronted with the malkhana

    register (Ex. D-3), which records that he had been

    handed the samples on 12th March, 2010 and had

    attempted to deposit them at the S.P. Office on 15th

    March, 2010. However, he feigned ignorance as to the

    said entry recorded in the official document (Ex.D-3).

    41. On a holistic appreciation of the evidence of

    these two witnesses, it becomes clear that there is a

    grave discrepancy regarding the safe-keeping/chain

    of custody of the muddamal articles. It is clearly

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    discernible from the evidence of Mathura Singh

    (PW.19) that the muddamal articles were sent out of

    the police station prior to 18th March, 2010, to be

    precise on 15th March, 2010, but the same were

    returned from the FSL because of some defects. The

    precise reason for return of the muddamal articles is

    not forthcoming in the evidence of the prosecution

    witnesses. The Carrier Constable (PW.16)

    categorically denied having carried the samples on

    any date prior to 18th March, 2010.

    42. The entry made in the malkhana register (Ex. D-

    3) with which both the witnesses were confronted,

    completely demolishes the versions of PW.19 and

    PW.16. In this entry, it is clearly recorded that the

    muddamal articles were forwarded to the FSL on 12th

    March, 2010. Utter failure of the prosecution to

    disclose as to the reasons for which the samples were

    returned from the FSL breaches the unbroken chain

    of custody mandatorily required to prove the safe

    keeping of the muddamal articles.

    43. In Karandeep Sharma alias Razia alias

    Raju v. State of Uttarakhand12, this Court

    12 2025 SCC OnLine SC 773.

    22

    emphasised that for a DNA/FSL report to be

    acceptable and reliable, the prosecution must

    establish an unbroken chain of custody and

    demonstrate that the samples remained duly sealed

    and untampered throughout, and held as follows:-

    “54. In order to make the DNA report acceptable,

    reliable and admissible, the prosecution would

    first be required to prove the sanctity and chain of

    custody of the samples/articles right from the

    time of their preparation/collection till the time

    they reached the FSL. For this purpose, the link

    evidence would have to be established by

    examining the concerned witness.

    55. Evidently, there is not even a semblance of

    evidence on record to satisfy the Court that the

    samples/articles collected from the dead body of

    the child-victim and those collected from the

    appellant which were later forwarded to the FSL

    were properly sealed or that the same remained in

    a self-same condition right from the time of the

    seizure till they reached the FSL. No witness from

    the FSL was examined by the prosecution to prove

    that the samples/articles were received in a

    sealed condition. Hence, there is every possibility

    of the samples being tampered/manipulated by

    the police officers so as to achieve a favourable

    result from the FSL, thereby, inculpating the

    appellant in the crime.”

    44. In view of the analysis of evidence made above,

    we are of the firm view that the requisite link evidence

    essential to prove the safe-keeping and sanctity of the

    muddamal articles is lacking and the chain of

    custody has been breached beyond reprieve, thereby,

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    making the FSL report (Ex. P-49) redundant and a

    worthless piece of paper.

    45. Moreover, this Court in Allarakha Habib

    Memon v. State of Gujarat13, expounded that even

    if the FSL report establishes that the blood group

    detected on the article recovered at the instance of

    the accused matches that of the deceased, such

    circumstance by itself is not sufficient to link the said

    accused with the crime. This Court observed as

    follows:-

    “42. The trial court as well as the High Court

    heavily relied upon the FSL reports (Exts. 111-115)

    for finding corroboration to the evidence of the

    eyewitnesses and in drawing a conclusion

    regarding culpability of the appellants for the

    crime. We may reiterate that the testimony of the

    so-called eyewitnesses has already been discarded

    above by holding the same to be doubtful. Thus,

    even presuming that the FSL reports (Exts. 111-

    115) conclude that the blood group found on the

    weapons recovered at the instance of the

    accused matched with the blood group of the

    deceased, this circumstance in isolation,

    cannot be considered sufficient so as to link the

    accused with the crime.

    43. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the

    judgment of Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthan

    [Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthan, (2011) 11 SCC

    724 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 473] , wherein this Court

    held that sole circumstance of recovery of

    bloodstained weapon cannot form the basis of

    13 (2024) 9 SCC 546.

    24

    conviction unless the same was connected with the

    murder of the deceased by the accused. The

    relevant portion is extracted hereinbelow : (SCC p.

    730, para 19)

    “19. The AB blood group which was found

    on the clothes of the deceased does not by

    itself establish the guilt of the appellant

    unless the same was connected with the

    murder of the deceased by the appellants.

    None of the witnesses examined by the

    prosecution could establish that fact. The

    blood found on the sword recovered at the

    instance of Mustkeem was not sufficient for

    test as the same had already disintegrated.

    At any rate, due to the reasons elaborated

    in the following paragraphs, the fact that

    the traces of blood found on the deceased

    matched those found on the recovered

    weapons cannot ipso facto enable us to

    arrive at the conclusion that the latter were

    used for the murder.”

    (Emphasis Supplied)

    46. Thus, even if the FSL report (Ex. P-49) shows

    that the blood found on the shirt allegedly recovered

    at the instance of the appellant-Pooranmal matches

    that of the deceased-Aruna, such finding would by

    itself not be incriminating in the absence of other

    cogent and corroborative evidence completing the

    chain of circumstances.

    47. Thus, neither the recovery of the currency notes

    is reliable, nor the recovery of the shirt inspires

    confidence. In addition thereto, the link evidence

    25

    having not been proved, the FSL report (Ex. P-49)

    pales into insignificance.

    III. CALL DETAIL RECORDS

    48. The last and final piece of circumstantial

    evidence relied upon by the prosecution to bring

    home the charges against the appellant-Pooranmal

    pertains to the call detail records.

    49. Section 65-B of the Evidence Act [Section 63 of

    the BSA] mandates that electronic evidence in form

    of a computer output (call detail records) can only be

    admitted in evidence upon satisfaction of the

    mandatory conditions prescribed under Section 65-B

    (4) of the Evidence Act [Section 63(4) of the BSA],

    which reads as follows: –

    “(4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give

    a statement in evidence by virtue of this section,

    a certificate doing any of the following things,

    that is to say, —

    (a) identifying the electronic record

    containing the statement and

    describing the manner in which it was

    produced;

    (b) giving such particulars of any device

    involved in the production of that

    electronic record as may be appropriate

    for the purpose of showing that the

    electronic record was produced by a

    computer;

    (c) dealing with any of the matters to

    which the conditions mentioned in sub26

    section (2) relate, and purporting to be

    signed by a person occupying a

    responsible official position in relation to

    the operation of the relevant device or the

    management of the relevant activities

    (whichever is appropriate) shall be

    evidence of any matter stated in the

    certificate; and for the purposes of this

    subsection it shall be sufficient for a

    matter to be stated to the best of the

    knowledge and belief of the person

    stating it.

    (Emphasis supplied)

    50. This position of law was cemented by this Court

    in the case of Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer14, wherein

    it was held as follows: –

    “14. Any documentary evidence by way of an

    electronic record under the Evidence Act, in view

    of Sections 59 and 65-A, can be proved only in

    accordance with the procedure prescribed under

    Section 65-B. Section 65-B deals with the

    admissibility of the electronic record. The

    purpose of these provisions is to sanctify

    secondary evidence in electronic form, generated

    by a computer. It may be noted that the section

    starts with a non obstante clause. Thus,

    notwithstanding anything contained in the

    Evidence Act, any information contained in an

    electronic record which is printed on a paper,

    stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic

    media produced by a computer shall be deemed

    to be a document only if the conditions

    mentioned under sub-section (2) are satisfied,

    without further proof or production of the

    original. The very admissibility of such a

    14 (2014) 10 SCC 473.

    27

    document i.e. electronic record which is called as

    computer output, depends on the satisfaction of

    the four conditions under Section 65-B(2).

    Following are the specified conditions under

    Section 65-B(2) of the Evidence Act:

    (i) The electronic record containing the

    information should have been produced

    by the computer during the period over

    which the same was regularly used to

    store or process information for the

    purpose of any activity regularly carried

    on over that period by the person having

    lawful control over the use of that

    computer;

    (ii) The information of the kind contained

    in electronic record or of the kind from

    which the information is derived was

    regularly fed into the computer in the

    ordinary course of the said activity;

    (iii) During the material part of the said

    period, the computer was operating

    properly and that even if it was not

    operating properly for some time, the

    break or breaks had not affected either

    the record or the accuracy of its contents;

    and

    (iv) The information contained in the

    record should be a reproduction or

    derivation from the information fed into

    the computer in the ordinary course of

    the said activity.

    15. Under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act, if

    it is desired to give a statement in any

    proceedings pertaining to an electronic record, it

    is permissible provided the following conditions

    are satisfied:

    (a) There must be a certificate which

    identifies the electronic record containing

    the statement;

    28

    (b) The certificate must describe the

    manner in which the electronic record

    was produced;

    (c) The certificate must furnish the

    particulars of the device involved in the

    production of that record;

    (d) The certificate must deal with the

    applicable conditions mentioned under

    Section 65-B(2) of the Evidence Act; and

    (e) The certificate must be signed by a

    person occupying a responsible official

    position in relation to the operation of the

    relevant device.

    16. It is further clarified that the person need

    only to state in the certificate that the same is to

    the best of his knowledge and belief. Most

    importantly, such a certificate must accompany

    the electronic record like computer printout,

    compact disc (CD), video compact disc (VCD),

    pen drive, etc., pertaining to which a statement

    is sought to be given in evidence, when the same

    is produced in evidence. All these safeguards are

    taken to ensure the source and authenticity,

    which are the two hallmarks pertaining to

    electronic record sought to be used as evidence.

    Electronic records being more susceptible to

    tampering, alteration, transposition, excision,

    etc. without such safeguards, the whole trial

    based on proof of electronic records can lead to

    travesty of justice.

    17. Only if the electronic record is duly produced

    in terms of Section 65-B of the Evidence Act,

    would the question arise as to the genuineness

    thereof and in that situation, resort can be made

    to Section 45-A—opinion of Examiner of

    Electronic Evidence.

    18. The Evidence Act does not contemplate

    or permit the proof of an electronic record by

    oral evidence if requirements under Section

    65-B of the Evidence Act are not complied

    with, as the law now stands in India.”

    (Emphasis Supplied)

    51. Subsequently, this Court in Arjun Panditrao

    Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1.,

    reaffirmed and clarified the position laid down in

    Anvar P.V. (supra), observing that the requirement of

    a certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act

    [Section 63 of the BSA] for admissibility of electronic

    evidence is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with,

    and held as follows:-

    “61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate

    required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition

    precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of

    electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar

    P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473

    : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 :

    (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108], and incorrectly “clarified”

    in Shafhi Mohammad [Shafhi Mohammad v. State

    of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801 : (2018) 2 SCC 807 :

    (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 346 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 351 :

    (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 860 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 865] .

    Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot

    possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory

    requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed

    principle in Taylor v. Taylor [Taylor v. Taylor,

    (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426] , which has been followed in

    a number of the judgments of this Court, can also

    be applied. Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act

    clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible

    only if led in the manner stated and not otherwise.

    To hold otherwise would render Section 65-B(4)

    otiose.”

    52. Admittedly, in the present case, the certificate

    under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act [Section 63 of

    the BSA] was not proved by the prosecution. In the

    absence of the certificate, mandatorily required

    under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act [Section 63 of

    the BSA], the call detail records become inadmissible

    in evidence and cannot be relied upon to support the

    prosecution’s case.

    CONCLUSION

    53. In view of the discussion made above, we are of

    the opinion that the prosecution has miserably failed

    to establish a complete and coherent chain of

    incriminating circumstances so as to bring home the

    guilt of the appellant-Pooranmal. Neither were the socalled

    incriminating circumstances proved by cogent

    and admissible evidence, nor do they form an

    unbroken chain pointing unequivocally towards the

    guilt of the appellant-Pooranmal.

    54. As an upshot of the above discussion, we have

    no hesitation in concluding that the prosecution has

    failed to bring home the charges against the

    appellant-Pooranmal and the impugned judgments

    do not stand to scrutiny.

    55. Consequently, conviction of the appellant-

    Pooranmal as recorded by the trial Court and

    affirmed by the High Court cannot be sustained.

    Hence, the impugned judgments are hereby set aside.

    The appellant-Pooranmal is acquitted of the charges.

    He is in custody and shall be released forthwith, if

    not wanted in any other case.

    56. The appeal is accordingly allowed in the above

    terms.

    57. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

    disposed of.

    ….……………………J.

    (VIKRAM NATH)

    ……………………….J.

    (SANDEEP MEHTA)

    ….……………………J.

    (N.V. ANJARIA)

    NEW DELHI;

    MARCH 10, 2026

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