Calcutta High Court
Tirupati Fuels Private Limited vs M.S.T.C. Limited on 22 May, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
COMMERCIAL DIVISION 2026:CHC-OS:253
ORIGINAL SIDE
RESERVED ON: 20.05.2026
DELIVERED ON: 22.05.2026
PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GAURANG KANTH
AP-COM 317 OF 2026
[OLD NO. AP 406 OF 2022]
TIRUPATI FUELS PRIVATE LIMITED
VERSUS
M.S.T.C. LIMITED
Appearance:
Mr. Mainak Bose, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Ramesh Ch. Prusti, Adv.
Ms. Mahuya Ghosh, Adv.
Ms. Sharmistha Sardar, Adv.
Ms. Pallabhavi Sengupta, Adv.
..... for the petitioner
Mr. Samriddha Sen, Adv.
Mr. Sourjya Roy, Adv.
..... for the respondent
JUDGMENT
Gaurang Kanth, J.:-
1. The Petitioner has preferred the present petition under Section 11 (6) of the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 for the appointment of the arbitrator
for adjudication of the disputes that have arisen between the parties
arising out of the agreement between 18.06.2010.
2. The facts leading to the present case are as follows:
3. The Petitioner is engaged in the business of sale of LAM Coke and Coking
Coal. The Respondent is a Government of India enterprise providing
services in various e-commerce sectors, including e-auction, e-
procurement, high sea sales, e-sales and retail software.
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4. An agreement dated 18.06.2010 was executed between the parties,
whereunder the Respondent, in consultation with the Petitioner, was
required to procure materials from overseas and open Letters of Credit
covering the value of such materials in terms of the purchase orders upon
the foreign sellers. Thereafter, the Respondent was required to sell the
imported materials to the Petitioner on a High Sea Sale basis. The
agreement further provided that the entire quantity of materials as per the
Bills of Lading would be pledged by the Petitioner to the Respondent, to be
stored with a designated agency in safe custody and delivered against
authorisation letters issued by the Respondent. The agreement also
conferred upon the Respondent the right to sell the materials on behalf of
the Petitioner, at the Petitioner’s risk and cost, in the event of the
Petitioner’s failure to make payment for or take delivery of the imported
materials. This right was exercisable upon issuance of fifteen days’ notice
to the Petitioner, following which the Respondent could exercise its lien
over the goods, sell them to any third party of its choice, and adjust the
sale proceeds in pro tanto satisfaction of its claim. Any loss arising from
such sale was required to be indemnified by the Petitioner.
5. In pursuance of the said agreement, the Petitioner imported Coking Coal
through the Respondent by way of Letters of Credit. During the period
2008-09, a global recession led to a significant reduction in demand for
Coke, on account of which the Petitioner was constrained to defer its plans
for conversion of the imported Coking Coal into Coke. The Petitioner claims
to have performed its obligations under the agreement and to have
maintained a security deposit with the Respondent in excess of Rs. 21
Crores, which was entitled to earn interest at the rate of 14% per annum.
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6. By a letter dated 06.06.2012, the Petitioner requested the Respondent 2026:CHC-OS:253
to
refund the security deposit along with accrued interest for the period from
01.04.2011 to 31.12.2011, amounting to Rs. 9.60 Crores. The Petitioner
also offered a permanent settlement of dues as on 31.12.2011 at Rs. 51.61
Crores, subject to the Respondent extending a fresh exposure of Rs. 100
Crores to enable the Petitioner to continue its business operations. No
response was received from the Respondent to the said letter.
7. The Respondent did not exercise its contractual right of lien nor did it
proceeded to sell the imported goods.
8. In the year 2012, the Petitioner offered storage space at its plant site to
facilitate the Respondent in storing and subsequently selling the goods
towards mitigation of losses. The materials have since remained lying at
the Petitioner’s plant site at Nanichiria, Gandhidham, Gujarat, occupying
an area in excess of 10 acres. The Petitioner contends that on account of
the commercial area so occupied, it has suffered loss and damages in
excess of Rs. 10 Crores. It is further the case of the Petitioner that the
Respondent, while continuing to stock the said quantity of Coking Coal at
the Petitioner’s stockyard, has failed to refund the security deposit
together with interest accrued thereon.
9. The Respondent subsequently initiated winding up proceedings against the
Petitioner, which were later transferred to the National Company Law
Tribunal, Kolkata, bearing TP/02/KB/2021.
10. By a letter dated 18.03.2022, the Petitioner invoked the arbitration clause
under Clauses 20 and 21.1 of the agreement dated 18.06.2010 in
accordance with Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
and proposed the name of an Arbitrator. In response, the Respondent, vide
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its letter dated 26.04.2022, contended that the Petitioner, in various
correspondences, had already admitted and acknowledged a crystallised
and admitted debt payable to the Respondent, and that in view of such
admission, no dispute capable of adjudication by an Arbitral Tribunal
subsisted between the parties. The Petitioner, however, contests this
position and maintains that by reason of the storage of materials at its site
and the non-refund of the security deposit, it has suffered substantial loss
and damage, giving rise to disputes requiring adjudication through
arbitration.
11. In view of the foregoing, the Petitioner has preferred the present Petition
under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking
appointment of an Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes arising out of the
agreement dated 18.06.2010.
Submission on behalf of the Petitioner
12. Mr. Mainak Bose, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioner, submitted that the present petition is maintainable in law and
that all conditions precedent for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court
under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 stand
duly satisfied. It was submitted that a valid, subsisting and binding
arbitration agreement exists between the parties under Clauses 20 and
21.1 of the agreement dated 18.06.2010, and that the Petitioner had duly
invoked the said arbitration clause vide letter dated 18.03.2022 strictly in
accordance with Section 21 of the Act. It was further submitted that the
Respondent, having expressly acknowledged receipt of the said invocation
notice and having responded thereto vide its letter dated 26.04.2022,
cannot now be permitted to approbate and reprobate by contending that
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no arbitrable dispute exists between the parties. In this regard, learned
Senior Counsel placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Krish
Spinning, reported as (2024) 12 SCC 1 and Aslam Ismail Khan
Deshmukh v. ASAP Fluids Pvt. Ltd., reported as (2025) 1 SCC 502, and
submitted that the settled legal position emerging from the said judgments
is that once the existence of a valid arbitration agreement is established
and a dispute is prima facie shown to exist, the Court at the stage of
consideration under Section 11 of the Act, is neither required nor
permitted to undertake a deeper or more intrusive examination into the
merits, validity, or strength of the claims, and the appointment of an
arbitrator ought to follow as a matter of course.
13. On the question of limitation, learned Senior Counsel submitted that
Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would govern the claims of the
Petitioner in the present case. It was pointed out that Article 113, which
applies to suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in
the Schedule, is distinct from the residuary Article 137, which governs
applications. The crucial distinction, it was urged, lies in the fact that
Article 113 prescribes that limitation begins to run only “when the right to
sue accrues”, a formulation that has a distinct, precise and well-settled
legal connotation in law, and which cannot be mechanically equated with
the date of the underlying transaction, the date of an alleged breach, or the
date on which a payment first fell due. Placing reliance upon the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v.
Central Bank of India, reported as (2020) 17 SCC 260, learned Senior
Counsel submitted that the right to sue accrues only at the point when a
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demand or claim made by one party is denied, repudiated, or met with2026:CHC-OS:253
a
clear and unequivocal refusal by the other, thereby giving rise to a lis
between the parties capable of adjudication. It was urged that a mere
efflux of time, silence on the part of the opposite party, or the continuation
of a contractual relationship between the parties cannot, by itself, be
treated as the accrual of the right to sue, and that until a demand is made
and met with a refusal or repudiation, the cause of action does not
crystallise so as to set the period of limitation in motion.
14. It was further submitted that the claims of the Petitioner in the present
case, namely, the refund of the security deposit together with accrued
interest thereon, and the damages arising out of the Respondent’s
continued and unauthorised stocking of imported materials at the
Petitioner’s premises occupying an area in excess of 10 acres, do not arise
from a single identifiable act of default occurring at a fixed and
determinable point in time. On the contrary, the Respondent’s failure to
refund the security deposit and its continued occupation of the Petitioner’s
stockyard without authorisation, consent or compensation constitute a
continuing wrong, inasmuch as the default is repeated and renewed with
each passing day, giving rise to a fresh cause of action and a fresh period
of limitation with each successive period of such default. Accordingly, it
was urged that the right to sue in respect of the Petitioner’s claims cannot
be said to have accrued at any single anterior point of time so as to render
those claims time-barred, and that the arbitration clause having been duly
invoked vide letter dated 18.03.2022 upon crystallisation of the disputes
between the parties, the present petition is clearly within limitation. It was
therefore submitted that no part of the Petitioner’s claims can be said to be
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barred by the law of limitation, whether under Article 113 or 137 or any
other provision of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the Respondent’s objection
on this ground deserves to be rejected in limine.
15. In further support of his submissions on the issue of limitation, learned
Senior Counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ramesh B. Desai & Ors. v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, reported as
(2006) 5 SCC 638, and submitted that the question of limitation is
quintessentially a mixed question of law and fact, the determination of
which necessitates an examination of the evidence, conduct of the parties,
and the circumstances giving rise to the cause of action. It was accordingly
urged that the Arbitral Tribunal, being the competent and appropriate
forum for adjudication of all factual and legal disputes between the parties,
is the proper authority to decide upon the question of limitation of the
substantive claims, and that this Court ought not to foreclose such
adjudication at the threshold stage of Section 11, where no detailed
evidentiary inquiry is either permissible or warranted.
16. In conclusion, learned Senior Counsel prayed that the present petition be
allowed, and that an independent and impartial Arbitrator be appointed by
this Court to adjudicate all disputes and differences between the parties
arising out of and in connection with the agreement dated 18.06.2010,
with all questions of law, fact, limitation and merits being expressly left
open for determination by the Arbitral Tribunal.
Submission on behalf of the Respondent
17. Mr. Samriddha Sen, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent, submitted that under the agreement dated 18.06.2010, the
Respondent acted as a facilitator for the Petitioner for procurement of LAM
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Coke and Coking Coal for the Petitioner’s plants at Kandla Stockyard and
Vishakhapatnam Stockyard, and that in pursuance thereof, the
Respondent imported the requisite materials at its own cost and expense
on behalf of the Petitioner. It was submitted that the Petitioner thereafter
failed and neglected to lift the said materials, on account whereof the
Respondent has accrued a claim in excess of Rs. 79,65,65,295/- as on
27.12.2013, arrived at after due appropriation of the security deposit of
Rs. 10,16,26,475/- standing to the credit of the Petitioner. It was
accordingly contended that the said amount constitutes a crystallised,
admitted and undisputed debt, leaving no dispute referable to arbitration.
It was further submitted that the Petitioner, in various correspondences,
has itself acknowledged the debt owed to the Respondent, rendering the
present petition a transparent attempt to circumvent the legitimate
winding up proceedings pending before the National Company Law
Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, being TP/02/KB/2021, which proceedings are
directly founded upon the same agreement dated 18.06.2010. It was
additionally submitted that the Respondent had, in good faith,
endeavoured to conduct an e-auction of the imported materials to mitigate
its losses, however the Petitioner failed to confirm the price, causing the e-
auction to lapse, thereby further compounding the Respondent’s losses.
18. On the question of limitation, learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that the Petitioner’s reliance upon Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is
wholly misconceived, inasmuch as Article 113 governs suits and has no
application to a petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, which is an application in its essential character
and is therefore governed by the residuary Article 137 of the Limitation
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Act, prescribing a period of three years from the date on which the right 2026:CHC-OS:253
to
apply accrues. It was submitted that the right to invoke arbitration in the
present case first accrued to the Petitioner on 27.12.2013, when the
Respondent formally communicated the crystallised outstanding dues
payable by the Petitioner, categorically appropriated the security deposit
towards the said dues, and explicitly warned that in the event of non-
payment, winding up proceedings would be initiated. It was urged that this
communication of 27.12.2013 constituted a clear, unequivocal and
definitive crystallisation of the dispute between the parties, from which
date limitation commenced and is liable to be reckoned, and that the
invocation of the arbitration clause only in the year 2022, after a gap of
nearly nine years, renders both the Section 11 petition and the underlying
claims ex facie barred by limitation under Article 137.
19. Learned counsel further submitted that the Petitioner’s plea of a continuing
cause of action and continuing wrong is wholly untenable in the facts of
the present case. It was urged that the doctrine of continuing wrong
applies only where the wrongful act is repeated or renewed on each
successive day, and not where, as in the present case, there was a single
completed act of default and crystallisation of disputes in the year 2013, of
which the Petitioner had full, clear and unambiguous knowledge. It was
submitted that the Petitioner remained completely silent for nearly nine
years and took no steps whatsoever towards invocation of the arbitration,
and that no subsequent communication, including the Respondent’s
notice of e-auction dated 29.11.2021, could have the effect of resurrecting
or extending a right to invoke arbitration that had long since accrued and
in respect of which the period of limitation had already expired by efflux of
10
time. It was further urged that the present case involves no intricate 2026:CHC-OS:253
or
complex question of mixed law and fact warranting reference to the
learned Arbitral Tribunal, as much as the crystallisation of the disputes
and the commencement as well as expiry of limitation stand demonstrably
evident from the record itself and do not require any detailed factual
inquiry.
20. Learned counsel placed reliance upon Arif Azim Company Ltd. v. Aptech
Ltd., reported as (2024) 5 SCC 313, to contend that the Court exercise
jurisdiction under Section 11(6) is not a mere post office and is duty-
bound to satisfy itself on two distinct aspects: first, whether the Section
11(6) petition has itself been filed within the period of limitation under
Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963; and second, whether the claims
sought to be referred to arbitration are ex facie dead claims hopelessly
barred by limitation on the face of the record. Reliance was also placed
upon B and T AG v. Ministry of Defence, reported as (2024) 5 SCC 358,
to urge that whether particular facts constitute a cause of action must be
determined with reference to the substance of the dispute and the specific
facts of each case, and that upon a substantive examination of the present
matter, the cause of action had indisputably crystallised in 2013 with no
fresh or independent cause of action having arisen thereafter. Learned
counsel further sought to distinguish Krish Spinning (supra) relied upon
by the Petitioner, by placing specific reliance upon paragraph 40 of the
said judgment, submitting that the said paragraph expressly carves out
and preserves the referral court’s jurisdiction to reject petitions where
claims sought to be referred are ex facie time-barred, warranting dismissal
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of the petition at the threshold itself without requiring reference of such
disputes to arbitration.
21. In view of the foregoing, learned counsel for the Respondent prayed that the
present petition be dismissed both on the ground of absence of any
arbitrable dispute, the Petitioner having admitted the debt owed to the
Respondent, and on the ground that the petition as well as the underlying
claims are ex facie barred by limitation. It was accordingly urged that the
appointment of an Arbitrator in the present facts and circumstances would
serve no purpose and would result only in unnecessary delay and
harassment of the Respondent.
Legal Analysis
22. This Court has heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both
the parties and has carefully examined the documents placed on record
and the Judgments relied upon by the parties.
23. The threshold question that arises for consideration in the present petition
concerns the extent of inquiry that this Court is required or permitted to
undertake at the stage of appointing an Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The law on this aspect now
stands authoritatively and finally settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Krish Spinning (supra) and Aslam Ismail Kan (supra) wherein a three-
Judge Bench, after an elaborate survey of the entire line of precedents on
the issue, held that the scope of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) is
confined solely to the prima facie examination of the existence of an
arbitration agreement between the parties. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
unequivocally held that the referral court is not required, and indeed is not
permitted, to embark upon any deeper or more intrusive examination of
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the merits of the dispute, the validity of the claims, the conduct of the
parties, or the question as to whether a full and final settlement has been
arrived at. The Court further held that all such questions, including
questions relating to accord and satisfaction, admission of debt, and the
validity or enforceability of particular claims, fall exclusively within the
domain of the Arbitral Tribunal and are required to be decided by learned
Tribunal, either as a preliminary issue or along with the merits.
24. In the present case, the existence of the arbitration agreement contained in
Clauses 20 and 21.1 of the agreement dated 18.06.2010 is not in dispute.
The Respondent has not challenged the validity or existence of the
arbitration agreement. In view of the binding pronouncement of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krish Spinning (supra) and Aslam Ismail Kan
(supra), the inquiry of this Court must therefore be limited to verifying the
existence of the said agreement, which is clearly established from the
materials on the record.
25. The Respondent has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Arif Azim Company Ltd. (supra) to urge that this
Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act, is duty-
bound to satisfy itself on two counts: first, whether the Section 11(6)
petition is itself barred by limitation; and second, whether the claims
sought to be referred to arbitration are ex facie dead claims barred by
limitation on the date of commencement of arbitration proceedings. While
it is correct that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arif Azim Company Ltd.
(supra) held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to
petitions under Section 11(6) of the Act, prescribes a period of three years
from the date on which the right to apply accrues, and further held that a
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referral court may, in an appropriate case, decline to refer disputes that
are manifestly and ex facie time-barred, it is equally important to
appreciate the significant clarification and qualification of the said position
as laid down by the subsequent three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Krish Spinning (supra) and Aslam Ismail Kan (supra).
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krish Spinning (supra) and Aslam Ismail
Kan (supra) expressly clarified that insofar as the question of limitation of
the underlying claims is concerned, the referral court must not conduct an
intricate or detailed evidentiary inquiry into whether the claims are time-
barred. The Court held that the referral court’s inquiry on the issue
limitation must remain restricted only to determining whether the Section
11(6) petition itself has been filed within the prescribed period of three
years, and that the question as to whether the substantive claims to be
arbitrated are barred by limitation is ordinarily a matter to be determined
by the Arbitral Tribunal and not by the referral court. The power to reject
claims as ex facie dead claims, as contemplated in Arif Azim Company
Ltd. (supra), is therefore an exceptional and narrow jurisdiction to be
exercised only in the most glaring and manifest cases where the claims are
hopelessly and undeniably time-barred on the face of the record, without
any factual inquiry whatsoever.
26. The parties have advanced diametrically opposed contentions on the
question of limitation. The Petitioner contends that Article 113 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 governs its claims, inasmuch as the right to sue
accrues only upon repudiation or unequivocal refusal of a demand, and
that the Respondent’s continuing occupation of the Petitioner’s stockyard
and continued non-refund of the security deposit constitute a continuing
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wrong giving rise to a fresh cause of action during each period 2026:CHC-OS:253
of
subsistence of the alleged default. The Respondent, on the other hand,
contends that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, being the residuary
provision applicable to applications, as distinct from suits, governs a
petition under Section 11(6), and that the cause of action had irrevocably
crystallised on 27.12.2013 when the Respondent communicated the
outstanding dues, appropriated the security deposit, and warned of
initiation of winding up proceedings, thereby setting limitation in motion
from that date, rendering the present petition filed after nearly nine years
hopelessly time-barred. The Respondent further contends that the
Petitioner’s reliance upon the communication dated 29.11.2021 regarding
the proposed e-auction as constituting a fresh accrual of the right to
invoke arbitration is wholly untenable, in as much as no subsequent
communication can resurrect a right to invoke arbitrate that had long
since become time-barred.
27. Considering the rival contention of the parties, this Court is of the
considered view that it is neither necessary nor appropriate at this stage,
to resolve this contest between applicability Article 113 and Article 137 of
the Limitation Act, or to determine whether the cause of action arose in
2013 or 2022. These are precisely the kinds of questions, involving a
detailed examination of the facts, the conduct of the parties, the nature of
the wrong alleged, and the applicable provision of the Limitation Act, that
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krish Spinning (supra) and Aslam Ismail
Kan (supra) has held to be beyond the jurisdiction of the referral court
under Section 11 and within the exclusive domain of the learned Arbitral
Tribunal. The determination as to which Article of the Limitation Act
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applies, when the right to sue or the right to apply accrued, whether the
wrong is a continuing one, and whether the claims are within or beyond
limitation, are all quintessentially mixed questions of law and fact, as
recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh B. Desai (supra),
and must be decided by the learned Arbitral Tribunal upon affording full
opportunity of hearing to both parties and upon examining the evidence on
record.
28. The Respondent has also placed reliance upon B and T AG (supra), to
contend that whether particular facts constitute a cause of action must be
determined with reference to the substance of the matter and the specific
facts of each case. This Court accepts the said proposition as a correct
statement of law. However, the application of this principle to the facts of
the present case leads not to the conclusion urged by the Respondent, but
rather to the opposite one: precisely because the determination of when
the cause of action arose requires a substantive, fact specific inquiry into
the communications exchange between the parties, the conduct of the
Respondent in continuing occupation of the Petitioner’s stockyard, the non
refund of the security deposit, and the question of whether the wrong is
continuing or completed, such an inquiry cannot be undertaken by this
Court while exercising limited jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act. The
principle laid down in B and T AG (supra) reinforces, rather than
undermines, the conclusion that all questions of limitation in the present
case must be referred to and decided by the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
29. In the present case, the arbitration clause was invoked vide letter dated
18.03.2022, and the present petition has been filed within a period of three
years therefrom. Accordingly, the Respondent’s contention on limitation
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must be rejected both on the ground that the Section 11(6) petition has
itself been filed within the prescribed period of limitation, and on the
ground that the question of limitation of the underlying claims, if at all
arising, falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the learned Arbitral
Tribunal in view of the settled legal position in Krish Spinning (supra) and
Aslam Ismail Kan (supra).
30. Having regard to the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the considered
view that: (i) a valid and binding arbitration agreement exists between the
parties under Clauses 20 and 21.1 of the agreement dated 18.06.2010; (ii)
the arbitration clause has been duly invoked by the Petitioner in
accordance with Section 21 of the Act; (iii) the present petition has been
filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 137 of the
Limitation Act, 1963; (iv) the claims of the Petitioner cannot be said to be
ex facie dead or hopelessly barred by limitation so as to warrant refusal of
reference; and (vi) the Respondent’s contention that no arbitrable dispute
survives by reason of an alleged admission of debt raises mixed question of
law and fact which fall entirely within the adjudicatory domain of the
Arbitral Tribunal and cannot be decided by this Court at the referral stage.
In view of the above, and in consonance with the settled pro-arbitration
mandate of the Act as reinforced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B and T
AG (supra), and the existence only test firmly established in Krish
Spinning (supra) and Aslam Ismail Kan (supra), this Court finds that the
present petition deserves to be allowed and that an Arbitrator ought to be
appointed to adjudicate the disputes between the parties.
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31. Accordingly, this Court appoints Mr. Justice Md. Nizamuddin (Retd.), as
the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate all disputes and differences between the
parties arising out of and in relation to the agreement dated 18.06.2010.
32. The appointment shall be subject to compliance with the disclosure
requirements under Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996. The learned Arbitrator shall be entitled to fix remuneration in
accordance with the Fourth Schedule to the Act.
33. The learned Arbitrator shall be at liberty to consider and decide all
objections raised by the parties, including the question of limitation of
individual claims and any question of maintainability, as preliminary
issues, after affording full opportunity of hearing to all parties. All
questions on merits are expressly left open. The arbitral proceedings shall
be conducted strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996.
34. With the aforesaid directions, the present petition stands allowed.
. (GAURANG KANTH, J.) SAKIL AMED P.A.
