Himachal Pradesh High Court
Manju Chawla vs Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited on 7 May, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
OSA No.01 of 2014
Reserved on : 28.04.2026
Decided on : 07.05.2026
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Uploaded on : 07.05.2026
Manju Chawla
...... Appellant
Versus
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
...... Respondent
of
Coram:
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge
rt
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the appellant : Ms. Preetika, Advocate for Mr. Varun Chauhan,
Advocate.
For the respondent : Mr. Rakesh Sharma, Advocate.
Bipin Chander Negi, Judge
The present appeal has been preferred against the
impugned judgment and decree dated 04.10.2013, passed by learned
Single Judge, in Civil Suit No.38 of 2007, titled Manju Chawla vs. Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Ltd., whereby, the suit for recovery filed by the present
appellant, has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge.
2. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the present
appeal at hand are that the appellant during the year, 1999-2000 was
engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling tubes of various
specifications required for use in the Telecom Industry. The Department
of Telecom through its Chief General Manager, Himachal Pradesh
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
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Telecom Circle invited offers for supply of different types of tubes vide
tender dated 30.07.1999. In pursuance to the tender, the appellant had
submitted her bid. The bid so made was accepted and a purchase order
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dated 01.12.1999 was placed on the appellant.
3. The Department of the Telecom was succeeded by the
present respondent w.e.f. 01.10.2000. The respondent succeeded to all
the rights and liabilities of the Department of Telecom, Government of
of
India, including all commercial transactions undertaken by the Department
of Telecom. rt
4. In pursuance to the purchase order dated 01.12.1999, the
appellant had supplied the entire quantity of tubes with different
specifications before 30.05.2000. Qua the supplies so made, 16 bills for a
sum of Rs.2,56,26,256/- w.e.f. 27.12.1999 to 25.05.2000, had been raised
by the appellant. Post making adjustments in the bills so submitted, vide
memo dated 17.08.2000, final balance payment was paid to the appellant
after deducting a sum of Rs.6,19,610/- on account of the liquidated
damages, price variations and transit insurances.
5. On account of the aforesaid deduction so made, a dispute
was raised by the appellant before the Arbitrator. The award in this
respect was passed by the Arbitrator on 11.02.2002. By virtue of the
award, the amount wrongly deducted by the respondent from the payment
made to the appellant was ordered to be paid to the appellant. Award
dated 11.02.2002 was assailed by way of filing a Section 34 application
under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Objections so filed were
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dismissed by the learned District Judge, Shimla vide judgment dated
22.06.2005.
6. In the suit filed, according to the appellant, as per the
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General Commercial Conditions of Contract, contained in Clause 8.3 of
Section III of the tender document, the respondent was to supply “Form D”
to the appellant in order to enable the appellant to claim reimbursement of
the amount of sales tax paid by the appellant over and above 4%. Further
of
in the suit filed, the appellant contended that the respondent failed tosupply “Form D” within the stipulated time without any justifiable cause.
rt
7. The appellant alleged that she had paid a sum of
Rs.14,67,764/- over and above 4% to the concerned Sales Tax Authority
against the supply made by her with respect to the purchase order dated
01.12.1999, for which she was entitled to a refund. On refusal of the
Sales Tax Authority to refund the above amount, the appellant had
suffered a loss, which according to the appellant was solely attributable to
the plaintiff.
8. In the written statement filed, the respondent submitted that
a demand for “Form D”, for the first time was made by the appellant on
21.02.2006. Since the matter pertains to an old record, therefore, after
examining the record, “Form D” was sent to the appellant on 06.09.2006.
It is further categorically stated in the written statement that “Form D”, in
terms of Section 30 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975, was to be obtained
within 12 months of the purchase order. In the aforesaid factual matrix, it
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was averred in the reply that for the delay in raising a demand for “Form
D”, the appellant is herself to be blamed.
9. Other than the aforesaid, in the written statement, it was
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averred that in terms of Clause 8.3 of Section III of the tender document,
“Form D” was to be provided where ever required. Hence, as per the
respondent, the demand for “Form D” was to be made by the plaintiff. It
was further contended that no such issue qua non-supply of “Form D” was
of
ever raised before the Arbitrator. Replication was filed, wherein, contents
of the plaint were re-iterated and those to the contrary in the written
rt
statement were denied.
10. Based on the pleadings of the parties, four issues were
framed and thereafter evidence was led. Subsequent thereto, post
hearing the parties, the suit was dismissed vide the impugned
judgment and decree dated 04.10.2013.
11. Learned Single Judge, in Paragraph-17 of the judgment has
reproduced Clause 8.3 of Section III of the tender document (Ex.PW2/A).
The controversy revolves around the interpretation of the said Clause.
12. The respondent, in the case at hand, had issued the tender,
wherein, the aforesaid Clause is contained. The interpretation given to
the said Clause by the maker of the tender, i.e., the respondent is
contained in Paragraph-4, on merits, of the written statement filed by the
respondent. The same reads as follows:-
“4. … … … The actual words used in clause 8.3 are as
follows:
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“(i)(a) The purchaser will provide Form-D/C wherever
required for purchases made against this tender for
availing Sales Tax concessions.
(b) Any increase in taxes and other statutory
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duties/levies after the expiry of the delivery date shall
be to the contractor’s account. However, benefit of any
decrease in these taxes/duties shall be passed on to
the Purchaser by the supplier.”
It is submitted that the words used are “wherever required”,
of
meaning thereby that the supplier has to make request for
the Form-D/C from the purchaser and “require” the said
Form-D from the purchaser. However, in the present case,
the supplier did not make request for Form-D for several
rt
years after the completion of the supply on 25.5.2000 for
reasons best known to the supplier.”
13. The interpretation so given by the maker of the tender is
manifestly in consonance with the language of the tender document. The
said interpretation so given by the maker of the tender has been accepted
by the learned Single Judge. Hence, on this account, no infirmity can be
found with the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
14. Other than the aforesaid, it is an admitted position that inter
se the parties, on account of a deduction of Rs.6,19,610/- from the
amount payable to the appellant for the material supplied, the appellant
had initiated proceedings before an Arbitrator. The said deduction had
been made in the final amount paid to the appellant by the respondent
vide memo dated 17.08.2000. The arbitration proceedings had concluded
vide an award made in favour of the appellant dated 11.02.2002 directing
refund of the aforesaid wrongly deducted amount from the final bill
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payable to the appellant. The objections filed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act preferred against the award were
dismissed by the learned District Judge on 22.06.2005. At this juncture, it
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would be appropriate to reproduce Paragraph-15 of the plaint, which
pertains to cause of action, as under:-
“15. That cause of action for filing the suit has arisen in
favour of plaintiff continuously since 30.5.2000 when the
of
supplies were completed. Cause of action is continuing
thereafter as the defendant supplied the “D-Forms” on
6.9.2006. Cause of action again arose on 9.4.2007 when
the Sales Tax Officer, Ward 61, Delhi returned the original
rt
“D-Forms” to plaintiff without reimbursement.”
15. From a perusal of the same, it is evident that as per the
appellant, cause of action had arisen in favour of the appellant ever since
30.05.2000 when the entire supplies, as per the purchase order dated
01.12.1999, had been made. Subsequent thereto on account of
deduction made in the final bill dated 17.08.2000, a dispute inter se the
parties had arisen, as a result whereof, arbitration proceedings had been
initiated by the present appellant. Surprisingly, no dispute in the
arbitration proceedings with respect to non supply of “Form-D” by the
respondent was ever raised, despite non supply of the same prior to
initiating arbitration proceedings. In Paragraph-4 of the written statement,
the respondent has categorically stated that the appellant never raised a
dispute with respect to non supply of “Form-D” before the Arbitrator.
16. In the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, all
claims that arose after supplies having been made on 30.05.2000 should
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have been raised before the Arbitrator. This having not been done, the
suit filed by the appellant before this Court raising the remaining dispute is
clearly barred. In this context reference can also be made to the
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judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.V. George vs. Secretary to
Government, Water and Power Department, Trivandrum and another
(1989) 4 SCC 595. The relevant extract whereof is being reproduced
here-in-below:-
of
“13. With regard to the submission that the issues that
have been raised in the second claim petition before the
Arbitrator is barred under the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2
rt
of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is convenient to refer to a
passage in Mulla’s Code of Civil Procedure (Volume II,Fourteenth Edition) at page 894:
” …. This rule does not require that when several
causes of action arise from one transaction, the plaintiff
should sue for all of them in one suit. What the rulelays down is that where there is one entire cause of ac-
tion, the plaintiff cannot split the cause of action into
parts so as to bring separate suits in respect of those
parts.”
14. It is pertinent to refer in this connection to the decision
in Muhammad Hafiz and Anr. v. Mirza Muhammad Zaka-
riya and Ors., AIR 1922 (PC) 23 wherein a mortgage deed
provided that if the interest was not paid for six months the
creditor should be competent to realise either the unpaid
amount of the interest due to him or the amount of principal
and interest, by bringing a suit in court without waiting for
the expiration of the time fixed, and the Plaintiff, more than
3 years after (i.e. time fixed), brought a suit for interest
alone and got a decree. It was held that the second suit for
principal and arrears of interest was not maintainable as
under Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C. he must be deemed to have
relinquished his claim for further relief, he having exercised
the option of suing for interest alone. It was further held that
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the cause of action referred to in the rule is the case of
action which gives occasion to, and forms the foundation of,
the suit, and if that cause enables a man to seek for larger
and wider relief than that to which he limits his claim, he
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cannot afterwards seek to recover the balance by
independent proceedings.
15. In the instant case, the contract was terminated by the
respondents on April 26, 1980 and as such all the issues
arose out of the termination of the contract and they could
have been raised in the first claim petition filed before the
of
Arbitrator by the appellant. This having not been done the
second claim petition before the Arbitrator raising the
remaining disputes is clearly barred.”
17.
rt
Except the bald statement of the husband of the appellant,
i.e., power of attorney holder, on her behalf, no documentary evidence
has been placed on record to show that a request for issuance of “Form-
D” Certificate was made by the appellant to the respondent. The
respondent has placed on record letter dated 16.09.2002, i.e., Ex.DW1/B.
A perusal of the same reflects that the same is qua reimbursement of
additional Central Sales Tax over and above 4% made by the appellant to
the respondent. The same contains no request for issuance of “Form-D”
Certificate, rather to the contrary seeks reimbursement of the Central
Sales Tax amount from the respondent.
18. In the aforesaid backdrop, learned Single Judge has
correctly placed reliance on Sub Section (3) of Section 30 of the Delhi
Sales Tax Act, wherein, it is provided that a claim for refund of excess
sales tax deposited will have to be made within a period of twelve months
from the date of the order. The purchase order, in the case at hand, was
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made on 01.12.1999. Hence, a claim for refund before the Tax
Authorities was required to be filed on or before 01.12.2000.
19. In view of the aforesaid, we see no infirmity in the impugned
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judgment dated 04.10.2013, passed by learned Single Judge, in Civil Suit
No.38 of 2007, titled Manju Chawla vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.,
hence calls for no interference from this Court. Accordingly, the present
appeal is dismissed, being devoid of merits.
of
Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also
stand disposed of.rt
(G.S. Sandhawalia) (Bipin Chander Negi)
Chief Justice Judge
May 07, 2026 (KS)
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