Telangana High Court
Bayyapu Surender Reddy vs Joint Collector on 6 May, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD.
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR
WRIT APPEAL No.118 of 2024
Date: 06.05.2026
Between :
1. Bayyapu Surender Reddy
and Three Others .... Appellants
And
1.Joint Collector, Nalgonda District,
Nalgonda and 14 others .... Respondents.
JUDGMENT:
(per Hon’ble Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar)
Heard Sri A.Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri
Vadeendra Joshi, learned counsel representing Ms. Mubeena Fathima,
learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri D.Prakash Reddy,
learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mrs.Lalitha Gayathri, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent Nos.4 to 15.
2. The present Appeal is filed by the appellants/Writ Petitioner Nos.2
to 5 assailing the order dated 19.09.2023 passed by a learned Single Judge
2
of this Court in I.A.No.3 of 2022 in/and W.P.No.8901 of 2008 filed for
quashing the order passed by the respondent No.1 bearing
No.F2/7130/2006 dated 27.02.2008 in exercise of powers conferred upon
the said authority under Section 9 of the Telangana Rights in Land and
Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 (for short ‘1971 Act’).
3. The subject property involved in the present case is the land
admeasuring Ac.24.18 gts and Acs.20.25 gts respectively situated in
Sy.Nos.29 and 33, totally admeasuring Acs.45.03 gts., of Bhongir village
and Mandal, Nalgonda District (presently in Yadadri-Bhuvanagiri
District).
4. The facts leading to file the Writ Petition are that the respondent
No.12/Writ petitioner No.1 was the absolute owner, pattadar and possessor
of the subject lands. Respondent Nos.4 and 5, claiming to have purchased
the subject land under a simple sale deed dated 16.02.1984, approached the
respondent No.3- The Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO) requesting for
validation of the said simple sale under Section 5A of the 1971 Act, who
in turn issued proceedings dated 21.09.1994 validating the simple sale
deed and issued Certificate in Form-13B in favour of respondent Nos.4 and
5, pursuant to which, their names were entered in the Revenue Records.
3
5. After about eight years, the Writ petitioner No.1 filed an Appeal in
2002 before the respondent No.2 challenging the regularization
proceedings, and the said Appeal was allowed by order dated 31.01.2004
setting aside the Form-13B Certificate dated 21.09.1994 by remitting the
matter back to respondent No.3 for conducting enquiry afresh. Pursuant to
the said remand order, the respondent No.3 conducted enquiry and passed
order dated 28.06.2005 recording a finding that earlier proceedings dated
21.09.1994 failed to follow the required procedure and cancelled the Form-
13B Certificate directing restoration of the name of Writ petitioner No.1 in
the Revenue Records.
6. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent Nos.4 and 5 filed an
Appeal under Section 5(5) of the 1971 Act before respondent No.2, who
passed an interim order dated 03.10.2005 directing to maintain status quo
in implementation of the order dated 28.06.2005 passed by the respondent
No.3. During the pendency of the appeal, respondent Nos.4 and 5 invoked
revisional jurisdiction under Section 9 before the respondent No.1 against
the remand order dated 31.01.2004.
7. The respondent No.1 granted an interim order suspending the earlier
orders passed by the respondent No.3 and allowed the revision by order
4
dated 27.02.2008. Meanwhile, respondent Nos.4 and 5 withdrew the
Appeal before the respondent No.2.
8. During the pendency of the proceedings, the appellants purchased
the subject property from Writ petitioner No.1 under registered sale deed
dated 21.11.2005, and they also filed an application in the Revision
petition pending then before the respondent No.1 seeking permission to
come on record claiming right through the registered sale deed dated
21.11.2005, which was rejected vide separate orders.
9. The appellants and Writ petitioner Nos.1 to 5 have filed
W.P.No.8901 of 2008 challenging the revisional order 27.02.2008 passed
by the respondent No.1.
10. During pendency of W.P.No.8901 of 2008, the Writ petitioner No.1
filed an application in I.A.No.1 of 2022 seeking permission of the Court to
engage a separate counsel along with I.A.No.3 of 2022 for withdrawal of
the Writ Petition, contending that without his knowledge, the said Writ
Petition was filed. By order dated 12.04.2023, I.A.No.1 of 2022 was
allowed. On the demise of respondent No.5, respondent No.6 to 11 were
brought on record as legal representatives of deceased respondent No.5.
5
11. Before the learned Single Judge, learned counsel appearing for the
Writ petitioner No.1 contended that the Writ Petition was filed without the
knowledge and consent of the Writ petitioner No.1; that the subject
property was also sold to respondent No.4 and 5, and since, the Writ
petitioner No.1 is not having any right over the subject property, he is not
interested to pursue the Writ Petition, thereby sought permission to
withdraw the Writ Petition.
12. The appellants herein contended before the learned Single Judge that
proceedings purported to have been issued under Section 5A of the 1971
Act in favour of respondent No.4 and 5 are basing on an Agreement of sale
dated 16.02.1984, but not a simple Sale Deed, and the same is non-est in
the eye of law, and that the respondent No.3 issued the said proceedings
without issuing prior notice to the Writ Petitioner No.1, the same is in
violation of the procedure of the 1971 Act and the Rules made thereunder.
It is further contended that respondent Nos.4 and 5, having participated in
the remand proceedings and having availed appellate remedy there against,
are estopped from invoking revisional jurisdiction against the remand
order, which is filed beyond the period of limitation.
6
13. It was therefore contended that orders passed by respondent No.3
under Section 5A of the 1971 Act are the result of fraud played by
respondent No.4 and 5 against Writ petitioner No.1 and also in violation of
principles of natural justice.
14. In support of the above contentions, reliance was placed on the
decisions in Chinnam Pandurangam Vs. Mandal Revenue Officer,
Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and others 1, Chintapalli
Agency Taluk Arrack Salfs Cooperative Society Ltd. and others Vs.
Secretary (Food and Agriculture) Government of Andhra Pradesh and
others 2, M/s.Chandni Crafts, Through Its Proprietor Ghanshyam
Agarwal Vs. Union of India and others 3 and Ganpatbhai Mahijibhai
Solanki Vs. State of Gujarat and others 4.
15. Respondent Nos.4 and 6 to 11 in the Writ Petition contended before
the learned Single Judge that it is not the open for the appellants to dispute
that there is no proceeding issued by respondent No.3 under Section 5A of
the 1971 Act as Writ Petitioner No.1 filed Appeal under Section 5(5) of
the 1971 Act against the proceedings dated 21.09.1994 only, and in the
1
2007(6) ALD 348 (FB)
2
(1977) 4 SCC 337
3
D.B.Civil Writ Petition Nos.5460 of 2020 of Rajasthan High Court
4
(2008) 12 SCC 353
7
absence of such proceedings, the respondent No.2 entertaining the appeal
does not arise; that respondent Nos.4 and 5 have availed the remedy of
revision; and since there is no limitation prescribed under Section 9 of the
Act 1971, the question of delay in approaching the revisional authority or
failure to seek condonation of delay etc. does not arise.
16. It is further contended that the registered General Power of Attorney
(GPA) holder of Writ petitioner No.1 had participated in the regularization
proceedings before the respondent No.3 resulting in issuance of the
proceedings dated 21.09.1994 and the GPA Holder of Writ petitioner also
conceded about the sale of subject property in favour respondent Nos.4 and
5 and as such, the ground of non-issuance of notice to Writ petitioner No.1
by the respondent No.3 does not arise. It is further contended that though
Writ Petitioner No.1 disputed about the execution of the registered GPA in
favour of Mr.Vadloju Ashok and about initiation of criminal proceedings
against respondent Nos.4 and 5, the genuineness of the said GPA was
established and final report filed in Crime No.66 of 2007 of Bhongir Town
P. S also proves the same.
17. It is further contended that once Writ petitioner No.1 has expressed
his intention not to pursue the Writ Petition, the appellants, who purchased
8
the subject property during the pendency of the proceedings before the
Revenue Authorities and whose application for impleadment in Revision
proceedings before Respondent No.1 was rejected on 27.02.2008, which
rejection was not challenged, are not entitled to pursue the Writ Petition.
18. It is contended that the appellants are the speculative purchasers and
at their instance only, the entire proceedings were initiated by Writ
petitioner No.1 causing great prejudice to respondent No.4 and 5. It is
further contended that the regularization proceedings were not issued upon
agreement of sale dated 16.02.1984, that respondent Nos.4 and 5 have paid
the balance sale consideration under a separate receipt dated 05.06.1984
and after such payment only, they approached the respondent No.3 seeking
regularization of such simple sale deed.
19. Before the learned Single Judge, the learned Assistant Government
Pleader for Revenue contended that the respondent No.1 passed the
impugned order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and if any of the
parties have got any claim of title over the subject property, it is
appropriate for them to approach the competent Civil Court for redressal of
their grievance, but not by way of a Writ Petition.
9
20. Basing on the above pleadings and contentions urged, learned Single
Judge held that Writ petitioner No.1 being the absolute owner and
possessor of the subject property, has disowned the Writ Petition
contending that he did not have any knowledge nor consented for filing the
petition and sought withdrawal. Further, in the absence of any rebuttal to
his withdrawal, W.P.No.8901 of 2008 was dismissed as withdrawn as
against Writ Petitioner No.1 is concerned, thereby weakening the case of
petitioner Nos.2 to 5, as the original record could not verify the vakalat of
the Writ petitioner No.1.
21. The learned Single Judge observed that during pendency of
proceedings and subsisting status quo order, the appellants have entered
into a transaction with Writ petitioner No.1 knowing well that dispute is
pending before the Revenue authorities. Further the appellants, without
challenging the rejection order of their impleadment, have filed
W.P.No.8901 of 2008 along with Writ petitioner No.1, with a reason that
no such order was communicated to them by respondent No.1.
22. Learned Single Judge held that the respondent No.3, on remand of
the matter from the respondent No.2, has once again undertaken an
exercise to find fault with the procedure followed by his predecessor, and
10
once again ordered to cancel the certificate issued under Form-13B and
pattadar pass books and title deeds issued in favour of respondent Nos.4
and 5. The respondent No.3, instead of considering the case of respondent
Nos.4 and 5 for regularization under Section 5A of the 1971 Act, has
erroneously misdirected himself and made an attempt to find fault with the
procedure adopted by his predecessor and the said order dated 28.06.2005
is only a consequent upon the order dated 31.01.2004 passed by respondent
No.2, and once the order dated 31.01.2004 is set aside by the respondent
No.1 in exercise of Revisional power, all consequential acts would also
automatically comes to an end.
23. On the aspect of maintainability of the Revision, the learned Single
Judge held that since Section 9 of the 1971 Act does not prescribe any
limitation period, the question of condonation of delay does not arise and
merely because the remedy of appeal is availed against the order dated
28.06.2005, that by itself cannot be a ground to bar invoking of revisional
jurisdiction against the order dated 31.01.2004 passed by respondent No.2.
24. The learned Single Judge held that when the GPA Holder of Writ
petitioner No.1 participated in the enquiry under Section 5A of the 1971
Act and expressed his no objection for regularizing the simple Deed in
11
favour of respondent Nos.4 and 5, the claim of Writ petitioner No.1 of he
not putting on notice, is of no avail, and there is no violation of principles
of natural justice. In the absence of proper explanation for filing the
appeal after a lapse of eight years under Section 5B of the 1971 Act, the
very appeal was not maintainable.
25. As regards the contention of regularizing the Agreement of Sale
under Section 5A of the 1971 Act, the learned Single Judge held that the
Memo dated 10.07.2023 shows that the original transaction under the
Agreement of Sale was completed by paying the balance sale consideration
and thereafter only respondent Nos.4 and 5 approached the Revenue
authorities for regularization under Section 5A of the 1971 Act. It was
further held that in terms of Section 5A of the 1971 Act, where a person is
an occupant by virtue of an alienation or transfer made or affected
otherwise than by registered document, the alienee or tranfereee is entitled
to apply for a certificate declaring such declaration or transfer is valid, and
it is not the form of or nature of document that is relevant, but it is the
occupation of land, by way of completed alienation or transfer, and that the
Writ Petitioner No.1 raised no objection while filing Appeal under Section
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5B of the 1971 Act, but objection is raised only for first time in the Court,
and the same is not maintainable.
26. The learned Single Judge concluded that the respondent No.1, while
exercising the revisional jurisdiction has arrived at right conclusion that if
appellants have got any right, claim or interest over the subject property, it
is open for them to pursue such all remedies by approaching a competent
Civil Court and establish their rights, and held that it is not a fit case to
interfere with the order passed by respondent No.1 in exercise of
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
and dismissed the Writ Petition.
27. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants herein have preferred the
present Appeal.
28. Sri A.Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel and Sri Vedeendra Joshi,
learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the learned
Single judge ought to have seen that their valuable property rights which
are constitutionally protected, are at jeopardy.
29. It was contended that the order dated 29.09.1994 passed by the
respondent No.3 regularizing document dated 16.02.1994 and
13
consequential order of the respondent No.1 dated 27.02.2008 are without
jurisdiction. It is further contended that document dated 16.02.1984 is in
the nature of an agreement entered into another registered agreement on a
future date and that it is evident on account of the fact that the balance of
sale consideration of Rs.7,536/- was yet to be paid and there was a specific
assurance of executing a registered sale deed in future upon payment of
sale consideration and therefore the same could not have been regularized.
It is urged that the learned Single Judge erroneously held that the balance
sale consideration was subsequently paid, the transaction stood completed
and therefore, the document was entitled to be regularized.
30. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that Section 5-A of the 1971
Act empowers the MRO to regularize simple/unregistered sale deeds only
and not agreements of sale. In this regard, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants relied upon the decisions in Konkana Ravinder Goud and
others Vs. Bhavanrishi Co-operative House Building Society, Hyderabad
and others 5 and K.Seetharama Reddy and another Vs. Hassan Ali Khan
and others 6, wherein this Court held that neither the MRO or any other
revenue authority has any jurisdiction to regularize a document which is in
5
2003 SCC OnLine AP 852
6
2002 SCC OnLine AP 1036
14
the form of unregistered agreement of sale and that any such proceeding of
regularization would be wholly without jurisdiction. In Konkana Ravinder
Goud (supra), it was held that even if the balance sale consideration was
paid thereafter, the nature of document would not change from an
agreement of sale to a sale deed and therefore, it would still not be entitled
to be regularized.
31. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge erred in holding
that the challenge to the regularization proceedings was raised for the first
time in the Writ Petition, as the said finding is contrary to record where the
respondent No.3 in the remand order dated 28.06.2005 had given a finding
to the effect that the document sought to be regularized was in the nature
of an agreement of sale which cannot be regularized. By placing reliance
on the decision in Jagmittar Sain Bhagat and others Vs. Director, Health
Services, Haryana and others 7, it is contended that an issue relating to
lack of jurisdiction of an authority can be raised at any stage, including in a
collateral proceeding,
32. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge failed to
properly appreciate the earlier proceedings, wherein respondent No.2
7
(2013) 10 SCC 136
15
allowed the appeal filed by respondent No.12 on 31.01.2004 and remanded
the matter for de novo enquiry, and thereafter the respondent No.3, by
order dated 28.06.2005 held that the regularization was erroneous. The
appellants assert that respondent Nos.4 and 5, having participated in the
remand proceedings, are precluded from challenging the remand order
after suffering an adverse order and cannot approbate and reprobate. In
this regard, reliance is placed on the decisions in Salem Muslim Burial
Ground Protection Committee Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others 8 and
Designated Authority (Anti-Dumping Directorate), Ministry of
Commerce Vs. Haldor9.
33. It is further contended that respondent Nos.4 and 5 withdrew the
appeal and pursued a revision without filing any delay condonation
petition, which is contrary to law.
34. The learned counsel further contended that the learned Single Judge
failed to consider the conduct of respondent No.12, who had consistently
denied execution of any sale deed in favour of respondent Nos.4 and 5 in
earlier proceedings, including the statutory appeal, and had also initiated
criminal proceedings alleging forgery, therefore the subsequent withdrawal
8
2023 SCC OnLIne SC 656
9
(2006) 6 SCC 626
16
of the Writ Petition is collusive. The learned Single Judge also stated to
have ignored the opinion of the Forensic Science Laboratory indicating
dissimilarity of signatures. It is contended that the learned Single Judge
erred in holding that the vakalat of the appellants was missing from the
bundle, when in fact, the Writ Petition itself would not be numbered
without there being any vakalat for the concerned parties.
35. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge failed to
consider that the respondent No.3 acted in violation of the mandatory
procedure by not issuing notice to respondent No.12 as required under the
ROR Act before validating the simple sale deed. It is asserted that the
revenue authorities have no jurisdiction to adjudicate title, yet the
impugned proceedings effectively recognize title in favour of respondent
Nos.4 and 5, which is impermissible in law.
36. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge failed to
consider material aspects such as the existence of valid registered sale
deeds in favour of the appellants executed by all family members, issuance
of pattadar passbooks and title deeds, and recognition of their possession in
official records, including entries in the Dharani Portal and benefits
extended under the Rythu Bandhu Scheme. Thus, it is contended that the
17
impugned order suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record, mis-
appreciation of facts and incorrect application of law, and is therefore
liable to be set aside
37. On the other hand, Sri D.Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel
representing Mrs.Lalitha Gayatri, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent Nos.4 to 15 contended that the order passed by the learned
Single Judge is just and reasonable, does not call for any interference by
this Court.
38. It is submitted that respondent Nos.4 to 5 are not precluded from
availing the statutory remedy of revision against the RDO’s order merely
because they participated in the proceedings before the MRO pursuant to
the RDO’s directions and challenged the MRO order as there can be no
estoppel against a statute, and therefore the exercise of a statutory right
cannot be defeated on such grounds. Consequently, the availing of the
substantive remedy of revision cannot be faulted on the technical plea of
prior participation in proceedings.
39. It is further submitted that the Revision petition filed by respondent
No.4 and respondent No.5 cannot be said to be barred by limitation as no
period of limitation is prescribed for instituting a Revision petition under
18
section 9 of the 1971 Act. Hence, the filing of the Revision after a lapse of
two years does not render the Revision invalid and the same ought to be
considered on merits rather than being rejected on procedural grounds.
40. Learned counsel for respondents challenged the legality of the
RDO’s order, contending that it is contrary to the statutory scheme as the
RDO, in 2002, entertained an appeal after an inordinate delay of eight
years from the date of the MRO’s validation proceedings, despite Section
5-B mandating that such appeal must be filed within 30 days and not
conferring any power on the RDO to condone delay. The RDO’s order is
completely silent on this jurisdictional defect. This fundamental illegality
has been rightly appreciated both by the learned Single Judge and the Joint
Collector.
41. It is, therefore, contended that setting aside the impugned order of
the Joint Collector would effectively result in reviving an illegal and time-
barred order of the RDO. Such a consequence would defeat the very
purpose of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
which is intended to correct illegality rather than perpetuate it. Therefore,
the present case does not warrant any interference in exercise of Writ
jurisdiction.
19
42. With regard to the contention that the document dated 16.02.1984 is
merely an agreement of sale and not a sale deed, the learned counsel
submits that this plea is untenable as this argument was never raised before
the RDO or the Joint Collector and cannot be pleaded for the first time in
Writ proceedings, and the earlier contention of respondent No.12/Writ
Petitioner No.1 that no document had been executed at all, directly
contradicts the present plea. According to the learned counsel for the
respondents, the proceedings evidence a completed sale, even if part of the
consideration was to be paid later, which is permissible under Section 54
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Moreover, the balance consideration
was paid prior to seeking validation, and therefore the transferee is entitled
to the benefit of Section 5-A of the 1971 Act.
43. The learned counsel further submits that the withdrawal of the Writ
Petition by Writ Petitioner No.1, accompanied by an affidavit stating that
he had never authorized the filing of the appeal before the RDO or the Writ
Petition, amounts to an admission that the validation proceedings before
the MRO were legal and valid. In such circumstances, any grievance of the
appellants lies against Writ Petitioner No.1 and not within the scope of the
present Writ proceedings. Additionally, the appellants, not being parties
20
before the Joint Collector, failed to seek leave of the Court before
instituting the Writ Petition and also did not challenge the dismissal of
their impleadment application, thereby rendering the Writ Petition
procedurally defective.
44. It is finally contended that although the MRO’s order suffers from
infirmity as it failed to conduct a fresh enquiry as directed by the RDO and
merely reiterated the earlier findings, the ultimate view taken by the
learned Single Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is a
plausible and legally sustainable one.
45. Learned counsel for the respondent No.4 to 15 relied upon the
decision in Management of Narendra and Company Private Ltd. Vs.
Workmen of Narendra and Company 10 and V.Praveen Vs. Telangana
State Road Transport Corporation rep., by its Managing Director11,
wherein it was held that when an appeal before the Division Bench is
preferred against the exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge, the
appellate court will not interfere with such exercise of discretion by the
court of first instance, and substitute its own discretion, except where the
discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or
10
(2016) 3 SCC 340
11
2018 SCC Online Hyd 364
21
capriciously or perversely or where the Court has ignored settled principles
of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory orders. Therefore, it was
contended that no case for interference in an intra-court appeal is made out.
Thus the impugned order does not call for any indulgence by this Court.
46. We have considered the contentions advanced on either side and
perused the material on record. Upon consideration of the material on
record, the learned Single Judge has discussed the issue at length including
on merits as well as law.
47. Section 5 of the 1971 Act deals with Amendment and updating of
record of rights.
Section 5A and 5B thereof states:
“5-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882, the Registration Act, 1908 or any other law for
the time being in force, 26[where a person is an occupant] by virtue of
an alienation or transfer made or effected otherwise than by registered
document, the alienee or the transferee may, within such period as may
be prescribed, apply to the Mandal Revenue Officer for a certificate
declaring that such alienation or transfer is valid.
(2) On receipt of such application the Mandal Revenue Officer shall,
after making such enquiry as may be prescribed require the alienee or
the transferee to deposit in the office of the Mandal Revenue Officer an
amount equal to the registration fees and the stamp duty that would
have been payable had the alienation or transfer been effected by a
registered document in accordance with the provisions of the
Registration Act, 1908 as fixed by the registering officer on a reference
22made to him by the Mandal Revenue Officer on the basis of the value of
the property arrived at in such manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that the Mandal Revenue Officer shall not require the
alienee or the transferee to deposit the amount under this sub-section
unless he is satisfied that the alienation or transfer is not in
contravention of the provisions of the Telangana Land Reforms (Ceiling
on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976, the Telangana Scheduled areas Land Transfer
Regulation, 1959 and the Telangana Assigned Lands (Prohibition of
Transfers) Act, 1977.
(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) shall be
deemed to validate any alienation where such alienation is in
contravention of the provisions of the Telangana Land Reforms (Ceiling
on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976, the Telangana Scheduled Areas Land Transfer
Regulation, 1959 and the Telangana Assigned Lands (Prohibition of
Transfers) Act, 1977.
(4) The Mandal Revenue Officer on deposit of an amount specified in
sub-section (2), shall issue a certificate to the alienee or the transferee
declaring that the alienation or transfer is valid from the date of issue
of certificate and such certificate shall, notwithstanding anything in the
Registration Act, 1908, be evidence of such alienation or transfer as
against the alienor or transferor or any person claiming interest under
him.
(5) The Mandal Revenue Officer, shall on the production of the
certificate issued under sub-section (2) make any entry in the pass book
to the effect that the person whose name has been recorded as an
occupant is the owner of the property.
(6) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 5-A, the
Tahsildar shall regularize claims of those applicants who apply not
later than 31.12.2017 and have been in possession and do not have
sada bainama (unregistered) document, based on enjoyment survey,
local enquiry, approval of Gramsabha and it shall be limited upto
Ac.5.00 gts.]5-B. (1) An Appeal shall lie against an order passed by the Tahsildar
under sub-section (4) of section 5-A, to the Revenue Divisional Officer,
within thirty days of the date of communication of the order and the
Revenue Divisional Officer shall, after due enquiry pass such order on
the appeal as he deems fit.
23
(2) The Revenue Divisional Officer may suo-motu call for record of a
case or proceedings from the Recording Authority and inspect it in
order to satisfy himself that the order or decision passed or the
proceedings taken is regular, legal and proper and make suitable order
in that behalf:
Provided that no order or decision affecting the rights of the
parties shall be made unless the concerned parties are given a notice
and hearing and such order, shall, subject to revision under section 9,
be final.”
48. The primary issue relates to the scope of Section 5-A of the 1971
Act and the validity of the regularization proceedings dated 21.09.1994.
The material on record shows that respondent Nos.4 and 5 were put in
possession pursuant to a transaction dated 16.02.1984 and that the balance
sale consideration was subsequently paid before approaching the MRO for
validation. Section 5-A of the 1971 Act recognizes possession based on an
unregistered transfer, and the emphasis is on completed alienation and
enjoyment of the land rather than the form of the document. The learned
Single Judge has rightly held that the transaction stood completed and was
capable of being regularized, and therefore the objection that the document
is only an agreement of sale, does not affect the validity of the
proceedings.
49. Regarding the lack of jurisdiction of MRO to regularize the
document, the record indicates that the proceedings under Section 5-A of
the 1971 Act were initiated and concluded after considering the possession
24
and the transaction between the parties. Therefore, the contention that such
objection can be raised at any stage, does not support the appellants in the
present facts, as the nature of the transaction and completion of
consideration were already evident. The finding of the learned Single
Judge that the objection regarding the nature of the document was not
consistently raised earlier and cannot be used to unsettle the settled
proceedings is in accordance with law.
50. On the issue of violation of principles of natural justice, the learned
Single Judge has correctly relied upon the participation of the GPA holder
of Writ Petitioner No.1 in the original proceedings as the record shows that
the GPA holder had taken part in the enquiry and had not opposed the
regularization. In such circumstances, the plea of non-issuance of notice to
the original owner does not survive. The subsequent denial by Writ
Petitioner No.1 does not supersede the earlier proceedings, particularly
when the genuineness of the GPA was supported by the material placed
before the authorities.
51. The validity of the appellate order dated 31.01.2004 passed by the
RDO was also rightly examined as the Appeal was filed after a lapse of
about eight years from the date of the original validation proceedings,
25
when the statute prescribes a period of 30 days and does not provide for
condonation of delay. The RDO entertained the appeal without addressing
this delay. The revisional authority, therefore, was justified in setting aside
such an order. The learned Single Judge has correctly held that once the
remand order dated 31.01.2004 is set aside, all consequential proceedings
including the order dated 28.06.2005 passed by the MRO would also fall.
52. Insofar as the objection raised by the appellants about invoking the
revisional jurisdiction by respondent Nos.4 and 5 is concerned, the mere
fact that respondent Nos.4 and 5 participated in the earlier proceedings
does not take away their statutory right to invoke revision. Further, section
9 of the 1971 Act does not prescribe any period of limitation for filing a
revision, and therefore the question of delay does not arise. In that view of
the matter, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the Revision filed
after two years cannot be treated as defective and that the revisional
authority was fully competent to examine the correctness of the order dated
31.01.2004.
53. The appellants purchased the property during the pendency of the
proceedings and when status quo order was in force. Their application to
come on record in the Revision was rejected and the same was not
26
challenged. Further, Writ Petitioner No.1 himself sought withdrawal of the
Writ Petition stating that it was filed without his consent. In such
circumstances, the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the
appellants cannot independently pursue the Writ Petition and seek relief.
54. The issues relating to fraud, collusion, and reliance on forensic
reports involve disputed questions of fact relating to execution of
documents and title over the property, which cannot be effectively
examined in writ proceedings. Similarly, the claim of the appellants based
on subsequent registered sale deeds, revenue entries, and benefits under
Government Schemes does not confer a right to question earlier statutory
proceedings in writ jurisdiction.
55. The revisional authority, while exercising jurisdiction under Section
9 of the 1971 Act, has examined the matter and arrived at a proper
conclusion. It has been observed that if the appellants have any right or
interest in the subject property, it is open to them to approach a competent
Civil Court and establish such rights. Thus, their remedies are not taken
away but are only directed to approach the appropriate forum.
27
56. In view of the above, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that
the order passed by the revisional authority does not warrant interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
57. The findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, in rejecting the
claim of the appellants, are well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation
of the material on record. This Court finds no infirmity or perversity
therein warranting its interference with the same.
58. We do not find it necessary to repeat that the discretion of the
Appeal Court is extremely limited in an intra-Court Appeal, particularly
where the first Court has exercised discretion in either allowing or
dismissing a matter where the discretion has not been exercised on an
arbitrary basis.
59. W.A.No.118 of 2024, along with all connected applications, is
dismissed. Interim orders granted if any, shall stands vacated. No costs.
________________________________
MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J
__________________________
GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, J
Date: 06.05.2026
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