Calcutta High Court
Jones Lang Lasalle Property … vs M. A. Leasing And Consruction Pvt. Ltd. … on 6 May, 2026
Author: Aniruddha Roy
Bench: Aniruddha Roy
In The High Court at Calcutta
Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction
[Commercial Division]
Original Side
Present: The Hon'ble Justice Aniruddha Roy
C.S. (COM) 171/2025
JONES LANG LASALLE PROPERTY CONSULTANTS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED
-VERSUS-
M. A. LEASING AND CONSRUCTION PVT. LTD. AND ORS.
For the plaintiff : Mr. Sourojit Dasgupta, Adv.
Mr. Subhradip Roy, Adv.
Mr. Souvik Bose, Adv.
Reserved on : 12.03.2026
Judgment on : 06.05.2026
ANIRUDDHA ROY, J.:
Facts:
1. Plaintiff on account of certain services having been rendered by it to the
defendants claims its unpaid price/fees from the defendants. The defendant
no. 1 had allegedly received and accepted the service provided by the plaintiff
and the defendant nos. 2 to 4 are the directors of the defendant no. 1.
2. On November 29, 2019, since the price/fees had not been paid by the
defendant no. 1 to the plaintiff, a notice under Section 8 of the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter, IBC) was issued upon the
defendant no. 1.
2
3. By a letter dated December 12, 2019, the said demand notice was replied to
by the defendant no. 1.
4. On the basis of the said notice, the plaintiff on July 29, 2020 had instituted
a proceeding under Section 9 of IBC before the Jurisdictional National
Company Law Tribunal (hereinafter, NCLT).
5. On September 10, 2023 (at page 220) of the application NCLT dismissed
the said Section 9 application by holding that there are pre-existing dispute
between the parties. The relevant observation from the order is quoted
below:-
“In view of the above facts and circumstances, we find that there was a
pre-existing dispute between the parties and hence the present petition
shall be rejected on this ground alone.
Consequently, CP (IB) No. 841/KB/2020 shall stand rejected. Needless
to say, the operational creditor is free to pursue its remedies under any
other law and the dismissal of the present petition shall not stand in the
way of such pursuit of remedies.”
6. Thereafter, the plaintiff had filed the instant suit and prays for the benefit
under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Submissions:
7. Mr. Sourojit Dasgupta, learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff referring
to the provision under Section 9 of IBC submits the adjudicating authority
shall within 14 days of receipt an application under sub-Section (2) to
Section 9 of IBC, by an order admit the application and communicate such
decision to the operational creditor and corporate-debtor. The application
shall also be admitted if no notice of dispute has been received by the
operational creditor or there is no record of dispute in the information utility.
He submits that if there is notice of dispute, i.e., if there is a pre-existing
dispute, the tribunal shall reject the application.
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8. Mr. Dasgupta further submits that the adjudicating authority shall, within
14 days of receipt of application under sub-Section (2), by an order rejecting
the application shall communicate such decision to the operational creditor
and corporate-debtor, if notice of dispute has been received by the
operational creditor or there is a record of dispute in the information utility.
9. Mr. Sourojit Dasgupta, learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff submits
that for an application filed under Section 9 of IBC to be entertained by the
tribunal, at the threshold, jurisdiction to be crossed is regarding existence of
prior dispute. If there is a pre-existing dispute, the same shall inhibit the
tribunal from entertaining or considering the application. Thus, according to
Mr. Dasgupta, learned Advocate, this amounts to defect of jurisdiction or
other cause of like nature, within the meaning of Section 14 of Limitation
Act, 1963. In support, he has relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court In the matter of: Roshanlal Kuthalia vs. R. B. Mohan Singh
Oberoi reported at (1975) 4 SCC 628.
10. Mr. Sourojit Dasgupta, learned Advocate submits that the said judgment In
the matter of: Roshanlal Kuthalia (supra) was subsequently followed in
various other judgments, which are:-
(a) In the matter of : Union of India Vs. West Bengal Paper Mills,
reported at (2004) 3 SCC 458;
(b) In the matter of: Shakti Tubes Vs. State of Bihar, reported at
(2009) 1 SCC 786;
(c) In the matter of : M. P. Steel Corporation Vs. Commissioner of
Central Excise, reported at (2015) 7 SCC 58.
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11. Mr. Sourojit Dasgupta, learned Advocate submits that both the fora, NCLT
and this Court are correct and jurisdictional for adjudication of the subject
dispute. In those circumstances, sub-Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act
would be applicable. In support, he has placed reliance upon a decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court In the matter of India Electric Works Vs.
James Mantosh reported at (1971) 1 SCC 24.
12. Learned Advocate then submits that there is a difference between sub-
Section (1) and sub-Section (2) to Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Under
sub-Section (1) both the proceedings shall have the same matter in issue
whereas under sub-Section (2) both the proceedings shall be for the same
relief. Sub-Section (1) specifically provides that the subsequent proceeding
shall be a suit whereas sub-Section (2) provides that the subsequent
proceeding shall be an application. He submits that the provision under sub-
Section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act shall not apply in the present
case, since the sub-sequent proceeding is not an application and both the
proceedings are not for same relief. The proceeding under IBC is primarily
for revival or resolution of a company, whereas in a suit the proceeding is for
recovery of debt.
13. Learned Advocate has relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
In the matter of: Sesh Nath Singh vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli reported
at (2021) 7 SCC 313 to submit that proceeding under IBC is ultimately for
recovery of debt, however, it cannot be denied that primary object of IBC is
not recovery of money but only for resolution of debt of the debtor.
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14. Mr. Dasgupta then submits that in the present case what is required to be
seen is whether the proceeding before NCLT and this Court relates the same
matter in issue.
15. Mr. Dasgupta then submits that the application filed before NCLT was based
upon the self-same fiscal claim which is the subject-matter in the instant
suit. The sole issue will be whether the defendant is a defaulter and liable to
pay the plaintiff. Therefore, the matter in issue of the proceeding before
NCLT under Section 9 of IBC and the instant suit are same and therefore the
provision under sub-Section (1) to Section 14 of the Limitation Act shall
apply.
16. To bring the distinction between the two sub-Sections, Mr. Dasgupta has
relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court In the matter of:
HPCL Bio-Fuels Vs. Shahaji Bhandudas Bhad reported at 2024 SCC
Online SC 3190. Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly laid down this scope and
effect of two sub-Sections under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, in the
context of IBC. In that case, the prior proceeding was before NCLT whereas
the sub-sequent proceeding was for appointment of an arbitrator before a
civil court, which attracted Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act. Reliefs in the
said two proceedings were different. For such reason, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court refused to extend the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act in that
case. In the present case, the subsequent proceeding in the instant suit
where the matter in issue is same with that of the previous proceeding filed
before NCLT under Section 9 of IBC.
17. Mr. Dasgupta, learned Advocate then placed reliance on a further judgment
of Delhi High Court In the matter of: Seitz Gmbh Vs. Simran
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Technologies reported at 2025 SCC Online Del 2403. In the said case,
in a factually similar circumstance benefit of sub-Section 14 of the
Limitation Act was granted to the plaintiff.
18. Learned Advocate Mr. Sourojit Dasgupta for the plaintiff submits that the
plaintiff has filed the suit within the limitation period of 3 years from the
date when the cause of action arose on 29th October 2019, if the period from
23rd July 2020 to 10th September 2023 is excluded as per Section 14 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. It is further submitted that the period from 20th
September 2024 till 12th December 2024 is liable to be excluded due to the
mediation proceeding initiated by the plaintiff. During the total period from
29th October 2019 till filing of the suit on 15th December 2025, there has
been a delay of about 982 days.
19. Unless the said delay is condoned and the instant plaint is accepted to be
filed within the period of limitation, the plaintiff shall be non-suited without
having any fault or latches on its part and the plaintiff shall suffer
irreparable loss, prejudice and injury.
20. The plaint should be accepted by applying Section 14 (1) of the Limitation
Act.
Decision :
21. The core issue needs to be decided is whether the provisions laid down
under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply in the facts and
circumstance of this case where the previous proceeding was filed under
Section 9 of IBC and the sub-sequent proceeding is the instant civil suit.
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22. For convenience Section 14 of the Limitation Act provides for exclusion of
time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction and is reproduced
below:-
“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court
without jurisdiction:-
(1) In computing the period of limitation for any
suit the time during which the plaintiff has been
prosecuting with due diligence another civil
proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of
appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be
excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same
matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a
court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other
cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any
application, the time during which the applicant has
been prosecuting with due diligence another civil
proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of
appeal or revision, against the same party for the
same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding
is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from
defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature,
is unable to entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2
of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5
of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply
in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission
granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order,
where such permission is granted on the ground that
the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the
jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like
nature.
Explanation–For the purposes of this section,–
(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil
proceeding was pending, the day on which that
proceeding was instituted and the day on which it
ended shall both be counted;
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(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal
shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action
shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with
defect of jurisdiction.”
23. The above provision of the Limitation Act provides for exclusion of time of
proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction. Therefore, the first test
whether the party seeking benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act had
proceeded bona fide in Court without jurisdiction.
24. Under Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, in computing the period of
limitation for a suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting
with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first
instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded,
where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and the proceeds in
good faith which, for defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature, is
unable to entertain it. Thus, the tests require to be examined for applicability
of Section 14(1) should be :-
a) The subsequent proceeding must be a suit;
b) Both the previous and sub-sequent proceeding must be civil
proceeding;
c) Both the previous and sub-sequent proceeding must be between the
same parties;
d) The previous and sub-sequent proceeding must have the same matter
in issue;
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e) The previous proceeding must have failed owing to defect of
jurisdiction of previous Court or any other cause of like nature;
f) The previous proceeding must have been prosecuted in good faith
and with due diligence and
g) Both the previous and the sub-sequent proceeding must be before a
Court.
25. Sub-Section (2) to Section 14 under the similar circumstance and
stipulation, as stipulated under Sub-Section (1) to Section 14, relates to
application and not a suit. The another difference in expression that under
sub-Section (1), the sub-sequent proceeding being the suit must relate to
the same matter in issue whereas under sub-Section (2) it is the same
relief between the same parties. However, in the facts of the instant case,
since the sub-sequent proceeding is a civil suit, this Court is not required to
discuss and interpret sub-Section (2) to Section 14 of the Limitation Act
extensively and in detail. The previous proceeding in the instant case is
proceeding initiated under Section 9 of IBC which was dismissed by
jurisdictional NCLT vide order dated September 10, 2023 with the
observation already quoted above and the ground of dismissal of the IBC
proceeding was a pre-existing dispute having been existed between the
parties.
26. While enacting IBC the legislature in its wisdom has provided that an
application for initiation of Insolvency Resolution Process by an operational
creditor should be in accordance with provision laid down under Section 9 of
IBC. Section 9 (5) (1) (d) of IBC, provides that the jurisdictional adjudicating
authority is obliged and it shall reject the application by an operational
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creditor within the time frame stipulated, if notice of dispute has been
received by the operational creditor and there is no record of dispute in the
information utility. Thus, it is a time bound obligation caste upon the
adjudicating authority under IBC.
27. Limitation Act has been enacted to consolidate and amend the Law of
Limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes related thereto.
Limitation Act applies to ‘suits and other proceedings and for purposes
connected therewith’, as would be evident from the preamble of this statute.
The expression other proceedings are necessarily proceedings arising out of
and/or related to suit. The law is well settled that when under a specific
statute, a specific provision for period of limitation is mentioned, in that case
the period of limitation for a proceeding under that statute should be
governed by the provisions contained in that statute. However, various
statutes have adapted and borrowed the provisions of Limitation Act by
incorporation or reference, either in its entirety or to a limited extent, for
these such borrowed provision would apply to any proceeding which is
initiated under such statute.
28. On a plain reading of IBC it appears and is evident that the law framers was
not intended to give a new lease of life to debts which were already time
barred. Section 238-A of IBC inter alia provides that the provisions of the
Limitation Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceeding or
appeal before the adjudicating authority and other relevant for a mentioned
thereunder. The expression used under the said provision of IBC is
significant. It says that the provisions of the Limitation
Act shall apply to the proceedings, as far as may be. Section 238-A of IBC
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imposes an overriding effect to IBC, notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law, for the time being in force, or any
instrument having effect, by virtue of any such law. There is no specific
period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 for an
application filed under IBC. Consequently Article 137 of the Limitation Act
applies. It is also noteworthy and significant that IBC does not excluded the
application of Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings under IBC, but shall be
applicable as far as may be to extent feasible.
29. Section 14 of the Limitation Act is to be read as a whole and in a liberal
manner, as far as possible, to advance the cause of justice. A conjoint,
meaningful and harmonious reading of the three sub-Sections read with the
explanations under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, this Court is of
the firm and considered view that an applicant who has prosecuted another
civil proceeding, which is a previous one, with due diligence, before a forum
which is unable to entertain the same on account of defect of jurisdiction or
any other cause of like nature, is entitled to exclusion of the time during
which the applicant had been prosecuting such previous proceeding, in
computing the period of Limitation. The substantive provisions of sub-
Sections (1), (2)and(3) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act do not provide that
Section 14 can only be invoked on termination of previous proceeding,
prosecuted in good faith. The explanation provided in a statute under a
particular Section must be read so as to harmonise with and remove
ambiguity, if any, in the main Section embodied under the statute. The
explanation should not be construed or understood to widen the scope and
ambit of the main Section. Neither an explanation to a Section can be
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understood and construed to be in contrary to the provision laid down under
the main Section or as substantive provision.
30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court In the matter of: Sesh Nath Singh (Supra)
had observed as under quote:-
“79. In our considered view, Explanation (a) cannot be
construed in a narrow pedantic manner to mean that
Section 14 can never be invoked until and unless the earlier
proceedings have actually been terminated for want of
jurisdiction or other cause of such nature. Explanation (a),
which is clarificatory, only restricts the period of exclusion
to the period between the date of initiation and the date of
termination. An applicant cannot claim any further
exclusion.
80. To cite an example, if a party were to file a suit in a
wrong forum, to enforce payment of money secured by a
mortgage or charge upon immovable property, for which the
prescribed period of limitation is twelve years, after expiry
of three years from the date of accrual of the right to sue,
and then file an application under Section 7 IBC after
dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction, that
application under Section 7 IBC would be time-barred since
such party would not be entitled to exclusion of any period
of time beyond the date of institution and date of
termination of the earlier proceeding. If after exclusion of
the time between the initiation and termination of the
proceedings instituted bona fide and in good faith and
prosecuted with due diligence, an application was still
beyond three years, Section 14 would not help save
limitation.
81. To cite another example, if civil proceedings were
initiated in a wrong forum in good faith and prosecuted
with due diligence, but after the proceedings ended, time
was wasted by making frivolous, meritless applications, the
applicant would only be entitled to exclusion of time from
the date of initiation till the end of the proceedings initiated
in good faith and bona fide and pursued diligently, and no
more. The applicant would not be entitled to exclusion of
any further time spent in pursuing frivolous further
proceedings, or otherwise.
82. To sum up, Section 14 excludes the time spent in
proceeding in a wrong forum, which is unable to entertain
the proceedings for want of jurisdiction, or other such
cause. Where such proceedings have ended, the outer limit
to claim exclusion under Section 14 would be the date on
which the proceedings ended.”
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31. The important expression used under sub-Section (1) to Section 14
of the Limitation Act is “from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a
like nature.” The law is well-settled that Section 14 of the Limitation Act
must receive liberal interpretation. Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide
in its application. The same cannot be restricted only for application two
cases of defect of jurisdiction but the same is also applicable two cases
where the previous proceeding has failed on account of other cause of like
nature. Therefore, even if there may not be any defect of jurisdiction but the
previous proceeding may fail without adjudicating its merits but on any
other reasons for other causes of like nature. On a meaningful reading of
the said expression in the light of the letters and spirit of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act, this Court is also of the firm and considered view that, such
expression has been used not only to cover the jurisdictional defects but also
any other deficiency which operates as a jurisdictional bar for the
Adjudicating Authority/Court/Tribunal from entertaining or accepting the
previous proceeding without going into the merit of such proceeding.
Therefore, in the order of dismissal of NCLT dismissing the Section 9
proceeding filed under IBC dated September 10, 2023, when shows that
the dismissal was at the threshold on the ground of pre-existing dispute,
which is a jurisdictional bar under the relevant statute, IBC, to entertain the
proceeding, such dismissal was not on merit and should be construed within
the meaning and expression ‘other cause of like nature’ used under sub-
Section (1) to Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court In the matter of: M. P. Steel
Corporation (Supra) had observed as under:-
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“50. Section 14 has been interpreted by this Court
extremely liberally inasmuch as it is a provision which
furthers the cause of justice. Thus, in Union of India v. West
Coast Paper Mills Ltd.32, this Court held: (SCC p. 464, para
14)
“14…. In the submission of the learned Senior
Counsel, filing of civil writ petition claiming money relief
cannot be said to be a proceeding instituted in good faith
and secondly, dismissal of writ petition on the ground that
it was not an appropriate remedy for seeking money relief
cannot be said to be ‘defect of jurisdiction or other cause of
a like nature’ within the meaning of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act. It is true that the writ petition was not
dismissed by the High Court on the ground of defect of
jurisdiction. However, Section 14 of the Limitation Act is
wide in its application, inasmuch as it is not confined in its
applicability only to cases of defect of jurisdiction but it is
applicable also to cases where the prior proceedings have
failed on account of other causes of like nature. The
expression ‘other cause of like nature’ came up for the
consideration of this Court in Roshanlal Kuthalia v. R.B.
Mohan Singh Oberoi and it was held that Section 14 of the
Limitation Act is wide enough to cover such cases where the
defects are not merely jurisdictional strictly so called but
others more or less neighbours to such deficiencies. Any
circumstance, legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment
or consideration by the court of the dispute on the merits
comes within the scope of the section and a liberal touch
must inform the interpretation of the Limitation Act which
deprives the remedy of one who has a right.”
51. Similarly, in India Electric Works Lid. v. James
Mantosh, this Court held: (SCC pp. 28-29, para 7) “7. It is
well settled that although all questions of limitation must be
decided by the provisions of the Act and the courts cannot
travel beyond them the words ‘or other cause of a like
nature’ must be construed liberally. Some clue is furnished
with regard to the intention of the legislature by
Explanation III in Section 14(2). Before the enactment of the
Act in 1908, there was a conflict amongst the High Courts
on the question whether misjoinder and non-joinder were
defects which were covered by the words ‘or other cause of
a like nature’. It was to set at rest this conflict that
Explanation III was added. An extended meaning was thus
given to these words. Strictly speaking misjoinder or non-
joinder of parties could hardly be regarded as a defect of
jurisdiction or something similar or analogous to it.”
52. As has been already noticed, Sarathy case has also
held that the court referred to in Section 14 would include a
quasi-judicial tribunal. There appears to be no reason for
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limiting the reach of the expression “prosecuting with due
diligence” to institution of a proceeding alone and not to the
date on which the cause of action for such proceeding might
arise in the case of appellate or revisional proceedings from
original proceedings which prove to be abortive.
Explanation (a) to Section 14 was only meant to clarify that
the day on which a proceeding is instituted and the day on
which it ends are also to be counted for the purposes of
Section 14. This does not lead to the conclusion that the
period from the cause of action to the institution of such
proceeding should be left out. In fact, as has been noticed
above, the Explanation expands the scope of Section 14 by
liberalising it. Thus, under Explanation (b) a person
resisting an appeal is also deemed to be prosecuting a
proceeding. But for Explanation (b), on a literal reading of
Section 14, if a person has won in the first round of
litigation and an appeal is filed by his opponent, the period
of such appeal would not be liable to be excluded under the
section, leading to an absurd result. That is why a plaintiff
or an applicant resisting an appeal filed by a defendant
shall also be deemed to prosecute a proceeding so that the
time taken in the appeal can also be the subject-matter of
exclusion under Section 14. Equally, Explanation (c) which
deems misjoinder of parties or a cause of action to be a
cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction expands
the scope of the section. We have already noticed that the
India Electric Works Ltd. judgment has held that strictly
speaking misjoinder of parties or of causes of action can
hardly be regarded as a defect of jurisdiction or something
similar to it. Therefore properly construed, Explanation (a)
also confers a benefit and does not by a side wind seek to
take away any other benefit that a purposive reading of
Section 14 might give. We, therefore, agree with the
decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that the period
from the cause of action till the institution of appellate or
revisional proceedings from original proceedings which
prove to be abortive are also liable to exclusion under the
section. The view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is too
broadly stated. The period prior to institution of the
initiation of any abortive proceeding cannot be excluded for
the simple reason that Section 14 does not enable a litigant
to get a benefit beyond what is contemplated by the section
that is to put the litigant in the same position as if the
abortive proceeding had never taken place.”
33. The law is also settled that the expression Court used in Section 14(1)
of the Limitation Act includes Tribunals, with its extended meaning, as held
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and interpreted in plethora of judgments of various Courts including the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, as already referred to above. One significant test, as
enumerated under Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, is that the subsequent
proceeding, the suit, must relate to the same matter in issue with that of the
previous proceeding.
34. On a meaningful and conjoint reading of Section 8 and 9 of IBC, it
appears to this Court that the only pre-condition for a proceeding under
Section 9 of IBC is occurrence of default. On a meaningful reading of the
statements made in the instant plaint, it appears to this Court that the
plaintiff seeks to sue the defendants claiming a money decree on occurrence
of default. Thus, the core issue in the instant suit would be whether there
has been any occurrence of default on the part of the defendants in
paying off the dues of the plaintiff, as claimed in the plaint. The issue
in the instant suit is therefore the same matter in issue in the previously
instituted proceeding under Section 9 of IBC.
35. In the matter of: HPCL Bio-Fuels Limited (supra) the judgment was
rendered under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act scenario, where the
subsequent proceeding was an application filed under Section 11 of the
Arbitration Act. The reliefs claimed under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act
were not same as that of the previous proceeding filed under Section 9 of
IBC. Hence, the ratio laid down in the said judgment would not apply in the
facts and circumstances of this case.
36. In as much as, the record shows that since the right accrued in favour
of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was diligent and had filed the said Section 9
proceeding before the jurisdictional NCLT. The said previous proceeding was
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dismissed by the jurisdictional NCLT on the jurisdictional ground, as already
discussed above. This Court finds that there was neither any lack of
diligence nor was any negligence on the part of the plaintiff in pursuing its
remedy, at any point of time. Immediately after the order of dismissal
passed by the NCLT, the plaintiff had instituted the instant suit within a
span of less than three months.
37. In view of the foregoing reasons and discussions, this Court holds that
the instant plaint has successfully qualified the tests laid down under sub-
Section (1) to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The relevant period
during which the said proceeding under Section 9 of IBC was pending stands
excluded in aid of institution of the instant civil suit.
38. Resultantly, the instant plaint being C.S. (COM) 171/2025 stands
admitted, subject to scrutiny by the department.
(Aniruddha Roy, J.)
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